An argument for a new normative theory (abridged version)

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Daniel McKay
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Joined: October 26th, 2015, 9:05 pm

An argument for a new normative theory (abridged version)

Post by Daniel McKay »

I am a PhD student who is working on an entirely new normative theory and, as part of that, I am looking for people to point out any problems with my arguments or any objections I should deal with to my theory. Previously I have posted links to chapters but that is quite a lot to read in order to contribute so instead I'm going to make some abridged versions of my case for my normative theory in this post. If you disagree with anything I say, or can think of an objection to the theory that comes out of it, please let me know. If you make good points I will respond to them in my thesis and reference you however you prefer.

To be clear, this is a very short summation of the arguments present in my first thesis chapters, if you would like to read them in more detail, I can link you the chapter itself.

So, let's dive straight in to the arguments:

I take as my starting assumption that morality, if it exists at all, is the way in which persons (by which I mean free, rational, conscious agents) ought to be or act, where ought is understood in a categorical and universal sense. With this assumption in hand, we can begin to ask what that way might be, or to put it another way, what is of moral value, by considering what it is to be a person. As a way in which persons ought to be or act would apply to all potential persons, not merely us as humans, we cannot use contingent facts about ourselves as humans as the basis for moral value. So moral value cannot be grounded in something like happiness, as we can imagine persons that do not experience happiness. What then could be a basis for moral value? We can consider what is shared by all persons in order to come up with possible candidates and what we find is that all persons have free will, so the capacity to make choices, and also understanding, the capacity to understand their choices. This joint capacity for both understanding and making choices, which I will from now on be referring to as freedom, is not only shared by all persons, it is also not shared by anything that is not a person. There are no things which are not persons, free, rational, conscious agents, which can understand choices and make them freely. This capacity is, in a very real way, what it means to be a person, a moral agent. For this reason, this seems to be our best candidate for moral value. Though it is possible there are other candidates and indeed other things that are of moral value, they will not be discussed here as I do not know what they could be.

So, our candidate for moral value is freedom, but freedom over what? As this morality is objective and universal, it is presumably not the case that it makes conflicting recommendations, or made no recommendations at all, in almost all practical situations, which would seem to be the case if all choices were of equal value. However, if the freedom that matters is the freedom to make one's own choices, the choices that relate to those things that belong to the person; their mind, their body and their property, then morality would be functional. Also, there is something conceptually odd about the idea of being free to make someone else's choices for them, against their will. For these reasons we can say that what is of moral value is the freedom of persons over those things which already belong to them; their mind, their body and their property. As a quick note on property, I should say that I have not yet seen a really good justification for how we come to own unowned property in the first place. If it turns out we cannot truly own property, and it is instead just a useful construct, then we can remove it from our list of things that our ours and treat it purely instrumentally.

So, we have our candidate for moral value, but we don't know what form our moral theory should take. To determine this let us first consider whether we ought to be concerned with the actions people perform or the character traits they exhibit. We might well want to be virtue ethicists of a kind, but many of the traits we might want to consider desirable in persons can't be shared by all potential persons, and those that can, such as being free and rational, are already shared by all free, rational agents, so it isn't clear how we could say a person ought to be. So instead we ought to focus on actions, but do we focus on the consequences of our actions or the form our actions take? We may want to be deontologists and say that people ought to only act in certain ways or according to certain maxims. But the problem with this is that maxims are always arbitrarily defined, in that a maxim that says "don't kill" could be made better if it included an exception for when the person you are killing is trying to kill you and you are defending yourself, but it could be made even better by including an exception for cases where killing that person prevents the death of five others who are in morally similar circumstances, and so on and so on until our maxims describe the situation we are in and what to do in it perfectly. This of course leads to the distinction between acting and letting happen, and it isn't clear how we can draw a clear distinction between something that happens because you did something and something that happens because you stood by. Without having a strong way to morally distinguish action from inaction, it seems we ought to be consequentialists.

