Towards a coherent theory of animal equality

Hi, I started writing a book on animal ethics ("the ethical consistency of animal equality"). Here I wanted to share two texts I have recently written; some preliminary parts for my book...
http://stijnbruers.wordpress.com/2011/1 ... -equality/
http://stijnbruers.wordpress.com/2011/1 ... sic-right/
http://stijnbruers.wordpress.com/2011/0 ... illusions/
Any comments are welcome...

Hi, I started writing a book on animal ethics ("the ethical consistency of animal equality"). Here I wanted to share two texts I have recently written; some preliminary parts for my book...
http://stijnbruers.wordpress.com/2011/1 ... -equality/
http://stijnbruers.wordpress.com/2011/1 ... sic-right/
http://stijnbruers.wordpress.com/2011/0 ... illusions/
Any comments are welcome...

The last one (speciesism) is excellent, I like the evolutionary perspective and how it really makes clear the arbitrariness of choosing species as an ethically relevant criterion.

The other two texts are well-structured, but content-wise, I do not like them. I think the whole "not merely using as a means" is a bad principle. (There's a neat way to show it: add a loop to the tracks in the standard trolley problem, so if you divert the trolley, it will hit the one man, but it will go on and get back to the original track, rolling towards the five. Now, make the one man really fat, and you have a situation just like the standard trolley problem -- but with an added piece of track -- where you're using the one man as a means: who would seriously think that the added piece of track is ethically significant enough to let four people die unnecessarily?)

In the first text, you systematically try to find a coherent theory. It starts off well with considering pleasure and pain, but then it just becomes a juggle of intuitions. Pretty ad hoc, not really a satisfying way to ground the theory.
What if I have opposite intuitions than you have?

You attributing value to biodiversity came out of nowhere, how does that connect to the other considerations? A "species" can neither feel pleasure nor pain, why should it be intrinsically valuable? Shouldn't just the individual MEMBERS of the species count?

You mentioned something about evolution there, which brings me to my main point, a point about intuitions: Nature is the way it is because of evolution. Evolution is a blind, indifferent process. It's about the copying of genes, not about the well-being of sentient creatures. Our intutions are the way they are because of natural selection. But what's good for the genes may not be ethically good. So we can't give too much weight to our intuitions, we should try to devise a rational ethical theory.

Prioritarianism: You mention that the worst-off being should get priority, but that effectiveness should count something too. This may not be inconsistent, but somehow it would seem unsettling to me, where do you draw the line? Suppose we had perfect information of everything, do you think one could devise a well-justified formula for a trade-off? If not, wouldn't that speak against this?

Hospital example: Even if we ignore the intuitions, one can well make the case that a general policy that allows doctors to do the organ transplants would be harmful overall. Only in highly specified hypothetical examples where you know that the consequences will be good would utilitarianism favor the transplants. And why would there be anything wrong with that?

(In case you wonder where I'm coming from, I'm a negative utilitarian, but I also think that preference utilitarianism is decently coherent and sensible.)

-- Updated Wed Dec 28, 2011 6:41 am to add the following --

And regarding the veil of ignorance: Risk aversion is only sensible if you're making a one-time decision. If you make the same decision thousands of times, it's irrational to be risk averse. (That's why it's bad to be a risk averse poker player.) In the veil of ignorance situation, your choosing of the universal ethical theory will lead to a near infinity of beings "born" in front of the veil. So if you ignore the aspect that it's only for you, the risk aversion thing has to go.

-- Updated Wed Dec 28, 2011 6:49 am to add the following --

Hi, I started writing a book on animal ethics ("the ethical consistency of animal equality"). Here I wanted to share two texts I have recently written; some preliminary parts for my book...
http://stijnbruers.wordpress.com/2011/1 ... -equality/
http://stijnbruers.wordpress.com/2011/1 ... sic-right/
http://stijnbruers.wordpress.com/2011/0 ... illusions/
Any comments are welcome...

