Indeed you must. Although Manny observes the honourable German tradition of ensuring that his philosophy is unreadable, he nevertheless manages to carefully draw the distinction between truth and knowledge. The epistemology/ontology divide has exercised the minds of philosophers since long before Kant, but essentially his noumena and phenomena are precise analogues of Plato's Ideals and Forms. In the "Critique" Kant basically anticipates the modern world-views of psychology and neuroscience and places the observer in the role of active agent in determining the nature of our personal reality. Our truths are only as good as our understanding of them.Belinda wrote:I must read Kant .
The modern psychologist of perception would say this: The observer does not observe the real world but rather he observes a representation of it presented to his senses in the form of information. From this information he constructs a mental map of reality in his own consciousness, which makes his comprehension of his world vulnerable to the hazards of confirmation bias. In other words rather than observing the real world we only MAP the world of our observation and the quality of our map is contingent on the validity of the prior information we use with which to construct it.
I emphatically do not do not regard mathematical reasoning as infallible because it is valid only in its own domain.Belinda wrote:By "human reason", in the above context, do you mean rational and thus infallible reasoning such as mathematics,
"Mathematics can be used to prove anything"...Albert Einstein
"It is the theory which determines what the observer will observe"....Albert Einstein
Since physics is a purely mathematical discipline it is the most obvious one to use to illustrate the limitations of mathematical reasoning, because this is where Kant's cautionary warning is most relevant and most consistently ignored. The entire "science" of physics is based solely on observation. The physicist observes his world and compiles a database of its behaviour. From this data he identifies patterns which repeat themselves and thus infers the existence of physical laws which determine this behaviour and he is then able to use mathematics to formalise these laws. Kant would immediately recognise this as a flaw in first-order logic because these inferred laws are only applicable to the phenomenal world and not to the noumenal one. The physicist is modelling his observational map, which is necessarily predicated on the a priori assumptions he makes about the nature of his observation. His cognition of the object can only be confirmed by his cognition of the object, which in the "Critique" is insufficient for truth. If one or more of his a priori assumptions is false his entire house of cards collapses.
It is for this reason that physics is not a science but rather a branch of mathematics which allows us to make predictions about the behaviour of matter and energy. To be definable as a science it would need to be both predictive and explanatory but this method disqualifies itself from any explanatory authority because the entire mathematical extravaganza rests on the original a priori assumptions of the observer. If we design our models specifically to predict what the observer will observe we can claim only a Pyrrhic victory when the observer duly goes ahead and observes what his models have predicted. We can make no statement about the ontological validity of his observation because to attempt this is to do science backwards.
This is the "problem of induction" and it is one which was well understood by the early 20th century pioneers of modern physics, most notably Einstein, Planck and Bohr. Bohr even issued this salutary warning to his inheritors in the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics: "It is not the role of the physicist to determine what the universe is, but merely to determine what we can meaningfully say about its behaviour."
Sadly this salutary warning has been persistently ignored by those who followed in the footsteps of the pioneers. They fell in love with their own mathematical virtuosity and mistook their map for the territory. All manner of bizarre hypotheses have been advanced to account for their observations, none of which are accessible to reason and none of which make sense. Manny Kant would raise a contemptuous eyebrow and offer them this: " I bloody well told you there be dragons".
Regards Leo
-- Updated December 12th, 2014, 8:33 am to add the following --
Just catching up on your addendum which you must have posted whilst I was composing my reply. Omar was a process philosopher like me and thus had no need for the supernatural. He saw reality as that which is continuously being created according to no predetermined agenda and according to no physical law beyond the universal doctrine of causation. Spinoza's philosophy was not markedly different but for obvious reasons his ideas had a more European flavour. However they were both solidly wedded to the notion of the self-causal universe.Belinda wrote:I think I see why Omar Khayyam is your favourite philosopher, although I have not placed him as Illuminationist, which may be too supernatural for Omar.
Regards Leo