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I have observed that many people do not share the same reason for being irreligious as I do, so I thought perhaps I could test my argument on this forum and see if it has any weaknesses. Hammer away at my argument, atheists, agnostics, theists, and everyone else! Don't hold back!

But before I offer the argument, I think I ought to first clarify what my position on religion and theological propositions are. I am an igtheist, which is a person who does not believe that theological propositions (e.g. "God caused the world to spring forth from non-existence") express meaningful ideas which can be used in a coherent and logical manner. So to an igtheist, trying to argue against God's existence is just as illogical as trying to argue for his existence. If igtheism is true, then all theological propositions are pseudo-propositions which do not meet the basic requirements necessary to form a complete idea. Some are igtheists because they observe that the word "God" has an inconsistent meaning among individuals; indeed, if you line up a hundred theists and question them on what the characteristics and properties of God are, you will get very contradictory answers between them. However, I am not an igtheist for this reason (although I also think this reasoning is also a very good one to follow).

My argument for igtheism is an argument against the meaningfulness of the word "God", and it is somewhat similar to A.J. Ayer's argument for igtheism, but with significant differences. For those not familiar with Ayer's phenomenalism, here is a summary I wrote:

Any word which refers to an empirical object (e.g. Table, Apple, Hydrogen Atom, Human, Universe) is really just a noun which refers to a collection of observations about the object (sense-data). So, for example, the word "Apple" is equivalent to "approximately 0.100kg, the colour red, roundness, the taste of apple, etc." These things are what the word Apple actually mean. There is no, so to speak, an "essence of an apple" which exists independently of these sense-data. So if, for some reason, the human body was not equipped with the sense organs necessary to experience these kinds of sensations, then the world Apple would literally become meaningless. We might as well use the word "smidditybop", because it contains just as many sense-data (exactly zero).

So if we accept that an empirical object is no more extensive than its perceived properties, then words which do not refer to even a single sense-data or possible observation fail to be meaningful.

However, this leaves us with the problem of objects such as "Apple the size of the universe" being meaningless as such (it is impossible to ever observe an apple the size of the universe, because no such thing exists). This is where I differ from A.J. Ayer's phenomenalism. For me, an empirical object may consist of either sense-data and/or modified sense-data. Modified sense-data are variations of sense-data which are generated by applying the human mind's imagination to already-existing forms of sense-data. So if we take the sense-data "size of an apple" and apply our imagination to it, we can get the modified sense-data of "size of the universe". So, the word "apple the size of the universe" is still meaningful when we apply my "modified sense-data theory of meaning" to it.

So now I will make my argument for igtheism.

Premises: [1] God is a transcendent thing, completely unlike any normal things we see in the natural world such as matter and energy. [2] Because God transcends reality, he is invisible, inaudible, odourless, tasteless... completely undetectable to the senses. [3] God is an empirical object, and theological propositions involving him are empirical (a posteriori) ones. [4] The modified sense-data theory of meaning is true.

Conclusion [5] Because the word "God" is an empirical noun that does not refer to any amount of sense-data and/or modified sense-data, it does not mean anything in the empirical (a posteriori) sense. [6] It then follows that all theological propositions fail to be a posteriori. And because they are not a priori either, they are meaningless. [7] Igtheism is true.

I feel like I probably could have written this post better, and with less unnecessary information. Really, this is just using the phenomenalistic aspect of logical positivism to render the word "God" meaningless rather than the whole proposition "God exists". I am not a logical positivist, but I do think that Ayer was still right to consider all theological propositions meaningless.

So, any thoughts? Counter-arguments? Should I try to clarify anything in my argument?

As an igtheistic atheist, I am particularly interested in seeing what an agnostic atheist may have to say about this.

If igtheism was simply the claim that the word 'god' is very equivocal, I would agree. As you say, if you asked different theists what they mean by god, they might each attempt to define it differently. I would be atheist in relation to most definitions given, and would be an igtheist to others. Someone could name their cat 'god,' and then assert that "god exists," meaning 'my cat exists,' in which case I would be a theist in regard to their idiosyncratic definition of the word god.

