Does Natural Law Theory reach a dead end?

Have philosophical discussions about politics, law, and government.
Featured Article: Definition of Freedom - What Freedom Means to Me
GE Morton
Posts: 4696
Joined: February 1st, 2017, 1:06 am

Re: Does Natural Law Theory reach a dead end?

Post by GE Morton »

Gertie wrote:The Ises, the state of affairs in the world, affect people's quality of life, including the actions of conscious agents who make choices which contribute to the state of affairs. And so that's where the Oughts come in, we Ought to act in ways which are overall beneficial to the well being of conscious creatures.
I agree. That is the gist of the Axiom I offered.
A crucial issue which tends to arise, is balancing the 'common good' against individual freedom, which is where you and I have disagreed in the past. You treat individual freedom as one side of the equation, vs the good of others, where-as in my model it's one element of well-being, which will inevitably be in the mix along with other elements, in creating a society which inevitably involves compromises. I believe my model is more congruent with the foundational principle of the well-being of conscious creatures, which I think we share.
There is no conflict between individual freedom and the good of others. All agents in the field have the same freedom to pursue they good as they define it, and the theory is indifferent --- neutral --- with respect to those various goals and goods (subject to the exception in Note 2). An agent's freedom can cause no harm to others unless he violates a rule of the theory.
Fair point. There are two connected issues for me, the pragmatic one of what do we as a society do in the absence of a basis for Oughts to loosely but effectively cohere around. And can we come up with a philosophically valid new basis for Oughts in a world without Objective Morality.
A moral theory or system that is philosophically valid will necessarily be objective. It's premises will be self-evidently true and its theorems will follow from them. Since the truth conditions for the premises are public, they are objective, and hence so will be the theorems. Also, "effectively but loosely cohere around" sounds more like a political goal and strategy than a philosophical one. The history of vernacular morality is a litany of "oughts" some shaman or demagogue or tyrant has persuaded (or compelled) majorities to rally around. Those successes lend no philosophical credibility to the "oughts" being peddled.

There is a way to derive "ought" from "is," in a sense. It is done all the time with the instrumental sense (as opposed to the moral sense) of "ought." For example, "If you wish to drive a nail, you ought to get a hammer," or "If you want to get a good job, you ought to get a good education." In this sense "one ought to do X" means, "Doing X is an effective means of accomplishing Y." The latter is an "is" statement, and is objective and empirically testable.

Now . . .
And I believe the well-being of conscious creatures is a philosophically sound foundation for society overall, and one which resonates with people on an emotional and intellectual level, which makes it potentially workable.

I believe your claim there is equivalent to the Axiom I offered in a previous post: "All agents in the moral field should adhere to rules per which goods can be maximized, and evils minimized, for all agents." Is it not?
Yup I think so.
So we seem to agree on the goal of a moral theory. What if the theorems of some such theory, each of which prescibes some moral rule, are effective (or even necessary) means of reaching that goal? Ought we obey those rules? Surely we ought to do so in the instrumental sense of "ought." And if the goal is a moral one (which I think we'll agree the above goal is), then do those instrumental "oughts" become moral "oughts"?
Here's where I think we part company. It seems to me you tag on your foundational guiding principle at the end, as if it's derived from your definitions, roles and rules - your methodology, where-as I see it as the starting point for coming up with Oughts, which then require methodology for implementation. So I think your construction here has a problem - . . .
Oh, no. The Axiom is not derived from the postulates. It bears no relation to them whatsoever. It is a free-standing moral goal, one which most people (or at least most moral philosophers) would agree is a worthy one, and one implicit if not explicit in nearly all moral theories. The postulates, except for the Equal Agency postulate, have no moral content. They merely describe empricially verifiable features of the moral field and the moral agents who populate it --- features that constrain the choices of theorems (rules) that will be workable. They establish "boundary conditions."
Is this genuinely the formulation you'd come up with starting from the axiomatic guiding principle of 'the welfare of conscious creatures'? It seems like you might be deriving your foundational axiom from your constructed categories, rather than the other way round?
As I said above, the Axiom is independent of the postulates. But the means of achieving the goal of the Axiom are constrained by features of the agents in the field and of their social setting.
If I'm right, how do you justify this? If you think I'm wrong, could you reformulate it, begininng with the foundational principle and showing how your rules and categories meet the the goal of optimising 'the well-being of conscious creatures'?
I'm not sure what you're counting as a "category." And no rules (theorems) are presented. The postulates do not create "categories;" they are simply descriptive statements about the agents and their setting, and are (I believe) empirically verifiable. But if you think one or more of them is false, please point out the error you see.
Take this -
1. Postulate of Liberty: There are noa priori[/i moral duties or constraints. The only duties and constraints binding upon moral agents are those derived from a sound moral theory.
Corollary: Postulate of Free Agency: The agents in the moral field are not parties to nor bound a prioriby any universal agreement or compact.
Corollary: Postulate of Autonomy: The agents in the moral field are not related as elements of an organic unity, and are not subject to any external imperatives or constraints other than those imposed by the laws of nature . . .


