Is Strong Atheism Sophistry, or Evil?

[Meleagar]

As the debate in my other thread about sophistry unfolded about determinism, I realized that the same argument can be made about strong atheism, or the belief that no god or gods exist.

I know that the weak atheist position (the lack of belief that any gods exist) might be more properly defensible (I will make my case against weak atheism in another thread), but this debate is not about weak atheism.

First, it is obvious that strong atheism cannot be logically supported, simply because it is impossible to prove (not in the absolute sense, but in the "sufficient evidence" sense). There may be evidence that certain gods, or kinds of gods, do not exist; but there is certainly no evidence or argument (that I'm aware of, anyway) that no significant, meaningful god or gods whatsoever exist.

Like determinism, strong atheism is a sweeping, categorical assertion that something does not exist; determinism asserts that acausal causes do not exist; strong atheism asserts that no significant god or gods exist. Like determinism, where the non-determinist is not metaphysically committed to the categorical non-existence of a potentially true explanation (acausality), the non-strong atheist is not metaphysically committed to the nonexistence of a potentially true explanation - that a nontrivial god of some sort might exist.

What is the useful point of a metaphysical position that excludes a potentially true explanation from consideration?

If one defines "evil" as that which prevents or confounds the discernment of true statements (which I do), then how can a metaphysical position which intrinsically denies a potentially true statement be considered anything other than evil? Even if one doesn't accept my definition of evil, what can the purpose of such a position be other than to thwart any interpretation of evidence or conclusion that a god of some sort exists, whether true or not?

Like determinism in the other thread, what does strong atheism bring to the table of debate other than the potential for intractable error and denial of potential truth?

[pjkeeley]

Strictly speaking I am agnostic concerning leprachauns. The existence of leprachauns is a possibility that I cannot deny with the kind of certainty that I reserve for philosophical discussions. I live my life, however, as if leprachauns are fictitious and do not exist; I strongly believe that there are no leprachauns. It is important to note however that I am not "excluding a potentially true explanation from consideration". I am willing to consider arguments involving leprachauns provided that they are sincere arguments. I would consider evidence for their existence if any were found. But until I hear of a convincing case for leprachauns, I will continue to treat leprachauns as fictitious and go about my life as if there weren't any. A belief that there are no leprachauns doesn't necessarily exclude from consideration the possibility that leprachauns exist.

What does my position concerning leprachauns bring to the table? I believe it is a reasonable, and certainly not, evil, position to hold. There may indeed be leprachauns. In philosophy I am willing to consider all sorts of possibilities that I would ordinarily ignore. When I'm not engaged in armchair philosophy, though, I am less interested in these sort of possibilities. Given that I am yet to be convinced of the existence of leprachauns, I consider it impractical for me to have to accommodate the possibility of leprachauns existing in my everyday life. Some may believe in leprachauns; so be it. But in my own life I am not about to check under toadstools or go looking for a pot of gold under a rainbow just because I can't rule out the existence of leprachauns, so to speak.

If one defines "evil" as that which prevents or confounds the discernment of true statements (which I do), then how can a metaphysical position which intrinsically denies a potentially true statement be considered anything other than evil?

Under this definition, theism may also be considered evil. You state that atheism is evil because it "intrinsically denies a potentially true statement". Since theism does the same, it too must be considered evil. There are no gods is a potentially true statement that is denied by theists, according to your definitions, no?

[Meleagar]

pjkeely,

Nobody has made an argument about leprechauns, nor about whether or not theism is evil or sophistry. Please keep your argument on topic.

If your statements about leprechauns are supposed to be analogous to statements about god or gods, the same argument applies. I didn't say that the consideration that it might be true that no gods exist is inherently evil or a case of sophistry; quite the contrary. It is only by considering such a case that one can discern true statements about whether or not god exists, and whether or not one's position about the existence of god or gods is a rationally supportable position - meaning, in service of discerning truthful statements.

IOW, it might be true that leprechauns exist; there is no reason to hold a metaphysical position that they in fact do not exist, any more than there was any reason to hold a metaphysical position that mountain gorillas do not exist, or that other planets around other stars do not exist, or that stones do not fall from the sky - all of which were, at one time or another, equally compared to derogatory analogies as you did with the leprechaun association.

The argument is about the metaphysical position of strong atheism, nothing else. If you have no argument to make about that, then you have no on-topic contribution to make here.

[Eckhart Aurelius Hughes]

Sure, strong atheism is as much what you call "sophistry" as theism is--assuming both are a belief held without evidence. (As you said, we're not talking about a specific god for which there could be alleged evidence for or against, but about a general idea of there being at least one god.)

Although, I recommend you check out my post Default positions and the increased burden of proof about which position in terms of any proposition (not just religious ones) is, in the absence of empirical evidence, inherently more believable as a matter of rationality, perhaps even a priori.

What is the useful point of a metaphysical position that excludes a potentially true explanation from consideration?

Does a mere belief exclude one from accepting a potentially true explanation after re-consideration of the evidence or the presentation of new evidence? I believe there is milk in my refrigerator based on the evidence I currently have (there was plenty of milk in there yesterday and my wife almost never uses it except small amounts for cooking). But if I go over there and look in and can't find any milk, then that new evidence would likely change my belief.

