Morality of id versus morality of ego

[Fooloso4]

Gertie:

Churchland talk introducing ideas she covers in her book Brain Trust

I just finished watching. A few comments:

Churchland makes the distinction I have been emphasizing between evolutionary explanations and biological explanations. First, with regard to the moles. Evolutionary advantage cannot be the explanation for pair bonding because some do and some don’t, the difference has something to do receptors. There was also the suggestion that sociality has an important ecological element, as with the Orangutan. Second, she is critical of inferences from current behavior to some evolutionary story. There are too many factors and variability. Some common behaviors, she points out, may be the result of good solutions to common problems.

I agree with her assessment of Sam Harris. Even on this forum there are some who claim that we now possess or will soon possess answers to moral questions based on biology. She supports a form of relativism, and later said to pluralism might be a better term.

I thought the picture of the adult video sign next to the sign that Jesus is watching was funny. Not the intended meaning but one might think it is saying that Jesus is watching adult videos. We might ask what we are supposed to conclude from Jesus watching us watching porn, or more generally what we should conclude from the idea that Jesus is watching. It seems to be more a matter of compliance (coercion?) for not doing what one already believes is wrong than a moral guide.

[Gertie]

Churchland makes the distinction I have been emphasizing between evolutionary explanations and biological explanations. First, with regard to the moles. Evolutionary advantage cannot be the explanation for pair bonding because some do and some don’t, the difference has something to do receptors.

Yeah, uptake of oxytocin/vasopressin as I recall, facilitating mate pair-bonding, in a similar way to oxytocin facilitating mother-offspring bonding. I can't remember the details of the mole story off-hand, but I think the two different species are found in different types of environments, which might explain the evolutionary advantage for one species.

On your larger point of the distinction between evolutionary explanations and biological explanations, I hadn't grasped that, and I don't know if we're disagreeing or not, can you explain it some more?

There was also the suggestion that sociality has an important ecological element, as with the Orangutan.

Right.

Maybe I've given the impression I, or Churchland, believe that all behaviour can be finely correlated to specific evolutionary adaptations, in my enthusiasm to point out that we have a naturalistic explanation for the under-pinnings of what came to be seen as an objective 'Thing In Itself' called Morality?

What I'm saying is that we no longer need to think of morality as A Thing In Itself which can be discovered and gotten objectively right through applying Reason. Or has to be explained by a an outside source like God. Because natural explanations rooted in evolved impulses 'sculpted' by experience and culture can now explain our intuitions that some things are objectively Right and some are objectively Wrong.

Second, she is critical of inferences from current behavior to some evolutionary story. There are too many factors and variability. Some common behaviors, she points out, may be the result of good solutions to common problems.

I'm wary of neat evolutionary psychology Just So stories too, and take the point about people in different times and places finding similar good solutions. But I don't dismiss the fact that there seem to be broad cross-cultural commonalities which could well be at least partially rooted in evolved instinct. It doesn't have to be either/or. The vid of the monkeys above is showing two individual monkeys cooperating to achieve a goal, and sharing the spoils. Is that because they've thought through a good solution, or is it it pure evolved instinct, or something more nuanced which involves a bit of both? My own view is the backstory of even a simple interaction like that will be complex and interwoven with lots of other stories.

I agree with her assessment of Sam Harris. Even on this forum there are some who claim that we now possess or will soon possess answers to moral questions based on biology. She supports a form of relativism, and later said to pluralism might be a better term.

My opinion is that Harris expressed a very simple and powerful truth and put in a beautiful nutshell when he spoke about morality being to do with the well-being of conscious creatures. It's something I'd been thinking about, but couldn't put it so succinctly and directly. But his attempts to 'scientise' a coherent and consistent normative morality, even one with lots of different types of hills and troughs, while something worth exploring, I'm iffy about. But then no philosopher imo has been completely convincing in coming up with that.

