A new normative theory (also a PhD thesis)
- Ranvier
- Posts: 772
- Joined: February 12th, 2017, 1:47 pm
- Location: USA
Re: A new normative theory (also a PhD thesis)
-
- Posts: 2645
- Joined: December 9th, 2011, 4:45 pm
Re: A new normative theory (also a PhD thesis)
The obvious solution in accordance with free will is to make morality subject to decision.
You also pretend that these issues are much fluid, that you can just change them whatever way, and still make sense. You should first investigate how morality works in common discourse, and then see if you can change that without tearing apart the conceptual structure, without creating logical contradictions.
-
- Posts: 2181
- Joined: January 7th, 2015, 7:09 am
Re: A new normative theory (also a PhD thesis)
Crikey. An intriguing heady brew!I derive individualism and free will from particle Physics, Quantum Mechanics,
and surprisingly Theology.
OK, but until your book is published and you get a Nobel Prize as a symbolic
recognition that Free Will (and by implication the Mind Body Problem) has
finally been solved, I'll maintain that free will is an open question, and one
which is often ill-defined. Hence a problem for all normative theories which
needs at least acknowledging. Which to your credit, you do. A normative theory
like the OP, actually centred on Freedom as a, or rather THE, Objective Good,
which doesn't address Free Will, is incomplete and almost inevitably built on
shifting sand imo.
Well maybe... is this a matter of real distinction, or framing?Free will and therefore freedom is an inherent property of individual
consciousness, wheres morality is a purely human construct derived from the
group reality.
Couldn't I say freedom is a man-made concept rooted in certain mental states,
same as morality?
Frame it this way - My individual sense of morality and my individual sense of
freedom to make choices are both inherent in me. Ultimately rooted in my
evolved brain, with certain innate genetic tendencies, sculpted by my
individual experiences, creating particular mental models of the world and
myself (including abstract concepts like freedom and morality)?
And replace 'Me' with 'Humanity'?
If you accept Libertarian Free Will, then yes you can see it as a tool to followAny type of morality therefore will infringe on individual freedom limiting
choices of free will.
your own goals and desires. Many of your goals and desires will be associated
with what we call morality, because you're a member of a social species which
gains pleasure and practical benefits from living amongst others in caring and
cooperative ways. Roughly speaking, when you want the goals and desires
associated with your social and caring impulses fulfilled, you will choose to
act in kindly and cooperative ways - act 'morally'. When you want more
individualistic desires and goals fulfilled, you will choose to act in
antisocial and selfish ways - act 'immorally'. But there might be punitive
curbs on some of those actions (like taking your neighbours car, or spouse, or
life). Perhaps laws locking you up, perhaps social mores, perhaps social
shaming and ostracism. Perhaps your own sense of guilt would over-ride the
benefit, making it not a goal or desire you want to pursue.
So the social 'punishments' are in place to constrain indiivduals from pursuing
the types of individualistic goals and desires which could harm the overall
coherence and functioning of society as a whole, which enable you to pursue non
anti-social desires and goals. You have the freedom to choose to move 'off the
grid', build a cabin in the woods, be self-sufficient, and do what you want.
But presumably you don't because you'd lose the ability to fulfil many more
pleasurable and practically beneficial goals and desires only available in
social living. Those social choices and rewards would be 'infringed' on, to use
your terminology.
IOW the benefits of social living require some cooperation and compromise, a
social contract of sorts.
And politics is largely about optimising benefits from competing desires. I
don't like paying taxes, but I like roads and hospitals and schools and
libraries and my rubbish removed and money to survive if I lose my job, etc -
and I like other people to have those things too. As a group we elect people to
sort out the balance on our behalf, in the way we prefer.
A major concern with the OP, is its claim that the Freedom to pursue
individualistic desires and benefits are somehow objectively moral and
therefore normative (with the OP's own ad hoc constraints attached). It's
essentially a political preference, not philosophy properly grounded in
knowledge of how people evolved to be, and certainly not objective.