***

Finally, the word 'god is broad and there may be many things that some people call 'god' that a self-described strong atheist either believes in or at least does not postively disbelief in. I think these definitions cover what strong atheists are generally saying they positively believe do not exist:

1. God
a. A being conceived as the perfect, omnipotent, omniscient originator and ruler of the universe, the principal object of faith and worship in monotheistic religions.
b. The force, effect, or a manifestation or aspect of this being.
2. A being of supernatural powers or attributes, believed in and worshiped by a people, especially a male deity thought to control some part of nature or reality.

So an atheist, by those definitions is a person who (1) believes there is no perfect, omnipotent, omniscient originator and ruler of the universe, and who (2) believes no being of supernatural powers or attributes, believed in and worshiped by a people, exists. Using such a definition I would qualify myself as a strong atheist meaning both of those statements describe my belief which I hold with as no moor rigor as I do the belief there is milk in my fridge. Though it may be what Meleagar calls "sophistry" for someone to ask me if I am strong atheist as such; I would agree to the extent that asking me if I believe there is a unicorn on Mars and me saying I believe there is not is "sophistry." To consider the existence or non-existence of things that have no evidence such as gods and unicorns is relatively pointless, I agree.

[pjkeeley]

IOW, it might be true that leprechauns exist; there is no reason to hold a metaphysical position that they in fact do not exist...

It is impractical to have to accommodate the mere possibility that leprachauns exist in my life. That is a good enough reason for me to hold the metaphysical position that leprachauns do no exist. This does not necessarily mean that I exclude the possibility of leprachauns existing in a philosophical discussion, evidence of leprachauns or arguments for the existence of leprachauns. That was my argument. I agree with Scott's point:

Does a mere belief exclude one from accepting a potentially true explanation after re-consideration of the evidence or the presentation of new evidence? I believe there is milk in my refrigerator based on the evidence I currently have (there was plenty of milk in there yesterday and my wife almost never uses it except small amounts for cooking). But if I go over there and look in and can't find any milk, then that new evidence would likely change my belief.

[Alun]

Meleagar, just because you consider a position to have no evidence in support of it, does not mean proponents of that position believe there is no evidence in support of it. Therefore it is unfair for you to accuse those proponents of sophistry or dishonesty.

[Meleagar]

Scott:

Since you have agreed that your position is sophistry (as defined in this debate), I don't see that we have anything left to debate on the matter of strong atheism.

[pjkeeley]

I note that you apparently have nothing to say on the subject of whether theism is also evil under your definition, Meleagar.

If one defines "evil" as that which prevents or confounds the discernment of true statements (which I do), then how can a metaphysical position which intrinsically denies a potentially true statement be considered anything other than evil?

Under this definition, theism may also be considered evil. You state that atheism is evil because it "intrinsically denies a potentially true statement". Since theism does the same, it too must be considered evil. There are no gods is a potentially true statement that is denied by theists, according to your definitions, no?

[Meleagar]

I note that you apparently have nothing to say on the subject of whether theism is also evil under your definition, Meleagar.

Like any positive claim that a thing exists, it might be possible to experience that thing and know it exists empirically, which gives theism at least the potential to be a known, true claim. As far as I know and has been shown here, strong atheism has no such potential; it cannot be "experienced", and cannot even rationally be asserted as true. It can only be asserted from pure faith, not reason or evidence.

[Keith Russell]

Strong atheism cannot be logically supported, because it is unable to be "proved"?

What can be "proved", other than that I am conscious, and that I exist (and then, that can only be "proved" to myself. To everyone else it is only a supposition, not a fact.)

Until there is siginificant, abundant, independently verifiable, non-contradictory evidence (note: "evidence", not "proof") that God (or gods) exist, there is no reason to believe in God (or gods).

It's as simple as that.

[pjkeeley]

Like any positive claim that a thing exists, it might be possible to experience that thing and know it exists empirically, which gives theism at least the potential to be a known, true claim. As far as I know and has been shown here, strong atheism has no such potential; it cannot be "experienced", and cannot even rationally be asserted as true. It can only be asserted from pure faith, not reason or evidence.

Regardless, theism fits your definition of evil since it denies a potentially true statement. Your definition is flawed.

[Meleagar]

Regardless, theism fits your definition of evil since it denies a potentially true statement. Your definition is flawed.

I think it is rather your straw man mischaracterization of my definition that is flawed, because that is not how I defined or explained my concept of evil.

[Stirling]

I would like to point out the complete irrelevance and ideaistic nature of metaphysics. Nothing in it can be proven. It is subjective, abstract mumbling at its highest. What is existing? What is being? Even Heidegger suggested that these aren't something to be proven as such but merely "observed" where understood.

And now, what is God? If I might ask the lot of you who believe in Him, what evidence do we have of His supposed existence?

For logic's sake, what do we have to argue off of aside from the common absolute that everything must have a definitive purpose, in its existence and function?

I agree with Scott. I would lastly like to point out the necessity of the burden of proof: it lies with those who claim the existence of something.

[Meleagar]

I would like to point out the complete irrelevance and ideaistic nature of metaphysics. Nothing in it can be proven. It is subjective, abstract mumbling at its highest."

Please stay on topic.

If you wish to make a metaphysical argument that metaphysical arguments are irrelevant and nothing but abstract mumbling, then I suggest you start a thread about it in the metaphysics section, instead of taking my thread off-topic.

Thank you.

[Alun]

I think he's arguing that strong atheism is a logical position, but I could be wrong.