An Argument for Igtheism

If you do not accept the a priori / posteriori distinction, then yes, my argument for igtheism holds no weight here. In fact, because you reject the a priori / posteriori distinction, it is impossible for me and you to talk about the same thing when discussing theological propositions. I think I have a way of convincing you that the Venus example is not a valid argument against the a priori / posteriori distinction, but it would be inappropriate to discuss in this thread; in any event, I think it would be an interesting discussion for the epistemology/metaphysics section if we continued this line of argument there. Would you prefer this?

But on an entirely different note, it looks like your notion of what a God is is very different from that of a common theist's (I am not sure you could even properly be called that). At this point, I am not sure exactly what kind of assertions you are trying to make here, and I don't think you were the target audience of my argument. We can no longer continue this discussion, as you have rejected the a priori / posteriori distinction. I must thank you Fhbradley, for providing a clear and precise criticism of my argument, even if I do not think it is valid.

If you do not accept the a priori / posteriori distinction, then yes, my argument for igtheism holds no weight here. In fact, because you reject the a priori / posteriori distinction, it is impossible for me and you to talk about the same thing when discussing theological propositions. I think I have a way of convincing you that the Venus example is not a valid argument against the a priori / posteriori distinction, but it would be inappropriate to discuss in this thread; in any event, I think it would be an interesting discussion for the epistemology/metaphysics section if we continued this line of argument there. Would you prefer this?

But on an entirely different note, it looks like your notion of what a God is is very different from that of a common theist's (I am not sure you could even properly be called that). At this point, I am not sure exactly what kind of assertions you are trying to make here, and I don't think you were the target audience of my argument. We can no longer continue this discussion, as you have rejected the a priori / posteriori distinction. I must thank you Fhbradley, for providing a clear and precise criticism of my argument, even if I do not think it is valid.

I'm actually not a Theist at all. I would be glad to discuss the a priori/a posteriori distinction in further detail. Just message me.

To Ophiuchus:

I wish to address your argument. I would like to note at the outset that I too am an atheist. There’s much I found interesting in your argument. But alas-I cannot agree, ultimately, with your reasons for non-belief or ‘positive’ non-belief. The argument itself seems fine in as long as we do not base it on the specious philosophical ideas that stem from empirical phenomenalism. Ultimately, it is your justificatory bases that motivate the argument that I find problematic.


Here, I will simply outline a series of objections that I have about these problems.


(1) You wrote, “Any word which refers to an empirical object (e.g. Table, Apple, Hydrogen Atom, Human, Universe) is really just a noun which refers to a collection of observations about the object (sense-data). So, for example, the word "Apple" is equivalent to "approximately 0.100kg, the colour red, roundness, the taste of apple, etc." These things are what the word Apple actually mean.”


Here you seem to provide what I will call a sort of ‘verification condition’ for meaning. In basic, the meaning of a word (sentence etc.) is just those clusters of sensate observations that can be semantically (and-perhaps-conceptually) made about any object X. This brings up the ole problem of what could be meant by “observation.” In basic, this view limits us to the type of observational evidence we can have for any sentence without remainder! For instance, the instrumentalist view of scientific statements concerning such things as electrons, memory traces, other galaxies, and so on are nothing more than mere abbreviations of complex sets of statements about our own laboratory data ONLY! How does this verification condition explain or handle statements about electrons? Is our talk about subatomic particles really nothing more than our macroscopic observations relating to these entities? Also, the same problem occurs when we turn to the human mind! Statements about people’s minds are merely abbreviations of further statements about their overt behaviors. Hence, internal thoughts either do not exist or are not genuinely meaningful or are not justifiable outside some verification condition. In fact, it would seem that such emphasis of meaning on verification-observation not only reduces the significance of philosophy of mind (and psychology-at least non-behaviorist psychology)-it wholly invalidates it!


