Self-Interest = Selfish?

Whitetrsh soldier wrote,

“In the end, I don't think there is such a thing as a "selfless" act. Everything you do, you derive some kind of benefit from [if only a chemical/neurological/psychological "high"]. You are obtaining "joy" in the chemical sense when you "pursue happiness" regardless of how "altruistic" you claim your motives are.”


Some issues left here: (1) for altruism to be—externally-- it would matter little if one derived personal benefit from an act. We can distinguish between personal benefit-motivation of an act and its external results. Therefore, we may say the resulting act is altruistic even though the motive may not entirely be!

(2) All acts may have some self-motivated desire. Yet, it is difficult to see how this amounts to anything but a mundane description of how we act. We may say that such is the case in all that we do—for sure, but even still, such a descriptive fact of ‘ourselves’ hardly reduces the act to either an act of selfishness or an act of total altruism. It would appear that the act would be both/and not either/or. Therefore, an ethical system that basis its virtue in selfishness must first clearly distinguish between acts that wholly concern a ‘self’ from those that are empty of such a property and identify what acts possess both properties! If acts possess both properties, then we want to know why this is significant at all and what ethical value they possess and how that would relate to acts merely based on wholly self-motivated interests. Such an analysis should reveal just why such self-motivated acts are both somehow "rational" and superior to other types of acts!

(3) We still must account for why it is that we obtain personal pleasure from altruistic acts. Also, we want an account for why it is that we admire those who do ‘apparently’ sacrifice ‘self’ for others. In basic, what accounts for this ethical interconnectivity we possess in thought and action? Can we answer such questions on the basis of rugged individual ‘rational’ self-interest, or do we possess a better explanation on a metaphysics that reveals that a rational view of the self is one that reveals that there is no self per se, and that so-called self merges with all else when we begin the definitional process of reductionism? Hence, to be rational, in the ethical sense, would be to search out those values and actions that somehow manifest the benefits of self AND other equally! Or, at the very minimum, we ought to atttempt to discover those principles and acts that BEST accomodate some benefit for self and other.


Eric D.

Ayn Rand said that pursuing one's own self interests is the "proper and most efficient" method of securing a happy life. Isn't that just selfishness? If everyone subscribed to that idea, wouldn't that just cause people to be greedy and constantly fight with each other?

I would believe that there is a fine line between pursing your own interests and being plain selfish. No act is really "selfless" because you think of the effects it will have on you at one point of making a decision. But, generally speaking, most people would not regard pursuing your own interests as "selfish". Obviously, always putting your own interests first is selfish. People in society would know the fine line between the two so conflict is not likely to always likely to arise. Of course, there is always selfish people in the world but that cannot be helped.

This topic is discussed in the form of a dialog here: wadeharvey.myqol.com/wadeharvey/PDFs/ET ... ONS%20.pdf
See pages 25-27 captioned "Self-Interest and Selfishness Revisited."

Let me know if you enjoyed it. Did it clear up the issue for you? Did it make careful distinctions? Did you find it to be highly-relevant?

I'd love to hear your opinions, questions or comments after looking this selection over.

Hello Prof:

I enjoyed the article quite a bit. In certain areas I see where what I had written was occasionally reflected in the discussion of these fictional philosophical characters. I enjoyed the general outline that was given.


It would appear that Bill advance two separate arguments against ethical egoism:


(1) The first argument deals with a misunderstanding of language that makes some versions of ethical egoism invalid: “If doing good deeds brings a person joy they are only being selfish” is a misuse of language because selfishness entails a disregard for others (instead of a positive regard – which is what Ethics requires.)” In other words, the property of ‘personal satisfaction’ that results from having done a good deed is not conceptually equivalent to being ‘selfish,’ since selfishness entails a form of personal satisfaction that is gained via neglect of others and their wellbeing. For me, this is a vital point! Some ethical egoists claim that one conditions the other: it is because personal satisfaction is gained from some ethical deed that we act in such ways. However, merely because one is present with the other it would be wrong to assume they are equivalent. In fact, it is impossible since we can identify those types of personal satisfactions that are due to having benefited others from those that are gained from directly disregarding them! These types of satisfaction are not just different, they are opposites! However, Bill doesn’t seem to think that an act done for its own sake doesn’t rank high on the moral latter. Presumably, the reason being that an act done for its own sake seems empty if not for some reason relevant to both the ethical actor and those that are the recipient of the act.

(2) Bill’s criticism here appears to be based on an understanding of ethical egoism: if we commit to doing a good deed, according to this understanding of ethical egoism, then we calculate that act in some way that will be individually beneficial. However, such an understanding would not account for those who spontaneously act to perform a good deed without any consideration of personal benefit.



The strength of Bill’s arguments are then taken up by Harry who wishes to clarify some details seemingly not taken up by Bill’s arguments. Harry begins with Bill’s (2) by arguing that such spontaneous actors are motivated by a separate question: What will benefit us all and not just me. For Harry, this is the key difference between selfishness (even those of the psychopathic sort) and that of ‘self-interest.’ This leads Harry to make explicit that there’s a way to take Bill’s (1) seriously but also defend a notion of self-interest that avoids the equivocation mistake that Bill expounds in (1). It goes something like this:

(1a) Harry agrees with Bill that selfishness is a disregard for others—pushing forward only those matters that fulfill one’s desires usually with utter neglect of the welfare of others.

(2a) However, Harry wants to advance a notion of self-interest that is not equivalent to ‘selfishness’ by stating wherein one neglects the other altogether, self-interest merely means regard for one’s advantage, or satisfying one’s goals.