And regarding the veil of ignorance: Risk aversion is only sensible if you're making a one-time decision. If you make the same decision thousands of times, it's irrational to be risk averse. (That's why it's bad to be a risk averse poker player.) In the veil of ignorance situation, your choosing of the universal ethical theory will lead to a near infinity of beings "born" in front of the veil. So if you ignore the aspect that it's only for you, the risk aversion thing has to go.
„Moral intuition 14: Predators are allowed to hunt. It would be a tragedy if they go extinct.“
Would the tragedy be worse than the status quo?
„During the minute it takes me to compose this sentence, thousands of animals are being eaten alive; others are running for their lives, whimpering with fear; others are being slowly devoured from within by rasping parasites; thousands of all kinds are dying from starvation, thirst and disease. It must be so.“ – Richard Dawkins, River out of Eden
Must it really be so? Is that what a perfect world looks like?
What is „natural“ is by no means necessarily good.

The other two texts are well-structured, but content-wise, I do not like them. I think the whole "not merely using as a means" is a bad principle. (There's a neat way to show it: add a loop to the tracks in the standard trolley problem, so if you divert the trolley, it will hit the one man, but it will go on and get back to the original track, rolling towards the five. Now, make the one man really fat, and you have a situation just like the standard trolley problem -- but with an added piece of track -- where you're using the one man as a means: who would seriously think that the added piece of track is ethically significant enough to let four people die unnecessarily?)

Thanks for your elaborate answers. very interesting!
Regarding the loop: it depends on how it is formulated, whether it is a real loop or a side track that moves back to the main track. In the first case one might say that doing nothing means letting the five people being used to protect the one. It might also be possible that there are other mechanisms and intuitions playing around (in fact, I have found three different accounts to distinguish the switch trolley dilemma from the fat man trolley dilemma. The basic right account is just one of them - and my favorite )
Anyway, I noticed that a lot of people are doubtful about the loop dilemmas, their intuitions are not so strong for neither of the options: turning the switch or not is about 50-50. So if people have a weak intuition that we are allowed to turn the switch, then I guess that - as it is a weak intuition - they might say that action is not allowed in order to respect this basic right. So they are willing to comply with this basic right principle.
Second, in the loop dilemma there seems to be a difference between a fat man on the side track, versus a thin man standing in front of a heavy stone. The stone will block the trolley. Psychological studies (by Hauser et al) showed that now people are more inclined to say that turning the switch is allowed.

What if I have opposite intuitions than you have?

if your system is coherent with your intuitions and internally consistent, then we cannot further argue. Then we have real moral disagreement in some dilemmas. Rational arguments won't help us either, because in the very end they also need to be based on something that cannot be further justified. These things are the intuitions.

You attributing value to biodiversity came out of nowhere, how does that connect to the other considerations? A "species" can neither feel pleasure nor pain, why should it be intrinsically valuable? Shouldn't just the individual MEMBERS of the species count?

I introduced this biodiversity principle in order to respect the intuitions that most people (inclding animal rights activists) have: we do not have a duty to stop a predator, even if we could. If you have better principles that are in correspondence with this intuition, you're welcome. If you'd say we have a duty to interfere in predation if we can, then even a lot of animal rights activists might have difficulties accepting this.

So we can't give too much weight to our intuitions, we should try to devise a rational ethical theory.

I agree that we cannot trust our intuitions always. some of them can be illusions. However, we have to start from something. I have never met an ethicist or vegan or meat eater who did not use arguments that were in the end based on intuitions (=judgments they could not further justify).

Prioritarianism: You mention that the worst-off being should get priority, but that effectiveness should count something too. This may not be inconsistent, but somehow it would seem unsettling to me, where do you draw the line? Suppose we had perfect information of everything, do you think one could devise a well-justified formula for a trade-off? If not, wouldn't that speak against this?

Well, I think most people can be a bit flexible about their need for efficiency, because no-one has a sharp line where efficiency wins from priority. We can write the theory in mathematical equations (see first article in http://stijnbruers.wordpress.com/2010/1 ... f-justice/) Looking at those equations, we see that there is a parameter Q, which measures our level of risk aversion or our need for efficiency. Most people would prefer a low but positive value for Q, but they do not propose an exact value. So in the end we can sit around the table and see in a democratic way what value for Q would get a consent.

Hospital example: Even if we ignore the intuitions, one can well make the case that a general policy that allows doctors to do the organ transplants would be harmful overall. Only in highly specified hypothetical examples where you know that the consequences will be good would utilitarianism favor the transplants. And why would there be anything wrong with that?