So, we have a consequentialist theory with the ability of persons to understand and make their own decisions as the measure of moral value. This means that when acting we ought to ensure we do not violate the freedom of others over their own choices, unless we must do so in order to prevent a greater violation of freedom which could not be prevented without at least this much of a violation occurring, and we have some degree of obligation (which I discuss in it's own chapter but won't get into here) to prevent or reduce such violations. What this means in practice is that determining what to do in a moral situation is not a matter of weighing happiness, following strict and unchanging rules or considering what kind of person acts in a certain way, it is a matter of allowing persons to make their own choices. To give a few examples of practical implications:

* Lying can be wrong in some circumstances such as fraud where it denies the person the ability to understand the choice they are making, but it is not wrong in most circumstances.
* Adultery (assuming there aren't any STIs involved) is a personal issue, not a moral one.
* Parents do not have a right to decide what happens to their children, rather they have an obligation to protect their child until it is capable of making its own choices and to act in its best interests when they must make decisions for it in the interim.
* The role of a government is to first protect its people and then to act in their interests especially when making decisions regarding shared property.
* Nothing can ever be offensive enough that we ought to violate the freedom of a person to say it.

Looking forward to reading all the ways in which you disagree with me.
Thanks for your time.
Dan.
Eduk
Posts: 2466
Joined: December 8th, 2016, 7:08 am
Favorite Philosopher: Socrates

Re: An argument for a new normative theory (abridged version

Post by Eduk »

all persons have free will, so the capacity to make choices, and also understanding, the capacity to understand their choices. This joint capacity for both understanding and making choices, which I will from now on be referring to as freedom, is not only shared by all persons, it is also not shared by anything that is not a person. There are no things which are not persons, free, rational, conscious agents, which can understand choices and make them freely.
1. But no one has perfect free will or understanding of their choices. We are biased and we protect our biases and we perform many actions due to unconscious irrational influences. Or to put it another way self deception.
2. Are you certain that nothing else has even the faintest amount of free will? I used to have a pet dog who wasn't allowed to sit on our leather couch. When we were out he would sit on the couch and then quickly jump off the couch when we returned so as not to be spotted. Now I'm not saying that that is incontrovertible evidence of free will, but many studies on animals have been done which I believe show at least some level of conscious behaviour?
So, we have a consequentialist theory with the ability of persons to understand and make their own decisions as the measure of moral value. This means that when acting we ought to ensure we do not violate the freedom of others over their own choices, unless we must do so in order to prevent a greater violation of freedom which could not be prevented without at least this much of a violation occurring, and we have some degree of obligation (which I discuss in it's own chapter but won't get into here) to prevent or reduce such violations. What this means in practice is that determining what to do in a moral situation is not a matter of weighing happiness, following strict and unchanging rules or considering what kind of person acts in a certain way, it is a matter of allowing persons to make their own choices.
1. So as an extreme example, if everyone on the planet decided to immediately and permanently cease procreation that would be moral?
2. If everyone decided to sit down and do nothing that would be moral?
3. If I owned a large warehouse of food in a country where the indigenous population would starve without the food I could morally set it on fire?

4. I have an issue with consequentialism. If I shot at you with a gun but hit a man who jumped into the path of bullet as I was firing who had a knife and was a moment away from killing you. Would you act like I had saved your life?

5. To me saying that something is immoral if you take away rational choices is part of a moral system, but not a whole moral system. Also I draw a line between all choices and rational choices. Rational choices are of course hard to define and different people will have different opinions. For example if someone is attempting to kill themselves due to some drug fulled psychosis is it immoral to attempt to stop them?
Unknown means unknown.
Daniel McKay
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Joined: October 26th, 2015, 9:05 pm

Re: An argument for a new normative theory (abridged version

Post by Daniel McKay »

I didn't say nothing else has free will. I would be inclined to think your dog probably does have free will. I don't think it is a rational agent. Free will was not the only criteria I used to identify persons.