(3a) Harry continues to clarify this concept by introducing the notion of ‘enlightened self-interest,’ meaning that what is truly in your self-interest is also in mine. So, when I engage in creating or doing certain things that are of interest to me, then I am giving you (others) something you want as well. In other words, because I pursue self-interest (responsibly), I am also contributing to the world around me through those interests. In basic, selfishness doesn’t care if others benefit or not. Actions done selfishly are apathetic as to their effects on others. Arguably, such acts are done by using others. In whatever case, such acts care nothing for others. Self-interest, on the other hand, is where one wishes to advance one’s preferences but not through apathy of others. Quite the opposite, self-interests are best fulfilled via meeting other’s interests as well. One cannot neglect the interest of others and succeed in the way envisioned here by Harry’s view of ‘self-interest.’ Responsible self-interest recognizes that both self-advancement and the needs and desires of others meet at a relevant nexus point! The two, at that point, are not distinguishable in their goal.

Carl’s view, on the other hand, makes a relevant clarifying objection, in my view. Carl argues that the situation is still one acting to benefit oneself. Even when one wishes to sacrifice one’s life for some heroic reason he still has his interest in being “most satisfied” in the transaction due to personal values that the hero decides is most valuable. In other words, according to this character, it matters little if any collective goal is in mind or some end for others is satisfied. Carl may say that of course one will do good for others when one pursues one’s interest. However, one doesn’t act or favor one’s own interests for this reason. The benefits to others isn’t, therefore, necessary to the ethical egoist. It will just be the result of a responsible self-interest that would take care of this altogether. So, Carl agrees with Harry that there’s such a thing as rational, or enlightened, self-interest. However, Carl’s criticism is that Harry is confusing the fact that self-interest will benefit others with the ethical justification of acting on behalf of one’s self-interests. Just because enlightened self-interests will lead to benefit others doesn’t mean that one’s reason for acting on the basis of self-interest IS because it will benefit others. On the contrary, one simply follows one’s own interests and must find value in doing so for oneself! By doing so, rationally, one will have to participate in the interests of others. Yet, it doesn’t follow that participating in the interests of others is the reason ‘why’ we act as we do—thusly, it cannot be the basis for a justification for doing so.

Harry retort reveals a sort of kink in Carl’s argument. Carl has failed to see that such acts are BOTH/AND not EITHER/OR. In other words, one who sacrifices oneself or simply pursues one’s interests on a daily basis is acting in a way that regards others! In other words, I do X not because I’m an isolated thing playing my own games without interests in others or their wellbeing. On the contrary, the very definition of selfishness precludes any interests for otherness! Period! In basic, enlightened self-interests also includes a rational concern for others. This is seen especially in certain cases as the beggar case: “Say they give money to a beggar that they never expect to see again. That cannot be said to be selfish by the very definition of the term ‘selfish’ which speaks of ‘disregarding others.” Hence, a rational self-interest, according to Harry, at some level, must involve an interest in the world of others. To say that one acts to favor ONLY ones interests is not a rational self-interest. This is more aligned with selfishness than with what Harry has outlines above.

However, in my view, it would be George that hits upon the real issue at stake here: There’s no such thing as a self-made man! Individualism is the philosophy of the self-made man. The so-called idea of the one who did it on all his own. George outlines his objection to ethical egoism. To be a self-made man is to neglect the fundamental reality that such people had been given the resources of society (the public till, an education, mentors, and so forth) that had been given to such a one graciously by many, and, arguably, all in some way. In other words, there’s this real interdependence that shows that even self-interests is a sort of contingent property of social conditions. You cannot realize nor even have interests if you are first not a product of the social world from which you emerge and from which your interest are shaped. This recognition of things isn’t a mere corrective on Carl’s ethical egoism, it isn’t only a prelude to a social ethics, it explains the basis from which we emerge and thrive as ethical beings at all. Given this, the discussion of self-interests will not be enough to have a more full discussion of ethical theory and practice! In order to value ethics properly, in other words, we cannot ignorantly ignore the social basis that makes possible ethics at all! In order to discuss ethics from this basis, we must include each other as ethical equals if we’re to have any hope of possessing a realistic and genuine sense of ethics itself!

For me, this ‘you’ that emerges from the social order of things cannot be legitimately separated from that order itself. If this is the case, and ‘I' can be reduced in some way to the society from which I emerged, then being self-made is an incoherent idea. We may speak of individuality in a sort of conventional sense whereby we can speak intelligently of interests. However, on analysis, my interests are the products of a complex interdependent social network. Therefore, there’s no ironclad way to speak of my interests in a way wherein a real self owns those interests! On this view, there’s no ultimate and relevant distinction between the rational interests of others and myself and not because “I” emerged from a sort of social context. It is because there’s no way to rationally distinguish between myself and my interests and others and their interests. To speak intelligibly of self-interests and other’s interests is to speak of discrete self-interested ethical selves. Given this brief mention of an outlined view of mine, I see no reason to make such a distinction.


I much enjoyed the read,


Thanks,

Eric D.

Greetings, Eric

That thorough review shows that you read the passages closely and really appreciated every drop of value to be found there And I appreciate your appreciation. Glad you enjoyed it.

I earlier wrote on the same topic, in the chapter What Is Selfishness? in a booklet entitled: ETHICS: A College Course, on pages 47-53. You will want to look that up to see if it fills in the picture even more - in regard to the topic of this current thread . Just click on this (safe-to-open) link: wadeharvey.myqol.com/wadeharvey/Ethics_ ... Course.pdf

Check it out. It traces ideas back to Thomas Hobbes - his view of human nature in The Leviathan. I predict you will gain some insight from a study of these few pages.

