Who determines linguistic meaning?

A Poster He or I

Understanding is subjective. Meaning must have some objective component (culturally circumscribed) to bridge the subjectivity of understanding.

I’d probably say ‘intersubjective’ rather than ‘objective’, but as long as we both mean something like ‘independent of any given individual’s understanding’, we’re on the same page.

Are there ever situations where you hear someone use a word in a certain way and say (or think, if you’re too polite to say anything) ‘That word doesn’t mean that in [standard] English’?

Sure, lots of times.

Then I think we’re in a position to return to the point of my original post. You replied, ‘#3 comes closest, although I don't see where any "majority" is needed … .’ And I in turn replied that ‘majority’ was just supposed to capture the idea that the usage of some critical mass of users (within a culture) determines the meaning of a term (within that culture). But if not a majority, then what sort of proportion? And are there users whose usage counts for more than that of others?
Remember that I’m asking here about terms that seem to be common property, and not about specialist terms like ‘wetware’.

Remster

-- Updated Sat Oct 22, 2011 7:47 am to add the following --

Dodaive

What about ‘know(ledge)’, ‘free(dom)’, ‘mind’ or ‘right’ (see my original post)?

Remster

Remster

The second I read your first post one name came to mind: Putnam. You used the term rigid designator and even used water as your example. I'm not sure if the rest of your posts would follow the theories of his but I suppose I could see some similarities. I also have seen the word relativism thrown around quite a bit by 'A Poster He or I' and I was expecting you to display Putnam's argument of "intensions not fixing extensions", so I was surprised when I didn't see it.

So here is Putnam's paraphrased argument which can be found in his "Meaning and Reference" essay. It is under the context of a sci fix example so walk with me here.

Consider that somewhere there is a Twin Earth and consider that this Twin Earth is identical to our Earth. They even speak English there. If it so pleases you, you could even consider that you have an identical copy there. There is however a peculiarity that Twin Earth has in comparison to Earth. This peculiarity is that the liquid called "water" is not H20 but instead it's a chemical formulation that is composed of this chemical abbreviation: xyz. An Earthian who traveled to Twin Earth and back would report that "water" there means xyz and the Twin Earthian who traveled to Earth and back would report that "water" means H20.

Now let's roll back the time to 1750. At this time the typical Earthian didn't know that "water" consisted of hydrogen and oxygen and the typical Twin Earthian didn't know that their "water" consisted of xyz. Now consider that Oscar1 is an Earthian and that Oscar2 is his counterpart living on Twin Earth. To be a counterpart, in this instance, means for the both of them to share the exact same psychological make up. Everything from thought to interior monologue. Now with that established Oscar1 and Oscar2's conceptions about water would seem to be similar in every single way. However they would actually differ in extension, i.e., one consists of H20 and one consists of xyz. They would not discover this until much later. Since Oscar1 and Oscar2 both thought their respective waters were equal to each other, does this mean that they actually were? No, it does not. If this same example were to be looked at in 1950 they would clearly see that they had two different waters.

I think this helps illustrate the relative example that keeps being brought up. It may be true that a culture deems certain words to mean certain things but it does not mean that the meaning a culture ascribes to a thing is actually its meaning. For instance the sun was commonly thought to revolve around the earth for over thousands of years but it did not mean that it was the case. I think that is a part of the problem if we define meaning in a relative manner.

CSU Philosophy Nerd

Thanks for your reply.

I'm familiar with Putnam's discussion. I think he argues successfully that, assuming we share his intuitions, natural kind terms are rigid designators (though not that intensions don't fix extensions, since intensions can be rigidified).

However, that issue cuts across the one we're discussing. Even supposing 'water' is a rigid designator, the question of whose usage determines its reference still arises. It might be that 50% of people within the culture of standard-English speakers use it with the intention of rigidly designating H₂O, while 50% use it with the intention of rigidly designating whatever substance fills the rivers, lakes and seas. So whose usage determines its reference in standard English (i.e. relative to the culture of standard-English speakers)?