The evolved neuro-biological social bonding mechanisms began in mammals as a wayMother and her child is the purest form of love and hence the primary unit of
society with theoretical unconditional love with ability for the child to retain
most of the freedom through manipulation.
for parents, mothers especially, to bond and care for helpless off-spring. But
they later evolved to extend to others, though usually not as powerfully, in a
dissipating-with-distance 'circle of care'. In your terms, mothers have their
Freedom infringed most severely by the social bonding mechanisms we all have,
which are expressed differently in different circumstances. (Perhaps not
psychopaths, who have brains which don't function normally). So in your terms,
Love is the Enemy of Freedom!
Yes, when we stopped living in small tribal groups, where our neuro-biologicallyOnce that child enters the school system and broader society the morality is
infused by group culture derived from history, religion, political system, etc.
based social tendencies would be triggered in face to face interactions, other
more formalised and institutionalised mechanisms were needed to maintain social
cohesion, and retain its benefits. Rules, social mores, archetypal myths,
religions, formalised learning, etc stepped into the breach, which results from
dissipation-with-distance of social tendencies. And over time the man-made concept of 'morality' came to be seen as 'thing in itself', with objective reality, which you can get
objectively right or wrong. Perhaps rooted in a perfect moral Law Giver, God.
What Steve said.human is fundamentally flawed
A worthy goal, nonetheless.That's where I attempt to formulate such method by suggesting multiple social
changes that could only be accomplished through common purpose.
-
- Posts: 3601
- Joined: February 28th, 2014, 4:50 pm
Re: A new normative theory (also a PhD thesis)
There is good evidence showing physiological changes in the brain of mothers, but I am not sure it is this same mechanism that is responsible for human sociality.The evolved neuro-biological social bonding mechanisms began in mammals as a way for parents, mothers especially, to bond and care for helpless off-spring. But they later evolved to extend to others, though usually not as powerfully, in a dissipating-with-distance 'circle of care'.
Again, I am not so sure. I think rules and standards begin much earlier on, both in terms of human interactions and the interactions of other mammals. I do agree that there is a change in group dynamics that occurs with size. This may have something to do with politics or leadership. The larger the group the less control any individual or group of leaders has over the day to day behavior of the rest. It may also have something to do with influence from outsiders - practices and beliefs that are picked up. Time may also play a role. Many cultures have a golden age. Over time new ways develop. With these changes explicit rather than tacit rules of conduct are required.Rules, social mores, archetypal myths, religions, formalised learning, etc stepped into the breach, which results from dissipation-with-distance of social tendencies.
Of course all of this is at odds with the rationalist theory of the OP. Since it is for a PhD thesis I decided not to challenge the theory directly. It is a very stressful situation and challenges from outsiders are likely to be more harmful than helpful at this stage. There are still academics who think that way and they may be more receptive than us, and they may be hiring.
-
- Posts: 2181
- Joined: January 7th, 2015, 7:09 am
Re: A new normative theory (also a PhD thesis)
Maybe you'd be more comfortable continuing the convo on Ozy's Id vs Ego thread?
My last reply to you there went into a bit more detail on the types of mechanisms which come into play within social groups, and I'll put a vid link there to a talk/discussion with Churchland on her work. There are other vids of her more detailed lectures on youtube, and her book Brain Trust, but that vid's a good intro for lay people if you want to check it out, and might answer your questions better than I can.