Now, you could revise this to mean something like ‘scientific verificationism.’ However, here, we now have two more sub-related problems: (1a) we now have multiple verification conditions on offer. Given this, how are we to choose since it is rather obvious that scientific verification involves entities that are hardly observable or knowable in the same way as more base ‘macro-sensate experiences’? (1b) Since it is possible that such inferred and ‘invisible’ entities are accepted as at least tentatively so-and such inductive causal inferences can be wildly false nonetheless, both their ‘possible’ falsity and possibly being ‘true’ are meaningful. Such hypotheses-or currently accepted scientific consensus-propositions are had on the basis that they can be either tested and shown as true (or thus far confirmed) or false! Therefore, we seem to already know what entails falsity or truth or confirmation of a proposition separate from any scientific observation of a given verification condition! It follows, then, that “meaning” is somehow had separate FROM the scientific verifiability condition. So, both the confirmation of such a proposition and its denial are wholly intelligible apart from scientific verification.


I would argue that this holds too for ‘direct’ observational verificationism as well since it is wholly meaningful-or, at least intuitively so, that my observational statements about any given descriptive experience could be wrong (and often is).


(2) This leads to a more general criticism of mine: What verifies a given string of words? Or more clearly, suppose we look at a string of words, and ask whether or not it is verifiable, and so what would verify it? In order to do that, we already have to know what the sentence says, how else could we know whether it was verifiable unless we already had some intelligible sense of what it meant? To determine the presence of some disease caused by a microbial we must already have some sense of what viruses or bacteria are!


This brings up a related secondary point. Not all sentences that verificationists hold as meaningless are so in the same sense! Word salads, meaningless strings of sentences are not the same as sentences such as, “ Everything has just doubled in size,” or “ The entire universe came into existence five minutes ago complete with memory of history records etc.” Now, your ‘modified sense data’ of meaning says that imagination is key in modifying such sentences and thus allows translation into meaning. However, imagination, along with such sentences, are not observationally dependent things! They are mental properties that must be internally perceived, and, once more, are false!! Apples the size of the universe type sentences are meaningful even though they are based partly on observation. Hence, “imagination,” by the implication of your own principle, has meaningful content contributions. So, some meanings can be had even though they’re observationally false! Thus, such sentences, and whatever may be wrong with them from an epistemological point of view, are not meaningful in the same way as other sentences are.


If unobservable processes, like mental processes, can impute meaning to certain other statements, then what verifies in one group of sentences is not the same as another. Moreover, if such meaningful statements can be ‘true’ or ‘false,’ then we, once again, know that the veridical status of such propositions are somewhat separable from their referents-and are, therefore, not wholly things and statements about things!


(3) The verification condition of meaning when related to ‘true’ propositions only seem to cover those statements related largely to descriptive facts or states of affairs. Yet, we communicate in all sorts of ways: humor, storytelling etc. These ‘ways’ of communicating contain meanings that seem just as relevant and possibly ‘true’ to us as any descriptive-observationally dependent statement would. One may take some sort of cognitive meaning, like your modified sense data, and attempt to explain these statements in terms of being meaningful in some non-fact descriptive way as fine, but from my point of view this criticism is damaging precisely because a theory of meaning in the philosophical sense is typically charged with explaining all meaning facts, not just those pertaining to fact-stating language.


(4) I wish here to return to more of a critical review of the term “observation.” I want to make two critical observations (no pun intended lol): (4a) what counts as direct observation or the relevant properties FOR meaningful statements? Your, and similar verificationist, views assumes a theoryless view of observation. It is just baldly accepted that whatever is described by sensate experience is appropriately meaningful. However, does our sensate experience need be direct? It would seem so! If so, then does experiencing the world through glasses count? Do experiences that examine stars and galaxies via telescope count as much as one directly seeing an apple in front of him or her does? If so, how so? After all, there’s direct and indirect sensate experience. The meaning of one originates in experiences indirectly and the other directly. But if we can use inference as legitimate observational types of experience, then direct observations are not all there is to a statement being either meaningful or true! So, there are seemingly many ways we can observe and “think” about such experiences. It would seem that we need more clarity on what sorts of observational experiences count as appropriate verification. Since we have competing ideas about what observational experience is, we likely need some testable and guided theory of our verification condition. But once we do this, we, in some way, must abandon direct verificational types of experiences as all that is necessary and sufficient grounds for meaning-statements.


