A Refutation of Meinongianism

I’ve read some Meinong. But whether I’ve read his stuff or not is completely irrelevant to the argument I made. I made an argument against Meinongianism, and I stated exactly what position I was arguing against. Repeatedly. Crystal clear. I’m not making an argument against something that Meinong said. I’m not saying: “Meinong says X, I disagree, and here’s why”. So, whether I read Meinong or not is irrelevant to the argument I made.


So, you're arguing against "Meinongianism" while ignoring Meinong? [I’M ARGUING AGAINST MEINONGIANISM AND NOT IGNORING MEINONG. I MIGHT AS WELL BE IGNORING YOUR SISTER. IT’S AS RELEVANT AS ME “IGNORING” MEINONG. IGNORING IS SOMETHING YOU DO INTENTIONALLY. IF I DON’T HEAR WHAT YOU’RE SAYING, I DON’T IGNORE YOU. IF I INTENTIONALLY DON’T LISTEN TO WHAT YOU’RE SAYING, THEN I IGNORE YOU. I DON’T INTENTIONALLY NOT LISTEN TO OR ADDRESS MEINONG. IT’S COMPLETELY IRRELEVANT TO THE ARGUMENT I MADE. THE ARGUMENT I MADE IS AGAINST MEINONG. THIS IS A VERY SIMPLE POINT] You provide a shallow caricature of the position and throw a bunch or words at it, calling those words "refutation." [NOT TRUE. DIDN’T CARICATURE MEINONG AT ALL. MADE AN ARGUMENT AGAINST MEINONGIANISM] If you wish to refute the position of a philosopher, YOU NEED TO KNOW WHAT THAT POSITION IS. Otherwise, you're just tilting at straw men. [NOT TRUE. NOT REFUTING MEINONG. MADE AN ARGUMENT AGAINST MEINONGIANISM. NO STRAW MAN COMMITTED.]




Jimmy_sanfrancisco wrote:
You are confusing the position that I am arguing against with arguments that I make against the position. You’re treating them all as claims I make, when they’re not. If you disagree with the argument I made, refute it. Make an argument against some of the premises.


I have. I have demonstrated that your use of "nonexistence" as a predicate is equivocal and incoherent. [THE USE OF NONEXISTENCE IS MADE BY MEINONGIANISM. I ASSUMED WHAT MEINONGIANISM SAID WAS TRUE, AND MADE AN ARGUMENT AGAINST IT BASED ON THAT. SIMPLE] If you have other premises you feel will circumvent this flaw, express clearly and concisely what those premises are, and I may argue against them as well.
Jimmy_sanfrancisco wrote:
You’re just adding a new predicate to the discussion, “being”. If you can’t specify what it is, then it’s just a noise or a mark without meaning. And we can just ignore it. So, what is being? Suppose x has being. How’s that different from x having existence?


No, I'm clarifying the terms of the discussion. And I have made quite clear what "being" and "existence" are, and how they differ. [NO YOU DIDN’T] Your refusal to attempt to understand this is beyond my power to alter. [NO REFUSAL MADE. BECAUSE NO SPECIFICATION MADE]
Jimmy_sanfrancisco wrote:
The fact that we can talk about Bilbo does not establish that Bilbo exists (or that he has being, whatever that is). For one thing: when we are talking about Bilbo, we are talking about the fictional character Bilbo. And the fictional character Bilbo is not the same as Bilbo. How are they different? The fictional character Bilbo exists; Bilbo doesn’t. Well, what’s the difference in the way the fictional character Bilbo exists, and the way Bilbo would exist if he did exist. The fictional character Bilbo exists according to a story; if Bilbo did exist, he would exist independently of any story. In this respect, Bilbo would be just like us. The existence of a fictional character is parasitic on the existence of individuals who exist independently of any story. Specifically, the existence of the fictional character depends on individuals having certain mental states: that we have certain beliefs about what a Bilbo is, according to the story, and what features a Bilbo has, according to the story. In fact, saying “a fictional character exists” is just a loose way of speaking. Strictly speaking, the fictional character doesn’t exist. What exists are our beliefs about what a character is, according to a story.


