A Refutation of Meinongianism

“The number three is prime”

Meinongianists claim that the sentence is true, and that, therefore, the number three is prime, but the number three doesn’t exist. Therefore, there is an object that doesn’t exist and is prime.

The refutation:

There is an object that doesn’t exist, or there isn’t.
If there is an object that doesn’t exist, then it is something or nothing.
An object that doesn’t exist is something only if it has some features that nothing doesn’t have.
An object that doesn’t exist has all the same features that nothing has: they both have no features at all.
Therefore, an object that doesn’t exist is nothing.
Nothing is an object that doesn’t exist is the same as its not being the case that there is an object that doesn’t exist.
Therefore, it is not the case that there is an object that doesn’t exist.

A Meinongian reply:

Reject 4th premise: Because there is an object that doesn’t exist that has some feature that nothing has: the number three doesn’t exist and it is prime.

My reply:

But Meinongianists claims that there are objects that don’t exist that are not prime, for example, the number four is an object that doesn’t exist and is not prime.
Therefore, not existing and being prime are independent features of objects that don’t exist: having not existing does not require having being prime.
Therefore, not existing is a feature that the number three has independently of its having being prime.
So, the number three is an object that doesn’t exist, or it is not the case that it is an object that doesn’t exist.
In either case, it follows that: it is not the case that it is an object that doesn’t exist.
Therefore, it is not the case that the number three doesn’t exist and is prime.

So, the number three is an object that doesn’t exist, or it is not the case that it is an object that doesn’t exist.
In either case, it follows that: it is not the case that it is an object that doesn’t exist.
Therefore, it is not the case that the number three doesn’t exist and is prime.

Basically, you just said:
P or not-P
"In either case" not-P
Therefore, not-P and Q

Your second premise is wholly unsupported. Going back to the substance of your argument, you established that there is no necessary connection between being prime and nonexistence. This is true, but it misses the point; look at it this way:

For any x, either x exists or x does not exist.
completely independent of the question of existence, however, to claim that x has property a is to claim that there is some x and the quality a-ness attaches to x; in order for x to be a, x must be. The is-ness of x makes it an object; the absence of x from the real world makes it nonexistent. The actual properties themselves are of no real import--four is not prime, Bilbo Baggins is not even, and three is not a hobbit, but in order to assert that these predicates are true of their objects, one must first assert the being of those objects, or so runs the ridiculously dumbed-down version of the argument.

So, the number three is an object that doesn’t exist, or it is not the case that it is an object that doesn’t exist. In either case, it follows that: it is not the case that it is an object that doesn’t exist. Therefore, it is not the case that the number three doesn’t exist and is prime.

Basically, you just said:
P or not-P
"In either case" not-P
Therefore, not-P and Q

Your second premise is wholly unsupported.

That’s false. I made the argument for the second premise in the section that occurs prior to the passage that you quoted. I made it in the section under the heading “The refutation”. The argument establishes that if there is an object that doesn’t exist, then it is not the case that there is an object that doesn’t exist. Therefore, if the number three is an object that doesn’t exist, then it is not the case that it doesn’t exist. And it trivially follows that if it is not the case that the number three is an object that doesn’t exist, then it is not the case that it is an object that doesn’t exist. So it follows that, as I stated in the passage you quoted:

So, the number three is an object that doesn’t exist, or it is not the case that it is an object that doesn’t exist.
In either case, it follows that: it is not the case that it is an object that doesn’t exist.

Going back to the substance of your argument, [BUT YOU MISSED THE SUBSTANCE OF MY ARGUMENT] you established that there is no necessary connection between being prime and nonexistence. [THAT ISN’T SOMETHING I REALLY ESTABLISHED; IT JUST FOLLOWS FROM CERTAIN ASSUMPTIONS THAT MEINONGIANISTS MAKE] This is true, but it misses the point; look at it this way [IT DOESN’T MISS THE POINT; THE ARGUMENT YOU MAKE AGAINST MEINONGIANISM DOESN’T WORK, BECAUSE IT BEGS THE QUESTION AGAINST MEINONGIANSIM; LET’S TAKE A LOOK AT IT]:


For any x, either x exists or x does not exist.
completely independent of the question of existence, [WHAT DOES “COMPLETELY INDEPENDENTLY OF THE QUESTION OF EXISTENCE” MEAN HERE? WHO THE HELL KNOWS? IF IT MEANS THAT THE EXISTENCE OF X IS INDEPENDENT OF THE EXISTENCE OF X, THEN IT’S OBVIOUSLY FALSE, BECAUSE THE EXISTENCE OF X DEPENDS ON THE EXISTENCE OF X] however, to claim that x has property a is to claim that there is some x and the quality a-ness attaches to x; in order for x to be a, x must be [THIS IS WHERE YOU’RE BEGGING THE QUESTION; MEINONGIANSIM CLAIMS THAT x has F EVEN THOUGH X DOES NOT EXIST; THAT’S THE WHOLE DAMN POINT OF THE DISPUTE THAT I AM HAVING WITH MEINONGIANISM; ASSUMING THAT MEINONGIANISM IS FALSE AS ONE OF THE PREMISES IN YOUR ARGUMENT TO ESTABLISH THAT MEINONGIANISM IS FALSE BEGS THE QUESTION AGAINST MEINONGIANISM] The is-ness of x makes it an object [NOT SURE WHAT THIS NEOLOGISM, “IS-NESS” MEANS HERE; THINK IT JUST MEANS “EXISTENCE”; SO, YOU’RE SAYING THE EXISTENCE OF X MAKES IT AN OBJECT; THAT ASSUMPTION THOUGH DOESN’T ESTABLISH THAT WHAT MAKES AN OBJECT AN OBJECT IS THAT IT EXISTS: THE FACT THAT THE EXISTENCE OF X IS SUFFICIENT FOR MAKING X AN OBJECT DOES NOT ESTABLISH THAT THE EXISTENCE OF X IS NECESSARY FOR MAKING X AN OBJECT; PLUS YOU HAVE TO MAKE AN ARGUMENT FOR THAT LATTER CLAIM: YOU JUST CAN’T ASSERT IT WITHOUT ARGUMENT} ; the absence of x from the real world makes it nonexistent [THIS IS IRRELEVANT TO WHETHER MEINONGIANISM IS TRUE OF FALSE]. The actual properties themselves are of no real import--four is not prime, Bilbo Baggins is not even, and three is not a hobbit, but in order to assert that these predicates are true of their objects, one must first assert the being of those objects [THAT BEGS THE QUESTION AGAIN], or so runs the ridiculously dumbed-down version of the argument [YOU’RE MISSING THE POINT. WHAT’S THE POINT YOUR MISSING? THE POINT OF MY BRINGING UP THE FACT THAT NOT EXISTING IS ONTOLOGICALLY INDEPENDENT OF BEING PRIME OR NOT BEING PRIME (OR OTHER PROPERTIES THINGS HAVE OR DON'T HAVE) IS IN ORDER TO REFUTE THE MEINONGIANIST’S CLAIM THAT THE FOURTH PREMISE IN MY ARGUMENT (UNDER THE HEADING “THE REFUTATION”) IS FALSE. THAT’S THE POINT.

The problem, in the simplest possible terms, is that you conflate being with existence. Meinong held that the two were distinct; if you wish to refute him, you need to present some evidence for the falsity of this distinction. You have, in fact, done nothing of the sort.