(4b) Obviously, our observational experiences are so because WE have them. But since the world hardly comes to us in terms of single essences or properties, we must somehow choose which properties are relevant and which are not. It seems that there’s far more involved here than mere sensate-like experiences; that is, in various and sundry ways we are “choosing” which properties to define and describe of, say, object X over others. But doing this shows that we are making a complex series of choices based on our speciated baises (that is, what we think relevant and NOT what is relevant). This means that while we describe and define things as they relate to us, these things have much broader existential connections than our mere observations of them could possibly engage. Trees, apples, and cars etc. all are described and defined in ways that are somewhat arbitrary and made useful for our conceptual and semantic purposes. If this is the case, we’re not saying, then, that meaningful statements are descriptive of separated objects-only that they are useful descriptions-linguistically helpful for us! Therefore, meaningful statements that profess to be ‘true’ are only so within a sort of cognitively human biased sense, i.e., true semantically and logically only within the human experience-but not objectively! We can, therefore, have statements that are more useful than others. But-even so-this doesn’t make such statements inherently or somehow objectively meaningful! Only meaningful FOR our experiences.


This leads us to consider the fact that our language places us into a sort of Wittgensteinian box wherein our lingual praxis is so for us and within a complex cultural situation as well. In other words, our “observational” semantics are dependent properties of our social and cultural worlds as much as anything else. Just as flies find feces so alluring and bonobo chimps wouldn’t find female humans attractive, there’s no fundamental essence, therefore, in language to be found either. Oddly, while verificationism attempts to rid or criticize essences or platonic sorts of a priori reasoning, their project seems, in the end analysis, to assume it. Just as we limit what properties we use to define—properties as they are relevant to us and work best FOR us, which often changes over time—we also abide by the cultural mores and accepted semantics as givens, which, once more, changes with the flux and flow of time. Attempting to free ourselves from such restrictions and assume a sort of fixed essence (verification condition) that can build and explain meaning is just that, a human attempt and nothing more.


Now, I wish to be clear here. I’m not advocating for some relativistic view or that all statements are equally useful, they clearly are not. However, whenever one wants to find meaning in our conceptual and semantic praxis as if there’s some discoverable order or certain unflawed means for meaning- has far more to provide us than what I think the verification condition can possibly hope to do!


Eric D.

> edelker: Now this is the kind of philosophy I was looking for on these boards. You have made a very good set of criticisms here and to be honest I am not sure what is the best way to respond to them.

One thing I should make clear first though is that I am not a verificationist. I think that one commits an error somewhere when they jump from "empirical objects are collections of sense-data" to concluding that "empirical propositions are meaningful only if they are verifiable in principle". Instead, I only say that "empirical objects are meaningful if and only if they are composed or sense-data and/or modified sense-data". So it looks like some of your counter-arguments were inadvertently strawman arguments (but do correct me if I am wrong, and my modified sense-data theory of meaning is still subject to the same criticisms).

In basic, this view limits us to the type of observational evidence we can have for any sentence without remainder! For instance, the instrumentalist view of scientific statements concerning such things as electrons, memory traces, other galaxies, and so on are nothing more than mere abbreviations of complex sets of statements about our own laboratory data ONLY! How does this verification condition explain or handle statements about electrons? Is our talk about subatomic particles really nothing more than our macroscopic observations relating to these entities?

I think perhaps you and I are using different definitions of the word sense-datum (and I would not be too surprised if I was indeed using the wrong word to express my ideas). As it is defined in my argument, sense-data are "objects of the mind which are generated (through some unanalyzable unconscious process) upon making direct-observations". So, in Hume's terms, sense-data are ideas and direct-observations are impressions. Now, this definition of sense-datum, I have come to realize, cannot account for the validity of the concept of the electron and other non-directly-observable things. So I will revise my definition of sense-datum even further: "a sense-datum is an object of the mind which is generated (through some analyzable unconscious process) when one makes direct-observations or when one considers pre-existing sense-data". So, for example, we can still meaningfully arrive at concepts like electrons because the concept of an electron (a sense-datum) is generated in our minds when we consider earlier theories and observations made in the directly-observable world (which are in themselves also sense-data derived from direct-observations). I don't actually know exactly how electrons were first discovered, so I must apologize for not being able to provide a more specific example. I think I did a passable job of explaining what I mean by "sense-datum", but if you find it confusing please do ask for clarification.

