Post Number:#29
September 14th, 2011, 9:07 pm
One would have to first expose the difficulty of this issue - defining something that has predominantly been considered purely subjective - and must realize and make understood what humbleness and consideration need be included in stipulating the vastness, the history, of this problem. And further, to finding such qualities that one might categorize one piece of art - whatever that is - from another: Why, for instance, are the works of Beethoven considered so much more highly than, say, the works of Mendelssohn? why Goethe than Patterson? why Monet than Dix? and so on. Why might one generation completely deny the works of an artist, like van Gogh, and another find it to be one of the most extraordinary feats in the history of art? or the reverse: why might one generation admire and revere the works of an artist, like Salieri, and another deny them and throw it into obscurity?
Let’s deal with the latter question first. – This first brings about the task of deciding what acts could be included in the term "art," or what things a person might do that "art" might be thrown about in relation to it. The typical activities people have done that often excite noting "Oh, now! What a piece of art!" have often traditionally been: Painting beautiful pictures of what have you; composing or preforming music, respectively; writing stories and essays; sculpting statues; designing and building cathedrals and the like. (There are assuredly more; however, for the sake of this post, this list of preponderantly artist actions seems sufficient enough for the time being.) Why do these things appear more “artistic” than, say, doodling, screaming, taking notes, making an ash tray, and building a tree house?
It would seem, from observing various relating objects – using the first example, painting – that there is an ever-growing, ever-changing tier, a spectrum from what is a simple doodle to what is a piece of art. That is to say, we onlookers, we listeners, make value judgments, placing one piece and another on one part of the tier and another on another part of the tier. This is all well and obvious. But the issue resides on the problem of individual sensibilities, sentiments – on one’s “training,” as Twain might say.
And there is some merit to that. The difference between one man likening to – in music – the works of Tupac and another man finding fullness and cleverness in the works of Shostakovich would, perhaps, be rooted in (1) what his parents listened to, what he grew up with, and later finds nostalgic; (2) what he necessarily finds alleviating, maybe countering the culture and bringing-up an uncomfortable childhood, a catharsis at the end of a tragedy; (3) traumas or pleasures found at any one time; or (4) what he finds, maybe in his studies, to be more interesting – though this would be more to the interests of a different, more childlike, maybe neotenous, abnormally spongy look into the things in life that make one happy (as I would suppose most art would do, supposing that one found an art one liked). I think it would be a naiveté to think that an appreciation for what is traditionally called art has nothing to do with how one is brought up, what experiences one has had hitherto his seeing an object his history would relate to the infamous term we’re talking of here. For that, I will always call on psychology, juxtaposed with philosophy, to find a solution to these problems; and I like to think that that is a much more pragmatic approach than staying with any one field, harboring there in simple and base comfort.
Then there is the historic approach which can’t ever be ignored or forgotten. There is a kind of subjectivism that permeates through history. In every generation, artistic sentiments change; artists, if we may call them that, like to do different what their teachers did before them, to make themselves more known, recognizable; so too does the glorified public change their feelings about art every generation: high art becomes low, boring art; low art becomes the new high art, a member of the popular zeitgeist. For this, there is a perpetual sense of revolution, reversals of values in artistic sensibilities – and example might be the change in appreciation at one time from Washington Irving to Mark Twain; or Dickens to Wilde to Huxley and Orwell; etc. (In another context, in politics, we might well find, more recently, a sudden difference in attention and appreciation from Gore Vidal to Christopher Hitchens.)
And for that, we might well discover that what is “art” – even what changes and is newly invented – is something inherited. That is to say, whatever our definition, it will most likely be one of an inherited subjectivism. However well and great it would be to break the bonds of the subjective chains we have to all our lives sensual ventures and find a universality, an objective truth to what we see, an absolute ground truth pervade and shimmering up into everything we see and hear; it doesn’t seem likely that we could hold onto any kind of honesty if leaving the bounds of subjectivism – though we can hope and make great efforts that our fellows and ourselves will stay or become increasingly critical that we could at least say, corroborating with that old maxim on wisdom, that “We don’t know; but let us think about it.”