I don't see why such a general policy that allows transplntations, would be harmful overall. Is it because people have an irrational fear to become the person who is to be sacrificed rather than one of the patients who needs organs?
Of course, if you have risk or uncertainty aversion and the technology of transplantations is not sufficiently reliable yet...

And regarding the veil of ignorance: Risk aversion is only sensible if you're making a one-time decision. If you make the same decision thousands of times, it's irrational to be risk averse. (That's why it's bad to be a risk averse poker player.) In the veil of ignorance situation, your choosing of the universal ethical theory will lead to a near infinity of beings "born" in front of the veil. So if you ignore the aspect that it's only for you, the risk aversion thing has to go.

that's an interesting point. Anyway, we only live once, reincarnation is not scientific, so the veil of ignorance is about a one-time decision.
I don't understand your last two sentences. A near infinity of beings? Ignoring it's only for you?

„Moral intuition 14: Predators are allowed to hunt. It would be a tragedy if they go extinct.“
Would the tragedy be worse than the status quo?

in terms of suffering, it might be that a world where predation becomes prohibited is better than a world where predation is still allowed. We can do two things now
1) for the moment we don't know what is the best world, we don't know what the consequences will be if we exterminate all predators where ever we could. If I have uncertainty aversion behind the veil of ignorance, I would prefer a world that I know, namely the one with predation still allowed.
2) if scientists find out that a world where extinction of predators would be better in terms of suffering, and if I still don't prefer such a world, I could introduce a principle about the value of biodiversity.

What is „natural“ is by no means necessarily good.

that's certainly right. If something is natural but not necessary and is a violation of the basic right, then is is not good. Rape is natural and normal (men have developed a tool that makes them able to rape women, a lot of animals do it, our ancestors did it for thousands of years,...), but not necessary, and it violates the basic right of women. The claim is that only when something is both natural, normal and necessary, it is allowed to violate rights.

Anyway, I noticed that a lot of people are doubtful about the loop dilemmas, their intuitions are not so strong for neither of the options: turning the switch or not is about 50-50. So if people have a weak intuition that we are allowed to turn the switch, then I guess that - as it is a weak intuition - they might say that action is not allowed in order to respect this basic right. So they are willing to comply with this basic right principle.

Those findings are interesting, but do they tell us anything about how we should act? Maybe if your approach to ethics is situational, and if you refuse to develop universal principles, then you might go with such intuitions. But as soon as you try to devise universal principles, the trolley cases lead to contradictions. Why not resolve it by concluding that our intutions cannot be rationally justified?

Second, in the loop dilemma there seems to be a difference between a fat man on the side track, versus a thin man standing in front of a heavy stone. The stone will block the trolley. Psychological studies (by Hauser et al) showed that now people are more inclined to say that turning the switch is allowed.

I'm actually quite curious as to why that would be. Maybe some already think in Kantian terms, maybe there's a tendency to extra carefully not be bigoted against fat people, and maybe we really do have an aversion to using people as a means in our genes. Would that make sense evolutionarily? Actually, my guess is that this particular finding is "contaminated", if you did it with people from forager tribes, it might turn out differently. Either way, I wouldn't give much weight to such findings.

if your system is coherent with your intuitions and internally consistent, then we cannot further argue. Then we have real moral disagreement in some dilemmas. Rational arguments won't help us either, because in the very end they also need to be based on something that cannot be further justified. These things are the intuitions.

We must share some core intuitions, but we don't have to share all intuitions. Intuitions can be given up, written off as irrational. The human mind is often systematically flawed, as is nicely illustrated here in the list of cognitive biases: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cognitive_biases

How to persuade people to give up intutions? Devise a thought experiment where the conclusion based on the intuitions is repugnant.

I introduced this biodiversity principle in order to respect the intuitions that most people (inclding animal rights activists) have: we do not have a duty to stop a predator, even if we could. If you have better principles that are in correspondence with this intuition, you're welcome. If you'd say we have a duty to interfere in predation if we can, then even a lot of animal rights activists might have difficulties accepting this.

