A new normative theory (also a PhD thesis)

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Fooloso4
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Joined: February 28th, 2014, 4:50 pm

Re: A new normative theory (also a PhD thesis)

Post by Fooloso4 »

GE Morton:
I make no such asumption. You seem to think that autonomy (as above defined) is antithetical to being a "social animal."
The idea that we are self-sufficient beings who live in groups as a matter of utility is contrary to the view that we are social animals.
But we are not eusocial animals …
Right.
We do not chose into which society we'll be born, but we choose the one in which we'll remain.
Right, but this is quite different than the question of whether we choose to live in society or outside of it.
Most of us do, of course, choose to remain in a social setting of some sort, because there are great advantages to doing so.
My point is that such a utilitarian view of social relations is impoverished, both with regard to what it means to be human and what it means to live in society.

Your claim there --- your implicit theory --- seems to be that one has an obligation to promote the good of others because doing so promotes one's own good.
Aristotle’s ethics, unlike modern ethical theories, is not based on obligation but rather on the observation that we all seek what is good and ethics is about how best to achieve that good. (See below)

It is perhaps true that a given view or norm is more common among certain populations than in other populations, but that is merely a statistical property of that group, from which nothing can be inferred about the views of any particular person.
The simple fact of the matter is that if you were born in Mongolia or New Guinea a thousand years ago you would not think and believe as you do and the particular people around you would not think and believe as 21st century westerner do.
Though a given belief or idea may spring from or incorporate prior beliefs and ideas, it may well be novel, even revolutionary …
Yes, there are revolutionary thinkers, some say that this is the mark of a true philosopher, but a new idea still has continuity and context within a larger framework of ideas.
Nor does anyone become "indebted to society" because he has learned from or been influenced by some of its members. Those members imparted their thoughts and wisdom freely …
Many great thinkers see themselves as benefactors. It is not a matter of what they owe to others but of what they can give to their society or mankind.
I did not claim that we are completely plastic and do not deny individual differences. All of us are historically situated here and now. If you were born at some other time in some other place you would not hold the beliefs and values you do. If you had not learned about modern liberalism you would probably not be saying what you are saying.

That may be true, but I'm not sure what you think it implies. Please elaborate.
It means that we are not intellectually autonomous, but rather that with few notable exceptions we think within a framework given to us in a language given to us.
Time and place is shorthand for the world in which we live and the way in which we see that world. Your worldview and mine differ to some extent but they fall within the range of contemporary western views. Your personal history occurs within the larger context of our shared history. It has nothing to do with “textbook” accounts of history.

Same question.
Same answer. We are not autonomous beings but members of a society that shapes who we are. Here and now matters, where ever and whenever that is for a person.
That sounds contradictory. How can there be "no focus on the individual," yet, "the character of Socrates interlocutors [be] of central importance"?
I was contrasting modern western philosophy and the Platonic dialogue. Individual character was of central importance for Plato, but in modern thought the individual is conceived of as a rational being and thus to that extent no different than other rational beings.
That while the Greeks did not ponder the relationship of the individual to his society …
They did, but as members of rather than in distinction from society.
Methinks you need to think that through. How do you decide what is beneficial, other than by observing what others regard as beneficial?
Your statement is ironic. It is all about thinking it through. Fundamental to Aristotle’s ethics is the question of the good life. It is a question that requires deliberation, and for Plato and Aristotle this meant both self-reflection and reasoned speech, that is, philosophical discussion. Observing what others regard as beneficial is certainly part of that, but this means critical examination.
And we certainly can separate value from human life; we do so routinely --- when we perform abortions, send soldiers to war, remove life support from vegetative patients, kill someone in self-defense, execute murderers, commit suicide. In all those cases we decide that some human's life is of less value than some other end.
This is not the sense in which I meant not separating value from human life. What I meant was that valuing is an essential part of our lives. The question of the value of a particular life in particular circumstances falls within the context of value.
Value statements which do not specify a valuer, including statements imputing value to human life (or more concretely, to particular human lives) are non-cognitive.
A statement about what one values is not the same as the statement that we all are valuers. We are not purely rational beings, how we think and what we think are inextricably tied to what we value.
The reason there is a "failure to properly understand what the common good is" is that there is no such thing.
That is your opinion. It is not the opinion of the authors of the U.S. Constitution. As the preamble states, the union was formed for the express purpose of promoting the “general welfare”. The founders recognized that the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, that is, the values of liberalism, could not be achieved for more than a privileged few without regard for the general welfare. It is a view shared by most political philosophers.
GE Morton
Posts: 4696
Joined: February 1st, 2017, 1:06 am

Re: A new normative theory (also a PhD thesis)

Post by GE Morton »

Fooloso4 wrote:
The idea that we are self-sufficient beings who live in groups as a matter of utility is contrary to the view that we are social animals.
Well, prima facie it is not contrary. Two propositions are contraries when both cannot be true. The propositions, "Humans are social animals," and, "Humans associate for pragmatic/utilitarian reasons" may both be true.