Okay, so if these objects (fictional characters) do not exist, and only our beliefs about them do, how is it possible for these beliefs to be false? [BELIEFS WOULD BE FALSE ACCORDING TO THE STORY. IF I SAID CAPTAIN KIRK IS A SERIAL RAPIST, THAT CLAIM WOULD BE FALSE ACCORDING TO THE ORIGINAL STAR TREK SERIES] If all that exists of Bilbo Baggins is my beliefs about him, and I believe that he has six fingers on his right hand, what ground does anyone have for claiming that my beliefs are incorrect? [DEPENDS ON WHAT THE STORY SAYS. IF THE STORY DOESN’T EXPLICITLY SAY, THEN IT’S PROBABLY OPEN TO INTERPRETATION AND DEBATE. NOT SURE HOW TO RESOLVE DEBATES WHEN THE STORY DOESN’T EXPLICITLY INDICATE THAT SO-AND-SO HAS A CERTAIN PROPERTY] If there is no object independent of the beliefs on which these beliefs are based, how can they be false? [FALSE ACCORDING TO THE STORY]

It still seems to me that making things true or untrue, caused or uncaused with words is not the same thing as noting the correlation between worlds and words. Here it seems we are as befuddled now as we were when the first mind thought about these profoundly problematic and mysterious relationships.

It's stimulating and entertaining to ponder them, sure, but it's never really gone much beyond that "in reality".

Whatever [out in the world] that means.

When I assent to the sentence,

“James T. Kirk is the captain of the USS Enterprise”,

I am not, strictly speaking, assenting to a truth. Because the sentence is not, strictly speaking, true. It is fictionally true: true according to the story of the Original Star Trek Series. In ordinary communication, speakers implicitly assume that listeners will interpret sentences like these to be fictionally true when speakers use them. If my listener were to take the sentence I say to be literally true, then we would have a case of miscommunication. And I would have to make my implicit assumption explicit in order to correct the miscommunication. But the ordinary listener knows that I’m not talking about a person. I’m talking about a fictional character. And that fictional character is nothing but our shared beliefs about whoever has the features of a James T. Kirk, according to the story of the Original Star Trek Series. These shared beliefs are pretend beliefs. Let me suggest the distinction:

My belief that Kirk is the captain of the USS Enterprise is a pretend belief.

My belief that according to the story of the Original Star Trek Series, Kirk is the captain of the USS Enterprise, is a non-pretend belief.

My pretend belief is fictionally true. It's about the fictional character, Kirk. My non-pretend belief is literally true. It's about a fictional truth according to the story of the Original Star Trek Series. Remarkably, both these truths are epistemically objective in this special sense: their truth-values don't just depend on my beliefs. Not any sentence I say about Kirk is fictionally true. "Kirk is a serial killer" is not fictionally true. If I believed that Kirk is a serial killer, then I would have a fictionally false pretend belief. The sentence, “according to the story of the Original Star Trek Series, Kirk is a serial killer” is literally false. And if I believed that, then I would have a literally false non-pretend belief.

What's the difference between a pretend belief and a non-pretend belief? A preliminary distinction:

The function of a non-pretend belief is to match the world. Otherwise put: a non-pretend belief has a mind-to-world function. A pretend belief does not have a mind-to-world function.

What's the difference between a pretend belief and a non-pretend belief? A preliminary distinction:

The function of a non-pretend belief is to match the world. Otherwise put: a non-pretend belief has a mind-to-world function. A pretend belief does not have a mind-to-world function.

Yes, this is clearly the case regarding the distinction made between the two interpretations of James T. Kirk in the original Star Trek TV series.

But what has always fascinated me philosophically is not the distinction made between fact and fiction but the distinction made between conflicting versions of the facts, and, given these conflicting versions, how we ought to act in the face of them. This is where the profound limits of philosophical language become apparent to me.

Let me give you an example of this from my favorite Star Trek movie, Star Trek IV: The Voyage Home.

One of the sub-plots in the film revolved around the perennial squabble between Kirk and Spock over the role of emotion in human interaction. I say human interaction because, as those who enjoy immersing themselves in the Star Trek universe know, Spock was half human and half Vulcan. The Vulcan half was basically bereft of emotional reactions. A Vulcan's reaction to the world was always logical, supremely rational. Thus the human half of Spock was, apparently, something he kept buried deep down in his psyche.

In the course of the movie, the Kirk [emotional], Spock [rational] conflict ebbed and flowed. But in a climactic scene near the end, the crew of the Enterprise are in a jam. One of their comrades, Pavel Chekhov, is isolated from the rest of them. He is in a hospital sure to die if not rescued. But if the crew goes after him they risk the possibility of not completing their mission. And if they don't complete their mission every man, woman and child on earth will die.