The problem, in the simplest possible terms, is that you conflate being with existence. [I CONFLATE TWO THINGS ONLY IF THERE IS A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO. WHAT’S THE DIFFERENCE? I’M NOT ASKING THIS BECAUSE I WANT TO CHALLENGE YOU. I’M ASKING THIS BECAUSE I WANT TO UNDERSTAND YOU (ALSO, IT SOUNDS LIKE YOU'RE BEGGING THE QUESTION AGAIN MEINONG, AGAIN. IT'S EASY JUST TO MAKE AN ASSERTION THAT IS INCONSISTENT WITH HIS. IT'S HARD TO MAKE A NON-QUESTION-BEGGING ARGUMENT AGAINST HIS. HE SAYS: THERE ARE SOME OBJECTS THAT DON'T EXIST; YOU SAY: TO BE AN OBJECT IS TO EXIST; HE SAYS: WHAT YOU SAY IS TRUE ONLY IF WHAT I SAY IS FALSE, SO WHAT'S YOUR ARGUMENT FOR YOUR POSITION?] Meinong held that the two were distinct; if you wish to refute him, you need to present some evidence for the falsity of this distinction. [I’M NOT ARGUING AGAINST SOME POSITION THAT YOU ASSOCIATE WITH MEINONG OR SOME POSITION SOMEONE ELSE ASSOCIATES WITH MEINONG. I’M ARGUING AGAINST A VERY, VERY SPECIFIC POSITION, AS INDICATED IN THE ORIGINAL POST. THAT’S THIS:

Meinongianists claim that the sentence is true, and that, therefore, the number three is prime, but the number three doesn’t exist. Therefore, there is an object that doesn’t exist and is prime.

NOW, YOU CAN SAY: HEY, YOUR ARGUMENT DOESN’T WORK AGAINST SOME OF MEINONG’S OTHER POSITIONS! I WOULD SAY: OH REALLY? WELL, THAT WASN’T THE POINT. BUT I’M INTERESTED IN LEARNING ABOUT IT. TELL ME WHAT THOSE POSITIONS ARE, AND I’LL TELL YOU IF I CAN EXTEND MY ARGUMENT IN SOME WAY TO APPLY TO THEM, OR MAKE A NEW ARGUMENT, OR PERHAPS I'LL EVEN AGREE WITH MEINONG. HENCE THE PREVIOUS QUESTION I ASKED; WHAT THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BEING AND EXISTENCE?]

You have, in fact, done nothing of the sort.

[YOU’RE RIGHT: I DIDN’T MAKE AN ARGUMENT AGAINST A POSITION THAT I NEVER INTENDED TO ARGUE AGAINST, AND A POSITION THAT I DON’T EVEN KNOW THAT MEINONG HAS. GUILTY AS CHARGED]

Okay, let's start over. Just so we're on the same page, what exactly is your conclusion?

1. The number three is not a nonexistent object.
2. No nonexistent objects are prime.
3. There are no nonexistent objects whatsoever.
4. Something else altogether.

You seem to be advocating 3, but I'd like to be sure before we proceed.

Okay, let's start over. Just so we're on the same page, what exactly is your conclusion?

1. The number three is not a nonexistent object.
2. No nonexistent objects are prime.
3. There are no nonexistent objects whatsoever.
4. Something else altogether.

You seem to be advocating 3, but I'd like to be sure before we proceed.

3 is right. there are problems with the second argument I made. Someone else in another forum pointed this out to me. Here's a clarification and elaboration:

You’re right in suggesting that the second argument I made in the original post needs some clarification and elaboration. So, here goes:

My 4th premise: An object that doesn’t exist has all the same features that nothing has: they both have no features at all.
Meinongian rejects 4th premise: Because there is an object that doesn’t exist that has some feature that nothing has: the number three doesn’t exist and it is prime.

My reply

Having not existing is independent of being prime if and only if an object can have not existing and not being prime (Since the locutions are admittedly awkward, let me illustrate the point by analogy: Having not being human is independent of being a plant if and only if an object can have not being human and not be a plant).
The number four is an object that doesn’t exist and is not prime, a unicorn is an object that doesn’t exist and is not prime, a leprechaun is an object that doesn’t exist and is not prime, etc. (By analogy: a cat is an object that is not being human and is not a plant).
Therefore, there are objects that have not existing and not being prime. (By analogy: there are objects that have not being human and not being a plant)
Therefore, having not existing is independent of being prime (By analogy: Therefore, having not being human is independent of being a plant)

If having not existing is independent of being prime, then having not existing does not require having being prime. (By analogy: If having not being human is independent of being a plant, then having not being human does not require being a plant)
And if having not existing does not require having being prime, then what makes an object have not existing is not the same as what makes it have being prime (By analogy: If having not being human does not require being a plant, then what makes an object not being human is not the same as what makes it being a plant)
Having not existing is independent of being prime.
Therefore, what makes an object have not existing is not the same as what makes it have being prime.