I suspect you argue otherwise because you believe that humans are "instinctively" social; that they are naturally programmed, or at least predisposed, to group together, to form bonds with others of their species. So while the second statement above is not contrary to the first, it is false (in your view). It gives a wrong reason for human sociality.

Am I guessing correctly here?

If you look again at my previous post outlining the "organic fallacy" (#31) you'll see that I agree with you. There, I said,

"All these laments of lost innocence and alienation are atavisms, psychic echoes of our tribal heritage, the social form honed over the course of our 3 million year primate history. All of our fellow primates still practice that form, and until the rise of civilization, so did all humans. It would be surprising were our brains not adapted to that social form. They have evolved synchronously with that form, and thus may be expected to function optimally in that environment, in many ways. So it is not surprising that we miss that form, or that we long to regain it. We are ducks out of water, trying to find our way back to the pond . . . We remain 'wired' for tribal life."

Yes, we are "instinctively." or "naturally," social. My argument has not been that we are social for pragmatic reasons, but that we (most of us) remain in large civilized societies for pragmatic reasons. The argument has been that our social "instincts" become inapplicable and unworkable when we expect that larger group to offer the intimacy and unity of a tribal group, and that they lead us to oppressive and destructive behaviors.

Civilized societies not only allow, but facilitate, the "instinctive" sociality you wish to defend. Indeed, they offer many more opportunities to indulge that "instinct" than any tribal setting. They offer millions of candidates for mates, friends, fellow travelers along some chosen path. It is only when we expect --- or demand --- that society "as a whole" behave like a tribe, a giant commune, or a "big happy family," that nastiness ensues. Civilized societies do not have that structure. They are randomly-assembled groups of unrelated, independent, autonomous individuals and kinship groups who happen, by accident of birth, to occupy a common territory. They have no common interests or goals, no natural bonds with one another or any a priori obligations to one another.

I hope this clarifies the argument.
Aristotle’s ethics, unlike modern ethical theories, is not based on obligation but rather on the observation that we all seek what is good and ethics is about how best to achieve that good. (See below)
Yes. Aristotle (and many others) assumed that at least some things are inherently, or "objectively," good. Those propositions are non-cognitive.
The simple fact of the matter is that if you were born in Mongolia or New Guinea a thousand years ago you would not think and believe as you do and the particular people around you would not think and believe as 21st century westerner do.
Well, that's essentially what you said before. I'm still unclear as to the relevance you think it has to these arguments, or how it bears on their validity. Since 11th century Mongolians and New Guineans did not live in civilized societies the issues currently in dispute would not have arisen.
That while the Greeks did not ponder the relationship of the individual to his society …
They did, but as members of rather than in distinction from society.
Those two are not incompatible or contraries. Every member of every group is distinct from the group (in fact, if the members were not distinct we could not define the group, except generically, or specify its cardinality). I know of no philosopher, liberal or otherwise --- not even the anarchists --- who denies he is a member of society.

It might be worthwhile to point out that there are two kinds of memberships in groups (of people). One may become a member of a group by definition, or by enlistment. We can define groups at will: "All bald-headed males now alive in N. America over the age of 40." I've just defined a group. Everyone who satisfies that criterion is a member of it. One may also become a member of a group by enlistment --- by approaching another person or persons with whom one wishes to associate, and being accepted by them. Typically, membership by enlistment is conditional; one may be required to agree to to certain conditions before he is accepted into the group, which are spelled out in a membership application. By signing that application the new member takes on certain obligations to other members of the group. The bald-headed males in my defined group, on the other hand, incur no obligations by their membership in that group (most of them won't even know they're members of it).