1) Yes if everyone decided to stop procreation that would be morally permissible.

2) If everyone decided to do nothing it could in theory be morally permissible, so long as there weren't horrible violations of freedom going on (which there are in our actual world).

3) No, you have an obligation to do your bit to alleviate the violation of their freedom being caused by their starvation.

4) Well you did save my life, but no I would still want you imprisoned. Consequentialists are consequentialists about punishment too, so we punish those who intended to do evil but accidentally did good because the consequences of punishing them are similar to those of punishing those who intended to do evil and carried it off.

5) I would say that if they don't understand the choice they are making, we should stop them temporarily until they do. So if they are jumping off a building because they think they can fly, we should stop them, wait for them to come off their high, and then if they still want to jump off a building to kill themselves, now understanding that choice, we should let them do so.

I think I would like to reference you in my thesis by the way. How would you like to be referenced?
Eduk
Posts: 2466
Joined: December 8th, 2016, 7:08 am
Favorite Philosopher: Socrates

Re: An argument for a new normative theory (abridged version

Post by Eduk »

1. Ah in that case I don't fully understand your definition of a rational agent, could you elaborate a little further for me please?
2. In number 3 above, what freedom are you taking away? I mean they are free to do whatever they want that is possible? Or is ruling out possibilities contravening freedom? Where do you draw the line? You could say that the bad history teacher I had in school took away my freedom to have a good history teacher?
3. Ah I believe I misunderstood consequentialism. The idea is to have a moral outlook based on consequences but for any specific case the actual outcome could be bad and it would still be morally correct. Is that more accurate?
4. Do you give any weight to the difference between irrational decisions and rational decisions? How do you decide what is rational and what is irrational?
5. Do you give any weight to the quality of decisions which are available? I guess this ties in with point 2.
6. I'm not sure I have said anything worthy of being put in a thesis :) How would you like to reference me, no one has ever asked before.
Unknown means unknown.
Ace9
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Re: An argument for a new normative theory (abridged version

Post by Ace9 »

"...all persons have free will, so the capacity to make choices, and also understanding, the capacity to understand their choices..."

I would challenge this premise. Many thought leaders in the both the philosophical and scientific communities are moving away from the notion that humans have agency and therefore free will. Based on our current knowledge of how our particular expanding universe works, the concept of free will is improbable at best. Our brains can only interpret the endless stream of causality based on our genetic inheritance in combination with our learned experience. The notion of free will is an illusion manufactured by our conscious awareness that gives us the impression that we actually have the ability to initiate action by simply thinking about same. The illusion also gives us the notion of a present moment in this endless stream of causality, when in the real universe, there is only that which has occurred, and the possibility of what might occur, or what we call the future. Our consciousness awareness is simply a reflection of what has already occurred (albeit a split second after) which leads to our intuitive sense that we have agency. Now lets be clear. For all practical intents and purposes this illusion serves a great purpose, in that it provides a very reasonable belief that we are in control of our actions, and that we can actually decide on a course of action. Further, the notion of agency provides us with the concept of responsibility for our actions and the evolution of folk psychology in human culture that in turn serves as a basis for all jurisprudence.

Back to your proposed argument. Given what we know of the physical universe, any attempt to fashion an epistemology around what constitutes moral behaviour is fraught from the get go

An alternative approach maybe to start from the premise that humans do not have agency, and from there craft the investigative approach required to explore what human society could learn from accepting all members of society on the basis of our true nature
Gertie
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Re: An argument for a new normative theory (abridged version

Post by Gertie »

I take as my starting assumption that morality, if it exists at all, is the way in which persons (by which I mean free, rational, conscious agents) ought to be or act, where ought is understood in a categorical and universal sense. With this assumption in hand, we can begin to ask what that way might be, or to put it another way, what is of moral value, by considering what it is to be a person. As a way in which persons ought to be or act would apply to all potential persons, not merely us as humans, we cannot use contingent facts about ourselves as humans as the basis for moral value. So moral value cannot be grounded in something like happiness, as we can imagine persons that do not experience happiness.
And I can imagine persons who don't match your ad hoc definition of 'persons' - irrational, and not free. Not free to exercise free will is particularly problematic, as free will is a contentious philosophical issue with huge implications for morality.