Spock's initial reaction is purely calculated: It is clearly more important [more rational] to save the lives of all planet earth's inhabitants then to risk these lives in the effort to save just one man.

But Kirk intervenes emotionally and reminds everyone that Chekhov is one of them. So, naturally, this being a Hollywood movie, Spock ends up agreeing that saving Chekhov is now the #1 priority. And, naturally, this being a Hollywood film, they still have time to rescue planet earth from the whale-probe. Barely.

Now, we can react to this film just as we react to Kirk above. The film is fiction, so the events never actually occured. But the filming of it is real and it did occur. Two levels of reality easily distinguished.

But what about the moral dilemma posed in the film. Is it more rational [ethical] to save Chekhov, if it means possibly the destruction of all human life on earth?

What are the limits of philosophical language here in deciding this? Can it even be decided philosophically?

Consider it in two ways:

In the first, we can rescue our beloved friend knowing there might still be time to rescue everyone else.

In the second, we can rescue our beloved friend knowing that, if we do, there is no time left to rescue everyone else.

What are the limits of philosophical language here in deciding this? Can it even be decided philosophically?

Consider it in two ways:

In the first, we can rescue our beloved friend knowing there might still be time to rescue everyone else.

In the second, we can rescue our beloved friend knowing that, if we do, there is no time left to rescue everyone else.

I think the second scenario is the more interesting because it forces a choice between the needs of many vs the needs of the few.

I find it useful to distinguish between 3 types of "facts":
1. Objective facts: facts about the physical world that can be verified with empirical evidence. (I realize that ultimately there are no absolutely objective facts.)
2. Subjective facts: These are determined by neural computations using the contents of personal conditioning as criteria for evaluation.
3. Social facts: Facts agreed upon by individuals of a social group.

In the second scenario individuals would compute their responses using the contents of their personal conditioning as criteria for evaluation.

If a group is involved in making the decision the group will need to attempt to arrive at a consensus among their subjective/personal computations. Of course in a hierarchic military context all subjective evaluation may not be equal. Kirk could pull rank and enforce his personally computed response.

Whatever the decision it is not going to be entirely rational (because of the mostly unconscious influence of the personal conditioning of those involved).

I suppose if the Federation had a law that the needs of the many must always outweigh the needs of the few the decision would be heavily influenced by such a law but, even so, the individuals involved might arrive at computed responses in defiance of the Federation.

Consider it in two ways:

In the first, we can rescue our beloved friend knowing there might still be time to rescue everyone else.

In the second, we can rescue our beloved friend knowing that, if we do, there is no time left to rescue everyone else.

I think the second scenario is the more interesting because it forces a choice between the needs of many vs the needs of the few.

Also, it reinforces the extent to which our emotional and psychological reaction to the world around us can marble any supposed "rational" discourse. If someone we know and love is in danger it can easily prompt us to rationalize giving priority to her rescue.

It's similar to the manner in which we can be rivited by a news story relating to a single child trapped in an abandoned mine shaft while a story relating to the thousands of children who starve to death every single day prompts little or no reaction from either the media or from the individuals all around us.

The single child has a name and a face and a narrative. The thousands starving become basically abstractions to most of us.

The human mind is often anything but a font of reason.

I suppose if the Federation had a law that the needs of the many must always outweigh the needs of the few the decision would be heavily influenced by such a law but, even so, the individuals involved might arrive at computed responses in defiance of the Federation.

Actually, the plot of the original Star Trek TV series often revolved around Us versus Them. Us being the capitalist West with our emphasis on individual freedom and Them being the Communist Klingons with their emphasis on pursuing war in order to expand "the good of the many".

Thus, we are supposed to cheer on the crew of the Enterprise for going after Chekhov. Why? Because, unlike Them, We don't abandon the individual in order to foster what is perceived [by the communist dictators] to be in the best interest of "the people"---synonymous of course with The State.

My point is that---philosophically, ethically---there is no objective answer that can be derived through Reason.

Sure, I would like to believe that, if I were in charge and was certain that rescuing the one I loved would mean abandoning all of the others I don't really know to death, I would do the "right thing" and rescue the many. But it always depends as much on how we perceive the circumstantial context and how we feel about it as it does some abstract philosophical invention like Kant's categorical imperative. Kant's deontological ethics [derived through Reason] requires that, first and foremeost, we must act in accordance with our Duty and always do the right thing.

That is an intellectual contraption to me. There is no necessarily right or wrong behavior.