A lot of AR activists indeed have a problem accepting this, that's actually a big problem (from within my point of view that is). I thought for a long time whether I should even try to introduce veganism to environmentalists. The two would fit together well, weren't it for the "conservationism" thing. I think that in the long run, the conservationist meme of nature being all good is bad for sentient beings, and thus bad for veganism. (But ultimately I think the vegan movement needs momentum more desperately, and one can still try to reason with people.) There are some AR activists that are very clear and emphatic about wild animal suffering being a huge problem. Oscar Horta, David Pearce and others. ARZone has some good material on this. This is, imo, the most important ethical question of the twenty-first century.

I don't see why such a general policy that allows transplntations, would be harmful overall. Is it because people have an irrational fear to become the person who is to be sacrificed rather than one of the patients who needs organs?
Of course, if you have risk or uncertainty aversion and the technology of transplantations is not sufficiently reliable yet...

Yes, irrational fear would be one problem, another is outrage by religious people or Kantians. A third is that people might start smoking in order to be non viable for becoming a donor, in turn they become more likely to have organ failure, and you end up with a self-reinforcing loop of disaster. But it's pointless to argue practicalities when we're discussing normative ethics. I'm quite clear that, if all the practical issues where resolved and if such a policy would indeed prevent the most suffering (or violations of interests), then it should be implemented.

that's an interesting point. Anyway, we only live once, reincarnation is not scientific, so the veil of ignorance is about a one-time decision.
I don't understand your last two sentences. A near infinity of beings? Ignoring it's only for you?

Yeah, last two sentences aren't intelligible, sorry. What I meant: You are basically making the decision for every living being in your future light cone. Therefore, you have the responsibility to treat it as a decision that's made a huge number of times.

in terms of suffering, it might be that a world where predation becomes prohibited is better than a world where predation is still allowed. We can do two things now
1) for the moment we don't know what is the best world, we don't know what the consequences will be if we exterminate all predators where ever we could. If I have uncertainty aversion behind the veil of ignorance, I would prefer a world that I know, namely the one with predation still allowed.
2) if scientists find out that a world where extinction of predators would be better in terms of suffering, and if I still don't prefer such a world, I could introduce a principle about the value of biodiversity.

1) is explicit status quo bias. You certainly wouldn't want to introce MORE predation or suffering to the world, and what's the reason that the current level (in nature) is ideal?
If animals could reason, they would speak out against biodiversity. They'd oppose it vehemently. Attributing intrinsic value to biodiversity is basically valuing the human preference for aesthetics more than the suffering of hundreds of billions of sentient animals.

Also, note that obviously, the approach to decrease wild animal suffering wouldn't be to just crudely extinguish predators. There are all kinds of technical difficulties to it, and if we're unlucky, it might not even be feasible. But with immunocontraception, micro-managing, genetic engineering and other technologies, we might some day be able to solve the practical issues. And then it comes down to the all important question: Should we do it? Or should we let the world go on, implicitly playing God (as well) by saying "this is the best there is", we could intervene, but we don't want to.

What is „natural“ is by no means necessarily good.

that's certainly right. If something is natural but not necessary and is a violation of the basic right, then is is not good. Rape is natural and normal (men have developed a tool that makes them able to rape women, a lot of animals do it, our ancestors did it for thousands of years,...), but not necessary, and it violates the basic right of women. The claim is that only when something is both natural, normal and necessary, it is allowed to violate rights.[/quote]

"Natural, normal and necessary"
There's a problem with that: This approach blinds you to the question of redesigning human nature. Your ethical theory becomes agent-specific, not universal. What if we had turned out differently? What if we needed rape to survive, would it then be okay? You would be compelled to say yes, furthermore, if we could stop the rape by altering just a couple of genes, and if there were no negative side effects to this, your ethical theory would give us no reason to do this. While it should be quite obvious that such an intervention would be a very good thing in that scenario!

Those findings are interesting, but do they tell us anything about how we should act? Maybe if your approach to ethics is situational, and if you refuse to develop universal principles, then you might go with such intuitions. But as soon as you try to devise universal principles, the trolley cases lead to contradictions. Why not resolve it by concluding that our intutions cannot be rationally justified?

my idea is to stick as close as possible to people's intuitions. The intuitions are the input data. What I want is an ethical system of clear and coherent universalized ethical principles that best fit most of our strongest intuitions. So it's amixture of rationality (method of universalization and consistency) and emotion (input of intuitions,...)