Insofar as igtheism is held because of some philosophical hypothesis regarding what makes an alleged proposition cognitively meaningful or meaningful in some other sense, then that means that one still requires specification of which alleged definition of the word god is being used.

I choose to categorize myself as a theist because even if the statement 'god exists' is actually a meaningless statement, in everyday language we refer to such meaningless sentences as false such as the statement 'an unmarried bachelor exists'. In this sense philosophical igtheism is compatible with everyday atheism with the difference not being one's views regarding what religious people generally claim exists but rather with one's philosophical views regarding claims about different types of unobservable, allegedly possible facts.

Other than preferring the term theological noncognitivist to igtheist, I am in agreement with the initial post. I would argue that no matter which definition of God is used, as long as you are using one of the standard definitions or any variation on one of them, theological statements using the word God are still meaningless because the word is not used to refer to anything which actually is within our experience or which could be within our experience. They all involve transcendental characteristics.

In Christian theology there has always been a tension between the notion of God as transcendental and God as immanent. God is entirely beyond our experience and yet the divine presence is within it at every point. Another one of those theological mysteries like the Holy Trinity.

The problem with your argument is your criterion of meaning, as you said, applies to empirical objects. But, if God exists, he would not be an empirical object. So your criterion of meaning is simply not applicable to such a class of objects. You did say 'God' is an empirical noun, but I fail to see the justification for that (nor did you define what it means). God, numbers, and sets are not like tables, apples, and atoms.

Fhbradley wrote:The problem with your argument is your criterion of meaning, as you said, applies to empirical objects. But, if God exists, he would not be an empirical object. So your criterion of meaning is simply not applicable to such a class of objects. You did say 'God' is an empirical noun, but I fail to see the justification for that (nor did you define what it means). God, numbers, and sets are not like tables, apples, and atoms.

Some version of this counterargument is always available to the theist: his God will not be limited by attributes of any sort. He is far too magnificent to be comprehended or understood or experienced by ordinary mortals. Yet he is active in the world every day and his handiwork is to be seen wherever you turn. He is the author of death and destruction through a thousand natural acts—earthquakes, tornadoes, tsunamis, etc., yet he is completely loving and kind and responsive to human prayers. He works in mysterious ways his wonders to perform. The price of not believing this incredible fantasy is eternal damnation—an infinite punishment for what is at worst a finite misdeed.

It is true that I have not defined what an empirical noun is, and I think I ought to think about this more precisely if I am to develop a rigid phenomenalistic empiricist philosophy like I intend to do. However, I think it is reasonable to make a simple distinction between empirical nouns and non-empirical nouns rather than trying to precisely specify the sufficient and necessary conditions of being an empirical noun. I cannot think of any particular noun that I would not classify as being "empirical" or "non-empirical".

I am also surprised that you classified God together along with numbers and sets rather than tables and apples. Furthermore, you seem to imply that non-empirical objects are capable of existing, which I am very surprised to hear. I do not believe that numbers and sets exist in the same way that tables and apples do; that is, they do not occupy spacetime. They are objects of the mind, but more often than not when we talk of things existing, we do not mean that they exist in our mind but rather they exist as part of the world.

I think it is much more intuitive to classify God as an empirical noun rather than a non-empirical one. Am I in the minority for having such an intuition?

Ophiuchus wrote:It is true that I have not defined what an empirical noun is, and I think I ought to think about this more precisely if I am to develop a rigid phenomenalistic empiricist philosophy like I intend to do. However, I think it is reasonable to make a simple distinction between empirical nouns and non-empirical nouns rather than trying to precisely specify the sufficient and necessary conditions of being an empirical noun. I cannot think of any particular noun that I would not classify as being "empirical" or "non-empirical".