So your starting definition needs justification.

This joint capacity for both understanding and making choices, which I will from now on be referring to as freedom, is not only shared by all persons, it is also not shared by anything that is not a person.
Circular, solely relies on your own definition of 'persons'.
There are no things which are not persons, free, rational, conscious agents, which can understand choices and make them freely. This capacity is, in a very real way, what it means to be a person, a moral agent. For this reason, this seems to be our best candidate for moral value. Though it is possible there are other candidates and indeed other things that are of moral value, they will not be discussed here as I do not know what they could be.
Sounds like you're blurring being a moral agent with 'moral value' (morality) as a whole. Which I think means you're saying it's impossible to act immorally towards any entity which doesn't fit your definition of a person/moral agent. So if you decide for example Eduk's dog isn't rational, you can treat it any way you choose without any moral implications.

So, we have a consequentialist theory with the ability of persons to understand and make their own decisions as the measure of moral value. This means that when acting we ought to ensure we do not violate the freedom of others over their own choices, unless we must do so in order to prevent a greater violation of freedom which could not be prevented without at least this much of a violation occurring, and we have some degree of obligation (which I discuss in it's own chapter but won't get into here) to prevent or reduce such violations. What this means in practice is that determining what to do in a moral situation is not a matter of weighing happiness, following strict and unchanging rules or considering what kind of person acts in a certain way, it is a matter of allowing persons to make their own choices.

So, our candidate for moral value is freedom
Because you've blurred freedom of choices as moral agents (Subjects) with morality as a whole, you've allowed yourself to see freedom as key, without regard to the consequences on the Objects of those choices, except in terms of freedom.

To summarise so far, you've without justification defined persons as axiomatically free (a contentious claim re the free will issue), but not necessarily capable of happiness/suffering. And then blurred this attribute of the moral agent/person - freedom, with the entirety of morality, allowing you to morally inflict suffering as long as you don't infringe another's freedom to act as free moral agent.

As this morality is objective and universal, it is presumably not the case that it makes conflicting recommendations, or made no recommendations at all, in almost all practical situations, which would seem to be the case if all choices were of equal value. However, if the freedom that matters is the freedom to make one's own choices, the choices that relate to those things that belong to the person; their mind, their body and their property, then morality would be functional.
And voila, just chuck in property with no justification and your Libertarian Charter is complete!

If your own politics are that way inclined, I'd reflect on how your objective formula formula happily coincides with them.

On a broader point, current research suggests there are 5 or six universal 'moral impulses' (see Haidt et al Moral Foundations Theory) which underlie all cultures' moralities, freedom being just one of them. And science is now providing a good account of how these impulses evolved in our sophisticated social mammalian species, which undermines any claim to 'objective morality' beyond evolutionary utility.

Hope this helps.
Daniel McKay
Posts: 56
Joined: October 26th, 2015, 9:05 pm

Re: An argument for a new normative theory (abridged version

Post by Daniel McKay »

Eduk: I'm using a means-end rationality only. By rational I only mean able to understand ones decisions and reasons for making one choice over another. So an "irrational" choice is fine.

There is a distinction to be drawn between act consequentialism which is concerned with the moral outcome of particular specific actions and rule consequentialism which is concerned with the consequences of following broader rules for action. In this case I am an act consequentialist.

In the case of starvation; the freedom to continue to live, to maintain one's bodily systems, to experience or not experience pain. Plenty of freedoms over one's body can only be maintained if one is not starving.