Out of time for today. Will pick this up in the AM.

PS: I haven't covered all your points. Too many! If there is one I've neglected to which you'd particularly like a response let me know.

-- Updated September 7th, 2017, 9:24 am to add the following --

Ranvier wrote:Before I offer my further thoughts on the subject of "Morality", it would be pertinent to define the meaning of the term from my subjective perspective. I perceive morality to be a "description" of the general "moral standard" within the society. Such moral standard stems from several cultural sources, which I mentioned before: religion, politics, economy, history...etc. The given "culture", in context of all these factors, contains certain "values" that are important to most members of the society: marriage, family, life in general, freedom, or even equality (gender, race, physical attributes such as disability). It's important to make a distinction in "values" from "value", which are two entirely different concepts . . . I personally reserve the right to view "Morality" as simply taking the "pulse" of a given culture, rather than a set of rules imposed on the people. Of course, the more uniform the culture is, the more social pressure there will be for any individual to conform to the "social norm". Therefore, discussing any "universal morality" must imply conscious "equalization" of the culture. However, as GEM points out in one of his posts, in the "society of strangers", it's virtually impossible nor it would be wise.


Your last statement there is correct, if you define morality as you have done --- as the de facto set of norms and values (what I called the "vernacular morality") dominant in a given culture. Most philosophers and anthropologists, however, prefer the term "mores" to denote those culture-dependent norms. And of course, any attempt to universalize such norms, to apply them to other cultures or uniformly within a pluralistic culture, would be futile and likely have unpleasant consequences.

But that last statement of yours is not true if you define "morality" more generally and abstractly, with no specific normative content. A universal morality will be possible if it is constrained by features of human nature and human societies that are truly universal --- and there are some. I mentioned in a previous post that there are some moral rules that are universal, or nearly so --- nearly all cultures prohibit murder, mayhem, stealing, and cheating, for example. So a moral system that proscribed only those behaviors, and perhaps a few others, could be a universal morality.

One implication of this is that the rules of --- the duties and constraints imposed by --- a universal morality will be few. In fact, the postulates and axiom of the moral theory I sketched generate only one duty and one constraint, and the duty is conditional.

I'll let you deduce what those might be. :-)

-- Updated September 7th, 2017, 10:00 pm to add the following --

Gertie wrote:
1. Postulate of Liberty: There are no a priori moral duties or constraints. The only duties and constraints binding upon moral agents are those derived from a sound moral theory.
Corollary: Postulate of Free Agency: The agents in the moral field are not parties to nor bound a priori by any universal agreement or compact.
Corollary: Postulate of Autonomy: The agents in the moral field are not related as elements of an organic unity, and are not subject to any external imperatives or constraints other than those imposed by the laws of nature . . .


and

2. The rules generated by the theory govern only the acts of agents, and is indifferent to the ends of actions. However, if a certain end should entail a violation of the rules, i.e., it cannot be pursued without violating a rule of the theory, it is effectively ruled out as a permissible end (a malum in se).