We must share some core intuitions, but we don't have to share all intuitions. Intuitions can be given up, written off as irrational.

only when they make the system inconsistent...

How to persuade people to give up intutions? Devise a thought experiment where the conclusion based on the intuitions is repugnant.

funny, that's indeed the strategy that deontologists used to show that utilitarianism is wrong. The conclusion based on the intuition that we should always maximize well-being is in conflict with other strong intuitions that we feel in certain moral dilemmas

A lot of AR activists indeed have a problem accepting this, that's actually a big problem (from within my point of view that is). I thought for a long time whether I should even try to introduce veganism to environmentalists. The two would fit together well, weren't it for the "conservationism" thing. I think that in the long run, the conservationist meme of nature being all good is bad for sentient beings, and thus bad for veganism. (But ultimately I think the vegan movement needs momentum more desperately, and one can still try to reason with people.) There are some AR activists that are very clear and emphatic about wild animal suffering being a huge problem. Oscar Horta, David Pearce and others. ARZone has some good material on this. This is, imo, the most important ethical question of the twenty-first century.

I might agree with the latter.

Yes, irrational fear would be one problem, another is outrage by religious people or Kantians. A third is that people might start smoking in order to be non viable for becoming a donor,

but the probability of getting cancer from smoking is higher then the probability to be sacrificed for organs. So their choice would be irrational. How strongly do we have to listen to those irrational people?

Yeah, last two sentences aren't intelligible, sorry. What I meant: You are basically making the decision for every living being in your future light cone. Therefore, you have the responsibility to treat it as a decision that's made a huge number of times.

hmmm... tricky one... I understand your point. Suppose that 1000 beings will be incarnated in the future light cone. So now we have those 1000 people behind the veil. And then that means I (should?) do the excercice 1000 times?
One problem is that our choices influence the number of future beings.
Anyway, I am a rational self-interested person behind this veil of ignorance, and I know I will get only one life. I don't (need to) know how many beings there will be.
If you do the exercice for all beings, then that would mean it is like I will be incarnated as every being one after the other. Then it is like I live a very very long time. But even then, in my life I'm not a sum-utilitarian; I do not tend to maximise the total well-being over my life. I give some priority to avoiding terrible moments... That is also how people evaluate their well-being over a period: it is not the integral of intensity over time.

1) is explicit status quo bias.

that's uncertainty aversion, and it is not irrational.

You certainly wouldn't want to introce MORE predation or suffering to the world,

no-one is arguing for that.

Also, note that obviously, the approach to decrease wild animal suffering wouldn't be to just crudely extinguish predators. There are all kinds of technical difficulties to it, and if we're unlucky, it might not even be feasible. But with immunocontraception, micro-managing, genetic engineering and other technologies, we might some day be able to solve the practical issues. And then it comes down to the all important question: Should we do it? Or should we let the world go on, implicitly playing God (as well) by saying "this is the best there is", we could intervene, but we don't want to.

If we have all the knowledge, ok, then it might be ok to intervene.

this point also might follow from the thought experiment of impartiality (veil of ignorance). Let’s make it very simple. Suppose from behind the veil of ignorance you know that you will be born as one of three sentient beings: one predator or two prey animals. You now that the predator needs two prey in order to survive. You can now decide whether predation is allowed or not. You have to choose between two games of chance. In the first game, a world with predation, you know that the predator is going to kill and eat the two prey. You have 1/3 chance to be born as this predator and survive. So your chance to win is 1/3. In the second game, a world without predation, you know that the predator will die from starvation. But what happens with the two prey? If there are enough resources, they can both survive. But likely there are not enough resources for both. So they might start to fight until one or both of them die. Or they might overexploit the resources so that one or both of them eventually die from starvation. You don’t know what will happen, and most of all: you don’t know the probabilities for them to survive. Your chance to win is something between 2/3 (if there are enough resources for both prey) and 0 (if everyone dies).
Let’s now compare this with Ellsberg’s paradox about uncertainty aversion. An urn contains three balls of three different colors (green, blue and black). One ball is green. That’s all you know. You can now decide between two games of chance. In the first game, you win when you draw the green ball. In the second, you win when you draw a blue ball. The analogy with the predation problem should now become clear: As in the predation situation, playing the first game means you have a probability 1/3 to win. In the second, your chances are between 0 and 2/3. If you have uncertainty aversion, you’d prefer to play the first game, because in that game you at least know your chances to win.
Most people have uncertainty aversion, and this might already justify the choice of a world with predation. tat's ok with me. But I slightly prefer a more principle based ethics...