You have raised an objection that others have made, I would like to reference you as someone who has made it. PM me with your preference of real name or username maybe?
Spraticus
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Joined: January 29th, 2014, 6:43 pm

Re: An argument for a new normative theory (abridged version

Post by Spraticus »

Daniel McKay wrote:I am a PhD student who is working on an entirely new normative theory and, as part of that, I am looking for people to point out any problems with my arguments or any objections I should deal with to my theory. Previously I have posted links to chapters but that is quite a lot to read in order to contribute so instead I'm going to make some abridged versions of my case for my normative theory in this post. If you disagree with anything I say, or can think of an objection to the theory that comes out of it, please let me know. If you make good points I will respond to them in my thesis and reference you however you prefer.

To be clear, this is a very short summation of the arguments present in my first thesis chapters, if you would like to read them in more detail, I can link you the chapter itself.

So, let's dive straight in to the arguments:

I take as my starting assumption that morality, if it exists at all, is the way in which persons (by which I mean free, rational, conscious agents) ought to be or act, where ought is understood in a categorical and universal sense. With this assumption in hand, we can begin to ask what that way might be, or to put it another way, what is of moral value, by considering what it is to be a person. As a way in which persons ought to be or act would apply to all potential persons, not merely us as humans, we cannot use contingent facts about ourselves as humans as the basis for moral value. So moral value cannot be grounded in something like happiness, as we can imagine persons that do not experience happiness. What then could be a basis for moral value? We can consider what is shared by all persons in order to come up with possible candidates and what we find is that all persons have free will, so the capacity to make choices, and also understanding, the capacity to understand their choices. This joint capacity for both understanding and making choices, which I will from now on be referring to as freedom, is not only shared by all persons, it is also not shared by anything that is not a person. There are no things which are not persons, free, rational, conscious agents, which can understand choices and make them freely. This capacity is, in a very real way, what it means to be a person, a moral agent. For this reason, this seems to be our best candidate for moral value. Though it is possible there are other candidates and indeed other things that are of moral value, they will not be discussed here as I do not know what they could be.

So, our candidate for moral value is freedom, but freedom over what? As this morality is objective and universal, it is presumably not the case that it makes conflicting recommendations, or made no recommendations at all, in almost all practical situations, which would seem to be the case if all choices were of equal value. However, if the freedom that matters is the freedom to make one's own choices, the choices that relate to those things that belong to the person; their mind, their body and their property, then morality would be functional. Also, there is something conceptually odd about the idea of being free to make someone else's choices for them, against their will. For these reasons we can say that what is of moral value is the freedom of persons over those things which already belong to them; their mind, their body and their property. As a quick note on property, I should say that I have not yet seen a really good justification for how we come to own unowned property in the first place. If it turns out we cannot truly own property, and it is instead just a useful construct, then we can remove it from our list of things that our ours and treat it purely instrumentally.

So, we have our candidate for moral value, but we don't know what form our moral theory should take. To determine this let us first consider whether we ought to be concerned with the actions people perform or the character traits they exhibit. We might well want to be virtue ethicists of a kind, but many of the traits we might want to consider desirable in persons can't be shared by all potential persons, and those that can, such as being free and rational, are already shared by all free, rational agents, so it isn't clear how we could say a person ought to be. So instead we ought to focus on actions, but do we focus on the consequences of our actions or the form our actions take? We may want to be deontologists and say that people ought to only act in certain ways or according to certain maxims. But the problem with this is that maxims are always arbitrarily defined, in that a maxim that says "don't kill" could be made better if it included an exception for when the person you are killing is trying to kill you and you are defending yourself, but it could be made even better by including an exception for cases where killing that person prevents the death of five others who are in morally similar circumstances, and so on and so on until our maxims describe the situation we are in and what to do in it perfectly. This of course leads to the distinction between acting and letting happen, and it isn't clear how we can draw a clear distinction between something that happens because you did something and something that happens because you stood by. Without having a strong way to morally distinguish action from inaction, it seems we ought to be consequentialists.