It's not looking for ways to work towards an end goal, the well being of conscious creatures, rather you're using a formulation which picks out and prioritises the freedom of the individual, imo. And I would say that's only one part of optimising the wellbeing of conscious creatures.


As I mentioned in the last installment those postulates are not moral posits. Most of them are matters of fact, subject to empirical testing. The Postulate of Liberty is somewhat different; it aims to head off question-begging. The aim of the theory is to generate moral duties and constraints, and it aims to be a complete theory. Hence it posits that the agents are tabulae rasae, morally speaking, at the outset; they have no duties not generated by the theory. The two corollaries are straightforward empirical claims: there is no "social contract" to which everyone is a party, and civilized societies are not "organic unities."

The Postulate of Liberty can also be read with another sense --- it proposes that no one enters the world "naturally" burdened by any duties or constraints (we are "born free"). Whatever duties we think people have or should honor are acquired later, via maturation, learning and other social experience.

The postulates, taken together, are not steps toward the end goal. They're facts or logical requirements we must take into account in order to move effectively toward that goal.

That's why people like Ranvier and I see it as effectively the morality of psychopathy, it's structured around, rooted in, your construction of a moral agent who should be free to pursue her own desires, and only curtailed if these cause your system to fail.


The theory would only fail if the rules it generated, though consistently followed, did not maximize goods and minimize evils for all agents. No act of Annabelle's could cause the theory to fail, but if an act of hers thwarts that goal, should it not be curtailed? And if it does not thwart that goal, then it should not be curtailed, because it (presumably) advances her own welfare, and her welfare is one of the welfares we're seeking to maximize.

Do you think agent actions should be curtailed for some reason other than that they thwart the theory's goal? If so, what are those reasons?

But perhaps I'm missing the thrust of your complaint there. If so, please amplify.

Right, that needs clarification. In the sense of an objective 'God's eye pov', there is no reason to value my quality of life above yours, the objective logic suggests this quality of mattering belongs to you as much as me.


I agree in essence, but would state the matter somewhat differently. There are no reasons to value anything (I'm speaking of end goods only; there are reasons to value means goods). No one can explain, without circularity, why they value anything. Values (in the "economic sense" -- h/t to Ranvier), tastes, preferences, desires for any end good, are all spontaneous and inexplicable; we just have them. This fact manifests itself in the current controversies over "gay rights." Why do some people prefer sex partners of the same sex? It is not a "choice," any more than preferring partners of the opposite sex is a choice. A preference for chocolate ice cream over vanilla is not a choice either, nor a preference for Mozart over Beethoven.*

Alfie just does value his own life above Bruno's, who is a stranger to him, and Bruno likewise values his life above Alfie's. There is no logic or reason behind either of their valuations. And it is not logic that suggests to me that Alfie and Bruno value their lives (and other things). I need only observe their behavior to affirm that.

So if we add a postulate of Equal Agency to our theory (all agents subject to the theory have the same moral status and are equally bound by the rules), then we'll be obliged to devise rules which give equal weight to the goals and interests of all agents.


But if our theory is built from the foundation up, based on the axiom of optimising the wellbeing of conscious creatures, then we have to look at the context. In the context of a complex interacting society, then it will of course be that people don't start from the place, aren't equal in that sense, and to work towards optimising the welfare of all some might have to help out others more, by taxation and redistribution for example. How does your formulation provide for this?


Ok, another break. This forum is becoming almost a full-time job! More tomorrow.

* There are, presumably, possible explanations for those interests and preferences involving the subtleties and idiosyncrasies of neural wiring and the effects of random environmental influences upon it. But no one knows what those are and they don't matter, morally speaking.
Gertie
Posts: 2181
Joined: January 7th, 2015, 7:09 am

Re: Does Natural Law Theory reach a dead end?