The US Constitution states, "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." What type of membership is that, and what obligations does it impose?
Methinks you need to think that through. How do you decide what is beneficial, other than by observing what others regard as beneficial?
Your statement is ironic. It is all about thinking it through. Fundamental to Aristotle’s ethics is the question of the good life. It is a question that requires deliberation, and for Plato and Aristotle this meant both self-reflection and reasoned speech, that is, philosophical discussion. Observing what others regard as beneficial is certainly part of that, but this means critical examination.
That doesn't answer the question. The question, "How do you decide whether X is or is not beneficial?" is not answered with, "by examination and critical reflection." That is a process for arriving at an answer (and a given), not the answer itself. If observing what others regard as beneficial is only part of the answer, what are the other parts? My own answer is, "X is benefical if P considers it beneficial, as evidenced by his efforts to secure X." I can only claim that X is not beneficial to P if I know, based on other observations, that P considers Y more beneficial than X and that pursuing X will foreclose securing Y (which P may not realize).

The thrust, of course, is that what is beneficial is agent-dependent --- it depends upon the interests and goals of the agent, and those differ from agent to agent. No amount of critical reflection will tell me anything except what is beneficial to me, and perhaps beneficial to certain others whom I know well enough to know what are their goals and interests.
And we certainly can separate value from human life; we do so routinely --- when we perform abortions, send soldiers to war, remove life support from vegetative patients, kill someone in self-defense, execute murderers, commit suicide. In all those cases we decide that some human's life is of less value than some other end.
This is not the sense in which I meant not separating value from human life. What I meant was that valuing is an essential part of our lives.
Of course, and I never claimed otherwise. But perhaps I was a bit unclear. The question was whether ethics should be separated from value (axiology). That doesn't mean ethics pays no heed to values. It is all about values; its aim is to assure that each agent can pursue that which he values to the extent of his abilities. But it cannot presume or stipulate values, since those are for each agent to define for himself.
A statement about what one values is not the same as the statement that we all are valuers. We are not purely rational beings, how we think and what we think are inextricably tied to what we value.

I agree. Indeed, values --- at least the things we count as "end goods," rather than "means goods" --- are non-rational. No one chooses, say, to prefer chocolate ice cream to vanilla, Beethoven to Mozart, to be more attracted to females than males, or to science than art. We don't choose those interests and preferences; we just have them.


(Nested quote removed.)
You can get "common goods" if you speak generally enough. For example, being free to pursue whatever one regards as good will surely be regarded as itself a good by everyone (in fact, everyone who values anything else must value that freedom, at least for themselves, as a logical matter). Hence it is a common good. There are other goods which are close to being universal. For example, very few people wish to be invaded and occupied by foreign armies (though there are some who wouldn't object), or to be preyed upon by criminals. The US Constitution enumerates the powers the federal government may exercise, most of which relate either to securing those near-universal goods or suppling a few other "public goods" (goods which are non-rivalrous and non-excludable and therefore can only be provided by government). For Madison, Jefferson, et al "promoting the general welfare" consisted in supplying those goods:

"To lay taxes to provide for the general welfare of the United States, that is to say, “to lay taxes for the purpose of providing for the general welfare.” For the laying of taxes is the power, and the general welfare the purpose for which the power is to be exercised. They are not to lay taxes ad libitum for any purpose they please; but only to pay the debts or provide for the welfare of the Union. In like manner, they are not to do anything they please to provide for the general welfare, but only to lay taxes for that purpose. To consider the latter phrase, not as describing the purpose of the first, but as giving a distinct and independent power to do any act they please, which might be for the good of the Union, would render all the preceding and subsequent enumerations of power completely useless."
---Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of a National Bank (1791).

"If Congress can do whatever in their discretion can be done by money, and will promote the general welfare, the Government is no longer a limited one possessing enumerated powers, but an indefinite one subject to particular exceptions. It is to be remarked that the phrase out of which this doctrine is elaborated, is copied from the old articles of Confederation, where it was always understood as nothing more than a general caption to the specified powers."
---James Madison, Letter to Edmund Pendleton (1792)
Gertie
Posts: 2181
Joined: January 7th, 2015, 7:09 am

Re: A new normative theory (also a PhD thesis)

Post by Gertie »

GE

I've pointed out what I see as serious flaws in your claim to have an Objective Moral Theory, and while you talk a good game I don't find your answers persuasive. A big problem for me is how you craft your language and arguments to serve your ends, then present it as a rational process. If you'd called your formulation GE's Preference for Individualism, Autonomy and Private Ownership, I'd say fair enough. But you call it an Objective Moral Theory. And it ain't.