Also, the same problem occurs when we turn to the human mind! Statements about people’s minds are merely abbreviations of further statements about their overt behaviors. Hence, internal thoughts either do not exist or are not genuinely meaningful or are not justifiable outside some verification condition. In fact, it would seem that such emphasis of meaning on verification-observation not only reduces the significance of philosophy of mind (and psychology-at least non-behaviorist psychology)-it wholly invalidates it!

I think these are acceptable results, since I am not a verificationist. I would not say that sentences like "Katie just thought about apples" are meaningless. I do however, think that individuals should only consider the minds of other people as observations about their behaviour; we simply do not have access to what it is like to be other people, and it may be too presumptuous to assume that they percieve the world exactly as we do.

This brings up a related secondary point. Not all sentences that verificationists hold as meaningless are so in the same sense! Word salads, meaningless strings of sentences are not the same as sentences such as, “ Everything has just doubled in size,” or “ The entire universe came into existence five minutes ago complete with memory of history records etc.” Now, your ‘modified sense data’ of meaning says that imagination is key in modifying such sentences and thus allows translation into meaning. However, imagination, along with such sentences, are not observationally dependent things! They are mental properties that must be internally perceived, and, once more, are false!! Apples the size of the universe type sentences are meaningful even though they are based partly on observation. Hence, “imagination,” by the implication of your own principle, has meaningful content contributions. So, some meanings can be had even though they’re observationally false! Thus, such sentences, and whatever may be wrong with them from an epistemological point of view, are not meaningful in the same way as other sentences are.

I do not require that imagination be derived from observation, so it looks like we are not in disagreement here.

The verification condition of meaning when related to ‘true’ propositions only seem to cover those statements related largely to descriptive facts or states of affairs. Yet, we communicate in all sorts of ways: humor, storytelling etc. These ‘ways’ of communicating contain meanings that seem just as relevant and possibly ‘true’ to us as any descriptive-observationally dependent statement would. One may take some sort of cognitive meaning, like your modified sense data, and attempt to explain these statements in terms of being meaningful in some non-fact descriptive way as fine, but from my point of view this criticism is damaging precisely because a theory of meaning in the philosophical sense is typically charged with explaining all meaning facts, not just those pertaining to fact-stating language.

I'm not quite sure I understand the counter-argument here. Are you saying that the modified sense-data theory of meaning is problematic because it only applies to empirical nouns?

Ophiuchus wrote,

“> edelker: Now this is the kind of philosophy I was looking for on these boards. You have made a very good set of criticisms here and to be honest I am not sure what is the best way to respond to them.”




Thank you! I also appreciate the careful argumentation you’ve provided here. Certainly a welcome anytime! I also have sympathies for the empirical approach to meaning. I just do not think that the logical positivist or verificationists have the right sort of approach here. But we’ll see.


I’m what one might call a ‘funtional physicalist.’ In basic, I accept the empirical language and sciences as a significant source of justified belief. However, beyond the mere functionality of such language—that is, it is MORE helpful to us and FOR us to describe and explain certain phenomena in this way as opposed to others—it is doubtful that such language clearly points out or reveals some essential truth about the objects of its concern. While this is far from what many logical positivists would want, it is, I fear, the best we can do. But the best we can do is still quite a bit more than other means of explanation we have on offer.


Ophiuchus wrote,

“One thing I should make clear first though is that I am not a verificationist. I think that one commits an error somewhere when they jump from "empirical objects are collections of sense-data" to concluding that "empirical propositions are meaningful only if they are verifiable in principle". Instead, I only say that "empirical objects are meaningful if and only if they are composed or sense-data and/or modified sense-data". So it looks like some of your counter-arguments were inadvertently strawman arguments (but do correct me if I am wrong, and my modified sense-data theory of meaning is still subject to the same criticisms).”