The number three is an object that has not existing and has being prime.
But what makes an object have not existing is not the same as what makes it have being prime.
Therefore, what makes the number three an object that has not existing is not the same as what makes it have being prime.


This final conclusion defends the truth of my 4tth premise. The number three has not existing and therefore has all the same features that nothing has IF what makes it have not existing is not the same as what makes it have being prime. And what makes it have not existing is not the same as what makes it having being prime. The issue ISN’T: what makes the number three be the number three? Of course, the answer is that it has being prime, amongst other features. The Meinongian can only establish that the number three has not existing and being prime (and that therefore my 4th premise is false) if they establish that both conjuncts are true: that it is true that the number three has BOTH not existing and being prime. It’s uncontroversial that the number three has being prime: we both agree on that. The controversy is over whether it ALSO has not existing. I made an argument establishing that it can’t also have that, for reasons independent of its having being prime. So, the Meinongian needs to make an argument for why the number three has not existing, and they need to so with reasons independent of its having being prime. Why independent? Because if the number three has not existing, it has not existing independently of its having being prime.

This is still not finished: I still need to argue for the premise:

The number three has not existing and therefore has all the same features that nothing has IF what makes it have not existing is not the same as what makes it have being prime.

I will do that at a future time.

Another argument against Meinongianism:

If the number 3 has not existing, then it has not existing even if it doesn’t have being prime.
But the number 3 is not the number 3 if it doesn’t have being prime.
So, the number 3 cannot have not existing and not being prime.
Therefore, the number 3 does not have not existing.

So, to put it simply, you argue:

1. Nonexistence is a property of nonexistent objects.
2. The property of nonexistence is independent of any other property an object may have.
3. Therefore, an object may have nonexistence and no other properties.
4. If an object has nonexistence and no other properties, it is indiscernible from nothing.
5. Therefore, by the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, an object that has nonexistence and no other properties is nothing.
6. Therefore, all nonexistent objects are nothing.
7. Therefore, there are no nonexistent objects.

Is this a fair and honest recapitulation? If not, please point out, in as few words and as clearly as possible, which of the above are incorrect and how do they need to be amended.

You did a pretty good job. This is what I would change:

1. Nonexistence is a property of nonexistent objects.
2. The property of nonexistence is independent of any other property an object may have.
3. Therefore, an object may have nonexistence and no other properties.

The conclusion that I make from these premises is narrower than the one you state here. My conclusion is:

Therefore, what makes an object have nonexistence is not the same as what makes it have any other property.

That conclusion just follows from the fact that if having F is independent of having G, then what makes an object have F is independent of what makes it have G.

Now, I ask the question: what is it that makes an object have nonexistence? Well, we know its not going to be the same thing as what makes it have any other property. And we know that something is what makes an object have any other property. So, it’s not going to be something. Therefore, what makes an object have nonexistence is nothing. Well: if it’s not something, then its nothing, because not something is nothing. Let me try to argue for this conclusion differently. Normally, when we try to figure out what makes an object have a property, we look at all the objects that have the property and try to identify all the other properties that all and only those objects have. Let’s try that.

The largest prime number has nonexistence.
Papa Smurf has nonexistence.
The present King of France has nonexistence.
The Fountain of Youth has nonexistence.
My third arm has nonexistence.


Here’s a brief list of objects that have nonexistence. What are the other properties that they all and only have? Nothing. Therefore, what makes an object have nonexistence is nothing. (These arguments, by the way, are the arguments I needed to make to shore up some of my premises in the previous post).

4. If an object has nonexistence and no other properties, it is indiscernible from nothing.

This isn’t right. If an object has nonexistence, then it has it in virtue of having nothing, not something. That is, it has it in virtue of having no properties, not some properties. And if it has no properties, then it has all the same properties that nothing has: no properties at all. And if it has all the same properties that nothing has, then it is the same thing as nothing, given the Identity of Indiscernibles. And if a nonexistent object is nothing, then nothing is a nonexistent object, because the identity relation is commutative (if Superman is Clark Kent, then Clark Kent is Superman). And nothing is a nonexistent object is the same as its not being the case that there is a nonexistent object. Therefore, if we assume that there is a nonexistent object, it follows that it is not the case that there is a nonexistent object.