Because of the ever-changing tier of high and low arts, it is safe to think that at any time – though a change might be subtle, or might be in a far off time – what is high could be hat is low; that is, what is high right now for you is inevitably low for another. However, there are pieces of art that stay prevalent to the appreciation of the field in which it is a member. For instance, Tounesols (Sunflowers), by van Gogh, is a forever studied piece. Or, more familiar to my area of study, Mahler’s Ninth Symphony (similar to Beethoven’s and Dvorak’s ninths) is one that will always be studied and admired; or, maybe even more important, Schoenberg’s theories on atonality. They are basic to theory and the growth of those entering into the field of music. What they represent and what makes them eternal in the fields they are a part of is what technical things were utilized in them which made the ultimate product, and then what influenced generations upon generations after them – to ultimately make better music, or so one can hope. Bach and Beethoven shouldn’t be forgotten in this similarly: both were revolutionaries – though more so the latter – in their own regards.
One might be able to create an objective tier of art depending on what influence a work had on works after its exposition and study. But that would be tedious and time-consuming, not appropriate for this thread.
In determining why people find certain arts more appealing at one time than another, we might very well create a tangible definition for what art-proper is. We could say that, because so many generations have found, for instance, Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony to be a piece of art that things like might be art as well. And why not? The ninth is a feat of extraordinary power and understanding of music theory. Shouldn’t, then, Bruckner’s Fourth Symphony, “Romantic,” also be a piece of art? And the same with Beethoven’s late string quartets: things after it, sharing similar qualities, are probably, if not assuredly, art as well. Of course, Beethoven and Bruckner aren’t starting points: art didn’t first appear with them. But what they, or rather there works, represent is an undertaking which brought about a reflection and the ability to say, in unison, that that work is artful. We could suppose that works before it, which influenced it, are also works of art – this leading back to a time when art was perhaps not even considered, but mere enticements, just entertainment.
But what is it to say that art is something like Beethoven’s Ninth? That’s kind of silly. But rather, what did Beethoven do that makes us think it’s art? Principally, if we go back far enough to the days before “art,” and find cave paintings which tell a story and remind us of fateful events of the past, singing and banging on drums as a way to justify life (Campbell), telling stories to the children to try and instill a sense of morality and sense, making statues to please the gods or commemorate events, building structures to ward off the harsh weathers of nature, we might find that what is universal is most things traditionally called art is the want to always be entertained and/or comforted: art is a break from the difficulties in life.
This makes us think of art as a psychological issue, and a man exclusively a philosopher might think of it as being “parochial.” But what philosophy has ever been grounded in something besides the bonds of humanity?
So, if we might go further, art is something, firstly, that entertains us. But we must suppose that it is a special kind of entertainment – otherwise playing with a paperclip while on a binge of boredom would suffice it an inclusion by our definition (though, I would suppose that the paperclip would be something we play with while one daydreams). The entertainment by art, if I may stipulate the abilities of various pieces of art I’ve witnessed, have excited emotions – undoubtedly due to my past experiences with anything, excited all sorts and kinds of emotions – from anger to humility to comedy, and all making me consider things in the past, or things that I expect in the future to happen. I imagine, knowing that we lot aren’t all that different from one another, that many people have the same happen to them, if only subconsciously. But often, depending on one’s situation, art might affirm what we feel about what we’ve done, what we’ve seen; art might make us feel better after some tragedy, of whatever scale; or art might; or art might just be some side attraction to get us through the day, keeping our interests up, our curiosities satisfied, inspiring us to do something interesting.
Another aspect would be its ability to teach us, to live differently. But I don’t see that as a unique qualifier for art. Maybe it is. Art assuredly does teach us something, but only insofar as it makes us think about the past, consider the future. I would think that part of its wont to comfort us. But this is, I’m reminded, entirely dependent on how’s psychological situation: What said here couldn't be turned on its head?
"Live slow, die eventually, leave an indifferently attractive corpse. That's my motto." - David Mitchell
"By a sarcasm of law and phrase they were freemen." - Mark Twain