I am also surprised that you classified God together along with numbers and sets rather than tables and apples. Furthermore, you seem to imply that non-empirical objects are capable of existing, which I am very surprised to hear. I do not believe that numbers and sets exist in the same way that tables and apples do; that is, they do not occupy spacetime. They are objects of the mind, but more often than not when we talk of things existing, we do not mean that they exist in our mind but rather they exist as part of the world.

I think it is much more intuitive to classify God as an empirical noun rather than a non-empirical one. Am I in the minority for having such an intuition?

I didn't mean to include God as in the same ontological class as sets and numbers. I just meant that they are different from concrete objects, if we wish to say they exist. God would be a supernatural object; sets/numbers would be abstract objects. The difference being abstract objects are said to have no causal powers, whereas supernatural objects do have causal powers.

So you mean to say that there is a major difference between propositions like "God exists", "Australia exists", and "Thoughts exist"? Are there any objects besides God which share the same mode of existence? I do not think I have encountered any kind of object which does not exist either as a physical entity or as an object of the mind.

But I think this discourse has already digressed, and I think I have a better way of pressing my point.

If we accept that theological propositions are not a posteriori propositions (I assume that all a posteriori propositions are empirical ones; maybe this is where we differ in thinking?), then the only remaining alternative is that they are a priori propositions. However, this is also not the case, because theists often use observations about the outside world (such as its complexity and wonderfulness) to try and prove that God exists. So are you asserting that "God exists" is not either a posteriori or a priori but some other (supernatural, perhaps?) kind of proposition? Or do you believe that it is an a priori belief?

Prismatic wrote:Other than preferring the term theological noncognitivist to igtheist, I am in agreement with the initial post.

I am curious. Is this for any particular reason? Or do you just want to distance yourself from the positions of atheism, agnosticism, and theism?

It depends upon what is meant by 'making sense '. Certainly the de novo idea of ineffable God or ineffable anything else makes no sense. Even empirically ineffable black holes in space are detectable by mathematics and logic. God is truly ineffable which is why God is an idea that ideally illustrates how we need to experience the particular before we can comprehend the generalisation from particulars. God was once the generalisation of perfect warriorhood. God was once, still is for many, the generalisation of perfect goodness. In both cases we all need to experience particular instances of warrior or good before we can begin to comprehend the generality of each of them. This why Jesus Christ is necessary for interpreting God to Christians. Muhammad although not worshipped as incarnation of God was upheld in Hadith as a paradigm case of a good man. It is the main strength of Islam that Muhammad is not worshipped as consubstantial with God because it is the error of idolatry to submit to anything except that which cannot ever be directly experienced by mortals, i.e.God.

I think that what I have written makes sense even although much of it is about God.

Prismatic wrote:Other than preferring the term theological noncognitivist to igtheist, I am in agreement with the initial post. I would argue that no matter which definition of God is used, as long as you are using one of the standard definitions or any variation on one of them, theological statements using the word God are still meaningless because the word is not used to refer to anything which actually is within our experience or which could be within our experience. They all involve transcendental characteristics.

Do you also take a noncognitivist position to statements like: vampires exist, Santa Claus exists, invisible unicorns exist secretly on Pluto, vastly technologically superior aliens frequently visit Earth and abduct humans but hide it from us completely using their incredible technology and desire not to know they are doing it, a special kind of blue dinosaurs with 18 eyes existed millions of years ago but all evidence of their existence was destroyed?

I would say that to a degree all of those statements express something that is meaningless and something that is meaningful in that there is not a single, black-and-white type of meaning. Yet, insofar as they are meaningful, I believe they are all false because of the lack of evidence and apparent ontological positivity of the statement.

Ophiuchus wrote:So you mean to say that there is a major difference between propositions like "God exists", "Australia exists", and "Thoughts exist"? Are there any objects besides God which share the same mode of existence? I do not think I have encountered any kind of object which does not exist either as a physical entity or as an object of the mind.