"Natural, normal and necessary"
There's a problem with that: This approach blinds you to the question of redesigning human nature. Your ethical theory becomes agent-specific, not universal.

how do you mean?

What if we had turned out differently? What if we needed rape to survive, would it then be okay? You would be compelled to say yes,

indeed: if rape is normal, natural and necessary, than it is allowed, because otherwise we (all beings that need to rape to survive, and that's quite a lot because rape was considered normal) would all die. Now, if you still don't want women to be raped, you might add that all female sentient beings with special mental capacities (rationality, self-consciousness) are still not allowed to be raped.

furthermore, if we could stop the rape by altering just a couple of genes, and if there were no negative side effects to this, your ethical theory would give us no reason to do this. While it should be quite obvious that such an intervention would be a very good thing in that scenario!

that's a good point indeed. So if we could genetically modify lions that they can survive without hunting, that might be ok.

I notice that risk aversion plays a very strong role in your arguments. I think that's smart when it comes to practical considerations, but I don't think risk aversion should operate on a normative level. If we do hypotheticals where the consequences are specified, there's no place for risk aversion.

As for the veil of ignorance, we should keep in mind that it's just an "intuition pump", not some ultimate principle that ethics must be based on. That's why I think the decision behind the veil should be impartial. Also, even if we play the game with being selfish behind the veil, would risk aversion really be the smart thing to do? I don't even think so.

my idea is to stick as close as possible to people's intuitions. The intuitions are the input data. What I want is an ethical system of clear and coherent universalized ethical principles that best fit most of our strongest intuitions. So it's amixture of rationality (method of universalization and consistency) and emotion (input of intuitions,...)

I see that, my point is that the input data is systematically biased towards gene survival and doesn't likely result in what's best for sentient beings. So I think if use unfiltered intuitions, you'll get stuck in some arbitrary valleys, unfortunate ways in which evolution has shaped our intuitions.

How to persuade people to give up intutions? Devise a thought experiment where the conclusion based on the intuitions is repugnant.

funny, that's indeed the strategy that deontologists used to show that utilitarianism is wrong. The conclusion based on the intuition that we should always maximize well-being is in conflict with other strong intuitions that we feel in certain moral dilemmas

Yes, it's a viable strategy. But not if you apply it wrongly. Can deontologists give good reasons why it would be wrong to push the fat man from the bridge in the trolley problem? The fact that the particular environment our ancestors evolved in -- small social groups -- led to the evolution of an aversion to killing of group members through physical contact, is hardly a good reason as to why we should let these intuitions trump all other considerations! It's much easier to kill people if you just have to push a button or pull a switch, as it's done in modern warfare. But does the killing suddenly become less bad?

Having said that, I'd like to emphasize that even deontologist vegans should imo reach the conclusion that compassionate intervention in nature is desirable. (Unfortunately, people like Francione are dogmatically against it, in fact, Francione explicitly states that there's no duty to help beings in suffering, you're basically perfect if you just abstain from causing harm. That ideology is the reason why there are so many self-righteous and "purist" vegans out there, but I'm getting off topic...)

but the probability of getting cancer from smoking is higher then the probability to be sacrificed for organs. So their choice would be irrational. How strongly do we have to listen to those irrational people?

Bernard Williams, in a critique of utilitarianism, suggested that utilitarianism should ignore irrational emotions. But that's nonsense. We should of course try to change them and educate people to be more rational, but when it's not working, you gotta deal with what there is. Bad feelings are bad feelings and suffering is suffering, no matter whether it's rational or irrational.