Post by Gertie »

Ranvier
We can observe the explosion of ideas and sophistication in our scientific pursuits but most of all the integration of multiple disciplines of science and thought into a rainbow of amazing concepts. It's that integration that allows for much more... complete perception of our reality.
I think you're right about that, but the way 'the academy' specialises tends to leave a dearth of overall Big Picture analysis. One of the reasons I like what Churchland and some others are doing now, which is looking at the research from different fields and building an accessible Big Picture Story.
With this in mind, one can also observe a reductionist trend of merging everything into materialistic terms, in conviction that everything is reducible to simple physical mechanisms. The concepts of free will, consciousness, or morality become just states of the human brain controlled by neurotransmitters and hormones, both just coded by our genome and phenotypically expressed. The philosophy of religion, art, or even human emotions become the expression of selected for traits arising from the practical evolutionary necessity. This is fine to some extent but the true ingenuity is born out of the courage to resist the temptation to simply succumb to current of the trend pursuing to expand upon the already existing ideas.
The way I see it, the biggest question facing philosophy now is how to resolve the 'worlds' of objective stuff (materialism) and subjective experiential states. Without some theoretical framework which encompasses both, we have parallel ways of approaching reality, and ne'er the two shall meet. The trouble is, it's hard to get a handle on, because our accustomed ways of creating theories lies in the observable, testable, empirical world of the material. So, for example, consciousness has no place in The Standard Model of Physics, because it has nowhere to put consciousness in a materialist model.

This lack of an overall theoretical framework encompassing Stuff and Experience leads to problems like free will, as you say, which obviously impacts ideas of Moral Agents. So in effect, we have to Act As If what we call free will exists, until we have this larger theoretical framework. If we ever do. And if we do, it might show we have to totally re-think our notions of things like agency and free will.
My contention, which is clearly visible in our three way debate, contrasts my opponents reduction of multiple concepts into a single term of "Morality". This is similar to love, where we use such term to describe emotions involved with: intimate partner, friend, family member, dog, country, or even an object such as a car. In the TED talk the presenter uses the term "Morality" several times, explained as mostly the mammalian evolutionary ability to derive behavioral patterns through learning mechanisms in context of endocrine and neurological control, all of which is genetically coded. I propose that everything that was discussed in that TED lecture is valid and conclusive but it's far from the justification of the use of the word "Morality".
My take is that she is giving an intro to the evolved foundations of what we eventually came to call 'Morality', and believe to have a source beyond ourselves, or some kind of independent existence which we can discover. Tho as she says, she's specifically looking at care for others, as for a long time people thought evolution couldn't account for this -hence the need for some external source for altruistic morality.
This is something that was profound in it's implications to my mind, even in early stages of my education, that the genetic makeup can have such immense impact on the human behavior. As an undergraduate student, I was involved in a research on "bird song". Deceivingly simple and uninteresting but the findings were spectacular. It turns out that the individual bird song is genetically coded for each species, not only the desire for the bird to sing but the actual "phonetic quality" of the song, even for birds that were never exposed to another bird in its life (excluding the environmental factors). How in the world can such complex behavior be genetically coded? The implications were staggering, including the possibility to code for Chopin's "Revolutionary Etude" into a human DNA, spontaneously expressed in a child that had never seen a piano before.

However, it turned out that the conclusions were not fully appreciated in the context of the bird's physiology that was conducive to expression of only specific set of "burst" in frequencies. In other words, it's not the genetic makeup that codes the behavior but the physiologic expression as the phenotype that drives the "ease" of certain behavior. To put it crudely, if one finds to be in a possession of genitals, one will find a creative way of physiologic use to accomplish procreation. In a different thread spanning with several posts about "morality", someone had asked me if my conclusions lead me to postulate that the "moral compass" is a innate quality. In my reply I had stated that "I can't reject such possibility, since this world did not make sense to me even as a child".
:)

Imo the sort of research Churchland alludes to is useful because it's increasingly helping us to identify the specific mechanisms which have evolved, and how they might play out in our current world, which is very different to the one they were 'designed' for - small tribal groups. Where face-to -face interaction was the norm. So we can understand how for example grooming, body language, reciprocal altruism, in-group behaviour, reputation and so on work well in such a setting, but in large societies of strangers they have little impact. Basically, the way our caring and bonding mechanisms work means they lose power with distance, and strangers would be more likely to be seen as threats or competitors.