Yes, I do mean to say that. The existence of material entities is clear and the existence of purely mental entities is reasonably clear also, but theists want to claim for the term God a different kind of existence that is neither material or mental—that of a being which cannot be the object of sensory observation but which has a material effect in the world.

I am curious. Is this for any particular reason? Or do you just want to distance yourself from the positions of atheism, agnosticism, and theism?

I am quite content to be called an atheist but I make a difference because to me God exists is not a meaningful statement—it is neither true nor false.

-- Updated May 12th, 2012, 12:18 pm to add the following --

Scott wrote: Do you also take a noncognitivist position to statements like: vampires exist, Santa Claus exists, invisible unicorns exist secretly on Pluto, vastly technologically superior aliens frequently visit Earth and abduct humans but hide it from us completely using their incredible technology and desire not to know they are doing it, a special kind of blue dinosaurs with 18 eyes existed millions of years ago but all evidence of their existence was destroyed?

I would say that to a degree all of those statements express something that is meaningless and something that is meaningful in that there is not a single, black-and-white type of meaning. Yet, insofar as they are meaningful, I believe they are all false because of the lack of evidence and apparent ontological positivity of the statement.

Most of your examples are more or less well-defined material entities for which there is no evidence and I would say that statements about them are false because they do not exist. One that may not be not so clear is invisible unicorns exist secretly on Pluto. If you wish to raise questions about an non-material entity whose existence cannot be detected by any material means, I might adopt a non-cognitivist position on such an example.That may be what you mean by the qualities "invisible" and "exist secretly". The difference with the idea of God is that he is an immaterial entity with no comprehensible attributes who is supposed to have material effects.

Theologians time and again echo Pascal's thought:

If there is a God, He is infinitely incomprehensible, since, having neither parts nor limits, He has no affinity to us. We are then incapable of knowing either what He is or if He is.

For such an entity the statement God exists cannot be meaningful.

The believer often takes another escape route (Pascal did): that God is perceivable only to those who believe he exists and who experience him personally in their heart. One book takes the position that theological statements only have meaning for believers. Others will even claim that God blinds non-believers to his truth. These I believe are sophistries, straws grasped fervently in the hope of silencing doubt.

Prismatic wrote:

Ophiuchus wrote:So you mean to say that there is a major difference between propositions like "God exists", "Australia exists", and "Thoughts exist"? Are there any objects besides God which share the same mode of existence? I do not think I have encountered any kind of object which does not exist either as a physical entity or as an object of the mind.

Yes, I do mean to say that. The existence of material entities is clear and t he existence of purely mental entities is reasonably clear also, but theists want to claim for the term God a different kind of existence that is neither material or mental—that of a being which cannot be the object of sensory observation but which has a material effect in the world.

Oh yes, I was certainly in agreement with you there, Prismatic. This question was actually directed towards Fhbradley, who seemed to suggest that there exist propositions which do not classify as either empirical (a posteriori) or a priori. I was very surprised to hear someone say that "God exists" is not an a posteriori proposition. Surely, all a posteriori propositions are also empirical ones?

Prismatic wrote:Most of your examples are more or less well-defined material entities for which there is no evidence and I would say that statements about them are false because they do not exist. One that may not be not so clear is invisible unicorns exist secretly on Pluto. If you wish to raise questions about an non-material entity whose existence cannot be detected by any material means, I might adopt a non-cognitivist position on such an example.That may be what you mean by the qualities "invisible" and "exist secretly". The difference with the idea of God is that he is an immaterial entity with no comprehensible attributes who is supposed to have material effects.

My point is that I don't think the difference between cognitivist disbelief and non-cognitivism is so black and white. A logical positivist -- as I understand the philosophy -- might take a non-cognitivist position to more of my examples than you, and I understand and agree with their criticisms of the alleged meaning of those statements like I understand yours but I also think there is other types of meaning. I maintain meaning isn't a singular, black-or-white quality.