Often, the Prisoners Dilemma game in Theoretical Game Theory is invoked - by those who don't want to make a distinction between self-interest and selfishness - to argue (with some Sophistry perhaps) that if one person is unselfish, but self-interested, the selfish will invariably take advantage of him or her.

However, one good refutation of that line of thinking is seen in an entry from Wikipedia here: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iterated_prisoner ... 7s_dilemma It makes the point that cooperation and altruism are the best strategies for both 'players' to win the game. Both players are assumed to be self-interested and rational. Maybe the last part is too big a stretch.
{In Game Theory, though, "rational" has a well-defined formal meaning, and is not the ambiguous sloppy word that philosophers often toss about.}

{It should be noted that, in print, in a magazine interview, a professor specializing in game theory at a prominent and very-reputable university admitted that real life is much, much more complex than the games of Game Theory. He went so far as to confess that the Theory is too artificial to be meaningful. Many economists, however, would disagree and find it to be a useful tool.} See, for example, Cooperative Species: Human Reciprocity and Its Evolution, a book by Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis as well as other selections by Gintis here: amazon.com/s/175-7911599-4051905?ie=UTF ... lla-search

Hello Prof!!

Hello! I have to say I find your ethical writing quite interesting. I also received your message and will be looking over that material in my copious spare time LOL! I look forward to this dialogue!

First, what I wish to do here is attempt a sort of brief neutral analysis of what you’ve provided on pages 47-53. Then, I wish to move to a kind of tentative critical analysis and we can move from there, if you don’t mind. This so-called critical analysis is my way of attempting to clear up some issues and give you some insight as to where I am currently-philosophically! Thanks for this opportunity Dr. (Sorry for the length). We can also continue this conversation in the other suggested routes you’ve already mentioned to me. Again, thanks for this opportunity!
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It is often the case that when one feels being selfish that he or she may unwittingly be working against his or her very wellbeing, as the case of the blind man reveals: he feels he selfishly has no use for street lights because he thinks he is apt to get along just fine without them; however, in so doing he places himself in danger by making it far more complicated for certain drivers to see him crossing the street—or whatever. In basic, his own ‘enlightened’ self- interest would have instructed him to see that certain needs of others are equally tied into his own.

Now, one way to unpack this way of thinking is by seeing what ‘value scientists’ recognize as three (ethically relevant) social relationships: (1) Systemic: Dependence; (2) Extrinsic: Independence, and (3) Intrinsic: Interdependence. We can abbreviate these in reverse order of import for convenience sake as follows: I>E>S. Hence, I is greater (or infinitely greater) than E and E is greater than S. So that we might say-as you do, “The conclusion one may then draw is that interdependence with others is far, far better than so-called "rugged individualism" -- the pretense that one is independent – or national isolationism, when that nation is well-off and fairly comfortable. Perhaps individualism and isolationism correlate with the "selfishness" about which the questioner was inquiring.” This basic outline, if we accept it, seems to reveal two facts about ourselves relevant to ethics: First, that no one is wholly isolated or a mere island unto himself, and secondly, and as a consequence of this seeming fact, that it is vital to moral development and spiritual growth to recognize that we are all connected!

Such a basic analysis of our ‘moral situation’ appears to lead us to seeing some important consequences. Prior, however, we must comprehend a basic principle: that to be ethical means to be morally consistent, that is, that we do not suppose one arbitrary standard for ourselves and another for all others! This principle, when combined to the above analysis, leads us to ask what it means for those who did NOT recognize this moral situation. In basic, by denying this interdependency one who embezzles, say, or, who acts selfishly in other ways-generally, has decided to settle for a kind of moral world wherein their actions are the desired criteria whereby such deeds now have license. This isn’t to merely say that the embezzler wishes to get away with her fraud, it is rather the desired part of her world FOR all others to also perform whenever they wish. Therefore, “They want personal corruption. They ignore -- or are indifferent to -- the pain that they may have caused to the party they embezzled. They can't deny that they are thereby getting a world that is more chaotic, more anarchic in the worst sense of the word, more unstable. Happy in how they 'got away with it', they now can indulge in pleasures galore -- as long as they buy them.” By their actions, they have created a world that we normally would take to be an undesirable world, or at least undesirable as seen through the eyes of ‘interdependency.’


Now, after considering this, when we apply the value dimension to “positive emotion,” you see three positive emotions:
Systemic-emotion: Satisfaction.
Extrinsic-emotion: Pleasure
Intrinsic-emotion: Joy (Also Love). Recall that I >E >S.


The conclusion, much like the scheme prior, reveals that it is much better (infinitely so) to have joy etc. than those emotions prior!

This conclusion leads us to see that those who truly possess ‘self-love’ will attempt to gain intrinsic emotion—joy—which, as seen from above, correlates with interdependence. A world based on selfish motives of pleasure, for example, can never achieve a higher level of positive emotion. They must settle for an infinitely less desirable world! But, intrinsic emotion cannot be had without the recognition and application of what we find with interdependency. When I help someone else, for example, out of no direct external benefit to myself, I, however, increase BOTH my (internal) joy as I do others (the person who is the recipient of my generous act as well as those who might take pleasure in it). Hence: “Conclusion:-- true love and joy are infinitely better than mere pleasure; and it is better to be pleased than only satisfied.” So, it isn’t possible to apply I while settling only with extrinsic-emotion. Nor is it proper to apply intrinsic-emotion with only E! However, intrinsic-emotion and ‘I’ are perfectly and non-problematically compatible. Such an analysis leads to a surprising discovery: is that, “that the wisest form of selfishness is unselfishness.”

