The Perfect Government

[ScottieX]

1) write morals into the constitution, this way all members are held accountable

A good constitution is vague enough to remain applicable in a wide range of situations and when times change, but an effective standard with which to hold someone accountable is a specific standard. It seems like you would tend to either have a constitution that is too restrictive such that it results in inferior decision making or one that doesn't really stop the government from doing much.

have levels of representation, this way we know who is our leader and whether he needs to be impeached.

I suppose the danger here is that the next leader might be effectively the same leader. You get this scenario in countries like Thailand or Russia, but it may be true to an extent in the US. Chop off the head (for example when Putin stepped down or Thaksin fled overseas), and the same people still have power. But maybe that is the best system we can have at the moment.

3) separate the powers into executive, legislative, and judicial. This has proven to work

Has separating the legislative and executive branches worked? I suppose it depends on how you measure it but it doesn't seem very successful to me.

Separating the executive and judicial branches does seem to work although it would be nice if they were a little more separate. It is not so great that the head of state appoints the judicial branch.

[David_the_simple]

1) write morals into the constitution, this way all members are held accountable

A good constitution is vague enough to remain applicable in a wide range of situations and when times change, but an effective standard with which to hold someone accountable is a specific standard. It seems like you would tend to either have a constitution that is too restrictive such that it results in inferior decision making or one that doesn't really stop the government from doing much.

The constraints are only the most fundimental for a stable society. Natural Morals would keep the system stable and restrict only those decisions that would de-stablize it. The rules of chess do not interfer with the plethera of strategies possible.

have levels of representation, this way we know who is our leader and whether he needs to be impeached.

I suppose the danger here is that the next leader might be effectively the same leader. You get this scenario in countries like Thailand or Russia, but it may be true to an extent in the US. Chop off the head (for example when Putin stepped down or Thaksin fled overseas), and the same people still have power. But maybe that is the best system we can have at the moment.

It is possible that a good and skilled leader could 'move up the ladder', which is expected as he would now have more knowledge and experience and closer fill that task. The balance keeps him from getting corupt.

3) separate the powers into executive, legislative, and judicial. This has proven to work

Has separating the legislative and executive branches worked? I suppose it depends on how you measure it but it doesn't seem very successful to me.

Separating the executive and judicial branches does seem to work although it would be nice if they were a little more separate. It is not so great that the head of state appoints the judicial branch.

Here, it seems to work the best for a non-autocracy... now now

[ScottieX]

]Here, it seems to work the best for a non-autocracy... now now

Can you tell me a way it seems to have benefited?

[David_the_simple]

]Here, it seems to work the best for a non-autocracy... now now

Can you tell me a way it seems to have benefited?

In history, if my memory serves me well enough, monarchy has a very polar outcome. With a good king, all is well, but with a bad one, the peasants paid dearly. Power corrupts. Yet there were good kings. It appears to be a crap shoot to get the good ones.

In comes the solution, how can we have a government that minimizes the corrupting effects of power? Divide and conquer, separate the powers. If we divide them any further we get a Bureaucracy... yuck. So, for now, we have a method to minimize the corrupting effects of power save that we need to put morality into the constitutioin.

[ScottieX]

Most would argue "it prevents tyranny", but usually they are just extrapolating from the USA comparing it with poor African states (or similar). A better comparison is countries like Australia and Canada (which many argue are more democratic).

-- Updated November 14th, 2014, 2:37 pm to add the following --

In comes the solution, how can we have a government that minimizes the corrupting effects of power? Divide and conquer, separate the powers. If we divide them any further we get a Bureaucracy... yuck. So, for now, we have a method to minimize the corrupting effects of power save that we need to put morality into the constitution.

Not many people would still suggest pure monarchy as a good idea. The more effective alternative to separation of powers is fusion of powers in a parliamentary system. I suggest a fully proportional parliamentary democracy.