Okay, I have to ask, and try not to take this the wrong way, but have you actually read Meinong?

Claim that nonexistence is a property of nonexistent objects, then claim that nonexistence is "nothing," thus nonexistent objects, by virtue of their nonexistence, have no properties whatsoever, and thus "are not." In addition to contradicting yourself, you are ignoring the core of Meinong's position on nonexistent objects, the distinction between existence and being.

In simplest terms, every potential object of thought has being; that we can say x is y requires that there be some x of which we can predicate y, for if there were not, then we would have no ground for asserting y, or denying not-y. Put another way, if we are to carry on an intelligible conversation about Bilbo Baggins, affirming that he is a hobbit, denying that he is missing his ring finger and the like, there must be some object answering to the label "Bilbo Baggins" to which we are both referring, some locus in which these properties inhere; were there not, there would be no difficulty in claiming that he is both a hobbit and not a hobbit, which would be absurd.

Beyond mere being, existence is, for Meinong, the property of being real independent of the consciousness of any noetic entity. Thus, Pluto (Mickey's dog) is, has being, whereas Pluto (the quasiplanetary body) both is and exists, has both being and existence.

Okay, I have to ask, and try not to take this the wrong way, but have you actually read Meinong?

Claim that nonexistence is a property of nonexistent objects, then claim that nonexistence is "nothing," thus nonexistent objects, by virtue of their nonexistence, have no properties whatsoever, and thus "are not." In addition to contradicting yourself, you are ignoring the core of Meinong's position on nonexistent objects, the distinction between existence and being.

In simplest terms, every potential object of thought has being; that we can say x is y requires that there be some x of which we can predicate y, for if there were not, then we would have no ground for asserting y, or denying not-y. Put another way, if we are to carry on an intelligible conversation about Bilbo Baggins, affirming that he is a hobbit, denying that he is missing his ring finger and the like, there must be some object answering to the label "Bilbo Baggins" to which we are both referring, some locus in which these properties inhere; were there not, there would be no difficulty in claiming that he is both a hobbit and not a hobbit, which would be absurd.

Beyond mere being, existence is, for Meinong, the property of being real independent of the consciousness of any noetic entity. Thus, Pluto (Mickey's dog) is, has being, whereas Pluto (the quasiplanetary body) both is and exists, has both being and existence.

Well, there are also essential difference between Bilbo Baggins and (for example) Abraham Lincoln.

Although, by your above definition, Abraham and Bilbo do not have (present tense) both being and existence, at one time there was (past tense) a human being called "Abraham Lincoln".

But, there isn't (present tense) nor was there ever (past tense) a being called "Bilbo Baggins"...

You raise an interesting point--is the existence of contingent beings necessarily temporally indexed? I suspect the answer is yes, though I wonder about the status of contingent beings like the singularity that allegedly spawned our universe, which is (near as I can tell) "outside of time," whatever that means. Also, much depends on what you mean by "Abraham Lincoln." (No, I'm not being facetious here.) If you mean a conglomeration of (mostly) organic molecules that was identified by that label, while the matter still exists, we no longer call it by that name. If you mean some immortal elan vital that animated that matter and imposed its will on them and the world, it depends on your metaphysical/spiritual/religious beliefs; Abraham Lincoln may have always existed and still exist in the way that immaterial beings do. If you hold that Abraham Lincoln is the unique confluence of the two, then we're back either to present nonexistence or to an ongoing temporally-indexed existence that was inaugurated at his birth, such that we could say "Abraham Lincoln exists in the first half of the nineteenth century, and evermore shall." Desperately thorny, such issues are, but for my part, I incline toward attaching a temporal qualifier to the existence of contingent existent beings. But that's really just my naive preference.