We might, then, be tempted to conclude that self-interests are THE motivating force in (and for) our ethical actions after all! This would be a mistake, given the above analysis, for two reasons: (1) to say that self-interest is the basis of our actions-is to say that we are conscious of acting as such. However, we may right well act selflessly WITHOUT conscious choosing. We just do it! In other words, there is NO calculation of benefit to self even when there is some payoff for acting selflessly. On this account of self-interest, then, we often act in such ways that do benefit ourselves BUT such self-benefit isn’t the consciously calculated reason FOR the action! ‘Selfishness-self-interest’ theory would have it that it is precisely these sorts of conscious-tactical-like calculations that structure our action (psychological egoism—which doesn’t necessarily lead to advocating FOR this type of action---see Hobbes) or ought to (ethical egoism). (2) However, according to this analysis, selfishness of this type is fundamentally inconsistent with such action because such action is decided (consciously or otherwise) to disregard others. If a benefit to others is had by the action of such an egoist, it is typically NOT meant for the purpose of benefiting others. Quite the opposite! It is meant to service self alone or predominately! Yet, there’s a way in which self-interest can be served without the sort of calculation FOR self that is typically a significant feature in much of ethical egoistic theory.

It is this sort of analysis that leads us to understand that there’s a distinction between selfishness and self-interest. Given the above, along with some other considerations, the distinction between the self-interest and selfishness is not one of degree, but of kind! One kind has the advantage of providing us the insight that *good* means that we are NOT just concerned with our own advantage above others, but that we ask what will benefit all-or would benefit best for all maximally. The other kind is, on the whole, morally reckless and appears to be the basis, or at least a relevant element in what we would term ‘bad’ action. If we act selfishly in an ever more consistent way, we not only harm (or advance the likelihood harming) others, but ourselves as well! By lying, cheating, stealing, and the like, such a one will likely be avoided—along with having greater obstacles for achieving his/her own goals!

There are other very interesting aspects of this theory, but this will do for now. I hope this adequately captures the essential elements of your overall thoughts on this subject-thus far. This is quite fascinating!

I think this approach opens a way to seeing just how we cannot really define our own moral obligation (I’ll use moral and ethical interchangeably here for convenience) without also considering how those obligations are connected to others. In this analysis, we do not need to conflate self-interests with the oft-troubling conception of selfishness that is being had by some very popular schools of thought! You have given us an outline that makes rationally possible a route around such a conflation! This is a treasure-indeed!

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I wish now to outline a possible critique if for no other reason than to display my own understanding on your position thus far and to indicate where my thoughts are leaning, which are quite along very similar lines. However, my thoughts are still in development, and so, I wish to only have this act as a sort of means to continue this fascinating discussion.

Let’s start with the two outlined schemes you provided earlier that sort of seems to summarize your thinking’s most important features: (1) the social relationships scheme (SRS), and (2) the positive emotion scheme (PES). I will only deal with these schemes within the context of which you presented them. I will take it that the intrinsic: interdependence (II) of (SRS) is the desired moral basis and goal of the ethical person. Hence, (SRS:II)=ethical person (EP). I will also take it that the Intrinsic-emotion: Joy (IE) is the emotionally ethical place of and desired emotion-goal for the ethical person. Hence, (PES:IE)=ethical emotion (EE). I will abbreviate the other elements as I move along and in my own way. These, as you argued, correlate. Therefore, the is a relationship –R- between (SRS:II) and PES:IE) or vice versa. Also, and given what has been argued, as I understand it- the ethical person, then, is one who strives to be in and for a world that can be symbolically represented as (SRS:II)-R-(PES:IE), or simply put, a world in which interdependency is recognized and enlightened-healthy-self interests are what we are doing –typically- as ethically aware individuals.

Now, to motivate this criticism I wish to offer, perhaps, an unsophisticated counterexample from the movie “John Q.” I’m not sure you know this movie so I’ll briefly outline the basic story line: A hard working father (and wife) has a son who falls into heart failure. John Q gets up every day goes to work, is faithful to his employer, wife and he’s a good father, friend, and citizen. Now, even though he’s working (like his wife) hard to maintain his responsibilities it doesn’t appear to be enough: his car is repossessed-for instance. Then, seemingly out of nowhere his son falls to the ground and is later diagnosed with heart failure- and he will die without the needed corrective surgery. The hospital denies John Q’s son’s name to be placed on a list of donors because his insurance policy (that was switched by his employer) couldn’t cover the total cost to get the needed “initial” payment. There’s NO social program to help them. Nothing! John, desperate, sells his personal belongings and works overtime-but ultimately to no avail. His son worsens and the hospital is going to release him-essentially, to die at home. Confronted by this enormously difficult situation his wife demands that he do something and out of sheer fear of losing his son on the mere basis of lack of cash, he acquires a gun and takes hostages in order for the hospital to keep is son and to place his son’s name on the donor’s list.

My thought here is that such a scenario, in the light of the above analysis, may lead to some problems with the overall ethical picture you painted. It would seem to me that John Q, at least prior to becoming a terrorist, could be described as one who would fit-pragmatically- the (SRS:II) condition- as well as one striving in the way that (PES:IE) would describe. In other words, he, practically— even if not intellectually—is a person who recognizes the need for others (good family person-law abiding citizen and an outstanding friend and worker etc.), and, presumably, wishes to be happy by—and through—fulfilling his obligations to all the social domains that he occupies. On the whole, then, John Q could be considered an ethical person.

