A new normative theory (also a PhD thesis)
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A new normative theory (also a PhD thesis)
To be clear, this is a very short summation of the arguments present in my first thesis chapters, if you would like to read them in more detail, I can link you the chapter itself.
So, let's dive straight in to the arguments:
I take as my starting assumption that morality, if it exists at all, is the way in which persons (by which I mean free, rational, conscious agents) ought to be or act, where ought is understood in a categorical and universal sense. With this assumption in hand, we can begin to ask what that way might be, or to put it another way, what is of moral value, by considering what it is to be a person. As a way in which persons ought to be or act would apply to all potential persons, not merely us as humans, we cannot use contingent facts about ourselves as humans as the basis for moral value. So moral value cannot be grounded in something like happiness, as we can imagine persons that do not experience happiness. What then could be a basis for moral value? We can consider what is shared by all persons in order to come up with possible candidates and what we find is that all persons have free will, so the capacity to make choices, and also understanding, the capacity to understand their choices. This joint capacity for both understanding and making choices, which I will from now on be referring to as freedom, is not only shared by all persons, it is also not shared by anything that is not a person. There are no things which are not persons, free, rational, conscious agents, which can understand choices and make them freely. This capacity is, in a very real way, what it means to be a person, a moral agent. For this reason, this seems to be our best candidate for moral value. Though it is possible there are other candidates and indeed other things that are of moral value, they will not be discussed here as I do not know what they could be.
So, our candidate for moral value is freedom, but freedom over what? As this morality is objective and universal, it is presumably not the case that it makes conflicting recommendations, or made no recommendations at all, in almost all practical situations, which would seem to be the case if all choices were of equal value. However, if the freedom that matters is the freedom to make one's own choices, the choices that relate to those things that belong to the person; their mind, their body and their property, then morality would be functional. Also, there is something conceptually odd about the idea of being free to make someone else's choices for them, against their will. For these reasons we can say that what is of moral value is the freedom of persons over those things which already belong to them; their mind, their body and their property. As a quick note on property, I should say that I have not yet seen a really good justification for how we come to own unowned property in the first place. If it turns out we cannot truly own property, and it is instead just a useful construct, then we can remove it from our list of things that our ours and treat it purely instrumentally.
So, we have our candidate for moral value, but we don't know what form our moral theory should take. To determine this let us first consider whether we ought to be concerned with the actions people perform or the character traits they exhibit. We might well want to be virtue ethicists of a kind, but many of the traits we might want to consider desirable in persons can't be shared by all potential persons, and those that can, such as being free and rational, are already shared by all free, rational agents, so it isn't clear how we could say a person ought to be. So instead we ought to focus on actions, but do we focus on the consequences of our actions or the form our actions take? We may want to be deontologists and say that people ought to only act in certain ways or according to certain maxims. But the problem with this is that maxims are always arbitrarily defined, in that a maxim that says "don't kill" could be made better if it included an exception for when the person you are killing is trying to kill you and you are defending yourself, but it could be made even better by including an exception for cases where killing that person prevents the death of five others who are in morally similar circumstances, and so on and so on until our maxims describe the situation we are in and what to do in it perfectly. This of course leads to the distinction between acting and letting happen, and it isn't clear how we can draw a clear distinction between something that happens because you did something and something that happens because you stood by. Without having a strong way to morally distinguish action from inaction, it seems we ought to be consequentialists.
So, we have a consequentialist theory with the ability of persons to understand and make their own decisions as the measure of moral value. This means that when acting we ought to ensure we do not violate the freedom of others over their own choices, unless we must do so in order to prevent a greater violation of freedom which could not be prevented without at least this much of a violation occurring, and we have some degree of obligation (which I discuss in it's own chapter but won't get into here) to prevent or reduce such violations. What this means in practice is that determining what to do in a moral situation is not a matter of weighing happiness, following strict and unchanging rules or considering what kind of person acts in a certain way, it is a matter of allowing persons to make their own choices. To give a few examples of practical implications:
* Lying can be wrong in some circumstances such as fraud where it denies the person the ability to understand the choice they are making, but it is not wrong in most circumstances.
* Adultery (assuming there aren't any STIs involved) is a personal issue, not a moral one.
* Parents do not have a right to decide what happens to their children, rather they have an obligation to protect their child until it is capable of making its own choices and to act in its best interests when they must make decisions for it in the interim.
* The role of a government is to first protect its people and then to act in their interests especially when making decisions regarding shared property.
* Nothing can ever be offensive enough that we ought to violate the freedom of a person to say it.
Looking forward to reading all the ways in which you disagree with me.
Thanks for your time.
Dan.
Daniel McKay
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- LuckyR
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Re: A new normative theory (also a PhD thesis)
As to your idea that: "Parents do not have a right to decide what happens to their children, rather they have an obligation to protect their child until it is capable of making its own choices and to act in its best interests when they must make decisions for it in the interim." Any parent will tell you that they are dong your green phrase when in practice they are doing what your red phrase denies them.