My answer would be that there there is no one mechansim, but many, which adapt to different social functions. Churchland points to oxytocin and vasopressin being key. So to get an idea of how these things play out, if we look at oxytocin, already present in reptiles, its function gets adapted by evolution in mammals to perform a role in lactation. But not just lactation - because mammalian off-spring are born helpless, maternal bonding is required to ensure the mother sticks around and nurtures her young. So oxytocin also gives her pleasurable feelings when suckling, or just being close to her off-spring. But if they're out of sight, or making distress calls, she gets a dose of anxiety inducing chemicals instead. Over time, oxytocin also became associated with forming bonds of trust and cooperation between even non kin, so for example chimps who groom each other get pleasurable doses of oxytocin too.Gertie:
The evolved neuro-biological social bonding mechanisms began in mammals as a way for parents, mothers especially, to bond and care for helpless off-spring. But they later evolved to extend to others, though usually not as powerfully, in a dissipating-with-distance 'circle of care'.There is good evidence showing physiological changes in the brain of mothers, but I am not sure it is this same mechanism that is responsible for human sociality.
https://www.mpg.de/6858847/oxytocin-social-grooming
Such evidence is suggestive of a bigger story which we can start to put together, tho unlike for example the evolution of the eye, the 'missing links' are currently more numerous, complex and hard to pin down in the interplay of social systems.Animals which maintain cooperative relationships show gains in longevity and offspring survival. However, little is known about the cognitive or hormonal mechanisms involved in cooperation. Researchers of the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology in Leipzig, Germany, have now found that cooperative relationships are facilitated by an endocrinological mechanism involving the hormone oxytocin, even when these are between non-kin. They collected urine samples of 33 chimpanzees from Budongo Forest, Uganda, and measured their urinary oxytocin levels after single episodes of a specific cooperative behaviour, mutual grooming. The result: Oxytocin levels were higher after grooming with cooperation partners compared with non-cooperation partners or after no grooming, regardless of genetic relatedness or sexual interest. This suggests that in chimpanzees oxytocin, which acts directly on neural reward and social memory systems, plays a key role maintaining social relations beyond genetic ties and in keeping track of social interactions with multiple individuals over time.
The Sonso group in the Budongo Forest, Uganda: two male chimpanzees grooming each other, a very intimate behaviour based on trust.
Zoom Image
The Sonso group in the Budongo Forest, Uganda: two male chimpanzees grooming each other, a very intimate behaviour based ... [more]
© Liran Samuni
In non-human primates and other social animals strong and enduring social bonds are typically seen between genetically related individuals but also, occasionally, between non-kin, same-sex individuals. Although such relationships are typically defined by high rates of cooperative behaviours, how they are maintained over time is still unclear. In humans and other social mammals the neuropeptide hormone oxytocin plays a central role in facilitating bonding between kin and mating partners. Catherine Crockford, Roman Wittig and colleagues of the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology have now analysed the role of this hormone in the social relationships between wild chimpanzees.
I think you're right. The history of human social biological evolution and culture is complex beyond the imagination, and people like Churchland are essentially creating a new field which tries to get a handle on how 'moral impulses' arose in mammalian sociability using the knowledge neuroscience is beginning, very crudely, to uncover. It will only be an interwined part of the overall story of human evolution and culture. But an important one imo, which should make us re-evaluate our traditional thinking about morality.Again, I am not so sure. I think rules and standards begin much earlier on, both in terms of human interactions and the interactions of other mammals. I do agree that there is a change in group dynamics that occurs with size. This may have something to do with politics or leadership. The larger the group the less control any individual or group of leaders has over the day to day behavior of the rest. It may also have something to do with influence from outsiders - practices and beliefs that are picked up. Time may also play a role. Many cultures have a golden age. Over time new ways develop. With these changes explicit rather than tacit rules of conduct are required.Rules, social mores, archetypal myths, religions, formalised learning, etc stepped into the breach, which results from dissipation-with-distance of social tendencies.
-
- Posts: 3601
- Joined: February 28th, 2014, 4:50 pm
Re: A new normative theory (also a PhD thesis)
I did intend to get back to that one. By the way I read Churchland’s Neurophilosophy when it came out as well as earlier work with her husband. I was a fan but got pulled in another direction and was not aware of her more recent work until you brought it up.Maybe you'd be more comfortable continuing the convo on Ozy's Id vs Ego thread?
… so for example chimps who groom each other get pleasurable doses of oxytocin too.
That’s funny because I was going to use that example to elaborate on mammalian interactions.