And as we come to understand the adaptive, kludgy evolved under-pinnings of human moral intuitions, it makes sense why philosophy has struggled. Pluralism is understandable in the context of basic tendencies being triggered or sculpted by experience, environment and culture, but is it the best we can do? Personally I think the work of Churchland et al will undermine another of our Certainties as it seeps into popular understanding, the education system and so on. People like Certainties, and I think loss of Moral Certainties will leave an important gap which it takes maturity to handle. Pluralism is one answer, but perhaps we need someone like Harris to give us some replacement framework.

[Fooloso4]

Gertie:

Yeah, uptake of oxytocin/vasopressin as I recall, facilitating mate pair-bonding, in a similar way to oxytocin facilitating mother-offspring bonding. I can't remember the details of the mole story off-hand, but I think the two different species are found in different types of environments, which might explain the evolutionary advantage for one species.

On your larger point of the distinction between evolutionary explanations and biological explanations, I hadn't grasped that, and I don't know if we're disagreeing or not, can you explain it some more?

She did not discuss why they differ or if there was an evolutionary advantage for the species that did not pair bond. I think it important to note that not every difference makes a difference in terms of evolutionary advantage, although it may be that this one does. Some biological differences can help explain behavior without necessarily having an evolutionary advantage.

We should be cautious about giving evolutionary stories to account for every behavior that seems to have a biological correlate. It is the biology that provides the actual object to observe and experiment with. I don’t think we are disagreeing. My point is that the biology offers hard evidence and some of the evolutionary stories, as Churchland points out, are just making stuff up.

Maybe I've given the impression I, or Churchland, believe that all behaviour can be finely correlated to specific evolutionary adaptations, in my enthusiasm to point out that we have a naturalistic explanation for the under-pinnings of what came to be seen as an objective 'Thing In Itself' called Morality?

That is not the impression I got from what you said and Churchland was clear about the importance of culture, but said it was something that others are better equipped to deal with.

Because natural explanations rooted in evolved impulses 'sculpted' by experience and culture can now explain our intuitions that some things are objectively Right and some are objectively Wrong.

Churchland uses the example of the Inuit practice of infanticide. She does not judge this as objectively wrong but an acceptable practice under certain conditions.

But I don't dismiss the fact that there seem to be broad cross-cultural commonalities which could well be at least partially rooted in evolved instinct. It doesn't have to be either/or.

Right, a complex question that does not yield a simple solution. For the longest time the emphasis was on human nature, that changed with the work of cultural anthropology, and then culture was everything and human nature denied. More recently we have come to see that both play a role. The nature/nurture debate has resolved in a similar way.

The vid of the monkeys above is showing two individual monkeys cooperating to achieve a goal, and sharing the spoils. Is that because they've thought through a good solution, or is it it pure evolved instinct, or something more nuanced which involves a bit of both?

I sometimes watch the squirrels try to get the seed out of the birdfeeders. It is the intelligence of humans building squirrel proof feeders versus the intelligence of squirrels. I do not know what is going on in their minds but it does look like they are problem solving. It involves trial and error and persistence. I do not think there is a strong distinction between acting and thinking.

Pluralism is understandable in the context of basic tendencies being triggered or sculpted by experience, environment and culture, but is it the best we can do?

I do not think that moral uncertainty and disagreement is something we are likely to overcome. How, for example, might we resolve the question of abortion?

[Gertie]

We should be cautious about giving evolutionary stories to account for every behavior that seems to have a biological correlate. It is the biology that provides the actual object to observe and experiment with. I don’t think we are disagreeing. My point is that the biology offers hard evidence and some of the evolutionary stories, as Churchland points out, are just making stuff up.

Ah gotcha.

Yes I think we pretty much agree overall.

Right, a complex question that does not yield a simple solution. For the longest time the emphasis was on human nature, that changed with the work of cultural anthropology, and then culture was everything and human nature denied. More recently we have come to see that both play a role. The nature/nurture debate has resolved in a similar way.

Exactly. Inherent tendencies manifested in brain structures, endlessly sculpted back and forth by experience manifested in patterns of neural connectivity, possible in sophisticated critters like us born with plenty of brain plasticity/ ability to learn. Unimaginably complex in detail, but we can get big picture ideas of what's going on.

