Pragmatic justification for the principle of induction?

Help!

I am a new philosophy student, who is really struggling with my class. I have NEVER studied something more complicated and challenging than philosophy, so hats off to you. My brain is fried .

I am trying to construct a pragmatic justification for the belief in the principle of induction. I understand how to write a basic pragmatic justification, and barely understand the concept of the principle of induction. It has been 10 days of reading Bertrand Russell, and I am still a bit lost. Any help is much appreciated!

This is my assignment for anyone who is interested/has some helpful advice:
Construct a pragmatic justification for the belief in God, and then address the following question:
-If pragmatic considerations show it is irrational not to believe in the principle of induction, do they also show it is irrational not to believe in God?

Cheryl

Note:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_induction

"Construct a pragmatic justification for the belief in God,"
Note this post,
http://onlinephilosophyclub.com/forums/ ... hp?t=4745#


"-If pragmatic considerations show it is irrational not to believe in the principle of induction, do they also show it is irrational not to believe in God?"
It is pragmatic to believe in the principle of induction.
I cannot see the link to 'not to believe in God'.
There is nothing irrational with 'not believing in God'.
'Not believing in God' is the fundamental default for humans.
'Believing in god' is pragmatic via evolving cultures but it is philosphical unjustifiable and irrational.

[Scott]

Without accepting induction, you cannot do anything. There is no practical reason not to touch a burning stove as you have no basis for believing the fire will burn you or even that the stove exists at all. Indeed, you would no reason to eat, no reason to believe eating more likely to fend off painful hunger and death by starvation than not. Accepting induction is the epitome of being practical, I think.

From another philosophical perspective, Hume and Karl Popper argued that there is no such thing as induction.

In real life, scientists and others do not give a damn on the above claim and continue to make 'inductive' inferences that generate practical values for humanity.

imo, Hume and Karl Popper had valid points, but those points are applicable to a different, a higher and more refined philosophical perspective.
Their views are highly disputed by opposing camps.

In terms of what/how the match was actually lit I`d be looking at the case for aliens being a far more probable one than that for god`s/a god, but the question then might arise as to whether an alien induction might under specific circumstances and on certain levels be considered to parallel that of a gods, and therefore to supplement/be a god?
Induction in my view only fundamentally changes anything for certain in so far as it may determine the concept meaning. In the presence of induction, meaning, as in absolute meaning, is a constant, and without induction it is only ever, and on every single level, in flux, at least for as much as we can be certain.
I don`t quite follow Scott`s thinking, for I don`t quite travel with the thinking which dispenses with one`s independant reason?

This is my assignment for anyone who is interested/has some helpful advice:
Construct a pragmatic justification for the belief in God, and then address the following question:
-If pragmatic considerations show it is irrational not to believe in the principle of induction, do they also show it is irrational not to believe in God?
Cheryl

So, rearrange the question:
If, after practical considerations, it is concluded to be rational to believe in the principle of induction... will this show that believing in god is not rational?

Define:
1. Practical (pragmatic) considerations?
I will let you decide.
2. principle of induction?
Deduction and Induction.
I would think of deduction, like Sherlock Holmes.
Deductive reasoning is forming a conclusion from theories, not proof.
Induction is forming a conclusion from proof, as in 'evidence'.
3. Inductive rationality of god.
I will let you decide.

To answer number 2. Lets say you believe a person is on trial for a crime:
a. To base your conclusion on deduction would be to do a character profile, ask them where they were and believe them on circumstantial evidence rather than collaboration and stuff like that.
b. To base your conclusion on induction would be to check their story with tests. Like, are you able to reproduce their quoted travel times or can a bullet travel through a wall and still have enough energy to kill a person.

Now I would reason that both induction and deduction in the legal system have failed, but I think induction would be more reliable. This would pragmatic consideration.

Then you need to decide if there is enough inductive 'evidence' to believe in god. This is a minefield and I'll leave that to you.

I could only answer `possibly` when phrased like that, and the best answer might be in terms of those impossible to quite go there waters left remaining once having travelled every inch of the way around them(?)

The real problem comes in claiming too much as given, but this doesn`t appear to be your problem beyond the accredited theory.

I`d also consider that ideally you`d need to go there in terms of defining God/gods(?)

Without accepting induction, you cannot do anything. There is no practical reason not to touch a burning stove as you have no basis for believing the fire will burn you or even that the stove exists at all. Indeed, you would no reason to eat, no reason to believe eating more likely to fend off painful hunger and death by starvation than not. Accepting induction is the epitome of being practical, I think.

I disagree. The so-called 'problem of induction' is a relic of 18th century empiricism, a confusion.

I find it characteristic that people started 'solving' the problem and justfying induction without providing any definition of clarification of what it is.

The problem of induction is the philosophical question of whether inductive reasoning leads to knowledge. That is, what is the justification for either:

• generalizing about the properties of a class of objects based on some number of observations of particular instances of that class (for example, the inference that "all swans we have seen are white, and therefore all swans are white," before the discovery of black swans) or
• presupposing that a sequence of events in the future will occur as it always has in the past (for example, that the laws of physics will hold as they have always been observed to hold). Hume called this the Principle of Uniformity of Nature.

I contend that both alternatives are to be rejected, not to be justified.

Now, let me be clear, I side with Popper here, not with Hume. Thank you, Spectrum, for mentioning these two wonderful philosophers here. It is unfortunate that you disagree with Popper - I mean, he's right, after all. :p

Popper claimed that our best knowledge, i.e. scientific knowledge, does not require belief in induction. Induction is not how science works. It works by conjecture and criticism: scientists make conjectures (all swans and white) and it is a rational conjecture until another scientist provides a shattering criticism (in the form of black swan).

Similar? Somewhat. Both induction and science use past experience to justify statements about the future. But consider the belief that the sun will raise every day. Inductively, we are justified in asserting this, but this is plainly false: as science informs us, sun will black out some millions of years from now. Proponents of induction - how did we manage to learn that fact?

I invite you to acquaint yourself with the brief summary of his thought in WikiPedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karl_Poppe ... _induction

I would do him no justice by presenting my understanding here.

There is nothing in the content of Ungomma`s post which I`d disagree with.

Now, let me be clear, I side with Popper here, not with Hume. Thank you, Spectrum, for mentioning these two wonderful philosophers here. It is unfortunate that you disagree with Popper - I mean, he's right, after all. :p

Btw, I only stated that Hume and Popper's views were opposed by others.
I did not offer any specific alignment to either Hume or Popper in my earlier post, note.

Note

imo, Hume and Karl Popper had valid points, but those points are applicable to a different, a higher and more refined philosophical perspective.
Their views are highly disputed by opposing camps.

My position is, I agree with Hume and Popper on their theorectical critique of induction.
Popper agreed with Hume's critique of induction, and he set about to avoid the psychologism implications of induction.
Popper introduced the 'trial and error' to make Science objective without any exceptions.

The difference in response by individual/individuals from the starting point of unconditional love, and a reasonably high order of conscious awareness/chemistry, would I believe, not be fundamentally altering to any higher moral position.

I believe in morality in the absence of induction.

I believe that it`s born from out of one`s own awareness.

I suspect that in an environment of the adequate unconditional love, chemistry, and then a stable mind, that although responses would undoubtably differ, morality would be realised in fundamentally the same place along its sliding scale.