Right! But that’s still a ‘form’ of verificationism! It is just that empirical objects are meaningful if they are composed of sense data and/or modified sense-data. In basic, you’ve limited the domain of the 'verification-meaning' principle to empirical objects. I’m uncertain how this makes your argument better off. In fact, it seems to limit meaning to just verifiable sense data and/or modified sense data. If you permit ‘other’ forms of meaning to exist that cover non-empirical phenomena, then it would seem that your project is not only grossly confusing-but pointless since most on the other side of such a debate would already readily agree that empirical objects are meaningful if they are composed of sense data and/or modified sense-data. If your view does not prohibit other derivations of meaning acquisition, then certainly something like the a priori or theological is possible and we’re back to square one.

Also, the meaning isn't derived in the objects themselves-but rather with sense-data or modified sense-data or our cogntive processing of such data or what have you. It is the meaning adequacy of our sensate experience of such objects that are typically in dispute. After all, there are few that wouldn't align some empirical object with some sense-datum or some modifed etc.-cogintive datum. Rather, it is our interpretations and explanatory effectiveness of our varied sensory experience of those objects that are the subject of great debate among empirical philosophers as well scientists. There are many ways to interpret our sensory experiences of empirical objects! Many are incompatible-but all are meaningful!


Ophiuchus wrote,


“I think perhaps you and I are using different definitions of the word sense-datum (and I would not be too surprised if I was indeed using the wrong word to express my ideas). As it is defined in my argument, sense-data are "objects of the mind which are generated (through some unanalyzable unconscious process) upon making direct-observations". So, in Hume's terms, sense-data are ideas and direct-observations are impressions. Now, this definition of sense-datum, I have come to realize, cannot account for the validity of the concept of the electron and other non-directly-observable things. So I will revise my definition of sense-datum even further: "a sense-datum is an object of the mind which is generated (through some analyzable unconscious process) when one makes direct-observations or when one considers pre-existing sense-data". So, for example, we can still meaningfully arrive at concepts like electrons because the concept of an electron (a sense-datum) is generated in our minds when we consider earlier theories and observations made in the directly-observable world (which are in themselves also sense-data derived from direct-observations). I don't actually know exactly how electrons were first discovered, so I must apologize for not being able to provide a more specific example. I think I did a passable job of explaining what I mean by "sense-datum", but if you find it confusing please do ask for clarification.”


This isn’t clear. So, sense datum originates (is generated) either when one makes a direct observation, like, one seeing an apple on the table in front of her, or when considering OTHER pre-existing sense data, i.e., inferences TO unobserved entities by second-hand non-direct means. Democritus reasoned to, i.e., inferred the a-tom (atom—meaning non-separable thing), the object. The concept didn’t occur anywhere in sensory experience. Again, you’re still justifying such concepts on the basis of macroscopic observations. Saying the object is meaningful is still saying something about things unobserved via a theoretical approach to such inferred things—‘inferences’ that could turn out to be false-but even so, such explanations are meaningful! This revision of yours, which is well stated, still falls under the above criticisms outlined under scientific verificationism. Keep in mind such “theories” can be wrong (and theories involve much more than observations as we all know)! But even such wrongness seems to possess some prior or posterior set of properties making them meaningful AND false. The problem still stands as far as I can see.


We can see from the above, then, that we still have at least two sources or possible ways to define or understand “observation.” Two ways that are not epistemically identifiable! One would or could argue that all such observations—the conceptual and those supposedly derived from sense impressions— are but properties of the mind, that is, they can take on some idealist position.


You still haven’t shown how these unobserved entities are somehow identifiable with their observational content. From the sciences we know that we ‘mean’ more than what our mere observations are suggesting. Meanings that clearly extend far beyond what is directly observed. Theories and their concepts have unobserved mental constituents and if they’re legitimate sources of meaningful knowledge, then clearly we’re far from anything recommended here.


In any case, clearly there's meaning to be had outside of observational sensate experience of empirical objects-or that such objects have more 'possible' meanings that have varied veridical statuses and implications than what is suggested by mere sense-data etc. experience alone.