With regard to that point and before moving over to the other topic, pleasure plays a role in Aristotle’s ethics but in the Christian tradition pleasure is more often associated with sin and what we should not do.
-
- Posts: 2181
- Joined: January 7th, 2015, 7:09 am
Re: A new normative theory (also a PhD thesis)
Oh cool. I haven't read that, I discovered Pat through her work on the neuro-biological under-pinnings of morality. Later I found out she she was an eliminative materialist, which gob-smacked me for such an erudite clear thinker, but it turns out not really eliminative, not exactly sure where she stands on that now. Paul I don't know, except as the proponent of eliminative materialism, which is the one approach to consciousness I have no time for, so that was that!By the way I read Churchland’s Neurophilosophy when it came out as well as earlier work with her husband. I was a fan but got pulled in another direction and was not aware of her more recent work until you brought it up.
Hah, there's a definite masochistic streak in that type of Christianity, which has a sort of appeal. (I'd add that to me, the idea of flawed fallen humanity in perpetual guilt and shame for our imperfections, almost fetishised in the grizzly sacrificial atonement of Jesus whipped and nailed to a cross for our sins, is kinda... well speaking to an unhealthy part of our psyche).With regard to that point and before moving over to the other topic, pleasure plays a role in Aristotle’s ethics but in the Christian tradition pleasure is more often associated with sin and what we should not do.
And may tie in to Haidt's ideas about Purity/Disgust - the carnal vs the spiritual, the sacred and profane, flesh and the soul. I think a lot of religious misogyny might be tied in to that too, religious patriarchs seeing temptations of the flesh (aka women, the 'other') as a distraction from a pure spiritual life.
-
- Posts: 132
- Joined: January 29th, 2014, 6:43 pm
Re: A new normative theory (also a PhD thesis)
-
- Posts: 4696
- Joined: February 1st, 2017, 1:06 am
Re: A new normative theory (also a PhD thesis)
LuckyR wrote:Perhaps I can make the idea that others find easy to understand clearer to you in a numerical example. Let's say there are 100 people in our society. The society offers a tax of $10 to cover fire department coverage. The chance of a fire is 0.1%. The fire department saves the home 100% of the time.
If everyone gets the coverage $1000 is raised. The cost of the fire department is $950 so as long as 95 choose to get the coverage there is a fire department.
If you choose to pay, you lose $10, if at least 94 others also make that choice, you win, you have fire coverage. If less than 94 join you, not only do you lose $10, but there is no fire coverage. If you choose to keep your $10, you don't personally get fire coverage, regardless but if more than 4 others join you no one will have coverage.
Thus your choice impacts many things: your $10, your fire coverage AND whether the group has fire coverage. The last one does not impact your individual interest since if you choose to forgo the tax you definitely won't be covered regardless . . . .
Sorry, but your $10/person premise is unwarranted. Among the 100 people some will want that coverage and think it is worth $10, others will not want it or think the price is too high. If fewer than 95 are willing to pay, then those who want the coverage will have to agree to a higher price (which is exactly how insurance works in the real world --- premiums are determined by the magnitude of the risk v. the size of the risk pool).
I'm not "depriving" anyone of anything. They can obtain the coverage if they're willing to pay their share of the cost.BUT you will be 20% of the potential cohort of depriving the group having coverage.
You seem to be arguing that persons who don't want some product are obliged to buy it in order to lower the price for those who do. What is the basis for that assumed obligation? Should everyone be forced to buy, say, a Mercedes sedan so that economy of scale will reduce the price for people who want one?
There is no "group interest" here. Some members of that group have an interest in that coverage, others don't. The only interests to be found in that, or any other group, are the diverse interests of its members.So while an individual can make a logical argument to forgo the tax on individual interest grounds, there is a group interest in almost everyone choosing to pay.