You raise an interesting point--is the existence of contingent beings necessarily temporally indexed? I suspect the answer is yes, though I wonder about the status of contingent beings like the singularity that allegedly spawned our universe, which is (near as I can tell) "outside of time,"--

"Time" is simply the standard measurement of the relative difference between various rates of change. For a singularity to give rise to the universe, something had to change, and thus "time" was "in effect".

--whatever that means. Also, much depends on what you mean by "Abraham Lincoln." (No, I'm not being facetious here.) If you mean a conglomeration of (mostly) organic molecules that was identified by that label, while the matter still exists, we no longer call it by that name.

Well, I think "Abraham Lincoln" makes the most sense in reference to the specific form of those molecules--and that form no longer exists...

If you mean some immortal elan vital that animated that matter and imposed its will on them and the world, it depends on your metaphysical/spiritual/religious beliefs; Abraham Lincoln may have always existed and still exist in the way that immaterial beings do. If you hold that Abraham Lincoln is the unique confluence of the two, then we're back either to present nonexistence or to an ongoing temporally-indexed existence that was inaugurated at his birth, such that we could say "Abraham Lincoln exists in the first half of the nineteenth century, and evermore shall." Desperately thorny, such issues are, but for my part, I incline toward attaching a temporal qualifier to the existence of contingent existent beings. But that's really just my naive preference.

Fair enough...

Okay, I have to ask, and try not to take this the wrong way, but have you actually read Meinong?

I’ve read some Meinong. But whether I’ve read his stuff or not is completely irrelevant to the argument I made. I made an argument against Meinongianism, and I stated exactly what position I was arguing against. Repeatedly. Crystal clear. I’m not making an argument against something that Meinong said. I’m not saying: “Meinong says X, I disagree, and here’s why”. So, whether I read Meinong or not is irrelevant to the argument I made.

Claim that nonexistence is a property of nonexistent objects, then claim that nonexistence is "nothing," thus nonexistent objects, by virtue of their nonexistence, have no properties whatsoever, and thus "are not."

You are confusing the position that I am arguing against with arguments that I make against the position. You’re treating them all as claims I make, when they’re not. If you disagree with the argument I made, refute it. Make an argument against some of the premises.

In addition to contradicting yourself, you are ignoring the core of Meinong's position on nonexistent objects, the distinction between existence and being.

I’m not contradicting myself. I’m making an argument against a position. I deduced consequences that follow from Meinongianism, given other premises. Again, if you disagree with the argument I made, make an argument against those premises. The fact that I didn’t refute what Meinong said is irrelevant. Why? Because I’m not making an argument against what Meinong said. You might as well be trying to object to my argument by claiming that I didn’t argue against Bush’s doctrine of preemptive war. It's irrelevant.

In simplest terms, every potential object of thought has being; that we can say x is y requires that there be some x of which we can predicate y, for if there were not, then we would have no ground for asserting y, or denying not-y.

You’re just adding a new predicate to the discussion, “being”. If you can’t specify what it is, then it’s just a noise or a mark without meaning. And we can just ignore it. So, what is being? Suppose x has being. How’s that different from x having existence? If it’s the same, then you’re adding a new predicate, when we already got one predicate that does the job. It would then be superfluous. But suppose being is not existence. And x has being, does not have existence, and x has a property F. But then how’s that different from x does not have existence and x has F. What’s the difference between x not having existence and having F, on the one hand, and x having being, not having existence, and having F, on the other. Bet there is none. Identify the feature in virtue of which x has being such that x has it in the second case but doesn’t have it in the first. If there is no feature, then nothing is what makes x has being. But nothing cannot make x have anything. Therefore, there would be no being. “Being” would just be an empty predicate, a meaningless noise and mark.

Put another way, if we are to carry on an intelligible conversation about Bilbo Baggins, affirming that he is a hobbit, denying that he is missing his ring finger and the like, there must be some object answering to the label "Bilbo Baggins" to which we are both referring, some locus in which these properties inhere; were there not, there would be no difficulty in claiming that he is both a hobbit and not a hobbit, which would be absurd.