My point is that---philosophically, ethically---there is no objective answer that can be derived through Reason.

Exactly, and even if there was an objective answer we would not necessarily follow it. We make decisions based on our individuality (genetics + experiential conditioning). I think it works something like this:
circumstances (stimuli) --> interpretation/neural computation based on genetics and personal conditioning (beliefs, knowledge, attitudes, etc.) --> thoughts and emotions --> behavior (responses)

One factor that can inject a measure of objectivity into the process is an awareness of one's personal conditioning and the pervasive influences of it. When this is the case this knowledge becomes part of the conditioning itself and as such is taken into account when neural computations are made.

That is an intellectual contraption to me. There is no necessarily right or wrong behavior.

The necessity becomes blurred the more complex a situation is. But the lower the dilemmas, the more obvious does right/wring become.

“The number three is prime”

Meinongianists claim that the sentence is true, and that, therefore, the number three is prime, but the number three doesn’t exist. Therefore, there is an object that doesn’t exist and is prime.

First, I think this is probably not an accurate presentation of what Meinongianism holds.

As I understand it, Meinongianism is the thesis that there are things/facts that do not exist.

Now, for any comments about this idea to be meaningfully intelligible, we have to define what we mean when we use certain words... such as [facts] and [exist]. If we carefully restrict the meaning of [exist] to [physical existence], then it seems to me that your argument is pointless-since by definition ideas do not exist. Your simply providing a very long argument to show that [that which does not exist] does not exist.

If, on the other hand, we assume that non-physical things like [ideas] and [mental concepts] are capable of existing, then your argument is deeply flawed, for many reasons.

So first, what is Meinongianism really trying to say? My suspicion is that it is simply another way of saying that [there are some facts which are only ideas] and [ideas are not physical]. I can't see how any other interpretation could be meaningful. (If you think it means something else, let me know what and I may comment further on that line of reasoning.)

Second, is your presentation of Meinongianism correct? Let's look at the presentation again:

“The number three is prime”

Meinongianists claim that the sentence is true, and that, therefore, the number three is prime, but the number three doesn’t exist. Therefore, there is an object that doesn’t exist and is prime.

I think you have probably mischaracterized what the meinongians would hold. I believe they would hold that "The number three is prime" is a [fact that is true]. The number [3], however, is not a fact. It is a physical object which exists, or (at the very least) we can show physical instances of it. Thus, in the framework of this presentation, it is not the number three that does not [physically exist], it is the idea that "the number three is prime". That is the fact which does not physically exist. There is no object that we can point to and say "this is The number three is prime". Yet we know that the number [3] is an instance of a prime number, and so "the number three is prime" is a fact.

It seems to me that when we present the meinongian POV in a meaningfully accurate way, your argument is revealed to be pointless, by definition. However, let us look at the argument more closely:

The refutation:
(P1) There is an object that doesn’t exist, or there isn’t.
(P2) If there is an object that doesn’t exist, then it is something or nothing.
(P3) An object that doesn’t exist is something only if it has some features that nothing doesn’t have.
(P4) An object that doesn’t exist has all the same features that nothing has: they both have no features at all.
...Therefore,
(C1) an object that doesn’t exist is nothing.

(P5) Nothing is an object that doesn’t exist is the same as its not being the case that there is an object that doesn’t exist.
...Therefore,
(C2) it is not the case that there is an object that doesn’t exist.

The first problem with this refutation is that it is far too imprecise to be meaningfully relevant. If we presume that [x] is a physical object that isn't a physical object... what exactly does that even mean? Only that [x] is [not x]. We need go no further. The proof of falsehood is in the premise. Which is another way of saying the premise is necessarily false.

On the other hand, I think if we state it in a meaningful, meinongian way, it becomes:

(P1) There is a "fact" which is either [physically real] or [not physically real].

Again, your (P2) seems to be saying, "If [x] is [something which physically exists] and it [doesn't physically exist], then it is [something] or [nothing].

Using the same logic, we can show this premise is trivial, (if not false). For your saying, "If [x] is [not x], then it is [something] or it is [nothing]. Again, vagueness plagues us, for in a sense, [nothing] is clearly [something]... it is an [idea], or a [mental concept]. Therefore, you have not given us a [one or the other] scenario. This also invalidates the premise and the conclusions drawn from it.

Your (P3) appears to be absurd and meaningless to me. Given my interpretation, it appears to be saying, "An object that [doesn't physically exist] has [physical existence] only if it has some feature that [nothing] doesn't have.