Remster

the question of whose usage determines its reference still arises. It might be that 50% of people within the culture of standard-English speakers use it with the intention of rigidly designating H₂O, while 50% use it with the intention of rigidly designating whatever substance fills the rivers, lakes and seas. So whose usage determines its reference in standard English (i.e. relative to the culture of standard-English speakers)?

Remster

Perhaps I am missing the distinction that you are pointing out, and if that is the case then my apologies, but it appears to me that Putnam's argument displayed how the reference was fixed. The matter of who "fixed" it was irrelevant due to the actual extension of the term water. They both thought they were referring to the same water when in actuality the chemical makeup of the water is what actually determined its extension. It took scientific discovery for both Oscar's to discover this. So whom fixed it prior to this discovery, as it seems to me, is a moot point. Unless of course I'm missing something here?

CSU Philosophy Nerd

Well, it can't be just the chemical makeup of water that determines the extension of 'water'. It must be that plus the resolution of an individual or group to use 'water' to rigidly designate this substance (imagine I'm pointing at some water), assuming the theory of direct reference is true. And since that's the case, it's possible for another individual or group to resolve to use 'water' to rigidly designate that substance.

(Please pardon the split infinitives if you don't like that sort of thing.)

Remster

-- Updated Mon Oct 24, 2011 8:01 am to add the following --

Addendum: I should make it absolutely clear that I'm talking about two individuals or groups on Earth (not one on Earth and another on Twin Earth) and two substances with different sensible qualities as well as different chemical makeups (unlike H₂O and xyz, which have different chemical makeups but the same sensible qualities).

CSU Philosophy Nerd wrote:

I think this [example of the Twin Earths with 2 different "waters"] helps illustrate the relative example that keeps being brought up. It may be true that a culture deems certain words to mean certain things but it does not mean that the meaning a culture ascribes to a thing is actually its meaning. For instance the sun was commonly thought to revolve around the earth for over thousands of years but it did not mean that it was the case. I think that is a part of the problem if we define meaning in a relative manner.

It frankly surprises me when I see this type of argument brought up as a criticism of philosophical or cultural relativism. It demonstrates that the critic has no regard for how relativism operates.

In such examples, relativism falls apart precisely because the situation is being analyzed NOT from WITHIN any of the perspectives being analyzed, but rather from an artificial, hypothetical "meta-perspective." In this particular example of the Twin Earths, each with their own meaning for water, the analysis introduces a completely unqualified "actual" meaning of water, seemingly from out of a magic hat, considering that it doesn't come from either of the two Earths under consideration. The magic hat in this case is our PRESENT where the varying chemical natures of each Earth's "water" have been declared distinct from each other via present-day chemical analysis.

A relativist recognizes that there are no magic hats: the PRESENT of the example analysis doesn't exist within what is being analyzed, namely the Twin Earths of the year 1750. In that scenario, the analysis as stated belongs to the FUTURE, not the present, and has no bearing whatsoever on the reality of water in its present (i.e., 1750). Any analysis that would or could be actually carried out in 1750 would demonstrate the objectivity of 1750's meaning for water, since that meaning is confined to a specific Earth of 1750.

My whole point here is that relativism occurs relative to other frames of reference; the analysis which declared an "actual" meaning is outside the Twin Earths and is itself only relative to the perspectives of the Twin Earths and has no bearing upon the perceptions and practical realities of those earthbound perspectives of 1750. Philosophically, scientifically, and practically, the reality of earth in 1750 (you pick which earth) has nothing to do with the analyst's "actual" meaning as stated, because 1750's philosophy, science, and practicality have no place for it.

CSU Philosophy Nerd wrote:

...the sun was commonly thought to revolve around the earth for over thousands of years but it did not mean that it was the case. I think that is a part of the problem if we define meaning in a relative manner.

A relativist recognizes that the sun DOES revolve around the earth. The only thing that has changed over time is the CONTEXT in which that statement can function as truth. Once upon a time, the truth of this perspective encompassed many contexts, including the design of the heavens. Today, it is confined to an earthbound perspective that proactively implies no need to consider astronomical perspectives. To drive home my point, the statement "The earth revolves around the sun" is also a contextual truth only. Step into a larger perspective that measures the Earth's path through space against the cosmos at large and there is no semblance of the elliptical path necessary to designate any kind of orbit: therefore from that perspective the earth isn't revolving around anything.