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Re: A new normative theory (also a PhD thesis)
Spot on.Well, you use freedom as a placeholder for Individual or Personal best interests. On scale of individual interest vs communal interest your premise seems completely on the pole of individualism. That is a perfectly fine opinion, but it is not superior to that of the socialist or the moderate who tries to balance societal interests with individual interests. Many would argue that the moderate choice is superior to either pole.
Research (still pretty new) suggests there are perhaps six or so broad categories of universal human 'moral impulses', across all cultures. Evolved instincts, not objective, and Freedom is one of them. Others include Fairness and Care/Harm, more obviously social. You could pick any, and construct a case, but they're all rooted in evolved impulses.
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Re: A new normative theory (also a PhD thesis)
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Re: A new normative theory (also a PhD thesis)
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Re: A new normative theory (also a PhD thesis)
I have no idea what a "societal interest" is. As far as I can see, the only interests to be found in any society are the interests of its individual members. I know what a communal interest is, but since civilized societies are not communes, I'm not sure how the concept applies here. Can you explain?LuckyR wrote:Well, you use freedom as a placeholder for Individual or Personal best interests. On scale of individual interest vs communal interest your premise seems completely on the pole of individualism. That is a perfectly fine opinion, but it is not superior to that of the socialist or the moderate who tries to balance societal interests with individual interests.
- LuckyR
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Re: A new normative theory (also a PhD thesis)
Isn't it funny? Gertie understands implicitly, yet you are stumped. No surprise considering your red statement. Perhaps words like "society" and "community" are overly vague, I apologize. I meant group vs individual interests. For example it is not in the obvious, simpleminded individual interest for a retired person to pay local taxes for public schools, since their kids are already through the school system. However it is in the group's interest (including the retired person) to have a robust education system in a "democracy" since we all know what happens when an ill informed populace goes to the polls charged up on emotionalism. Thus taxes for schools are not "user fees", they are spread out among the citizenry.GE Morton wrote:I have no idea what a "societal interest" is. As far as I can see, the only interests to be found in any society are the interests of its individual members. I know what a communal interest is, but since civilized societies are not communes, I'm not sure how the concept applies here. Can you explain?LuckyR wrote:Well, you use freedom as a placeholder for Individual or Personal best interests. On scale of individual interest vs communal interest your premise seems completely on the pole of individualism. That is a perfectly fine opinion, but it is not superior to that of the socialist or the moderate who tries to balance societal interests with individual interests.
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Re: A new normative theory (also a PhD thesis)
Those terms are not vague, but we may have differing understandings as to what a society is. I take it to be a group of people (or other creatures) so situated as to be able to interact, and who interact constructively. But it is not, per se, a moral agent or even a sentient creature. It has no interests, goals, desires, etc., not reducible to those of its individual members. I.e., in a society consisting of Tom, Dick, and Harry, Tom, Dick and Harry all have interests. If those interests are removed, there are none left over attaching to the "society" of Tom, Dick, and Harry.LuckyR wrote: Isn't it funny? Perhaps words like "society" and "community" are overly vague, I apologize. I meant group vs individual interests.
So there are no conflicts between "individual and group interests." There can only be conflicts between the interests of the various individual members of a society.
Group names are merely terms of convenience for denoting a number of particular things with a single term. They do not denote ontologically distinct entities.
You seem to be acknowledging the above when you say, " . . . . it is in the group's interest (including the retired person) to have a robust education system . . . " What you are describing there is a short-term v. a long-term interest of an individual. not a "group interest v. an individual interest." So the next question we have to ask is, "How do we determine what are an individual's interests, short- or long term?For example it is not in the obvious, simpleminded individual interest for a retired person to pay local taxes for public schools, since their kids are already through the school system. However it is in the group's interest (including the retired person) to have a robust education system . . . .
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Re: A new normative theory (also a PhD thesis)
LuckyR wrote:Isn't it funny? Gertie understands implicitly, yet you are stumped. No surprise considering your red statement. Perhaps words like "society" and "community" are overly vague, I apologize. I meant group vs individual interests. For example it is not in the obvious, simpleminded individual interest for a retired person to pay local taxes for public schools, since their kids are already through the school system. However it is in the group's interest (including the retired person) to have a robust education system in a "democracy" since we all know what happens when an ill informed populace goes to the polls charged up on emotionalism. Thus taxes for schools are not "user fees", they are spread out among the citizenry.GE Morton wrote: (Nested quote removed.)
I have no idea what a "societal interest" is. As far as I can see, the only interests to be found in any society are the interests of its individual members. I know what a communal interest is, but since civilized societies are not communes, I'm not sure how the concept applies here. Can you explain?
I agree. Here in UK we are still suffering from Thatcher's dogma that there is no such thing as society, only individuals and their families. the result is a disintegrating society where large numbers of people behave and vote like Trump supporters because their lives have been impoverished by the selfish actions of those lucky enough to have the power to act in their own interest. Altruism was denigrated for a long time in evolutionary thinking but in recent years it has been shown to have positive evolutionary value. Membership of a cooperative group enhances individual survival.