-
- Posts: 4696
- Joined: February 1st, 2017, 1:06 am
Re: A new normative theory (also a PhD thesis)
It certainly needs to be acknowledged. But the "metaphysical" concept of free will, which I take to be the claim that (at least some) human decisions are uncaused, is not necessary for moral theory. All that is needed is the legal notion, i.e., where saying an act is done "of one's own free will" means only that it was not coerced by another moral agent. There is no need to delve into the neurophysiological minutia or quantum-theoretical underpinnings of the decision-making process.Gertie wrote: . . . I'll maintain that free will is an open question, and one
which is often ill-defined. Hence a problem for all normative theories which
needs at least acknowledging.
All human concepts are man-made, although some of them --- Kant's synthetic a priori concepts, (space, time, cause-and-effect) --- may be forced by the wiring of our brains.Couldn't I say freedom is a man-made concept rooted in certain mental states,
same as morality?
All goals and desires are the goals and desires of individuals, and are therefore "individualistic." Some of them involve other people in some way, others don't. The criterion for deciding whether an act is moral or immoral is not whether it is "kindly and cooperative" or "antisocial and selfish," but whether or not it violates another agent's rights.If you accept Libertarian Free Will, then yes you can see it as a tool to follow
your own goals and desires. Many of your goals and desires will be associated
with what we call morality, because you're a member of a social species which
gains pleasure and practical benefits from living amongst others in caring and
cooperative ways. Roughly speaking, when you want the goals and desires
associated with your social and caring impulses fulfilled, you will choose to
act in kindly and cooperative ways - act 'morally'. When you want more
individualistic desires and goals fulfilled, you will choose to act in
antisocial and selfish ways - act 'immorally'.
No action by an individual will ever harm "society as a whole." It may at least be assumed that it will not harm the actor, since if it did he would not do it. The harms (if any) will always accrue to specific individuals (though certain acts may harm many individuals). We need to abandon this notion that "society" is a moral agent in its own right, with interests and goals distinct from those of the individuals who comprise it.So the social 'punishments' are in place to constrain individuals from pursuing
the types of individualistic goals and desires which could harm the overall
coherence and functioning of society as a whole, which enable you to pursue non
anti-social desires and goals.
But surely you'll acknowledge that not everyone desires those things, or desires them in the same form or to the same degree. So how do you justify forcing those folks to pay for those things?And politics is largely about optimising benefits from competing desires. I
don't like paying taxes, but I like roads and hospitals and schools and
libraries and my rubbish removed and money to survive if I lose my job, etc -
and I like other people to have those things too.
There is no need for any sorting. You pay for the goods and services you desire, I pay for those I desire. There are certain goods --- "public goods" --- for which this is not possible. Public goods are those which are non-excludable and non-rivalrous, and hence cannot be provided by private suppliers. All of the goods you mention, however, except roads, are private goods and are easily provided privately.As a group we elect people to sort out the balance on our behalf, in the way we prefer.
An "objective morality" would be a set of rules governing interactions between moral agents (who are assumed to be of equal moral status) in a social setting which allows each of those agents to maximize the good as he defines it. Whether or not a given set of rules does this is an empirical, and therefore objective, question.A major concern with the OP, is its claim that the Freedom to pursue
individualistic desires and benefits are somehow objectively moral and
therefore normative (with the OP's own ad hoc constraints attached). It's
essentially a political preference, not philosophy properly grounded in
knowledge of how people evolved to be, and certainly not objective.
-
- Posts: 2181
- Joined: January 7th, 2015, 7:09 am
Re: A new normative theory (also a PhD thesis)
My reading of your post is that it contains the implicit assumption that freedom to follow one's own individualistic goals and desires is the only objective moral good, and one's right to do so the only objective moral Right. In line with the OP's position.
Is this a fair summary of your position?
If so, I'd say the impulse under-pinning your position is explainable by evolved brain circuitry, there is no objective moral foundation for it, it's a personal preference.
And if you live in a society you get to express your personal preference via the political system like everyone else in that society.
Which is fine. And you are free to vote for a Libertarian candidate, or be a Libertarian candidate.