The fact that we can talk about Bilbo does not establish that Bilbo exists (or that he has being, whatever that is). For one thing: when we are talking about Bilbo, we are talking about the fictional character Bilbo. And the fictional character Bilbo is not the same as Bilbo. How are they different? The fictional character Bilbo exists; Bilbo doesn’t. Well, what’s the difference in the way the fictional character Bilbo exists, and the way Bilbo would exist if he did exist. The fictional character Bilbo exists according to a story; if Bilbo did exist, he would exist independently of any story. In this respect, Bilbo would be just like us. The existence of a fictional character is parasitic on the existence of individuals who exist independently of any story. Specifically, the existence of the fictional character depends on individuals having certain mental states: that we have certain beliefs about what a Bilbo is, according to the story, and what features a Bilbo has, according to the story. In fact, saying “a fictional character exists” is just a loose way of speaking. Strictly speaking, the fictional character doesn’t exist. What exists are our beliefs about what a character is, according to a story.

Beyond mere being, existence is, for Meinong, the property of being real independent of the consciousness of any noetic entity. Thus, Pluto (Mickey's dog) is, has being, whereas Pluto (the quasiplanetary body) both is and exists, has both being and existence.

Mickey’s dog, Pluto, does not exist. We have beliefs about what a Pluto is, according to a story. We believe that a Pluto is a dog, that it is golden brown, that it’s owner is a Mickey Mouse, etc. There’s nothing to the fictional character Pluto but those beliefs. There is no being that Pluto has. For two reasons: there is no being; there is no Pluto.

I’ve read some Meinong. But whether I’ve read his stuff or not is completely irrelevant to the argument I made. I made an argument against Meinongianism, and I stated exactly what position I was arguing against. Repeatedly. Crystal clear. I’m not making an argument against something that Meinong said. I’m not saying: “Meinong says X, I disagree, and here’s why”. So, whether I read Meinong or not is irrelevant to the argument I made.

So, you're arguing against "Meinongianism" while ignoring Meinong? You provide a shallow caricature of the position and throw a bunch or words at it, calling those words "refutation." If you wish to refute the position of a philosopher, YOU NEED TO KNOW WHAT THAT POSITION IS. Otherwise, you're just tilting at straw men.

You are confusing the position that I am arguing against with arguments that I make against the position. You’re treating them all as claims I make, when they’re not. If you disagree with the argument I made, refute it. Make an argument against some of the premises.

I have. I have demonstrated that your use of "nonexistence" as a predicate is equivocal and incoherent. If you have other premises you feel will circumvent this flaw, express clearly and concisely what those premises are, and I may argue against them as well.

You’re just adding a new predicate to the discussion, “being”. If you can’t specify what it is, then it’s just a noise or a mark without meaning. And we can just ignore it. So, what is being? Suppose x has being. How’s that different from x having existence?

No, I'm clarifying the terms of the discussion. And I have made quite clear what "being" and "existence" are, and how they differ. Your refusal to attempt to understand this is beyond my power to alter.

The fact that we can talk about Bilbo does not establish that Bilbo exists (or that he has being, whatever that is). For one thing: when we are talking about Bilbo, we are talking about the fictional character Bilbo. And the fictional character Bilbo is not the same as Bilbo. How are they different? The fictional character Bilbo exists; Bilbo doesn’t. Well, what’s the difference in the way the fictional character Bilbo exists, and the way Bilbo would exist if he did exist. The fictional character Bilbo exists according to a story; if Bilbo did exist, he would exist independently of any story. In this respect, Bilbo would be just like us. The existence of a fictional character is parasitic on the existence of individuals who exist independently of any story. Specifically, the existence of the fictional character depends on individuals having certain mental states: that we have certain beliefs about what a Bilbo is, according to the story, and what features a Bilbo has, according to the story. In fact, saying “a fictional character exists” is just a loose way of speaking. Strictly speaking, the fictional character doesn’t exist. What exists are our beliefs about what a character is, according to a story.

Okay, so if these objects (fictional characters) do not exist, and only our beliefs about them do, how is it possible for these beliefs to be false? If all that exists of Bilbo Baggins is my beliefs about him, and I believe that he has six fingers on his right hand, what ground does anyone have for claiming that my beliefs are incorrect? If there is no object independent of the beliefs on which these beliefs are based, how can they be false?