[David_the_simple]

In comes the solution, how can we have a government that minimizes the corrupting effects of power? Divide and conquer, separate the powers. If we divide them any further we get a Bureaucracy... yuck. So, for now, we have a method to minimize the corrupting effects of power save that we need to put morality into the constitution.

Not many people would still suggest pure monarchy as a good idea. The more effective alternative to separation of powers is fusion of powers in a parliamentary system. I suggest a fully proportional parliamentary democracy.

In order for me to continue with logical argument, Could you articulate on "fully proportional parliamentary democracy"

Thanks

[ScottieX]

In order for me to continue with logical argument, Could you articulate on "fully proportional parliamentary democracy"Thanks

Each party decides on a list of "candidates" that they will offer - the first candidate will usually be the leader of the party.

So it might be "Bob,Fred, Mike and Charles".

These are the people this party is putting up to be elected for government which may have (for example) 200 members. They will campaign in an election and then the seats of government will be divided according to the amount of votes they get. If the party gets 1% of the vote nationally then Bob and Fred get into government but the others do not.

Now all the parties that got into government need to get together to decide who is the prime minister. To do that they need to prove they have the confidence of 50% +1 of the people in government.

Note that in practice you will almost never get a single party running such a government.

[David_the_simple]

In order for me to continue with logical argument, Could you articulate on "fully proportional parliamentary democracy"Thanks

Each party decides on a list of "candidates" that they will offer - the first candidate will usually be the leader of the party.

So it might be "Bob,Fred, Mike and Charles".

These are the people this party is putting up to be elected for government which may have (for example) 200 members. They will campaign in an election and then the seats of government will be divided according to the amount of votes they get. If the party gets 1% of the vote nationally then Bob and Fred get into government but the others do not.

Now all the parties that got into government need to get together to decide who is the prime minister. To do that they need to prove they have the confidence of 50% +1 of the people in government.

Note that in practice you will almost never get a single party running such a government.

Thanks for the answer. Interesting proposal.

If I am understanding this, the people are voting by party and not by person. The person(s) is decided from within the party.

In one sense, there is practically little difference when played out:

1) The common man doing the voting really does not know the person who gets the job. The level of representation is too dilute for national elections.

2) Legislation can still pass laws that bias advantage to lobbyist, immediate friends, party members, etc.

[ScottieX]

In one sense, there is practically little difference when played out: 1) The common man doing the voting really does not know the person who gets the job. The level of representation is too dilute for national elections. 2) Legislation can still pass laws that bias advantage to lobbyist, immediate friends, party members, etc.

Well the common man almost never really knows the person who leads them or at least not in the way that would allow them to make a particularly good judgement about their suitability. I think maybe that is an impossible goal. But in the suggested system A) the leader of the country doesn't really rule alone. he needs the support of the majority of his party or he doesn't have much power at all so he doesn't matter nearly as much - it really is the party that matters. B) No single party gets control in the vast majority of elections - this means there are secondary parties that can withdraw their support and bring the government down.

For 2) - campaign finance reform. Force every donor to record their donation on a register and limit the total amount that a party can spend in various situations. Lobby groups can be restricted in their power both by the fact that they now have to bribe a party collectively (as opposed to an individual - which is harder because more people = more leaks) and the reduced need for their support anyway. You could also simply make certain activities (like super pacs) illegal.

[David_the_simple]

.. Well the common man almost never really knows the person who leads them or at least not in the way that would allow them to make a particularly good judgement about their suitability. I think maybe that is an impossible goal. But in the suggested system A) the leader of the country doesn't really rule alone. he needs the support of the majority of his party or he doesn't have much power at all so he doesn't matter nearly as much - it really is the party that matters. B) No single party gets control in the vast majority of elections - this means there are secondary parties that can withdraw their support and bring the government down.

For 2) - campaign finance reform. Force every donor to record their donation on a register and limit the total amount that a party can spend in various situations. Lobby groups can be restricted in their power both by the fact that they now have to bribe a party collectively (as opposed to an individual - which is harder because more people = more leaks) and the reduced need for their support anyway. You could also simply make certain activities (like super pacs) illegal.

