Re: Some questions about ethics
Posted: May 12th, 2017, 8:48 am
To -1-
-1-, let me see if I understand. You view human morality as comprising two parts, personal morals and social morals. Personal morals are the direct product of genetics or DNA; they cannot be altered, being as they are “codified in genes.” In any case of conflict between them and social morals, personal morals will invariably govern the outcome. They are not, as Achim has suggested, the product of human choice or decision; it would seem rather that they underlay human choice or decision.
Social morals, on the other hand, vary from community to community, although there may be some precepts which are common to all communities. Social morals take the form of commandments, and they, unlike personal morals, can be acted against, or resisted. They are therefore weaker than personal morals.
If all of this appears correct to you, then consider this. It seems to me erroneous to call “personal morals” morals at all. Morality indicates, nay, presupposes, the possibility of choice or of alternatives. Supposing someone taps my knee, and I, without wishing to, kick him in the face. This cannot be considered a moral act, because I had no command over it, while it would be considered a moral act if I willingly kick a person who has insulted me. Or consider again: if I enter a person’s house and spit on his floor, that would be taken as an act of provocation or insult—a moral act. But if I am overcome by a fit of nausea and even vomit on his floor, that would be merely an embarrassment; no normal person would hold me accountable for this, because it was not an act of choice. Therefore, since “personal morals” are neither the object nor the consequence of choice, they are in fact better understood as personal impulses, personal instincts. It would seem, then, that morality is in fact reducible to social morals alone.
Does this seem correct to you?
To Spectrum—
The unit by which we should take our moral bearings is therefore not the species, but that part of the species which is capable of preserving our ways and our good: not the species, but Western society, should be the standard of reference.
And so again—does it not seem that the society, rather than the species, is the more natural standard of reference, in contemplating morality?
-1-, let me see if I understand. You view human morality as comprising two parts, personal morals and social morals. Personal morals are the direct product of genetics or DNA; they cannot be altered, being as they are “codified in genes.” In any case of conflict between them and social morals, personal morals will invariably govern the outcome. They are not, as Achim has suggested, the product of human choice or decision; it would seem rather that they underlay human choice or decision.
Social morals, on the other hand, vary from community to community, although there may be some precepts which are common to all communities. Social morals take the form of commandments, and they, unlike personal morals, can be acted against, or resisted. They are therefore weaker than personal morals.
If all of this appears correct to you, then consider this. It seems to me erroneous to call “personal morals” morals at all. Morality indicates, nay, presupposes, the possibility of choice or of alternatives. Supposing someone taps my knee, and I, without wishing to, kick him in the face. This cannot be considered a moral act, because I had no command over it, while it would be considered a moral act if I willingly kick a person who has insulted me. Or consider again: if I enter a person’s house and spit on his floor, that would be taken as an act of provocation or insult—a moral act. But if I am overcome by a fit of nausea and even vomit on his floor, that would be merely an embarrassment; no normal person would hold me accountable for this, because it was not an act of choice. Therefore, since “personal morals” are neither the object nor the consequence of choice, they are in fact better understood as personal impulses, personal instincts. It would seem, then, that morality is in fact reducible to social morals alone.
Does this seem correct to you?
To Spectrum—
To what extent can we resist or alter our “DNA programming” through our adoption of a given morality?Spectrum wrote:[In] general it is always the species that drives the survival at all costs and this is already programmed in the DNA of the living thing.
Given this logic, what would stop me from arguing as follows? Our Western society is clearly distinct from all other human societies, and particularly from more primitive or pre-industrial societies. Only in our Western society has it been possible to establish functioning democracies. This suggests a fundamental division between our society and the other societies of the world. If these other societies can expedite their evolution to be like Westerners, we could group them within the same collective, but until such a time as that, it is useless and worse than useless to consider them as part of our collective.Spectrum wrote:Why I used "species" is because the human species is evident a very distinct species with special mental abilities. If the higher primate can expedite their evolution to be like humans, I would group them within the same collective in consideration of Morality issues.
The unit by which we should take our moral bearings is therefore not the species, but that part of the species which is capable of preserving our ways and our good: not the species, but Western society, should be the standard of reference.
It is not clear to me that a bee who perishes for the sake of her colony, is perforce perishing for the sake of her species. Here is empirical evidence. Bee colonies, like human societies, war with one another: a strong bee colony will enter a weak one to rob it of its honey, often killing many of the bees, and sometimes the entire hive, in the process. Human beings, it goes without saying, indulge similar behaviors in their societies. Ants and chimpanzees both follow similar patterns. Now, all of this would be patently absurd, maybe even impossible, if the primary “genetic program” of these groups were to preserve their species, rather than their own society, their own “colony.” Just as no bee will ever massacre her sisters in order to rob the honey of her own hive, and just as only the rarest human beings will murder what they regard as their brethren for the sake of gain or personal advancement, so it seems that the primary concern of all social animals, humans included, is not the species, but the society—however that term is to be understood.Spectrum wrote:Note the insects, e.g. bees and ants, when attacked individual fighter bees or ants will be sacrificed for the sake of the colony and therefrom the species. It is not obvious in humans but a fine comb analysis can reveal such a program is also inherent in humans as species.
And so again—does it not seem that the society, rather than the species, is the more natural standard of reference, in contemplating morality?