So, we have a consequentialist theory with the ability of persons to understand and make their own decisions as the measure of moral value. This means that when acting we ought to ensure we do not violate the freedom of others over their own choices, unless we must do so in order to prevent a greater violation of freedom which could not be prevented without at least this much of a violation occurring, and we have some degree of obligation (which I discuss in it's own chapter but won't get into here) to prevent or reduce such violations. What this means in practice is that determining what to do in a moral situation is not a matter of weighing happiness, following strict and unchanging rules or considering what kind of person acts in a certain way, it is a matter of allowing persons to make their own choices. To give a few examples of practical implications:

* Lying can be wrong in some circumstances such as fraud where it denies the person the ability to understand the choice they are making, but it is not wrong in most circumstances.
* Adultery (assuming there aren't any STIs involved) is a personal issue, not a moral one.
* Parents do not have a right to decide what happens to their children, rather they have an obligation to protect their child until it is capable of making its own choices and to act in its best interests when they must make decisions for it in the interim.
* The role of a government is to first protect its people and then to act in their interests especially when making decisions regarding shared property.
* Nothing can ever be offensive enough that we ought to violate the freedom of a person to say it.

Looking forward to reading all the ways in which you disagree with me.
Thanks for your time.
Dan.

Are you excluding the mentally challenged, people in prison and women in traditionally oppressive societies like Saudi Arabia, from personhood?
Daniel McKay
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Re: An argument for a new normative theory (abridged version

Post by Daniel McKay »

I am not excluding the latter two. As for the "mentally challenged", I am not excluding those who I suspect you are talk about, but without being more specific I'm not sure. There are some degrees of "mental challenge" that I would definitely be excluding, such as anencephaly, but assuming that you just mean the moderately intellectually disabled, then no I'm not.
Spraticus
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Re: An argument for a new normative theory (abridged version

Post by Spraticus »

Daniel McKay wrote:I am not excluding the latter two. As for the "mentally challenged", I am not excluding those who I suspect you are talk about, but without being more specific I'm not sure. There are some degrees of "mental challenge" that I would definitely be excluding, such as anencephaly, but assuming that you just mean the moderately intellectually disabled, then no I'm not.

Obviously I'm considering the capacity of a person to act morally, and this is clearly separate from their capacity to make moral judgements. A Saudi woman can make a judgement but may not be free to act on it.

At one time I worked in special education, both with pupils described as "maladjusted" and in a school for children who, in old fashioned terms, had an IQ below 70. Both groups had an impaired ability to make moral judgements and the maladjusted certainly had an impaired ability to act on them because of the rage and fear that dominated their lives.
Daniel McKay
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Joined: October 26th, 2015, 9:05 pm

Re: An argument for a new normative theory (abridged version

Post by Daniel McKay »

A Saudi woman in the circumstances I suspect you are thinking of does not stop being a moral agent. She still has rationality and free will. Rather it is her freedom, her ability to understand and make choices, that is restricted. It is this restriction, this violation, that my theory treats as the "bad" in the world.

Yeah that is a complicated topic. The issue of having impaired ability to make moral judgments is tricky because often people say "make moral judgments" when they mean something like "empathize" or "have the same moral intuitions as others" which is going to be quite a different issue. Also, as it is the actions of persons which are morally relevant, not their judgments, it isn't always important how good a person's moral compass is. But as to whether a human is a person, whether they are free and rational, it is a murky area but there is no reason to think that rationality begins and ends at a normally functioning adult human. So long as someone can understand their own choices, then it seems to be they are a rational agent.
Eduk
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Re: An argument for a new normative theory (abridged version

Post by Eduk »