Pluralism is understandable in the context of basic tendencies being triggered or sculpted by experience, environment and culture, but is it the best we can do?

I do not think that moral uncertainty and disagreement is something we are likely to overcome. How, for example, might we resolve the question of abortion?

I dunno. What would Aristotle say?

But at least I think I know why I dunno!

Like some others around here, I have a theory! Here's how I'm thinking about it, still a work in progress, and I'd be interested in your
thoughts -

Conscious experience is what brings potential Oughts into a world of Ises (the Ises being of the type Churchland describes).
Because it brings Value and Meaning and Mattering into the world. In other words it brings Subjective Qualiative properties into a world which is otherwise only able to be described in Objective Quantitive terms.

So it Matters how I behave towards you, because it can impact on your Quality of life, your qualiative experiences (as opposed to how I behave towards a rock or toaster or tree). My actions can cause you to suffer, or be happy and so on.

And you have inherent Value, because of your ability to consciously experience a quality of life (unlike a rock, toaster or tree).

To summarise -

Your conscious qualiative states entail you having interests in the state of affairs, which I can affect. Therefore my
actions can Matter to you. And my actions Mattering entails me having Oughts. Same applies to all critters with a quality of life.


Maybe such a framing should be called Mattering rather than Morality (I nicked this idea of Mattering from Goldstein), but I think it works as a basis for Oughts. And it isn't undermined by issues of Subjectivity vs Objectivity, or how it arose, through evolution. It still Matters anyway.


But can it answer specific questions, like abortion? I don't think it can give clear cut rules, because by its very nature qualiative experience isn't neatly and objectively quantifiable. That's Harris's problem, and why all attempts at objective exceptionless rule based morality inevitably stumble imo. And why they must fail, according to my Mattering framing. It's apples and oranges, Objective and Subjective, Quantitive and Qualiative. That's why weighing the benefits and harms to the pregnant woman can't be perfectly calculated and given a number, a formula, and then weighed against the benefits and harms to the foetus. (It's particularly complicated in the case of abortion, because we're talking about greater potential harms and benefits for the foetus (a potential quality of life) vs existing lesser quality of life benefits and harms for the woman).

And quality of life can be experienced in many different types of ways,of 'flavours', not directly comparable/quantifiable. So while it feels easy to answer (quantify/calculate) a question like - Ought I to disbenefit myself by ruining my clothes jumping into a pond to save a drowning toddler (Singer's example) in terms of qualiative harms and benefits , it's not so easy compare in a calcuable way many different types flavours of experience in less extreme cases.

[Belindi]

Gertie wrote:

Maybe such a framing should be called Mattering rather than Morality (I nicked this idea of Mattering from Goldstein), but I think it works as a basis for Oughts. And it isn't undermined by issues of Subjectivity vs Objectivity, or how it arose, through evolution. It still Matters anyway.


But can it answer specific questions, like abortion? I don't think it can give clear cut rules, because by its very nature qualiative experience isn't neatly and objectively quantifiable. That's Harris's problem, and why all attempts at objective exceptionless rule based morality inevitably stumble imo. And why they must fail, according to my Mattering framing. It's apples and oranges, Objective and Subjective, Quantitive and Qualiative. That's why weighing the benefits and harms to the pregnant woman can't be perfectly calculated and given a number, a formula, and then weighed against the benefits and harms to the foetus. (It's particularly complicated in the case of abortion, because we're talking about greater potential harms and benefits for the foetus (a potential quality of life) vs existing lesser quality of life benefits and harms for the woman).

Thank you Gertie for the term 'Mattering' to substitute for 'Morality' . When 'morality' is discussed on these pages it seems not to apply to how morality is an anthropological concept. As an anthropological concept 'morality' refers to descriptive and explanatory facts that relate to the structure of specified societies.