I realize this isn't what you're trying to say, but I don't think there is any way to intelligibly say [what you are trying to say]. First, we have the same [x is not x] problem. Secondly, [nothing] is necessarily an idea that cannot be physically actualized--so it necessarily shares at least one feature with the [non-physical x]: Neither [exists in the physical sense]. Given this obvious truth, why would we then turn around and assume that [x] should reject the relevant features that make it [not physical]. Clearly, since [x] and [nothing] are not the same idea, there will be some features that they do not share. [x] is the idea of [primeness]; while [nothing] is the [absence of some thing]. These are clearly very different ideas... yet they both lack the property of being physical.

It should be rather clear that my above argument completely undoes (P4). The key word is [all]. Something that doesn't physically exist will share one feature with nothing... and that is the fact that [nothing doesn't physically exist].

By extention, (C1) is clearly flawed. Just because two things share certain properties doesn't necessarily make them the same thing. Only if they share ever possible property are they the same. [x and nothing] do not share every possible property. In fact, they share only one significant property. We can, however, restate (C1) in a manner that does make sense.

(C1) ...Something that doesn't physically exist is nothing physical

But again, we didn't need any of the rest of your proof to demonstrate this fact. It is self evident, by definition.

Given all of the above, (P5) is such a garbled jumble as to be devoid of any meaningful meaning. I have a vague notion of what you're trying to say, but it is extremely vague, and mostly nonsensical. One attempt to restate it plainly, while keeping to your implied meaning, might go something like:

(P5) ...saying 'there is no [thing] which is a [physical object] and yet is [not physical] ... is the same as saying 'it is not the case that there is a [thing which physically exists] that [does not physically exist]

While this may be true, it is nothing more than a (very complicated, but none-the-less) trivial tautology.

The final conclusion is much easier to reinterpret:

(P5) ...it is not the case that there is [something physical] which is [not physical].

Once again, however, this is a trivial, self evident truth. No 'proof' is needed to show it's truth. (Or, if it is needed, it is not possible.)

A Meinongian reply:
Reject 4th premise: Because there is an object that doesn’t exist that has some feature that nothing has: the number three doesn’t exist and it is prime.

My assumption is that this is not a valid presentation of the Meinongian counter-argument. However, (with a little tinkering to give clarity), it can be seen as a fairly accurate way to state (at least one of) my strategy(-ies) for dealing with (P4). For as I showed, [nothing] does share some features with the fact in question--but certainly not all.

My reply:
(P1) Meinongianists claims that there are objects that don’t exist that are not prime, for example, the number four ...
...Therefore,
(C1) not existing and being prime are independent features of objects that don’t exist: having [not existing] does not require having [being prime].

(P2) not existing is a feature that the number three has independently of its having being prime.
(P3) the number three is an object that doesn’t exist, or it is not the case that it is an object that doesn’t exist.
(P4) In either case, it follows that: it is not the case that it is an object that doesn’t exist.
...Therefore,
(C2) it is not the case that the number three doesn’t exist and is prime.

Given my comments above, you may already be able to see what I believe to be the flaw in this line of reasoning.

First, (P1) is inaccurately stated. It should be:

(P1) ...M's claim there are [facts that do not physically exist] and which [are not prime]. For example, "The number 4 is not prime". is such a fact.

So is the fact that, "The number three is prime." This fact is clearly not itself a prime number. It states something about a [number] and about [being a prime]... but the fact is not a [number] or a [prime].

...Therefore
(C1) ...[not existing physically] and [being prime] are not inter-dependent features of things that do no exist physically. And having the property of [not existing physically] does not require something to also have the property of [being prime].

This is redundant and obvious; and I would suggest does not require (P1) for its truth. All that is necessary is the realization that [x] is not [y]. And [not existing physically] is not the same idea as [being prime]; therefore, they cannot be reciprocally inter-dependent features. They are not identical. One can depend on the other (as primes depends on being non-physical) but they can't both depend on the other, without being the same thing.

(P2) restates (C1) and (P3) basically says "Either [3] exists physically or it doesn't". While (P4) basically says,

(P4) ...In either case, it follows that the [object that does or doesn't physically exist] is not an object that [doesn't exist physically].

This is the same as saying:

If [x or not x] then [not x].

I think it's pretty obvious this is not correct--and the assumption that it is correct invalidates the conclusion, (C2).