So long as someone can understand their own choices, then it seems to be they are a rational agent.
I think this is the point really. How many people understand their own choices? For example no one 100% understands 100% of their choices, I would suggest there is a sliding scale of how much understanding of how many choices which different people have. To give an example I would understand covering of women's heads differently than many women who cover their heads. And to give a mundane example, why do you use the knot you use to tie your shoelaces?
Unknown means unknown.
Nick_A
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Re: An argument for a new normative theory (abridged version

Post by Nick_A »

Hi Dan. Since you are working on a serious thesis, I’d like to recommend Simone Weil’s essay. She asserts the importance of society and its morals reflecting the needs of the inner man as essential for promoting freedom. It isn’t an easy read but you may find some ideas being useful to include in your thesis. I hope all goes well

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/questionofgod/voices/weil.html
In this 1943 essay, written during the last year of her life, which she spent working with Gen. de Gaulle in the struggle for French liberation, Weil makes the case for the existence of a transcendent and universal moral law, and describes the social responsibilities that accompany it.
Man would like to be an egoist and cannot. This is the most striking characteristic of his wretchedness and the source of his greatness." Simone Weil....Gravity and Grace
Fooloso4
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Re: An argument for a new normative theory (abridged version

Post by Fooloso4 »

Dan, what is it that you think is “entirely new” here?

As to the question of moral value and how one ought to act, your answer is freely with regard to their own things. Freedom thus stands as both a necessary condition for and end for which morality exists. Absent from this view is the concept of good and bad. Are we to conclude that whatever promotes freedom is good and whatever thwarts it is bad? But what if what I do in the exercise of my freedom is harmful to me? Do you address the question of how I ought to act with regard to considerations other than freedom?

Since you take a consequentialist position, the question can be framed as follows: what consequences should be taken into consideration? Are we to say that as long as the consequences allow for freedom other things are of little or no consequence?

Another way to address the problem is to ask about the relationship between freedom and the good. Being a rational agent is not a sufficient condition for making good choices. But it seems as though the problem of good choices is outside the sphere of morality, since morality is to be understood as a matter the freedom to choose without regard to consideration of whether those choices are good or not.
Daniel McKay
Posts: 56
Joined: October 26th, 2015, 9:05 pm

Re: An argument for a new normative theory (abridged version

Post by Daniel McKay »

Nick: Thanks, that is helpful.

Fooloso: We are to conclude that which violates ones freedom over that which belongs to them is bad, and that which prevents or reduces this violation is good. What do you mean by good choices? Morally good choices are those which have good consequences, good choices from the perspective of the individual I would agree are outside the sphere of morality.

Eduk: You are taking way too harsh a definition of understand. I need not understand the myriad reasons that contribute to the knot I use to tie my shoelaces (though I think I actually have a very good understanding of that reason: it's a knot I can do easily, am familiar with as it's close to the knot I was taught to tie my shoelaces with and a knot which will keep them for a few weeks at a time) in order to understand the choice to do so. As for covering one's head, one need not understand all the cultural significance of doing so, so long as one understands the choice of covering one's head with cloth. However, interestingly I suspect that many practices of that nature are, in some circumstances, done under threat of punishment from a god, and, as this threat is a false one, being coerced through not properly understanding their choices. Of course, that isn't to say that all religious people maintain their practices because they believe they will go to a hell otherwise, but it certainly seems likely that this is the case for at least a minority of religious believers.
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Rediscovering the Wisdom of Human Nature: How Civilization Destroys Happiness
by Chet Shupe
March 2023

The Unfakeable Code®

The Unfakeable Code®
by Tony Jeton Selimi
April 2023

The Book: On the Taboo Against Knowing Who You Are

The Book: On the Taboo Against Knowing Who You Are
by Alan Watts
May 2023

Killing Abel

Killing Abel
by Michael Tieman
June 2023

Reconfigurement: Reconfiguring Your Life at Any Stage and Planning Ahead

Reconfigurement: Reconfiguring Your Life at Any Stage and Planning Ahead
by E. Alan Fleischauer
July 2023