Ophiuchus wrote,

“I think these are acceptable results, since I am not a verificationist. I would not say that sentences like "Katie just thought about apples" are meaningless. I do however, think that individuals should only consider the minds of other people as observations about their behaviour; we simply do not have access to what it is like to be other people, and it may be too presumptuous to assume that they percieve the world exactly as we do.”



Yet, we know from the failures of behavioral psychology and how the science of behaviorism led to such interesting fields as evolutionary psychology- that internal states and designs seem to have an enormous impact on how the world is experienced. Knowing that we and other species experience the biosphere in radically different ways because of our diverse and respective psychological make-up reveals just how vital the internal life is-and how little overall concern the whole of the animal kingdom appears to have for descriptive details of the world.


Also, internal states or one's qualitative experiences about the world can be true and meaningful beyond their mere behvior. If this so, then mere behavior observations will always be grossly inadequate as causal descriptions of other's behaviors. It hardly follows that just because we lack access to other minds that we ought to only interpret minds as mere observations of their behavior! We simply need another language of science and study to describe and meaningfully talk about internal states. And we do!



Ophiuchus wrote,

“I do not require that imagination be derived from observation, so it looks like we are not in disagreement here.”


Right! But you do require meaning to be derived from observational/modified etc. experience. Given this and the fact that imagination, which is only, or perhaps, partly based on observations about the world or our cultural languages about the world, can be meaningful and false—or even descriptively neutral— shows that meaning is not clearly derived from mere observational type-experiences.



Ophiuchus wrote,

“I'm not quite sure I understand the counter-argument here. Are you saying that the modified sense-data theory of meaning is problematic because it only applies to empirical nouns?”


I’m saying it is hardly sufficient to do the job, along with other parts of your theory, of explaining meaning in the way you’ve outlined it.


That’s all for now. Thanks for the good convo.

Eric D.

The agenda of Igtheism seemed shining in:

a) God is useful;

b) God is transcendental.

However, something that is transcendental can not be instrumental to the empirical world, because which transcendental characteristics is beyond human comprehension.

If God as immanent, then it must reside in the mind of the thinker. This is an argument for Memetheism, an evolved concept over Igtheism.

I must admit that I have a very weak understanding of psychological topics (it would be an overstatement to say that I had one at all ), so I cannot argue against you on the psychology front. However, it seems that you are criticizing a position which I am not actually endorsing. I do think that there are non-empirical things which give meaning to sentences. I do think that there are such things as synthetic a priori truths. My project here is only to clarify what empirical nouns are and what is permitted in the meaning of an empirical noun.

Right! But that’s still a ‘form’ of verificationism! It is just that empirical objects are meaningful if they are composed of sense data and/or modified sense-data. In basic, you’ve limited the domain of the 'verification-meaning' principle to empirical objects. I’m uncertain how this makes your argument better off. In fact, it seems to limit meaning to just verifiable sense data and/or modified sense data. If you permit ‘other’ forms of meaning to exist that cover non-empirical phenomena, then it would seem that your project is not only grossly confusing-but pointless since most on the other side of such a debate would already readily agree that empirical objects are meaningful if they are composed of sense data and/or modified sense-data. If your view does not prohibit other derivations of meaning acquisition, then certainly something like the a priori or theological is possible and we’re back to square one.

Actually, this is what I am saying. I am not saying that words which are not empirical nouns are meaningless (that would be quite preposterous), but rather I am trying to provide a criterion for which things count as empirical objects. Your assertion "most on the other side of such a debate would already readily agree that empirical objects are meaningful if they are composed of sense data and/or modified sense-data." is something which I don't think is true; I think that many people (namely, transcendental theists) do think that empirical nouns are allowed to be composed of things which are neither sense-data nor modified sense-data. This is precisely the position I am trying to argue against.

And I must apologize for not responding to all of your criticisms here. When I read them, I do not get the same "clarity of thought" that I usually do with positions I understand well, so I do not feel I can meaningfully argue with you on those fronts.

Ophiuchus wrote,

“I do think that there are non-empirical things which give meaning to sentences. I do think that there are such things as synthetic a priori truths. My project here is only to clarify what empirical nouns are and what is permitted in the meaning of an empirical noun.”