How Mattering can answer specific questions such as abortion is a large part of the human condition which is existential angst. We who take mattering seriously have the responsibility to live our decisions on such questions as abortion. Inauthentic people are not so much those who don't think at all as those who concede to the authority of such as big money, politicians, and priests.

For myself I tend to rest upon basic therapeutic criteria of relieving suffering and prolonging life. I doubt if anyone except possibly Buddha is capable of absolute authenticity.

[Fooloso4]

Gertie:

(Nested quote removed.)


I do not think that moral uncertainty and disagreement is something we are likely to overcome. How, for example, might we resolve the question of abortion?

I dunno. What would Aristotle say?

On abortion, I don’t know. It is not something that I have looked at carefully, and with Aristotle all things must be looked at carefully before reaching a conclusion. As to morality in general it is a large question. Key elements are the development of good character and habits, moderation, prudence, and practical wisdom. I think Aristotle is within the Socratic tradition of zetetic skepticism kept hidden by a salutary public teaching. In other words, the best we can do is is not the attainment of some ideal of moral certainty, but rather, the cultivation of individuals who can practice moral deliberation responsibly and give the rest norms to be followed.

Your conscious qualiative states entail you having interests in the state of affairs, which I can affect. Therefore my actions can Matter to you. And my actions Mattering entails me having Oughts. Same applies to all critters with a quality of life.

If I understand you correctly, the ought is not established via the reasoning, that is, it is not that I ought to do this because I deduce it from the principle that human life has inherent value. It is, rather, that I recognize, or perhaps empathize or sympathize (feel with), at a pre-deliberative level that other humans and animals are things for which things matter. So, it is not a question of why we ought to care but that we naturally do. To use Hume’s language the ought is the is.

But can it answer specific questions, like abortion? I don't think it can give clear cut rules, because by its very nature qualiative experience isn't neatly and objectively quantifiable.

If what I said above is correct then mattering is the ground of morality but not a rational ground. That we value is part of our nature, but what we value is a matter of choice and involves culture and deliberation. That is to say, it is historically determined. We tend to see this in terms of progress. If we accept this the question is whether we will progress to a point where we have satisfactory answers to our moral questions, and if so, whether that will only be a temporary stage of stability. On the other hand, many of the ethical questions that arise today are due to the advances of in technology, and so, as technology advances new ethical problems may arise.

So while it feels easy to answer (quantify/calculate) a question like - Ought I to disbenefit myself by ruining my clothes jumping into a pond to save a drowning toddler (Singer's example) in terms of qualiative harms and benefits , it's not so easy compare in a calcuable way many different types flavours of experience in less extreme cases.

In the discussion portion of the Churchland video they talk about the “Trolley Problem”. Churchland and someone in the audience (who they all knew and I am guessing works in the field of ethics) were critical of such problems because although they seem to present real life situations they are not. They tell us nothing about how we might actually act in the moment or what considerations might come into play. But then again, how we might act leaves open the question of whether we acted morally.

[Gertie]

Belindi

I like Mattering too. It's something Goldstein has been exploring, she talks about it more here in an Edge article if you're interested, tho it's a bit long and rambly https://www.edge.org/conversation/rebec ... g-instinct


Fooloso

Your conscious qualiative states entail you having interests in the state of affairs, which I can affect. Therefore my actions can Matter to you. And my actions Mattering entails me having Oughts. Same applies to all critters with a quality of life.

If I understand you correctly, the ought is not established via the reasoning, that is, it is not that I ought to do this because I deduce it from the principle that human life has inherent value. It is, rather, that I recognize, or perhaps empathize or sympathize (feel with), at a pre-deliberative level that other humans and animals are things for which things matter. So, it is not a question of why we ought to care but that we naturally do. To use Hume’s language the ought is the is.

Both really. But yes it should lead you to Oughts based on the principle that people possess something of inherent value, or at least something that matters, because they have qualiative conscious experience (a quality of life). Let me try to put it more clearly -

We now have an understanding of the evolved roots of what came to be seen as objectively existing Oughts (discoverable either through rationality, or a perfect moral law giver (God). This means we have to re-think what an Ought is, and whether it's still a viable concept. A different type of approach might be required. This is where Mattering comes in.