What do you mean when you say "immaterial entity" and what do you mean when you say "material effects"?

What about the suggestion that undetectable parelell but slightly different universes exist and that everything ever possibly obersvable to us is only part of one plane in a vast multiverse? What about the suggestion that invisible ghosts exist who have material effects? What about the statement that breaking a mirror gives a person 7 years of bad luck? Do you take a non-cognitivist position to those?

Scott wrote: My point is that I don't think the difference between cognitivist disbelief and non-cognitivism is so black and white. A logical positivist -- as I understand the philosophy -- might take a non-cognitivist position to more of my examples than you, and I understand and agree with their criticisms of the alleged meaning of those statements like I understand yours but I also think there is other types of meaning. I maintain meaning isn't a singular, black-or-white quality.

For theological statements there at least in my mind is a clear distinction between cognitivist disbelief and non-cognitivism. The cognitivist accepts that the statement God exists makes sense and is either true or false—to believed on that basis. The non-cognitivist does not accept the statement as meaningful because he has no referent for the word God.

What do you mean when you say "immaterial entity" and what do you mean when you say "material effects"?

By material I mean physical as opposed to immaterial or spiritual. Spirits, demons, ghosts, and gods are usually considered to be immaterial entities, but sometimes they have material effects or 'manifestations' such as table thumping, etc.

What about the suggestion that undetectable parelell but slightly different universes exist and that everything ever possibly obersvable to us is only part of one plane in a vast multiverse? What about the suggestion that invisible ghosts exist who have material effects? What about the statement that breaking a mirror gives a person 7 years of bad luck? Do you take a non-cognitivist position to those?

For the sake of argument suppose there were a parallel material universe to which we have no possible access and of which as a consequence we can never have any knowledge under any circumstances whatever. Any statements about such a universe would be meaningless (in our universe), that is, neither true nor false for us because they would necessarily refer to things of which we could have no knowledge or experience.

What does it mean for a statement (a sentence which asserts something) to be meaningful? At the very least the words must make sense, syntax must be observed, etc. The nouns, especially the proper nouns or singular terms, must refer to definite things in the material or mental realms. The word God as used by everyone in my experience is intended to be a singular term, that is to say, a term that refers to one and only one object.

But what object? Certainly nothing we can sense in the material world, but those who use it seem to mean a real entity, not just a mental notion. To what then does the word God refer?

Ophiuchus wrote:So you mean to say that there is a major difference between propositions like "God exists", "Australia exists", and "Thoughts exist"? Are there any objects besides God which share the same mode of existence? I do not think I have encountered any kind of object which does not exist either as a physical entity or as an object of the mind.

But I think this discourse has already digressed, and I think I have a better way of pressing my point.

If we accept that theological propositions are not a posteriori propositions (I assume that all a posteriori propositions are empirical ones; maybe this is where we differ in thinking?), then the only remaining alternative is that they are a priori propositions. However, this is also not the case, because theists often use observations about the outside world (such as its complexity and wonderfulness) to try and prove that God exists. So are you asserting that "God exists" is not either a posteriori or a priori but some other (supernatural, perhaps?) kind of proposition? Or do you believe that it is an a priori belief?

Well, I personally reject the notion of a priori propositions and a posteriori propositions if you mean to say that the former are necessary truths and the latter contingent. The reason why is that it conflates epistemic necessity with metaphysical necessity, which is fallacious. For example, the discovery that the morning star is identical with the evening star was an empirical discovery, yet we would not want to say the proposition 'the morning star is identical with the evening star' is contingent, since that would be to say

Possibly, Venus is not identical with Venus.


But even if I did accept the traditional division of statements, I would say that although some theological propositions are a posteriori, some are a priori. For example, all versions of the ontological argument are supposed to be a priori. Since, supposedly, the possibility of a necessary being entails that that being exists in all possibles worlds, which entails he exists in the actual one, and therefore that he exists (so the very concept of God implies he exists, and thus it requires no appeal to experience).