So, we may draw from epistemology here: are there really empirical ‘things’ upon which such nouns ultimately find their source or are such nouns merely useful linguistic functions FOR us? This is a vital issue. For if we say that such things are actually real in the way that naïve empiricism suggests, which, then, gives rise to a “meaning” stratagem at least analogous to your project here, then we are faced with the problems inherent with psychological relations as it relates to our inductive causal inferences. If the best we can do is something like functional physicalism or empiricism, then our meaning references need not be confined to anything empirical by necessity but simply serve a function that accommodates our own biases. The issue, then, philosophically-or the more interesting question, relates to the ontological and semantic relevance of our conceptual and lingual practices. If the latter is the case, and I would argue that it is, then the project in clarifying what empirical nouns are and what is permitted in the meaning of an empirical noun may well miss the larger issue at stake: that ultimately there are no such empirical semantic things or that no such things actually refer to actual objects-only objects as we experience them from within our cultural-human biases. This bias is both conventional and natural. In basic, we see tree-like things and we name such things trees, bushes and such. However, this says nothing about what is real or how such language praxis adequately reflects some world outside of ourselves. If meaning, then, is wholly based on this rather curious set of cognitive circumstances, it is unlikely that any rule to establish certain classes of meaning from others will likely turn out to be, under analysis, contrived.


So, your ‘belief’ in such a classification of meaning related to empirical nouns will likely have to assume certain things about our cognition and the adequacy of our sensate experiences at some level or other that in the end will present far more problems than solutions.


Ophiuchus wrote,

“Actually, this is what I am saying. I am not saying that words which are not empirical nouns are meaningless (that would be quite preposterous), but rather I am trying to provide a criterion for which things count as empirical objects. Your assertion "most on the other side of such a debate would already readily agree that empirical objects are meaningful if they are composed of sense data and/or modified sense-data." is something which I don't think is true; I think that many people (namely, transcendental theists) do think that empirical nouns are allowed to be composed of things which are neither sense-data nor modified sense-data. This is precisely the position I am trying to argue against.”


But many theists in fact do! They do this based on the notion that the universe is bifurcated, i.e., metaphysical dualism—there is a realm of the transcendent and supernatural that gave birth to a universe filled with actual objects and that our general language practices adequately capture and make real or adequate sense of these sense-objects. In fact, there’s an entire school of apologetics based on “natural theology” that argues from what is commonly regarded as evidential apologetics that centers its arguments in a foundationalist view of language-object relations. At best, your view would only address certain theistic viewpoints-not all! Moreover, given what is argued above, your position also assumes that we possess a basic sort of relation to the world that is at best questionable.


Again, thanks for a good convo,

Eric D.

I think your argument would apply equally well to anything non-material so, by the same logic, would you not have to conclude that all moral, aesthetic or indeed philosophical propositions including igtheism are meaningless?

Well the modified sense-data theory of meaning is intended to apply only to empirical nouns, so I don't think that my argument can be applied to the a priori (both analytic and synthetic); so no, I would not say that ethics, (non-transcendent) metaphysics, and igtheism are meaningless concepts. I wouldn't object to aesthetics being meaningless though, assuming that it is supposed to be a posteriori.

I think I ought to first clarify what my position on religion and theological propositions are. I am an igtheist, which is a person who does not believe that theological propositions (e.g. "God caused the world to spring forth from non-existence") express meaningful ideas which can be used in a coherent and logical manner. So to an igtheist, trying to argue against God's existence is just as illogical as trying to argue for his existence. If igtheism is true, then all theological propositions are pseudo-propositions which do not meet the basic requirements necessary to form a complete idea.

I'm trying to understand in what way such a general statement of belief in igtheism is in any way 'superior' to, of greater standing, on more solid grounds than a statement of belief such as 'I believe in a benevolent God' or 'I believe there is a pluralistic immanent divinity in apples and many other fruits and flowers.'

What special qualities does the the proposition-against-theology have?