Hence in larger societies things like religion, institutions, laws, social mores, cultural narratives and learning generally, need to act in lieu of our visceral neurobiological responses. And we have to rely on more intellectualised concepts of right and wrong to be the foundation upon which we build institutions, laws and so on, which eventually became the Concept of Morality.

Today, we live in societies of strangers, and this knowledge of the evolved under-pinnings of our 'moral intuitions' is emerging into the population and undermining our foundational Concept of Morality - both of these things make the need for a new approach to Oughts pressing, imo. Hence my efforts :)
My own mind was skeptical about the "accuracy" of any religion, even in the earliest memories of my childhood, with emerging logic of a young mind unable to "marry" family driven faith in the awareness of several major religions. How could it be possible for so many other people to be so "delusional" in the light of the "truth"...
The skepticism persisted to the Agnosticism of the adult life but also the question about the "delusion". It's easy to become swept by the current of the modern realism in rejection of thousands of years of "superstitious" philosophy. However, there is an "ease" of my scientific mind in parallel perception in the reality of my own mind's imagination. With such "ease", I must conclude that there is much more to the Natural Laws of Nature that I had proposed, with awareness of such mind, only now able to access the consciousness beyond my own.
I think we all have our own ways of dealing with this, and that's perfectly OK as long as it's not harmful. Secular tolerance is the best way we've found to allow everyone room to find their personal answers. I had a similarish journey of youthful rejection of the religion society feeds its youth. Then I found my life was missing some foundational purpose , meaning and comfort, and became a Christian. That ran its course, and now I say I can't know the unknowable stuff, but can try to live my life well. That's a big enough challenge, I find!

-- Updated September 8th, 2017, 6:56 pm to add the following --
P.S. to Gertie
I would incorporate "Balance" in to the concept of "mattering of consciousness" by "clipping" or shifting the polar opposites into the right of the bell curve. One can argue that this would violate the "Diversity" principle but the greatest diversity of distribution is in the middle of the bell curve. The trick is in the method of the "shift" to the right, only to intervene in conviction of the "value" to maintain the diversity in protection of those who are all the way on the left of the bell curve without violating the diversity of the middle and the far right.
Sorry Ranvier, I don't understand what you're saying. Can you put it differently?
User avatar
Ranvier
Posts: 772
Joined: February 12th, 2017, 1:47 pm
Location: USA

Re: Does Natural Law Theory reach a dead end?

Post by Ranvier »

Gertie

I realize that I was speaking again from my perspective and what I wrote in the P.S. is too vague and out of context.
I propose (very dangerous if misconstrued) that all individuals are not equal in each individual consciousness. We pretend to agree that we are all equal in our "rights" that would suggest simple "Ought's" but in reality it's not true. Let me offer this example:

Titanic... There is a limited space on the life boats that can accommodate people to safety. Who gets on the boat? What "moral" premise will be taken? First come first serve or would people argue with that? Children > women > disabled > healthy young men > old men? What would be the order of choosing people to be saved? Should there be any such criteria for all equally conscious moral agents? The most amazing thing is that the most "moral" will almost certainly perish regardless of the choices.

What I had suggested is to introduce a balance in "shift" of our systemic reality to the right of the bell curve to include those who would let everyone else to be "saved" before themselves. Otherwise, how can we speak of any morality when the homeless are on the ground like animals among the "civilized society".
There must be a minimum standard of morality based on needs for survival... we need more life boats. Simple
GE Morton
Posts: 4696
Joined: February 1st, 2017, 1:06 am

Re: Does Natural Law Theory reach a dead end?

