Reply to RustyK4:
If the topic of discourse is getting you quickly from London to Paris, and I offer the assertion “You should take the chunnel-train”, I am expressing a judgement about the way you should behave. I could even offer the assertion “The right thing to do is take the chunnel-train.” Or even “It would be wrong for you to take the channel ferry.” These are all prescriptive assertions, but given the context of discourse, do have value.
To what extent does expressing your judgement makes it ‘objective’? I can understand that, if the judgement is made based solely on travel time then it can claim to be more objective than other judgements. But it is still an approximation. Somebody else might suggest that, all things being equal, the chunnel-train is more rapid, but it might be more inclined to unexpected delays or breakdowns which increase travel time. There are variables. The judgement may certainly have value but not absolute value relative to other options. You seem to be using ‘objective’ here in a relative way.
If morality has to do with achieving “flourishing” (however you choose to understand that concept), the moral assertions become hypothetical conditional assertions that are indeed truth apt.
I find the ”(however you choose to understand that concept)”
to be intriguing. It sounds highly subjective. If we are talking about something as relatively simple as travel time, we might be able to agree on a simple measure – such as hours and minutes – to make the judgement more objective. How would you do this with ‘flourishing’, even if everybody agreed on this criterion, which is not necessarily the case? Does ‘objective’ require that a few people agree on the criterion or that everybody does? If this is truth apt, then I have no idea how ‘truth’ in this context could be demonstrated, even in theory.
The physical universe will determine whether the stated judgements are in fact true ways to achieve flourishing.
I am bewildered by this. Firstly, I doubt very strongly that any broad agreement can be reached that morality has to do with ‘flourishing’, particularly when many ‘believers’ insist that morality must based on a set of laws which are handed down and not questioned. Your statement is, in itself, subjective. Even if we accept the premise I can see no way in which agreement might be reached on what is required to assess ‘flourishing’. Let’s imagine that we try to keep it simple by choosing some basic measures. An ascetic requires solitude for contemplation. A zealot requires freedom for their particular religion but suppression of all others. A bacchanalian requires plenty of access to booze, nightclubs and so on. How would you go about resolving conflicts objectively? What is it about the physical universe which will, of itself, sort out anything?
We choose values, and value them, because we believe that they will contribute to our own "flourishing".
Yes, we choose values. Subjective. Based on our own concepts and requirements for ‘flourishing’. Subjective. Which are highly unlikely to be the same criteria as those chosen by others. Subjective.
If that is the case, the morals and values are not subjective.
They become objective facts of the matter.
I am unable to follow your line of reasoning.