Now, what of the situation after he takes hostages? It seems to me that neither (SRS:II) or (PES:IE) are a wholly good description and guide for our understanding. It isn’t just that they’re not a good descriptive-guide in the sense that they fail to be applicable in highly unusual situations, either. Rather, it seems to be because their interest is in unraveling the ethical story from the view of self-and self-interest predominately.

So, can we say that, given the analysis above, that John Q was being either ethical or unethical when he took hostages? It seems difficult to say either way on the basis of the above analysis. The issue becomes complicated. For example, when John Q takes hostages- which of the schemes, or parts of the schemes, does he ethically fit best? I could see that his actions can be arguably described as best fitting the extrinsic: independence of the social relationships scheme (SRS:EI)-in that he acts out of his own selfish desires to save his son—he does disregard the hostages and their respective concerns for his own. Or, can it be that this act is truly selfish? Maybe not entirely! After all, John Q is trying to be a good father and a good husband, and, arguably, even a good member of society by defying a corrupt system on his own terms! If we could make this case, then we could formulize this situation as both (SRS:II) via (SRS:EI). Hence, (PES:IE) also correlates-in this situation-with (PES:EE); (SRS:II) and (SRS:EI). There’s no seemingly clear way, given all of this, that we could identify the ethical status of John Q’s actions.

It seems that John Q’s actions are, at some level of analysis or other—and at some points of experience, necessarily dependent on factors that transcend himself and even his so-called interests. What makes the above analysis a workable and rational ethical system at all seems to be the principle of interdependency. But why is this the case at all? It would seem to be that because there appears to be NO discrete ethical performer, which the John Q-example conveniently brings out. We would appear to all be constant movers and forces being moved within a much larger context for which this ‘I’ am reducible in ethical AND ontological terms. For example, I may conventionally speak of myself desiring and acting. However, at the end of the day, when I have to explain my reason for why this act is good over another, I will have to use justifications that must eventually move beyond me if they’re to make any sense. I cannot merely say that being a good student or friend or boyfriend etc. are good in that they give me pleasure and I’m able to contribute something to others—whether or not I’m always aware of doing whatever good I do for others. Ultimately, this seems only to beg the question as to why this would be good for me AND them at all! As soon as I start down the trail of trying to define my actions-I will eventually reach non-ethical contexts: pleasure for self; happiness; the good for otherness etc. will lead down an analytic path that seems to merge this ‘I’ with all else around. In this sense, then, the thing that makes people happy in healthy ways mentioned above, or something like (SRS:II) possible at all, is because there’s no self to contend with-just an interconnective series of processes that act in and are dependent upon a web of constantly changing dependent relations. This isn’t a form of relativism! Quite the opposite! It seems that the reason we can say that this ethical ‘we’ are ‘all’ interdependent is because of the pre-ethical reality of our interconnectivity that makes possible ethics and reveals our need for it! Likewise, such a situation would also show that there are no discrete ethical entities.

So, the blind man’s selfishness, so to speak, is not predominately a case of merely failing to see the needs of others in order to preserve his own interest to be safe. Rather, this seems to be a consequence of a much deeper problem: the blind man believes he IS an independent thing whose needs and desires exist in some sort of isolated way. There is a ‘them’ and there’s an ‘I’ and these two ontological categories consequently represent two distinct ethical categories. Just as racists argued that there are real distinct racial categories, the egoist of this variety argues that there are superior and inferior ethical categories. If we dispensed with self as a philosophically viable ontological category, we would have no need to discuss self beyond any conventional means. Therefore, we would not have to entertain a self-space over which a set of ethical principles would need apply.

In this case, John Q’s actions are analyzable through the complexity of what he is (biological entity, father, husband, friend, citizen etc.) his social situation (the laws and social expectations of and for ethical and legal conduct) and an actor in the midst of this complex web of relations acting and being acted upon. So, there’s no one answer that need be had to the question of whether he was ethically justified or not. In some sense, yes—as most of us would be willing to argue. In other senses, no—because allowing people to act outside of an ordered practical system of laws and social expectations has the undesirable effect of seemingly justifying any person’s actions any time he/she sees or feels the system to be unjust.

I’ll stop there. As you can tell, this latter part requires far further development. However, this is where I am philosophically and how I see certain issues within your own theory. I hope this discussion continues and I can get a better understanding on your point of view. This has been fun. Thank you for allowing me the opportunity to write you!

Eric D.

It should be noted that, in print, in a magazine interview, a professor specializing in game theory at a prominent and very-reputable university admitted that real life is much, much more complex than the games of Game Theory. He went so far as to confess that the Theory is too artificial to be meaningful.

There's an interesting paper on the real-world results from a classroom simulation analyzed in accordance with game theory which are consistent with the theoretic predictions. The simulation is called the "Hobbes' Game" and was designed by John Immerwahl.

Although the paper explains a bit of game theory and talks about the limitations thereof, it was fascinating to me to see the results of about 15 (I think I remember correctly) episodes of the performance of the game in university ethics classes.

The link to the paper is here An Analysis of the Hobbes Game

There's an abstract with the paper which should let you know if it's of interest.

Hi, dowhat1can

The author of this paper, Lee Archie - in his Conclusion - and maybe Immerwahl himself, are employing the word "self-interested" to mean "selfish" of "self-centered" whereas I believe it is helpful to make a distinction between the words. They first two I mentioned are terms in a system, namely A UNIFIED THEORY OF ETHICS. Time and again in that theory I stress that one may be self-interested and yet be trusting, altruistic, benevolent toward others. For it is in our true self interest to be so. If one tries it, he finds out.