Post by GE Morton »

Gertie wrote:
So if we add a postulate of Equal Agency to our theory (all agents subject to the theory have the same moral status and are equally bound by the rules), then we'll be obliged to devise rules which give equal weight to the goals and interests of all agents.
But if our theory is built from the foundation up, based on the axiom of optimising the wellbeing of conscious creatures, then we have to look at the context. In the context of a complex interacting society, then it will of course be that people don't start from the place, aren't equal in that sense, and to work towards optimising the welfare of all some might have to help out others more, by taxation and redistribution for example. How does your formulation provide for this?
Well, first, a duty upon agents to help other agents, and to what extent and under what conditions, must be derived from the axiom and postulates as a theorem. It can't be taken for granted a priori (the purpose of the theory is, after all, to establish a foundation from which moral duties can be derived). There is a problem, however, with any suggested duty that requires some agents to compromise or forfeit their own interests or well-being in favor of others' interests or well-being. If all agents have equal moral status, per the Equal Agency postulate, then no agent's interests are inferior or subordinate to another's, and no agent may be compelled to serve others. To hold otherwise establishes a master-slave relationship between the agents involved.

Any proposed rule which demands that the welfare of some agents be sacrificed in order to promote the welfare of others also violates the Axiom, which restricts rules to those which maximize welfare for all agents. That entails that any exchanges required by the rules be "Pareto-efficient" --- the required acts must make at least one person better off without making anyone else worse off.

On the other hand, I think one can derive a conditional Duty to Aid from the Axiom and postulates. An agent ought to help another agent in distress or in need, if:

1. The needy agent has no means to satisfy his need on his own, and

2. His need or distress is not due to informed choices he has freely made or to known or knowable risks he has freely assumed, and

3. In the judgment of the benefactor the needy person would reciprocate if their situations were reversed; and

4. Rendering the aid will not impose costs on the benefactor he has no chance of recovering and which will prevent him from reaching a goal he considers imporant.*

Of course, nothing prevents agents from rendering aid to persons who do not satisfy those conditions, pursuant to some private morality they embrace. Christians, for example, may support any charity they wish, independently or through their churches.

I believe that conditional duty advances the goal of the Axiom. So may any aid to anyone freely rendered per a private morality. But a duty to aid without the conditions violates the Equal Agency postulate and thwarts the Axiom.
My justification for designating someone as a Moral/Mattering Agent would be that they are capable of acting in ways which support or undermine my foundational axiom. And my foundational axiom relies on Mattering, which lies in the Subjective realm of qualiative experiential states.
It doesn't rely on WHAT matters. It relies on the fact that various things matter to people. That fact is in the "objective realm." Do you agree?

* This is similar to Singer's formulation that we have a duty to aid if we can do so "without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance." But what is of importance, moral or otherwise, is a subjective matter. The rule must recognize that (I take "moral importance" to be Singer's term for "intrinsic value.").
Post Reply

Return to “Philosophy of Politics”

2023/2024 Philosophy Books of the Month

Entanglement - Quantum and Otherwise

Entanglement - Quantum and Otherwise
by John K Danenbarger
January 2023

Mark Victor Hansen, Relentless: Wisdom Behind the Incomparable Chicken Soup for the Soul

Mark Victor Hansen, Relentless: Wisdom Behind the Incomparable Chicken Soup for the Soul
by Mitzi Perdue
February 2023

Rediscovering the Wisdom of Human Nature: How Civilization Destroys Happiness

Rediscovering the Wisdom of Human Nature: How Civilization Destroys Happiness
by Chet Shupe
March 2023

The Unfakeable Code®

The Unfakeable Code®
by Tony Jeton Selimi
April 2023

The Book: On the Taboo Against Knowing Who You Are

The Book: On the Taboo Against Knowing Who You Are
by Alan Watts
May 2023

Killing Abel

Killing Abel
by Michael Tieman
June 2023

Reconfigurement: Reconfiguring Your Life at Any Stage and Planning Ahead

Reconfigurement: Reconfiguring Your Life at Any Stage and Planning Ahead
by E. Alan Fleischauer
July 2023