- LuckyR
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Re: A new normative theory (also a PhD thesis)
Perhaps I can make the idea that others find easy to understand clearer to you in a numerical example. Let's say there are 100 people in our society. The society offers a tax of $10 to cover fire department coverage. The chance of a fire is 0.1%. The fire department saves the home 100% of the time.GE Morton wrote:Those terms are not vague, but we may have differing understandings as to what a society is. I take it to be a group of people (or other creatures) so situated as to be able to interact, and who interact constructively. But it is not, per se, a moral agent or even a sentient creature. It has no interests, goals, desires, etc., not reducible to those of its individual members. I.e., in a society consisting of Tom, Dick, and Harry, Tom, Dick and Harry all have interests. If those interests are removed, there are none left over attaching to the "society" of Tom, Dick, and Harry.LuckyR wrote: Isn't it funny? Perhaps words like "society" and "community" are overly vague, I apologize. I meant group vs individual interests.
So there are no conflicts between "individual and group interests." There can only be conflicts between the interests of the various individual members of a society.
Group names are merely terms of convenience for denoting a number of particular things with a single term. They do not denote ontologically distinct entities.
You seem to be acknowledging the above when you say, " . . . . it is in the group's interest (including the retired person) to have a robust education system . . . " What you are describing there is a short-term v. a long-term interest of an individual. not a "group interest v. an individual interest." So the next question we have to ask is, "How do we determine what are an individual's interests, short- or long term?For example it is not in the obvious, simpleminded individual interest for a retired person to pay local taxes for public schools, since their kids are already through the school system. However it is in the group's interest (including the retired person) to have a robust education system . . . .
If everyone gets the coverage $1000 is raised. The cost of the fire department is $950 so as long as 95 choose to get the coverage there is a fire department.
If you choose to pay, you lose $10, if at least 94 others also make that choice, you win, you have fire coverage. If less than 94 join you, not only do you lose $10, but there is no fire coverage. If you choose to keep your $10, you don't personally get fire coverage, regardless but if more than 4 others join you no one will have coverage.
Thus your choice impacts many things: your $10, your fire coverage AND whether the group has fire coverage. The last one does not impact your individual interest since if you choose to forgo the tax you definitely won't be covered regardless BUT you will be 20% of the potential cohort of depriving the group having coverage.
So while an individual can make a logical argument to forgo the tax on individual interest grounds, there is a group interest in almost everyone choosing to pay.
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Re: A new normative theory (also a PhD thesis)
Yep, looks like we're heading full steam back into the dominance of that mindset again.Spraticus wrote:LuckyR wrote: (Nested quote removed.)
Isn't it funny? Gertie understands implicitly, yet you are stumped. No surprise considering your red statement. Perhaps words like "society" and "community" are overly vague, I apologize. I meant group vs individual interests. For example it is not in the obvious, simpleminded individual interest for a retired person to pay local taxes for public schools, since their kids are already through the school system. However it is in the group's interest (including the retired person) to have a robust education system in a "democracy" since we all know what happens when an ill informed populace goes to the polls charged up on emotionalism. Thus taxes for schools are not "user fees", they are spread out among the citizenry.
I agree. Here in UK we are still suffering from Thatcher's dogma that there is no such thing as society, only individuals and their families. the result is a disintegrating society where large numbers of people behave and vote like Trump supporters because their lives have been impoverished by the selfish actions of those lucky enough to have the power to act in their own interest. Altruism was denigrated for a long time in evolutionary thinking but in recent years it has been shown to have positive evolutionary value. Membership of a cooperative group enhances individual survival.
And this faux 'objective morality' = what is essentially Libertarianism imo.
It is not only biased and mistaken, it's potentially dangerous. It claims objective moral authority and gives a sheen of academic respectability to Libertarian (freedom and private ownership based) values, while ignoring our other evolved values which are more social - cooperative and caring. Sign of the times maybe.
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Re: A new normative theory (also a PhD thesis)
I was no fan of Thatcher in the 80's but I think this famous speech of hers was misunderstood and misrepresented. The point she was making, an obvious one on the face of it, was that a society is not something separate from ourselves. We are society and (in a democracy) we are the government. She was having a moan about people who blame things on society as if it has nothing to do with them - the dependency culture. This was clear from a reading of the whole speech. But not from simply considering the phrase:Here in UK we are still suffering from Thatcher's dogma that there is no such thing as society, only individuals and their families.
"there is no such thing as society, only individuals and their families."
Apart from anything else, if there is no such thing as society then, by the same reasoning, there is no such thing as a family. So the phrase, taken in isolation, is self-contradictory.
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Re: A new normative theory (also a PhD thesis)
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Re: A new normative theory (also a PhD thesis)
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Re: A new normative theory (also a PhD thesis)
I disagree with the use of the word "flawed" in this context, although I understand that sometimes we have to make do with the words we have available (perhaps language is flawed!). To say that humans and/or human societies are flawed implies that they are in some sense broken or fall short of some kind of perfection. I don't think any such perfection exists and I don't think it's meaningful to think of ourselves as broken. We are what we are. The idea that we are somehow moving towards some perfect state is very pervasive. It pervades things as diverse as politics and misinterpretations of Evolution. But I think it's mistaken....human is fundamentally flawed and hence any human society will be flawed as well...
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