In fact, and here I agree with Sam Harris' formulation, "The only wise way to be selfish is to care for others." Why? Because we rely on others to provide us with what we need, e.g., affection, recognition, love. Without the latter we tend to atrophy. Science informs us, for instance that single people don't live as long as married people do ...according to a recent research study. {Of course a couple can be committed and devoted to one another - 'spiritually married' so to speak - without being legally hitched. The Common Law is an Extrinsic value, while the Statute Law is only a mere Systemic value.}

The point I am making is that you have "enlightened" self-interest if you know your Ethics. Ethics is defined in the system as a perspective, a way of viewing individuals - a way that differs from the Anatomical (which is Systemic value) or the Social-Psychological (which is an application of Extrinsic value). Ethics arises when we Intrinsically value individuals. That entails that we give them our full attention ....we listen to them, we show some respect. We even honor them if we can. At the least we find something to compliment them on, as a way of boosting them up. When you regard a person as a precious treasure not to be defiled you are being ethical, according to this definition. Many, many implications follow from this. And the spinning out of those implications constitute the system. The entire system, the new paradigm, is rooted in a Meta-Ethics (a value theory. Here is a link to a simplified exposition of it, a booklet called LIVING THE GOOD LIFE. Pages 26-28 are on the topic of this thread.
wadeharvey.myqol.com/wadeharvey/Living_ ... _Lifef.pdf

Way back in history, Adam Smith, in his moral philosophy/economics-theory advocated enlightened self-interest. His views are often distorted by those who purport to be his followers. [The same happened with John Stuart Mill.]

-- Updated Fri Sep 23, 2011 3:41 am to add the following --

Hello Prof!!

Hello! I have to say I find your ethical writing quite interesting. I also received your message and will be looking over that material in my copious spare time LOL! I look forward to this dialogue!

First, what I wish to do here is attempt a sort of brief neutral analysis of what you’ve provided on pages 47-53. Then, I wish to move to a kind of tentative critical analysis and we can move from there, if you don’t mind. This so-called critical analysis is my way of attempting to clear up some issues and give you some insight as to where I am currently-philosophically! Thanks for this opportunity Dr. (Sorry for the length). We can also continue this conversation in the other suggested routes you’ve already mentioned to me. Again, thanks for this opportunity!
.... You have given us an outline that makes rationally possible a route around such a conflation! This is a treasure-indeed!
I hope ... I can get a better understanding on your point of view. This has been fun. Thank you for allowing me the opportunity to write you!

Eric D.

You are very welcome. Thanks for the kind words !

It would help you get a better understanding if you look at that table (of new definitions derived by the use of the three basic Dimensions of Value.) See Endnote 4 - pages 64-66 in that booklet that comprises the first part of the new paradigm for ethics: - wadeharvey.myqol.com/wadeharvey/A%20UNI ... ETHICS.pdf

When you examine the correlations presented there, the fuller picture begins to fill in. You see what values are better than what other values - by the meaning of "better" given earlier in the model. You also get a sense of how useful the Dimensions are at explaining different aspects of general philosophy. Things fall into place. The world makes more sense. Heaven knows the situation in the world today doesn't seem to make much sense !

By taking a complex moral dilemma - the story of John Q - and analyzing it with an inadequate set of tools - the only ones you had from that brief passage in the treatise - taken out of context - you are in danger or "driving yourself crazy." [Absolutely no offense intended.] There are many layers to John's story. Are you familiar with The Heinz Dilemma that you find in Wikipedia? I allude to it in one of the four parts of the new theory. Do property rights trump human rights? Your dilemma has to do with the whole issue of the relation of means to ends. I have chapters on that (which you may have not yet studied.) A lot more could be said on this, but it's time for me to get some sleep.

Keep up the good work. You have a great future as a writer.

Hello!

Thank you for your kind words as well. I think I will take your advice here and gain a more full understanding of your thinking on the topic. I’ll also continue the inquiry via email out of the forum. However, just one issue to take note of here: You wrote, “There are many layers to John's story. Are you familiar with The Heinz Dilemma that you find in Wikipedia? I allude to it in one of the four parts of the new theory. Do property rights trump human rights? Your dilemma has to do with the whole issue of the relation of means to ends.”

I am familiar with the Heinz Dilemma. Interesting exercise in ethical theory for sure! I also see what you were saying about the John Q case possessing many layers and that this case can be, perhaps, best classified as s sort of ‘means vss ends’ ethical issue. However, I suppose that there just seems (and I should emphasize “seems” lol) that one could identify an act (or a set of acts)—within the context of what could be termed a ‘set event’ that would permit one to see where ‘self-interest’ and ‘selfishness’ merge to the point of being, within such a set event—of course, indistinguishable. It seems that there’s an aspect of the John Q example that involves this sort of identification-even though there are many other aspects to this situation that might also be considered when determining the possibly larger issues involved with such an example. Again, I’ll go over the lit. and do some more thinking on the topic. I think I'll just read the whole booklet lol! Its a good read!

Thanks for the opportunity-once again!

The author of this paper, Lee Archie - in his Conclusion - and maybe Immerwahl himself, are employing the word "self-interested" to mean "selfish" of "self-centered" whereas I believe it is helpful to make a distinction between the words. They first two I mentioned are terms in a system, namely A UNIFIED THEORY OF ETHICS. Time and again in that theory ...