First Survivor: The Impossible Childhood Cancer Breakthrough

First Survivor: The Impossible Childhood Cancer Breakthrough
by Mark Unger
August 2023

Predictably Irrational

Predictably Irrational
by Dan Ariely
September 2023

Artwords

Artwords
by Beatriz M. Robles
November 2023

Fireproof Happiness: Extinguishing Anxiety & Igniting Hope

Fireproof Happiness: Extinguishing Anxiety & Igniting Hope
by Dr. Randy Ross
December 2023

Beyond the Golden Door: Seeing the American Dream Through an Immigrant's Eyes

Beyond the Golden Door: Seeing the American Dream Through an Immigrant's Eyes
by Ali Master
February 2024

2022 Philosophy Books of the Month

Emotional Intelligence At Work

Emotional Intelligence At Work
by Richard M Contino & Penelope J Holt
January 2022

Free Will, Do You Have It?

Free Will, Do You Have It?
by Albertus Kral
February 2022

My Enemy in Vietnam

My Enemy in Vietnam
by Billy Springer
March 2022

2X2 on the Ark

2X2 on the Ark
by Mary J Giuffra, PhD
April 2022

The Maestro Monologue

The Maestro Monologue
by Rob White
May 2022

What Makes America Great

What Makes America Great
by Bob Dowell
June 2022

The Truth Is Beyond Belief!

The Truth Is Beyond Belief!
by Jerry Durr
July 2022

Living in Color

Living in Color
by Mike Murphy
August 2022 (tentative)

The Not So Great American Novel

The Not So Great American Novel
by James E Doucette
September 2022

Mary Jane Whiteley Coggeshall, Hicksite Quaker, Iowa/National Suffragette And Her Speeches

Mary Jane Whiteley Coggeshall, Hicksite Quaker, Iowa/National Suffragette And Her Speeches
by John N. (Jake) Ferris
October 2022

In It Together: The Beautiful Struggle Uniting Us All

In It Together: The Beautiful Struggle Uniting Us All
by Eckhart Aurelius Hughes
November 2022

The Smartest Person in the Room: The Root Cause and New Solution for Cybersecurity

The Smartest Person in the Room
by Christian Espinosa
December 2022

2021 Philosophy Books of the Month

The Biblical Clock: The Untold Secrets Linking the Universe and Humanity with God's Plan

The Biblical Clock
by Daniel Friedmann
March 2021

Wilderness Cry: A Scientific and Philosophical Approach to Understanding God and the Universe

Wilderness Cry
by Dr. Hilary L Hunt M.D.
April 2021

Fear Not, Dream Big, & Execute: Tools To Spark Your Dream And Ignite Your Follow-Through

Fear Not, Dream Big, & Execute
by Jeff Meyer
May 2021

Surviving the Business of Healthcare: Knowledge is Power

Surviving the Business of Healthcare
by Barbara Galutia Regis M.S. PA-C
June 2021

Winning the War on Cancer: The Epic Journey Towards a Natural Cure

Winning the War on Cancer
by Sylvie Beljanski
July 2021

Defining Moments of a Free Man from a Black Stream

Defining Moments of a Free Man from a Black Stream
by Dr Frank L Douglas
August 2021

If Life Stinks, Get Your Head Outta Your Buts

If Life Stinks, Get Your Head Outta Your Buts
by Mark L. Wdowiak
September 2021

The Preppers Medical Handbook

The Preppers Medical Handbook
by Dr. William W Forgey M.D.
October 2021

Natural Relief for Anxiety and Stress: A Practical Guide

Natural Relief for Anxiety and Stress
by Dr. Gustavo Kinrys, MD
November 2021

Dream For Peace: An Ambassador Memoir

Dream For Peace
by Dr. Ghoulem Berrah
December 2021