After concideration of this proposal and existing implementation, there is another type which with tweaking may solve both problems.

In the Iroquois Great Law of Peace (IGLoP), there is ground work that allows the immediate leader to be known, voted in and impeached (if necessary). This method is scalable, from immediate tribe to national. The idea of a man voted into national leadership by the next level lower without consent of the common man bothers me, but on a good side, that said man is known by those that voted him in and the common man can voice his opinion up the chain. The The two tweaks to the IGLoP I can think of is: write natural-morality into the constitution, divide power into legistlative, executive, judicial. Should party lines/aliances form, check-and-balances as well as by-level impeachment would keep things sober.

[ScottieX]

This method is scalable, from immediate tribe to national. The idea of a man voted into national leadership by the next level lower without consent of the common man bothers me, but on a good side, that said man is known by those that voted him in and the common man can voice his opinion up the chain.

My concern with that sort of model would be that it would create the sort of tribal democracy. At the low level you get groups with very low diversity, those groups select self interested policies like maybe that their tribe should get more money at the expense of other tribes. They make these promises to their people and then go up to the next level. But it is very difficult to get a decision in the national interest out of such a group, - instead you tend to get complex combinations of corruption.

[David_the_simple]

This method is scalable, from immediate tribe to national. The idea of a man voted into national leadership by the next level lower without consent of the common man bothers me, but on a good side, that said man is known by those that voted him in and the common man can voice his opinion up the chain.

My concern with that sort of model would be that it would create the sort of tribal democracy. At the low level you get groups with very low diversity, those groups select self interested policies like maybe that their tribe should get more money at the expense of other tribes. They make these promises to their people and then go up to the next level. But it is very difficult to get a decision in the national interest out of such a group, - instead you tend to get complex combinations of corruption.

I believe I did not do a good job explaining this. Given the proposal above with:

If a tribe/town were to make a policy, its context would be contained within that tribe/town only.

Should a leader of a tribe/town try to implement a change that is regional, it would be the regional leader's responsibility to weigh it against or for the other tribes/town.

The corruption within each level would be contained and dealt with from within that level per constitutional morals and impeachment.

This arrangement could lead to great variations from town to town, but still unified at the regional level. The one thing to unify all levels would be the constitution which includes morals and the scalable structure.

Consider a scenio that extend top down, a top leader wants to pass a law that effects all lower levels. Each lower level representative would have to contact the next down with buy in.

[ScottieX]

I believe I did not do a good job explaining this. Given the proposal above with: If a tribe/town were to make a policy, its context would be contained within that tribe/town only.

hmmm.. how do we ensure that happens? If there is the requirement for a prison - a local leader might argue it is a local issue because it is in his area, the regional leader says it is a regional issue as it is a regional prison, the country leader says it is a national issue because it is part of he judicial system which needs to be consistent and these groups may be unable to get agreement.

Should a leader of a tribe/town try to implement a change that is regional, it would be the regional leader's responsibility to weigh it against or for the other tribes/town. The corruption within each level would be contained and dealt with from within that level per constitutional morals and impeachment.

Consider a scenio that extend top down, a top leader wants to pass a law that effects all lower levels. Each lower level representative would have to contact the next down with buy in.

To me the system you are describing sounds not only like the american Indian system but also the system that is common in less developed countries. Admirable constitutions and structures where a small sub tribe might have a leader and those leaders have a chief and the chiefs select representatives for their greater group and those people cone together in the government.

But in those countries this system tends not to control corruption (or create high quality national decisions) and corruption is often seen as positive way to protect the interests of the people to whom you are responsible. Maybe there is no system that can do that in a corrupt society but it doesn't seem to automatically address the issue.

[David_the_simple]

hmmm.. how do we ensure that happens? If there is the requirement for a prison - a local leader might argue it is a local issue because it is in his area, the regional leader says it is a regional issue as it is a regional prison, the country leader says it is a national issue because it is part of he judicial system which needs to be consistent and these groups may be unable to get agreement.