I intend no disrespect, but most assuredly this is not the case. The definition of "self-interest" does not mean "selfish" or "self-centered" in these studies as you suggest. As a professor of philosophy yourself, why attribute this mistake to your colleagues in this forum without evidence of quoting and citing how these terms are used in the papers in question?

The remarks about Prof. Archie and Prof. Immerwahl seem to me to be not only uncharitable but also obscure the point of the Hobbes' Game studies. Moreover, the import of the studies of Prisoner's Dilemma do not depend upon the definitions your provide in your theory of moral philosophy.*

It's a good bet that both Prof. John Immerwahl and Prof. Lee Archie are well aware of how the term "self-interest" is used in various moral philosophies. Both philosophers have extensive publications in ethics.

There are many philosophies of self-interest (besides yours) including rational egoism, personal ethical egoism, individual ethical egoism, universal ethical egoism. personal psychological egoism, individual psychological egoism, universal psychological egoism, ... and so on. And I suspect there are persuasive definitions for each.

But in the papers I mentioned in Post # 37, these professors are using the terms within the context of game theory -- more precisely Prisoner's Dilemma. The dilemma posed in this case is a choice limited to one of two exclusive alternatives normally stipulated as "self-interest" and "cooperation." The authors are not using the terms as defined in your theory of ethics referred to above, and so it is careless, in my opinion, to accuse them of making this mistake.

In philosophy, a good source for the use of the terms in this context (i.e., the conventional way the terms are theoretically defined and used within the context of Prisoner's Dilemma) is explained here: Steven Kuhn, "Prisoner's Dilemma in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Certainly, you are free to define the terms in any manner you wish in your publications to which you often refer, but this is different from claiming that the conventional uses of these terms in the context of Prisoner's Dilemma (and, as well, in various other practices of philosophy) is mistaken. The use of the terms even in the context of the former is not at all unusual in the history of philosophy; see for example John Doris and Stephen Stich, "Moral Psychology: Egoism vs. Altruism" in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

People often behave in ways that benefit others, and they sometimes do this knowing that it will be costly, unpleasant or dangerous. But at least since Plato's classic discussion in the second Book of the Republic, debate has raged over why people behave in this way. Are their motives really altruistic, or is their behavior ultimately motivated by self-interest?"

Immerwahr explains what he means by "self-interest" within the context of the Hobbes' Game in this manner:

Self-interested parties who act independently will choose options which are not the most favorable ones available. The most favorable outcome can only be obtained if there is some way to insure co-operation and trust among the parties. (John Immerwahr, "The Hobbes Game," [i]Teaching Philosophy, 1:4 (Fall, 1976), p. 435.)

Of course, this characterization is different from the way you use the terms in your publication. Immerwahr is using a precising definition of "self-interest" in the context of the exclusive choices available.

*(Please excuse the bluntness of my comments. I assure you no disrespect is intended, but I think you can sense my annoyance stems in part from acquaintance with some philosophy professors who feign interest in student contributions in order to use those comments as an opportunity to espouse their own beliefs.)

Ayn Rand said that pursuing one's own self interests is the "proper and most efficient" method of securing a happy life. Isn't that just selfishness? If everyone subscribed to that idea, wouldn't that just cause people to be greedy and constantly fight with each other?

What can one do? I agree with Ayn Rand that people are naturally selfish, and not naturally generous, and then people are acting generous they really are hiding behind a mask, and doing it for selfish reasons, so is there any such thing as pure generosity ? The sad answer is no. I agree with Ayn that is good to a certain degree that people are selfish, but the fact that people are nothing but selfish makes me not happy with people, and very sad and mad about it, so I don't always think that it is a positive thing that people are naturally selfish like Ayn does.

...most assuredly this is not the case. The definition of "self-interest" does not mean "selfish" or "self-centered" in these studies as you suggest. As a professor of philosophy yourself, why attribute this mistake to your colleagues in this forum without evidence of quoting and citing how these terms are used in the papers in question?

...*(Please excuse the bluntness of my comments. I assure you no disrespect is intended,

Greetings, dowhat1can

I attempted - so I could offer it as evidence - to highlight and copy the exact two initial sentences in the Conclusion of Dr. Archie's paper where I noticed the usage of the word "self-interest" in - and I quoute - "the sense of Hobbes' psychology" and I got the impression that it connoted selfishness, but scribd or the journal publisher's website did not permit me to copy anything out to show you. So I just summarized.

You can see the evidence for yourself . Please read the first two sentences in Part 3 Conclusion. There Prof. Immerwahl equates self-interest with Thomas Hobbes' view of it ,....which, as I understand it, is that people are quite selfish. The next sentence says that "yet in my games, summarized above, students disclosed their games were based on trust and fair play." The word "yet" gives it away: trust and fair play are marks of the opposite of a narrow, selfish attitude.

If I got the wrong impression, I apologize. I am sure Prof. Immerwahl is a fine man. I respect him. {Why I don't even disrespect John Boehner or Addison Mitchell "Mitch" McConnell, even though they uphold corporate interests and those of the super-rich whereas I uphold the interests of 'the little guy.'. I disrespect no one !!] Please forgive me for misunderstanding. I had no idea how much you Intrinsically-valued these two professors or I wouldn't even have brought up the subject. Thank you for calling our attention to The Hobbes Game and the Assurance Game.



-- Updated Sat Sep 24, 2011 2:14 am to add the following --

Hello!

Thank you for your kind words as well. I think I will take your advice here and gain a more full understanding of your thinking on the topic.