First Survivor: The Impossible Childhood Cancer Breakthrough

First Survivor: The Impossible Childhood Cancer Breakthrough
by Mark Unger
August 2023

Predictably Irrational

Predictably Irrational
by Dan Ariely
September 2023

Artwords

Artwords
by Beatriz M. Robles
November 2023

Fireproof Happiness: Extinguishing Anxiety & Igniting Hope

Fireproof Happiness: Extinguishing Anxiety & Igniting Hope
by Dr. Randy Ross
December 2023

Beyond the Golden Door: Seeing the American Dream Through an Immigrant's Eyes

Beyond the Golden Door: Seeing the American Dream Through an Immigrant's Eyes
by Ali Master
February 2024

2022 Philosophy Books of the Month

Emotional Intelligence At Work

Emotional Intelligence At Work
by Richard M Contino & Penelope J Holt
January 2022

Free Will, Do You Have It?

Free Will, Do You Have It?
by Albertus Kral
February 2022

My Enemy in Vietnam

My Enemy in Vietnam
by Billy Springer
March 2022

2X2 on the Ark

2X2 on the Ark
by Mary J Giuffra, PhD
April 2022

The Maestro Monologue

The Maestro Monologue
by Rob White
May 2022

What Makes America Great

What Makes America Great
by Bob Dowell
June 2022

The Truth Is Beyond Belief!

The Truth Is Beyond Belief!
by Jerry Durr
July 2022

Living in Color

Living in Color
by Mike Murphy
August 2022 (tentative)

The Not So Great American Novel

The Not So Great American Novel
by James E Doucette
September 2022

Mary Jane Whiteley Coggeshall, Hicksite Quaker, Iowa/National Suffragette And Her Speeches

Mary Jane Whiteley Coggeshall, Hicksite Quaker, Iowa/National Suffragette And Her Speeches
by John N. (Jake) Ferris
October 2022

In It Together: The Beautiful Struggle Uniting Us All

In It Together: The Beautiful Struggle Uniting Us All
by Eckhart Aurelius Hughes
November 2022

The Smartest Person in the Room: The Root Cause and New Solution for Cybersecurity

The Smartest Person in the Room
by Christian Espinosa
December 2022

2021 Philosophy Books of the Month

The Biblical Clock: The Untold Secrets Linking the Universe and Humanity with God's Plan

The Biblical Clock
by Daniel Friedmann
March 2021

Wilderness Cry: A Scientific and Philosophical Approach to Understanding God and the Universe

Wilderness Cry
by Dr. Hilary L Hunt M.D.
April 2021

Fear Not, Dream Big, & Execute: Tools To Spark Your Dream And Ignite Your Follow-Through

Fear Not, Dream Big, & Execute
by Jeff Meyer
May 2021

Surviving the Business of Healthcare: Knowledge is Power

Surviving the Business of Healthcare
by Barbara Galutia Regis M.S. PA-C
June 2021

Winning the War on Cancer: The Epic Journey Towards a Natural Cure

Winning the War on Cancer
by Sylvie Beljanski
July 2021

Defining Moments of a Free Man from a Black Stream

Defining Moments of a Free Man from a Black Stream
by Dr Frank L Douglas
August 2021

If Life Stinks, Get Your Head Outta Your Buts

If Life Stinks, Get Your Head Outta Your Buts
by Mark L. Wdowiak
September 2021

The Preppers Medical Handbook

The Preppers Medical Handbook
by Dr. William W Forgey M.D.
October 2021

Natural Relief for Anxiety and Stress: A Practical Guide

Natural Relief for Anxiety and Stress
by Dr. Gustavo Kinrys, MD
November 2021

Dream For Peace: An Ambassador Memoir

Dream For Peace
by Dr. Ghoulem Berrah
December 2021