I believe it may be hard on the most local level as a prison cost to operate. This would be an area where towns would work together to have a common facility. Crime is local regardless of what level the offense was, hence imprisinment would be in the area of the crime.

To me the system you are describing sounds not only like the american Indian system but also the system that is common in less developed countries. Admirable constitutions and structures where a small sub tribe might have a leader and those leaders have a chief and the chiefs select representatives for their greater group and those people cone together in the government.

But in those countries this system tends not to control corruption (or create high quality national decisions) and corruption is often seen as positive way to protect the interests of the people to whom you are responsible. Maybe there is no system that can do that in a corrupt society but it doesn't seem to automatically address the issue.

Historically, this system was not implemented on a large scale, the population wasn't there and they did not have the technology in communications, which would also have increased their efficiency.

As far as automatically addressing the issue... I agree... it does not. The proposal is based on mechanism which were not immediately brought out on the table.

There will always be the few who violate moral code. The government model needs to be riggerous enough to filter them out or minimize their effect till they get caught red handed.

A) One method, as proposed, is to decrease the population to representation ratio. It is easy for a representivity to go with the lobbyest over the common man who didn't take him to dinner. Robin Dunbar's monkeysphere helps explains this mechanism.

B )It appears that having a constitution adds stability government. Adding natural morals would hold all members moraly accountable by constitution and not by juristprudence, which has let the guilty free on technicallities.

C) It appears that dividing the powers of government reduces, but not eliminates, corruption.

So it is proposed to use all three mechanisms: better representation through more levels of government, writing natural morals into a constitution, dividing power. Admittedly, fine details need to be added, and other details are inferred from them. Although not automaticaly addressing the issue, it does explain more of the hows and why of the issue.

[ScottieX]

I believe it may be hard on the most local level as a prison cost to operate. This would be an area where towns would work together to have a common facility. Crime is local regardless of what level the offense was, hence imprisonment would be in the area of the crime.

Would it not be a better system if we relied on efficiency and effectiveness rather than fairness? For example that a prison should be in the place that prisons are most efficient and effective?

A little imagery and maths to help explain this....

Imagine playing a game 1,000 times (each game being a major political decision). Imagine that the optimal outcome returns maybe 1.1 times the result from the fair outcome in terms of net effect on welfare and each of the 1000 decisions (randomly) effects a significant proportion of people.

After those 1000 decisions I suggest that statistically it will be VERY hard to find a person who benefits form the locally "fair" strategy. Even in a large country there may well be not a single person who benefits from it.

A) One method, as proposed, is to decrease the population to representation ratio. It is easy for a representivity to go with the lobbyist over the common man who didn't take him to dinner.

The lobbyist is still the man at dinner with the representative, not the common man.

B )It appears that having a constitution adds stability government. Adding natural morals would hold all members moraly accountable by constitution and not by juristprudence, which has let the guilty free on technicallities.

You still have to catch them. I suggest an agency designed to catch corruption in the government not reporting to them. Then you have to have punishments severe enough that they are not worth the gamble (risk of being caught x loss > gain x reward from corruption).

C) It appears that dividing the powers of government reduces, but not eliminates, corruption.

That sounds plausible - but maybe we should look at some empirical data

1) Anglo-Saxon countries Canada/Australia/NZ/UK - low corruption - fusion of powers USA - high corruption (highest of the comparable countries) - division of powers

2) List of 11 least corrupt countries using 2013 corruption perception index Denmark, Finland, NZ, Sweden, Norway, Singapore, Switzerland, Netherlands, Australia, Canada, Luxembourg

I think this list is dominated by if not totally fusion of power states and the obvious countries with similar western traditions like France and Belgium are separation of power states.

3) And a list of presidential system countries someone made (not exactly the same as separation of powers but i couldn't find that list) including probably every one of the worst countries one might have thought of in terms of corruption (Somalia, Nigeria, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Haiti).

http://www.ranker.com/list/countries-ru ... /reference