CSU Philosophy Nerd wrote:

They [the 2 Twin Earths] both thought they were referring to the same water when in actuality the chemical makeup of the water is what actually determined its extension. It took scientific discovery for both Oscar's to discover this. So whom fixed it prior to this discovery, as it seems to me, is a moot point. Unless of course I'm missing something here?

I'm compelled to observe that who fixed the intension prior to science's discovery of distinct chemistry for the 2 planets' waters is very much relevant to answering Remster's opening post if you find this scientific discovery irrelevant (as I do) to the meaning of water in 1750 (as circumscribed by the Twin Earth scenario). The scientific discovery creates an all new context for the evaluation of truth, one that did not exist before. For beings such as humans, who are not omniscient and who are bound by time, truth cannot exist in any other fashion.

It frankly surprises me when I see this type of argument brought up as a criticism of philosophical or cultural relativism. It demonstrates that the critic has no regard for how relativism operates.

I just want to back Putnam for a moment here (though I realise you're addressing CSU Philosophy Nerd and not Putnam). When Putnam argues that xyz wouldn't have been water even if it, rather than H₂O, had had all the surface properties of water - which is what the Twin Earth thought-experiment is designed to show - he isn't (or at least needn't be) subscribing to the sort of absolutism you reject. He's arguing that when we use the term 'water' to talk about some counterfactual situation, we're still using it to refer to H₂O and not to whatever substance in that situation has the surface properties that water has in our situation. It's an argument about our usage, not about proper usage.

I'm compelled to observe that who fixed the intension prior to science's discovery of distinct chemistry for the 2 planets' waters is very much relevant to answering Remster's opening post if you find this scientific discovery irrelevant (as I do) to the meaning of water in 1750 (as circumscribed by the Twin Earth scenario).

Who fixed the intension is very much relevant either way! The term 'water' didn't drop from the sky with its meaning already assigned to it. The dispute in which Putnam is engaging isn't about whether someone fixed the meaning of 'water'; rather, it's about how they fixed its meaning (by ostention/description) and what sort of meaning they assigned to it (rigid/flaccid designation).

Sorry for my protracted delay in responding, I have been consumed in a plethora of work but I am finally free to read and respond accordingly

CSU Philosophy Nerd

Well, it can't be just the chemical makeup of water that determines the extension of 'water'. It must be that plus the resolution of an individual or group to use 'water' to rigidly designate this substance (imagine I'm pointing at some water), assuming the theory of direct reference is true. And since that's the case, it's possible for another individual or group to resolve to use 'water' to rigidly designate that substance.

I can see more clearly now the distinction that you have been trying to make Remster. I think that my response via Putnam wasn't far off from how I will respond now as the theory is fairly similar. I am referring to Kripke's causal chain of reference theory. Kripke and Putnam were both advocates of a rigid designator. Kripke described this designation as being intimately connected to a causal chain of reference. For instance when Aristotle was born he was named Aristotle by his mother. "When every other person comes in contact with that name they must intend when they learn it to use it with the same reference as the person from whom they heard it" (Naming and Necessity, Lecture II).

So to relate this back to our water example. Let's say when the water of our earth was discovered to be composed of H20. Then the person(s) who made this discovery and showed it to everyone else. Everyone who received this would then be intending to use the name (water) with the same reference (that it's H20) as the person from whom they heard it. I hope that adequately answers your objection.


On a side note, I know that Kripke didn't formally call this his theory in Naming and Necessity but this is the picture he was trying to create nonetheless.

CSU Philosophy Nerd wrote:

I think this [example of the Twin Earths with 2 different "waters"] helps illustrate the relative example that keeps being brought up. It may be true that a culture deems certain words to mean certain things but it does not mean that the meaning a culture ascribes to a thing is actually its meaning. For instance the sun was commonly thought to revolve around the earth for over thousands of years but it did not mean that it was the case. I think that is a part of the problem if we define meaning in a relative manner.