I am familiar with the Heinz Dilemma. Interesting exercise in ethical theory for sure! I also see what you were saying about the John Q case possessing many layers .....I’ll go over the lit. and do some more thinking on the topic. I think I'll just read the whole booklet lol! Its a good read!
!

Greetings, edelker

You are a good student and you have a good attitude. You are bound to do well in your college career.

To see how the dimensions of value may be employed as "tools in a toolbox", as tools of analysis, scroll down the screen at this link to see what this professional in the field of industrial design does with them: hartmaninstitute.org/Portals/0/html-fil ... Design.htm
He applies them in his own field in a brilliant and creative manner. He gives us a model of deep thinking. He is focused and displays the creative process at work. We need that in the field of Ethics to develop it as a full-fledged discipline.

Hobbes omits one of the defining attributes of humanity which is that it is social. That humanity is social can be found empirically by way of social anthropological findings that reciprocity crosses cultures, and can be found rationally by perceiving that enlightened self interest produces longer lasting rewards than does reactive selfishness.

Prof, I don't think you read the paper you are criticizing since the point of Prof. Archie's paper, as I understand it, was to show that when students competed for grades, it was in their self-interest to get the highest grade possible -- and this result was achieved through cooperation, not "selfishness." What students termed "self interest" turned out to be, in the running of the simulation, cooperation.

This is why I described your remarks as "careless."

And what Belinda describes as ...

Hobbes omits one of the defining attributes of humanity which is that it is social. That humanity is social can be found empirically by way of social anthropological findings that reciprocity crosses cultures, and can be found rationally by perceiving that enlightened self interest produces longer lasting rewards than does reactive selfishness.

was corroborated in the episodes of the conduct of the Hobbes game.

I attempted - so I could offer it as evidence - to highlight and copy the exact two initial sentences in the Conclusion of Dr. Archie's paper where I noticed the usage of the word "self-interest" in - and I quoute - "the sense of Hobbes' psychology" and I got the impression that it connoted selfishness, but scribd or the journal publisher's website did not permit me to copy anything out to show you. So I just summarized.

Here's the passage (which I could not copy and paste either, but I found that the two sentences involved less typing than your justification for not typing them):

Immerwahr reports that the behavior of the players in his game is "totally self-interested,'' and he notes that this nicely matches Hobbes' psychology.{Immerwahr, 437.}) Yet, in my games summarized above, students disclose their behavior was based on trust and fair play (62\%), vacillation between trust and egoism (23\%), or self-interest (15\%).

Notice that these two sentences do not imply ...

You can see the evidence for yourself . Please read the first two sentences in Part 3 Conclusion. There Prof. Immerwahl equates self-interest with Thomas Hobbes' view of it ,....which, as I understand it, is that people are quite selfish. The next sentence says that "yet in my games, summarized above, students disclosed their games were based on trust and fair play." The word "yet" gives it away: trust and fair play are marks of the opposite of a narrow, selfish attitude.

Hobbes does use the word "self-interest" in the manner that Immerwahr describes which is ...

There are always some men who act only for their own self-interest and who care nothing for the standards of the rest of society.

Note that "scare quotes" are used in the sentence referring to what Prof. Immerwahr reports. As I'm sure you are well aware, scare quotes are used to set off words one knows are imprecise. And the students (in their understanding) did contrast trust and self-interest. But nowhere in the passage you refer to is the word "selfish" or "narrow selfish attitude" used to describe the meaning of the word by Prof. Immerwahr or by Prof. Archie. Moreover, there is also no mention here of Dr. Immerwahr's or Dr. Archie's definition of the word "self-interest." So this comment has yet to be thought though and is, as it stands, simply false.

The author of this paper, Lee Archie - in his Conclusion - and maybe Immerwahl himself, are employing the word "self-interested" to mean "selfish" of "self-centered" ...

Here's a short passage from the paper that summarizes as best I can that neither Prof. Archie nor Prof. Immerwahr make the mistake you attribute to them.

The specter of either player breaking his promise has the consequence that the betrayer cannot be trusted in future interaction. This central point is well expressed by Alexandra in his discussion of the Assurance Game: ``The possibility of gaining a reputation as untrustworthy, unreliable and so on may be very much against our long term interests. Consequentialist considerations may lead an agent preferring, all things considered, to cooperate rather than defect.{Andrew Alexandra, ``Should Hobbes's State of Nature be Represented as a Prisoner's Dilemma?,'' The Southern Journal of Philosophy 30:2 (1992), 9.} Alexandra cites a rich list of commentators who have represented the State of Nature as different versions of Prisoner's Dilemma. Moreover, almost all commentators agree with Immerwahr. For example, Jean Hampton states, ``And Hobbes does not recognize the existence of any 'ethical' incentive that could overcome self-interest and consequently motivate these people to perform the cooperative action in this or any prisoner's dilemma.''{Jean Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1986), 134.}

In other words, to act in Hobbes' sense of self interest, i.e., not cooperatively, is not in the participant's long-term interest.

I had no idea how much you Intrinsically-valued these two professors or I wouldn't even have brought up the subject.

Hopefully you can see by my comments that this is not the reason for my comments. I am somewhat surprised that you are unaware of the ad hominem implications of this statement.

I always felt that a person needs to take care of their self first before helping others.

If a person has not taken care of their needs before trying to address other peoples needs then they will not have the capability to really help another person. Only when a person truly feels the time is right to help other people will they be able to put their heart into it. Someones self-interest may look like they are being selfish, but that is from a outside perspective. A outside observer is going to have totally different ideas on what being selfish is.

It's a moral that is set from within.

Deron.