My suggestion for the foundation for a new in principle approach to Oughts is to stop worrying about Subjective vs Objective. And begin with the brute fact that conscious experience has certain inherent properties which bring certain properties into existence. These are properties associated with the qualiative realm of Value, Meaning and Mattering.

The reality of this is that you have a quality of life (you can experience pleasure and pain, fulfilment and frustration, well-being and harm, etc). As can I. It matters to each of us what our qualiative experiences are. We lose something when we die, because we lose our ability to experience a quality of life. The prevailing state of affairs affects our quality of life, it matters. We have interests, a stake in how things are which affect us.

Therefore it's desirable (Good) to have a prevailing state of affairs which promotes a fulfilling and desirable quality of life for those who will be affected by the state of affairs.

Therefore we Ought to try to bring about a state of affairs which brings positive desirable effects to the quality of life of conscious beings capable of experiencing a quality of life (which will vary from individual to individual, and species to species)


So this is a suggestion for an underlying Principle to guide Oughts, required because science has undermined our old certainties about Objective Morality. And an answer to the problem, Without God/Objective Morality, all is permissable. But it's not a prescriptive set of rules, because desirable qualiative properties vary, and by their nature aren't amenable to being objectively quantified. (So it doesn't put Aristotle out of a job )

Does that make more sense? Would you say it looks philosophically sound? Or at least has the makings of a new type of theory of morality/mattering? I'd appreciate your thoughts, if you have any.

[Fooloso4]

Gertie:

The reality of this is that you have a quality of life (you can experience pleasure and pain, fulfilment and frustration, well-being and harm, etc). As can I. It matters to each of us what our qualiative experiences are. We lose something when we die, because we lose our ability to experience a quality of life. The prevailing state of affairs affects our quality of life, it matters. We have interests, a stake in how things are which affect us.

Therefore it's desirable (Good) to have a prevailing state of affairs which promotes a fulfilling and desirable quality of life for those who will be affected by the state of affairs.

Therefore we Ought to try to bring about a state of affairs which brings positive desirable effects to the quality of life of conscious beings capable of experiencing a quality of life (which will vary from individual to individual, and species to species)

I agree, but 1) despite the term ‘qualiative experience’ I don’t see where you are saying anything new, and 2) I question whether anyone who does not already care about others will do so as a result of the argument. I either already recognize that things matter to me and to others and act accordingly, or it does not matter to me that things matter to others.

Put differently, I do not think that there can be a persuasive rational argument for being moral. Anyone who asks why be moral betrays the fact that it matters for them. (I have had this conversation in this forum, and those who claim to be amoral eventually admit that they are not.) It is not as if I would have no regard others prior to the argument but be convinced that I ought to afterwards. Those who have no regard for others are not going to find it as the result of argument. There might, however, be some room for persuasion with regard to who one thinks matters, who one regards as worthy of moral consideration.

So this is a suggestion for an underlying Principle to guide Oughts, required because science has undermined our old certainties about Objective Morality. And an answer to the problem, Without God/Objective Morality, all is permissable. But it's not a prescriptive set of rules, because desirable qualiative properties vary, and by their nature aren't amenable to being objectively quantified. (So it doesn't put Aristotle out of a job )

I do not think the main problem is that without moral certainties all is permissible, but rather that there is no clear guide as to what is or is not permissible. I do not think the challenge is to demonstrate that people ought to be moral, but to figure out what we ought to do in this or that case.

[Gertie]

Thanks for the feedback Fooloso, I appreciate you taking the time. Don't feel obliged to continue, but here's how I'd respond.

I agree, but 1) despite the term ‘qualiative experience’ I don’t see where you are saying anything new,

Maybe not, I haven't seen any formulation quite like it myself, but it's essentially a mash up of Harris' 'Well-being of conscious creatures' and Goldstein's 'Mattering'. I also think it explains why philosophy can't come up with exceptionless hard and fast moral rules, and ties that together in a neat way with my justification of Oughts.