I ask as an atheist, I don't have any hidden religious variables in my agenda

Just to cut through some of the crap, lets suppose God is like unto Brahman, and that it is best represented in reality through the father, which could be likened to the highest works of the imagination, which in itself belongs to Brahman. That could mean that those who belong to the greater part of the imagination are in fact kin to the father, which could go hand in hand with scripture as to belonging to such a father, and therefore in some way are saved by the father. Speculative of course, and not dependent upon knowledge of such a father, but rather backed up through scripture of our fathers and works of wonder around the world. like machine marks when man had no machines, maps of parts of the world only recently discovered in comparison that could only have been mapped from satellite, and a pyramid that encompasses the dimensions of our world that also only very recently in comparison has been confirmed by satellites. In the end, it may be the fathers argument that we have been left struggling with, along with such wonders, when the Gods, or father presided with man, rather than solely above him. The greatest quest for any imagination, is to find meaning. Anything other would simply be a lack of such imagination. I guess.

Physics seeks to understand physical reality, or "being in motion." Physics also seeks to posit a first principle of the universe, such as the big bang. It does this because many empirical signs point to a non-eternal universe. Physics seeks to extract the intelligible data out of what it observes in physical reality in order to find its properties which provide the its core most explanatory data. What is most evident in observing "being in motion," is that if you go backwards starting with a present being in motion, you see that it is now in act, but was in a state of potentiality to act, and its potentiality was actualized by another material being, you then go from this object and you keep finding the same exact property of material reality. Thus, physical reality seems not to have its own explanatory power because it always ends in a being in a state of potentiality to motion. Again, this is only what seems to be MOST evident to our senses. You can hypothesize about matter which "behaves differently," but that is not what is most empirically evident.

If we listen to what matter is telling us, then it cannot have put itself in any kind of motion. It seems to contradict what is most evident to our sense observation. Thus, it is not so clear from sense datum that physical reality is the only possible kind of thing which exists.

I wonder if you're still active in this thread, but I have a very interesting different argument for you: The German theologist Peter Kliemann summed it up in "Glauben ist menschlich" (I don't know if this was translated to English...).

His argument in brief: God expresses himself mainly through personal experiences people have with him - the Bible is the largest collection of accounts for that. You must choose whether you can believe or use these reports for yourself or not. But the point is: These encounters with God are individual and unique, which means they can be sensed, but are irrepeatable. Empirical science is based on finding constants by carrying out experiments - but this is only possible because objects are subject to natural laws and always react the same in equal circumstances.

This is, at the same time, one of the major problems of psychology. Empirism does not work with singular events or personal relationships.

I'm excited to hear your answer!

Best wishes

>Brahman: What?

>Nicholas: I'm not sure I understand what you were trying to say in your post. It is a sort of cosmological argument for the existence of God? If so, I'm not quite sure how it is intended to undermine the position of igtheism; the cosmological argument says that there must be a "state of affairs" that existed prior to the beginning of the universe, and that this state of affairs is God. But this sheds no light on what kind of meaning the word "God" entails, which is what the position of igtheism attacks.

>Annaruebe: As an empiricist and phenomenalist, I would interpret Kliemann's concept of God to mean the following: "God is the collection of one's experiences of talking to people who believe they have experienced God". If this is his definition of God, then igtheism no longer applies; the word God has gained some cognitive content. However, if this is his definition, then this seems to be the sort of assertion which Kliemann does not want to imply; namely, that God is merely a sociological phenomenon. Surely, he wants God to be a real thing in the universe which interacts with the world in some observable way; not merely a bunch of verbal exchanges between people. This is not the kind of God that a theist would want to argue for the existence of.

As for an incompatibility between psychology and empricism, I do not think such a thing exists. The fact is, a person is only able to experience the world through his own mind. Whenever we form the belief that another person is thinking about something or performing some mental activity, we are only forming these beliefs on the basis of observations about that person's behaviour. There is a big ontological difference between the concepts of "my experience of the taste of coffee" and "somebody else's experience of the taste of coffee". I cannot know what it is like to taste coffee as someone else, because I only have access to my own experiences. The best I can do is to observe what other people are doing and saying, and to form beliefs based on my observations.