It frankly surprises me when I see this type of argument brought up as a criticism of philosophical or cultural relativism. It demonstrates that the critic has no regard for how relativism operates.

In such examples, relativism falls apart precisely because the situation is being analyzed NOT from WITHIN any of the perspectives being analyzed, but rather from an artificial, hypothetical "meta-perspective." In this particular example of the Twin Earths, each with their own meaning for water, the analysis introduces a completely unqualified "actual" meaning of water, seemingly from out of a magic hat, considering that it doesn't come from either of the two Earths under consideration. The magic hat in this case is our PRESENT where the varying chemical natures of each Earth's "water" have been declared distinct from each other via present-day chemical analysis.

A relativist recognizes that there are no magic hats: the PRESENT of the example analysis doesn't exist within what is being analyzed, namely the Twin Earths of the year 1750. In that scenario, the analysis as stated belongs to the FUTURE, not the present, and has no bearing whatsoever on the reality of water in its present (i.e., 1750). Any analysis that would or could be actually carried out in 1750 would demonstrate the objectivity of 1750's meaning for water, since that meaning is confined to a specific Earth of 1750.

My whole point here is that relativism occurs relative to other frames of reference; the analysis which declared an "actual" meaning is outside the Twin Earths and is itself only relative to the perspectives of the Twin Earths and has no bearing upon the perceptions and practical realities of those earthbound perspectives of 1750. Philosophically, scientifically, and practically, the reality of earth in 1750 (you pick which earth) has nothing to do with the analyst's "actual" meaning as stated, because 1750's philosophy, science, and practicality have no place for it.

I can see how using a future example would seem like a short cut and one that completely bypasses the argument in question but it was merely to give a vivid picture of how meanings aren't necessarily in the head. One need not use a "magic hat" in order to display this. Even with the present example and the two earth's the distinction is still present. They both have a seemingly identical substance here, when it rains it rains 'water', when they need hydration they drink 'water', when they bathe they use 'water'. The fact that they call it the same thing doesn't make it the same thing because in reality the extensions are different. All water on Twin Earth is that liquid which is composed of xyz and all water on Earth is that liquid which is composed of H20. I know you made it a strict point to illustrate that the present analysis is not what the relativist considers and if I understand you clearly you are stating only the archaic analysis is the one that a relativist would be considered with. I just wanted to make clear that using a time travel was not necessary to make the distinction I was trying to make, I just thought it made it more vivid.

As far as the archaic analysis goes I think the causal chain of reference covers that as well and if I’m not mistaken I would think that a relativist could find some merit in that, unless of course I've totally missed the bar. If that is the case then I look forward to being better informed.

CSU Philosophy Nerd

Hmm, I don't think you've got the causal theory quite right. The causal chain starts at the point that someone decides to use 'water' to rigidly designate this substance, whatever it may be, which is long before anyone discovers that this substance is H₂O. Then the next person decides to use 'water' as the last person used it, and so on, until (and after) the discovery of water's chemical makeup is made.

Then the question still stands: How long does the causal chain have to be before this usage becomes standard English? I could pick my nose and resolve that the substance on the end of my finger was to be rigidly designated 'flibble', and then you could come round and help me establish its chemical makeup, but that wouldn't make this usage of 'flibble' standard English.

Remster

PS I'd like to add that all of Putnam's arguments (I think) and most of Kripke's are about rigid designation and not direct reference. The latter entails the former but not vice versa: the definite description 'the man who actually invented the zip' is a rigid designator, but it doesn't refer directly.

CSU Philosophy Nerd

Hmm, I don't think you've got the causal theory quite right. The causal chain starts at the point that someone decides to use 'water' to rigidly designate this substance, whatever it may be, which is long before anyone discovers that this substance is H₂O. Then the next person decides to use 'water' as the last person used it, and so on, until (and after) the discovery of water's chemical makeup is made.