If you do the exercice for all beings, then that would mean it is like I will be incarnated as every being one after the other. Then it is like I live a very very long time. But even then, in my life I'm not a sum-utilitarian; I do not tend to maximise the total well-being over my life. I give some priority to avoiding terrible moments... That is also how people evaluate their well-being over a period: it is not the integral of intensity over time.

(There are views in philosophy of mind, i.e. open individualism, that suggest that there's no objective criterion for "personal identity". I don't know whether that's true, it certainly sounds quite esoteric, but there are interesting thought experiments having to do with duplication and teleportation, and the 3dimensionality of space time, that make me wonder whether there's a point to it. So even if I'm selfish, I'd assume a non-zero probability for utilitarianism being in "my" very interest.)

Preference utilitarianism fits perfectly for how people act in life. Kind of by definition actually.

If we have all the knowledge, ok, then it might be ok to intervene.

Great to see that you're open to the possibility! Certainly no one is seriously advocating to rush through with things if it is likely going to mess things up. There are huge technical difficulties. But people also tend to understimate the power of exponential growth in technology and knowledge..

this point also might follow from the thought experiment of impartiality (veil of ignorance). Let’s make it very simple. Suppose from behind the veil of ignorance you know that you will be born as one of three sentient beings: one predator or two prey animals.

This reminds me of Oscar Horta's paper "Disvalue in Nature and Intervention (The fox, the rabbit and the vegan food rations)". http://masalladelaespecie.files.wordpre ... ention.pdf

In the second game, a world without predation, you know that the predator will die from starvation. But what happens with the two prey? If there are enough resources, they can both survive. But likely there are not enough resources for both. So they might start to fight until one or both of them die. Or they might overexploit the resources so that one or both of them eventually die from starvation. You don’t know what will happen, and most of all: you don’t know the probabilities for them to survive. Your chance to win is something between 2/3 (if there are enough resources for both prey) and 0 (if everyone dies).
Let’s now compare this with Ellsberg’s paradox about uncertainty aversion. [...]
Most people have uncertainty aversion, and this might already justify the choice of a world with predation. tat's ok with me. But I slightly prefer a more principle based ethics...

Of course we would be very cautious to make sure that we will know what happens, and that we make sure that there'll be enough food for the remaining predators, and that their populations will be regulated humanely and so on.

Additionally, you can't just point out "uncertainty!" and then apply uncertainty aversion as a reason to favor the status quo. It's crucial to the equation that you compare possible losses to possible gains, (weighed by their expected probabilities). Even if there's uncertainty about the exact probabilities, it can well be the case that there's little to loose and everything to gain. If we let wild animal suffering count ethically, the world becomes suddenly very miserable. How much do we have to lose? Can it really get much worse? On the other hand, we have a lot to gain.

"Natural, normal and necessary"
There's a problem with that: This approach blinds you to the question of redesigning human nature. Your ethical theory becomes agent-specific, not universal.

how do you mean?

This is connected to the example I gave about rape and the hypotethical genetic cure for it. If you use the above ethical principle, you'll end up with different codes of behavior for agents with different biologies. Like, if there are aliens that have different intutions and behaviors, you'd be saying that they should just do whatever their biology tells them to, at least if it is necessary. But: Certainly not all biological make-ups are equally efficient and equal likely to lead to happiness. By adhering to the above principles, you're forfeiting the possibility of ever improve one nature. Your ethical theory then contains a very arbitrary variable called "human nature", and that's not a good thing imo.

furthermore, if we could stop the rape by altering just a couple of genes, and if there were no negative side effects to this, your ethical theory would give us no reason to do this. While it should be quite obvious that such an intervention would be a very good thing in that scenario!

that's a good point indeed. So if we could genetically modify lions that they can survive without hunting, that might be ok.

Yeah, that's my point exactly, we should stay open-minded for such kinds of interventions.
Some people are suggesting that this could be done in the future, reprogramming predators. But they wouldn't be completely "natural" after that anymore, would that be a problem? Not to me. Even the Bible talks about the paradise where animals don't eat each other..

I notice that risk aversion plays a very strong role in your arguments. I think that's smart when it comes to practical considerations, but I don't think risk aversion should operate on a normative level. If we do hypotheticals where the consequences are specified, there's no place for risk aversion.