2) I question whether anyone who does not already care about others will do so as a result of the argument. I either already recognize that things matter to me and to others and act accordingly, or it does not matter to me that things matter to others.

Largely agree, but I wouldn't say that means there's no role for a philosophical justification. And such philosophical justifications can seep into popular thinking via academia, and become influential to a degree in how people think about things. (That's why I gave Dan the thesis chap a hard time over his claim that Freedom is objectively moral, such claims can get traction and have influence through academia).

Put differently, I do not think that there can be a persuasive rational argument for being moral.

My point is that this might no longer be the appropriate way to think about Oughts. If science now tells us that they are not grounded in objective truth, getting an Ought might not be achievable via rationality. Oughts might be more appropriately be addressed in terms of Mattering. Why does it matter how I treat you or you treat me? Because you and I have a quality of life and it matters to us.

I do not think the main problem is that without moral certainties all is permissible, but rather that there is no clear guide as to what is or is not permissible. I do not think the challenge is to demonstrate that people ought to be moral, but to figure out what we ought to do in this or that case.

Yes, and I don't provide a solution to that, just a framework in which to ask the questions, but I do explain why a perfect solution isn't possible.

[Fooloso4]

Gertie:

Maybe not, I haven't seen any formulation quite like it myself …

I haven’t either. I do not want to discourage you from your own formulation. Perhaps it is more that we are thinking along similar lines. I guess my own view developed from my own experience and through Aristotle ancient Chinese philosophers.

Quick story: When I was young I had an argument with my father. He told me what I ought to do and I asked why. He could not answer the question but from the way he looked at me I found the answer. It matters. (I just doubted myself and wondered whether I put it in these terms because of our discussion and so I went back and found a version of the story I told before):

I remember when I was young I challenged my father to tell me why I should be good or maybe it was to prove that anything was good or right (I can’t remember my age or exactly how I put the question). He just looked at me. He did not answer in words but the look on his face told me all I needed to know. It showed a complex of emotions that included love, concern, and worry that told me it matters. Without words he conveyed the knowledge that it matters.
(A dialogue concerning Hume's is/ought problem #4)

[Gertie]

That's a good story . And it's true, this is a large part of the reality of how we form our views, I think. Something which has always stuck with me was a convo with my Dad, where I was criticising a corny celeb on the radio which cool teenage me didn't like and my Dad said he does a lot for charity, and I instinctively belittled it, saying he can afford it, he makes sure everybody knows, blah blah, and my Dad just let it go with a look. And for some reason it niggled at me for ages, till my mean-spiritedness sunk in, and I realised I'd rather be the sort of person my Dad is. I'm not, but it makes me want to try. Just a daft little thing like that, when I've completely forgotten much much more serious things. And any philosophical argument pales in comparison. It's weird what gets under our skin, hits a nerve.

Perhaps it is more that we are thinking along similar lines.

Yeah could be. To me it's a fancy way of stating the bleedin obvious, but then some people just don't seem to get it, or see things quite differently. These kind of ideas are under serious challenge right now across the west. And I think it's good to have the language available to crystalise what you kinda know, like the 'naming' thing, it makes it more concrete, real, and easier to point to, defend.

It sort of validates Aristotle too, in that there's no neat formula for answering questions which matter.

I'm wondering if it might tie in nicely with Rawls' Veil of Ignorance, as a practical application, but haven't given it much thought yet. It strikes me that up close and personal we do pretty well, it's the dissipation-with-distance of the biological mechanisms problem which is where we struggle most. Usually manifested in Public policy issues. The Veil of Ignorance works like an empathy prompt, making us look at quality of life issues of others as if they're our own. Ish.

-- Updated February 21st, 2017, 11:58 am to add the following --

Anyway thanks for the chance to talk it through, it at least helps me clarify my thoughts.

[Belindi]

Gertie, and Fooloso4, Thanks for your stories. I've had one or two rough corners knocked off me by a respected relative.