You don't believe in objective morality yourself. And you can't even make an objective rules based case for using a hammer to hit a nail, nevermind moral rules. But still you call it an 'Objective Moral Theory', lending your preferences a sheen of academic rigour, rationality, objectivity and inarguable moral superiority. But your justifications for using the term 'Morality' is ad hoc, and 'Objective' is contrived. Similarly with your term 'Equal Moral Agents', you're co-opting the language of equality to actually mean 'Every Person For Themselves', within a system which takes no account of privilege or disadvantage in their 'original position', and is primed to promote unequal outcomes - which your system does nothing to mitigate. The morality of Might is Right. And then you throw in Rights, or rather two Rights only, the individual's Right to do what you want, and then... surprise surprise - the Right to own Property. It's just Libertarianism, no more no less.

All you've persuaded me of is your personal preference for Libertarianism as an organisational system for governing interactions between people.


The second major problem is that it results in some pretty 'odd' outcomes. By design. Lets contrast two scenarios using your preferred moral formulation.

A) My desire for chocolate cake is morally good, anyone who prevents me from getting chocolate cake is morally evil.

This is a silly, unhealthy way to think about about chocolate cake, and a silly, dangerously unhealthy way to think about other people.


2) If I see a non-swimmer drowning in a pond, it would be morally wrong to hold her head under, because I'd be denying her right to her life. But there's no moral obligation to help her, throw her a line. If I walk past the rope and her with a shrug, that's morally neutral.

That's because the welfare of anyone but myself is morally irrelevant to me, by design, unless they can serve my desires. In fact if I desire to help her, it's morally good to help her. If I desire not to help her, it's morally good not to help her. Objective? Moral?


That's your moral theory in practice. Other people are just means to my ends, their welfare is irrelevant. If a person acts that way we call them a psychopath, you build a moral theory around it. It might be the way many western societies are heading right now, but it's got nothing to do with objectivity, or anything worth the name morality.
GE Morton
Posts: 4696
Joined: February 1st, 2017, 1:06 am

Re: A new normative theory (also a PhD thesis)

Post by GE Morton »

Gertie wrote:
You don't believe in objective morality yourself. And you can't even make an objective rules based case for using a hammer to hit a nail, nevermind moral rules.
The only explanation I can think of for your comment there is that we continue to have some differing understandings of what "objective" means. As I said, I understand "objective" and "subjective" to be properties of propositions. A proposition is objective if it has public truth conditions, i.e., anyone can ascertain its truth by making the relevant observations (or if the proposition is analytic, by analyzing the proof). "One ought to buy a hammer if one wishes to drive a nail" means, "A hammer is the best (most effective, efficient) tool for driving nails*." This is "ought" in the intrumental sense. That proposition is objective --- using a hammer either is or is not the most effective way of driving nails, and we can determine whether it is or is not empirically, by trial-and-error. The various complications you mentioned earlier don't change that --- whether or not you can afford a hammer is irrelevant to the truth/falsity of the proposition, "One ought to use a hammer if one wishes to drive nails."

* Unless one must drive hundreds of nails. Then one "ought" to buy a pneumatic nail gun.

The rules of a sound public morality are objective in the same instrumental sense --- they either are, or are not, the optimum rules for attaining the stated aim: To maximize good and minimize evil for all agents in a moral field.
But your justifications for using the term 'Morality' is ad hoc, and 'Objective' is contrived.

I suppose you see it as ad hoc because you assume there is (as I suggested earlier) some unique "moral" sense of "ought" that is distinct from the instrumental sense. As long as we assume that, we will continue to pointlessly debate a slew of non-cognitive propositions about what one "ought" to do in various scenarios --- propositions which have no agreed upon truth conditions and are therefore without determinable truth values. But perhaps you can spell out what you understand by "objective" and "moral."

Many people, including philosophers, assume that the job of moral philosophy is to rationalize some pre-existing moral sentiments or instincts, i.e., to elucidate and validate "moral intuitions." That is otiose question-begging, and an exercise in futility. Intuitions are products of innate dispositions and prior conditioning, both of which are idiosyncratic; they vary wildly from person to person. A rational, philosophical, moral theory sets those aside, a la Descartes, poses the questions, What is the aim of a moral theory?, What is its scope and context?, and then proceeds in a systematic way to develop some rules.