What is not correct is that your personal tendencies and preferences are Objectively Moral, and my similarly evolved more pro-social personal preferences and tendencies are not.
-
- Posts: 3601
- Joined: February 28th, 2014, 4:50 pm
Re: A new normative theory (also a PhD thesis)
I do not think that morality is reducible to rights. First, there is the distinction between natural rights and legal rights. Second there is the distinction between ancient and modern theories of natural rights. Clearly you take a modern view of natural rights, that is, rights based on the sovereignty of the individual. But the good of others is not determined by your rights as an individual. Your actions may not violate the rights of others, but if you act without regard to their well-being your actions might be be good for them. In addition there is the question of whether what you do freely of your own volition is necessarily good for you.The criterion for deciding whether an act is moral or immoral is not whether it is "kindly and cooperative" or "antisocial and selfish," but whether or not it violates another agent's rights.
That is a questionable assumption. Self-destructive behavior is quite common as is making poor choices. Just because we are free to act does not mean that we will do what is good for us.No action by an individual will ever harm "society as a whole." It may at least be assumed that it will not harm the actor, since if it did he would not do it.
Society is affected by the actions of moral agent. Its interests and goals cannot be that of the individual qua individual simply because our interests as individuals may be at odds. We must consider the individual in society rather than in distinction from it.We need to abandon this notion that "society" is a moral agent in its own right, with interests and goals distinct from those of the individuals who comprise it.
In line with the philosophy of individualism the justification is the social contract.But surely you'll acknowledge that not everyone desires those things, or desires them in the same form or to the same degree. So how do you justify forcing those folks to pay for those things?
-
- Posts: 4696
- Joined: February 1st, 2017, 1:06 am
Re: A new normative theory (also a PhD thesis)
No. There are no "objective moral goods." There are no "objective" goods of any kind. A good is something an agent desires to acquire or retain. An evil is something an agent desires to avoid, or be rid of. Goods and evils (so defined) are interests.Gertie wrote:My reading of your post is that it contains the implicit assumption that freedom to follow one's own individualistic goals and desires is the only objective moral good, and one's right to do so the only objective moral Right. In line with the OP's position.
Is this a fair summary of your position?
Value is not a property of things; any value assigned to X is a measure of the strength of some agent P's desire for X. Value claims which do not specify, or at least imply, an agent---the valuer---are non-cognitive.
What is objectively certain is that every agent values certain things, whether positively (goods) or negatively (evils). It it also quite apparent that every agent seeks to maximize good and minimize evils, as he defines them.
So if one accepts the postulate of "equal agency," which holds that all agents in the moral field (a social setting) are of equal status and equally subject to the same set of rules of interaction, and accepts the premise that that aim of a moral theory is to maximize good and mininmize evils, then the rule I mentioned follows. It follows just because goods and evils are not objective; they are subjective and located in many disjoint, independent systems of ends. The only way to maximize good, therefore, is to maximize it for each agent, using his own definition.
Moral theory has historically been bound up with axiology (the theory of value). They need to be decisively separated. A sound moral theory must be value-neutral.
Well, before you can recommend a political system, and certainly before you can assert an obligation on the part of any agent to subscribe to that system or conform to its commands, you need to provide some justification for that alleged obligation grounded in a sound moral theory.And if you live in a society you get to express your personal preference via the political system like everyone else in that society.
Which is fine. And you are free to vote for a Libertarian candidate, or be a Libertarian candidate.