You're quite right, that wouldn't be the initial "baptism" of the name water and the liquid that we refer to it as such. I was just using a modified version of the theory to placate our current discussion. In other words I was taking the discovery of 'Water being composed of H20' as an initial baptism and from that point forward the process of inculcation conisted of people intending for people to associate the name 'water' with the reference 'H20'.

You're also right in pointing out that they don't use it as direct reference and unfortunately that left the theory suspect to the "qua problem" as pointed out by Devitt and Sterelny pointed out. In trying to solve that problem it leads us back to solving the definite description problem, which leads us again back to the rigid designation solution. So it is definitely problematic in that aspect and as such not complete.

I guess the only answer to your "flibble" question is that if every person that referred to the 'substance on the end of your finger that is resultant from your finger reaching in to the inner recesses of your nose and procurring it' as flibble and understanding what it is that makes it flibble. Then I suppose however long it takes a word to be inculcated into people and be considered as a standard name of that reference in English. That's a cop-out answer, in regards to length, but I am unaware as to how long that process would take. I think the rub of the matter lies in the initial naming and the following understanding that results from other people connecting that particular name with that particular reference.

The discussion of Kripke's causal chain of meaning reminds me of the current efforts by a single individual (namely, popular columnist and provocateur Dan Savage) to re-define Republican presidential candidate Rick Santorum's last name into a word meaning a certain byproduct of sodomy. Since 2003, Savage has maintained a website which simply states the meaning (his intended meaning, not the surname) of the word "santorum" for all to see. He occassionally has talked about his effort in his column, also. To the best of my knowledge, there has been no other formal attempt by him to spread his new meaning throughout the English-speaking world.

In the years since, the website has become the top website returned by internet search engines whenever someone searches on the term "santorum" causing considerable frustration for Rick Santorum, as you may imagine. Despite how popular the website is, the new meaning has not entered English common usage. I have not read anything to suggest it is being used as a common term with its new meaning in any sub-culture either. I would posit that the causal chain breaks down NOT because the original meaning (Mr. Santorum's surname) is entrenched among English speakers (most English speakers have never heard of Rick Santorum); but because the new meaning (a certain byproduct of sodomy I will not elaborate on) is too far outside of everyday usage and experience for anybody to remember or have reason to remember(except hardcore sodomists perhaps).

I guess the only answer to your "flibble" question is that if every person that referred to the 'substance on the end of your finger that is resultant from your finger reaching in to the inner recesses of your nose and procurring it' as flibble and understanding what it is that makes it flibble. Then I suppose however long it takes a word to be inculcated into people and be considered as a standard name of that reference in English. That's a cop-out answer, in regards to length, but I am unaware as to how long that process would take. I think the rub of the matter lies in the initial naming and the following understanding that results from other people connecting that particular name with that particular reference.

I don't suppose there's a definitive answer, but you seem to be siding with option 3 from my original post.

I guess the only answer to your "flibble" question is that if every person that referred to the 'substance on the end of your finger that is resultant from your finger reaching in to the inner recesses of your nose and procurring it' as flibble and understanding what it is that makes it flibble. Then I suppose however long it takes a word to be inculcated into people and be considered as a standard name of that reference in English. That's a cop-out answer, in regards to length, but I am unaware as to how long that process would take. I think the rub of the matter lies in the initial naming and the following understanding that results from other people connecting that particular name with that particular reference.

I don't suppose there's a definitive answer, but you seem to side with option c from my original post.

Just looked up 'santorum' ...

You are dealing with an anthropomorphism. Meaning is intention, and therefore is not contained in language. One of the biggest scams in linguistics are those fools who study the meaning of words.

Words, in of themselves, have no meaning-they simply have an association. In order for them to do their job as names, they neither add to nor subtract from that which they are the name of.

Example, the geometric figure is a language. You are looking at an analogic. It simply is. What it means to you is how you can use it to attain to your goals.

You must come to realize, that as mind, you have a job to do, just like any other environmental acquisition system of a living organism. You use words, logics and analogics to do your job. Self awareness entails awareness of your function, as mind, and ability to use tools, methods, to accomplish your job, as mind.