I've said that the scope and context of a theory of public morality is a plurality of moral agents interacting in a moral field (a social setting). The aim of the theory is to devise rules for those interactions which permit all agents in the field to maximize good and minimize evils (all of which are agent-defined and agent-relative). A given set of rules either is or is not the optimum set for achieving the stated goal, and whether it is or not is an objective matter, just as is whether a hammer is the best tool for driving nails.

If you have any disagreements with this, please spell them out.

There is, BTW, no way of arguing for the goal as I've given it, i.e., maximizing goods and evils for all agents in a moral field. One either takes that a worthy goal, and one relevant to common understandings about the meaning of "morality," or one does not. Someone, for example, who takes "moral" to mean, "In accordance with the will of God," will have no use for this theory.
Similarly with your term 'Equal Moral Agents', you're co-opting the language of equality to actually mean 'Every Person For Themselves', within a system which takes no account of privilege or disadvantage in their 'original position', and is primed to promote unequal outcomes - which your system does nothing to mitigate.
You're evading the argument there, Gertie. You really have to rebut an argument as it's stated, not by "translating" it into different terms, or assuming it means something other than what is says. I gave the definition of "equal agency" --- it means that all agents in the moral field are of equal status and equally subject to the rules. That is hardly a "co-opting of the language of equality." On the contrary, it is the precise sense of "equality" understood throughout the liberal tradition, from Hobbes and Locke onward. It has always meant "equal in the eyes of God (we are all created "in His image")." It is the view assumed in the US Declaration of Independence (". . . all men are created equal, and endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights . . ."). It is also the view expressed in the US Constitution, which provides that all citizens have one vote and are entitled to "equal protection of the law."

The expansion of "equality" to embrace social/material equality is a 19th-century corruption of the "language of equality." It's advocates are the ones doing the "co-opting," not me.

As with the goal of the theory, no argument can be given for the "Equal Agency" postulate. One either accepts it or not. Many will not accept it. Egoists, racists, chauvinists, divine-right monarchists, etc., will not accept it. All of those folks assume that "some animals are more equal than others," and that some people's goals and interests are subordinate to those of others. But if you do accept the Equal Agency postulate you can't consistently advocate material equality as a goal of a public morality. The two are incompatible (but nothing prevents an agent from acting to mitigate material inequalities pursuant to some private morality he's adopted).
And then you throw in Rights, or rather two Rights only, the individual's Right to do what you want, and then... surprise surprise - the Right to own Property.
Why will you not address the arguments as presented? Yes, there are two basic rights (actually, two classes of rights) --- rights to act (liberty rights) in any way that does not injure others, and rights to things (goods) one has acquired without injuring others (property rights). I can easily show how those rights follow from the aim of the theory (to maximize goods and minimize evils for all agents). If you suggest there are other rights ("moral" rights, not legal rights) not embraced in those two categories, you need to show how they follow from the stated aim of the theory (but of course, as mentioned above, you can reject that aim and substitute some other).
The second major problem is that it results in some pretty 'odd' outcomes. By design. Lets contrast two scenarios using your preferred moral formulation.

A) My desire for chocolate cake is morally good, anyone who prevents me from getting chocolate cake is morally evil.

This is a silly, unhealthy way to think about about chocolate cake, and a silly, dangerously unhealthy way to think about other people.

2) If I see a non-swimmer drowning in a pond, it would be morally wrong to hold her head under, because I'd be denying her right to her life. But there's no moral obligation to help her, throw her a line. If I walk past the rope and her with a shrug, that's morally neutral.
Again, you're ignoring what I actually said. There are no "moral goods." All goods are morally neutral. But if eating chocolate cake contributes to your quality of life, then someone who prevents you, by force or deceit, from doing that is acting immorally (I'm assuming you did not steal the cake or otherwise injure anyone by obtaining or eating it). Do you disagree?

As for the swimmer --- yes there is an obligation to help her. There is a duty to aid. We haven't got to that yet. And nothing I've said so far justifies that conclusion on your part.
Other people are just means to my ends, their welfare is irrelevant. If a person acts that way we call them a psychopath, you build a moral theory around it. It might be the way many western societies are heading right now, but it's got nothing to do with objectivity, or anything worth the name morality.
You're descending to ad hominems Gertie. You can do better.
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