-
- Posts: 4696
- Joined: February 1st, 2017, 1:06 am
Re: A new normative theory (also a PhD thesis)
My view of natural rights is the classic one (the concept assumed in the common law and by Locke, Kant, Blackstone, et al). There are two classes of "classical" rights --- natural rights and "common rights." Both of those embrace property rights (rights to things) and liberty rights (rights to act). The natural rights are one's rights to things one acquired naturally, i.e., things one brought with one into the world, such as one's life, body, one's various talents and abilities. The common rights are rights to things acquired afterwards. Essentially, one has a (property) right to a thing if he considers it a good and has acquired it without inflicting loss or injury on another moral agent. Likewise, he has a right to act (a liberty right) in any way that does not inflict harms or losses on other agents.Fooloso4 wrote:I do not think that morality is reducible to rights. First, there is the distinction between natural rights and legal rights. Second there is the distinction between ancient and modern theories of natural rights. Clearly you take a modern view of natural rights, that is, rights based on the sovereignty of the individual.
I assume you meant to say, "might not be good for them." That's true. But you seem to be assuming, a priori, a duty to promote others' good. Methinks you need to justify that assumption via a sound moral theory.But the good of others is not determined by your rights as an individual. Your actions may not violate the rights of others, but if you act without regard to their well-being your actions might be be good for them.
There are no a priori moral duties. An alleged duty must be derivable from a sound moral theory or the ethic you've adopted is not philosophical.
An agent may do something that is not good for him because he's uninformed or misinformed about some aspect of the contemplated act, or because he's failed to consider all the reasonably foreseeable consequences. We can try to inform him, but if he's aware of the risks and consequences and accepts them, the question is settled. We may not impose our own values on him.In addition there is the question of whether what you do freely of your own volition is necessarily good for you.
Society is only affected to the extent particular individuals are affected. Society is nothing but a plurality of individuals. If there are no effects upon any individuals, there is no effect upon "society." If there are effects on individuals, then those individuals are the parties affected.Society is affected by the actions of moral agent.
There is no such thing as a "social contract." That is a myth invented by some 17th century philosophers. The "socal contract" can be useful as an analytical device, but being hypothetical, it can have no binding power on any real moral agent.In line with the philosophy of individualism the justification is the social contract.
-
- Posts: 3601
- Joined: February 28th, 2014, 4:50 pm
Re: A new normative theory (also a PhD thesis)
Typically classical natural right refers to the ancients not the moderns, but the point is that the modern theories are based on the theory of individualism.My view of natural rights is the classic one (the concept assumed in the common law and by Locke, Kant, Blackstone, et al).
Not a priori, but rather, based on the notion that we are social animals. This is the foundation of classical or ancient political philosophy. The idea that regard for others requires a moral theory is based on the notion that we are atomistic, which is contrary to what we observe. No man is born autonomous and self-sufficient. Do you have regard for your parents or children or anyone at all? Is that regard based on a sound moral theory?But you seem to be assuming, a priori, a duty to promote others' good. Methinks you need to justify that assumption via a sound moral theory.
You mentioned Locke, Kant, and Blackstone specifically as those who influenced your view of natural rights. Kant claimed that there are a priori moral duties. Locke and Blackstone both base morality on God’s laws. My own view is that the attempt to ground morality in rational theory or divine law is misguided. Two fundamental philosophical mistakes that an increasing number of ethical theories acknowledge.There are no a priori moral duties. An alleged duty must be derivable from a sound moral theory or the ethic you've adopted is not philosophical.
Or because the notion of a rational agent is a fiction.An agent may do something that is not good for him because he's uninformed or misinformed about some aspect of the contemplated act, or because he's failed to consider all the reasonably foreseeable consequences.
Society is nothing but a plurality of individuals.
That is an assumption. There is today a great deal of criticism of the notion of social atomism. Non-western and pre-modern western societies do not see it that way.
There is no such thing as a "social contract." That is a myth invented by some 17th century philosophers.
The same philosophers who invented the state of nature and modern natural rights. The same philosophers you base your claims on. Locke, Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant, and Blackstone all accept some form of a social contract.
2023/2024 Philosophy Books of the Month
Mark Victor Hansen, Relentless: Wisdom Behind the Incomparable Chicken Soup for the Soul
by Mitzi Perdue
February 2023
Rediscovering the Wisdom of Human Nature: How Civilization Destroys Happiness
by Chet Shupe
March 2023