I have four intuitions, coupled in pairs:
1) impartiality (veil of ignarance) with high but not absolute need for safety (high but not maximum risk aversion)
2) empathy (gives priority to the worst-off individuals) with low but not zero need for efficiency
These two cohere with each other, so i'm fine with that. And I'm glad to see that other people share those intuitions.

As for the veil of ignorance, we should keep in mind that it's just an "intuition pump", not some ultimate principle that ethics must be based on. That's why I think the decision behind the veil should be impartial. Also, even if we play the game with being selfish behind the veil, would risk aversion really be the smart thing to do? I don't even think so.

would risk neutrality be, if you know that you could be the individual in the worst-off position, who does now get even worse off? Both risk neutrality and aversion are equally rational.
All ultimate principles are based on some intuitions.

I see that, my point is that the input data is systematically biased towards gene survival and doesn't likely result in what's best for sentient beings. So I think if use unfiltered intuitions, you'll get stuck in some arbitrary valleys, unfortunate ways in which evolution has shaped our intuitions.

well, so is the intuition behind utilitarianism. Happines is correlated with satisfying needs, which is correletad with survival. that is a reaso why we prefer things that generate happines. Maximizing happines for people who share our genes, means that we maximize their need satisfaction, and hence also maximize vital need satisfaction... So utilitarianism is actually a clear example of an ethic rooted in biology. Not that that is a problem. But biology also seems to make things more complex. Not that that is a problem...

Yes, it's a viable strategy. But not if you apply it wrongly. Can deontologists give good reasons why it would be wrong to push the fat man from the bridge in the trolley problem?

what about reasons like respect? It is not respectful to treat someone as merely means...
Aren't they as good as utilitarian reasons? (well, I think utilitarian reasons are a bit better, because for them we can give more arguments, based on different moral feelings and intuitions, such as empathy and impartiality. But still, for me those deontological intuitions behind the basic right principle are felt too strong, and I have too many of them which cohere with each other. So I can't help it. Too many data pointing in the same direction, and at least one argument to take those data seriously...)

The fact that the particular environment our ancestors evolved in -- small social groups -- led to the evolution of an aversion to killing of group members through physical contact, is hardly a good reason as to why we should let these intuitions trump all other considerations!

I doubt whether that is the case. The persons on the track might equally belong to the ingroup as the fat man on the bridge. Gene survival rate would be five times higher if individuals were used as means.

It's much easier to kill people if you just have to push a button or pull a switch, as it's done in modern warfare. But does the killing suddenly become less bad?

That intuition or feeling is not the explanation of the trolley dilemma, because we can make the bridge dilemma more impersonnal if you like... Push a button to turn over the bridge...

Having said that, I'd like to emphasize that even deontologist vegans should imo reach the conclusion that compassionate intervention in nature is desirable. (Unfortunately, people like Francione are dogmatically against it, in fact, Francione explicitly states that there's no duty to help beings in suffering, you're basically perfect if you just abstain from causing harm. That ideology is the reason why there are so many self-righteous and "purist" vegans out there, but I'm getting off topic...)

I also disagree with francione on that point. He only focusses on the basic right, not on the prioritarian justice part.

Great to see that you're open to the possibility! Certainly no one is seriously advocating to rush through with things if it is likely going to mess things up. There are huge technical difficulties. But people also tend to understimate the power of exponential growth in technology and knowledge..

and people also tend to underestimate the complexities of nature. Who might think that killing predators in the sea might result in suffocation of land animals?
But yes, the complexity of nature is not growing exponantially (or at least not as fast) so the curves might cross at one point...

This reminds me of Oscar Horta's paper "Disvalue in Nature and Intervention (The fox, the rabbit and the vegan food rations)". http://masalladelaespecie.files.wordpre ... ention.pdf

that's an easy one. For the fox it was not necessary to kill the rabbit. When I think about the predation problem, I think about complete extinction of all predators.

This is connected to the example I gave about rape and the hypotethical genetic cure for it. If you use the above ethical principle, you'll end up with different codes of behavior for agents with different biologies. Like, if there are aliens that have different intutions and behaviors, you'd be saying that they should just do whatever their biology tells them to, at least if it is necessary. But: Certainly not all biological make-ups are equally efficient and equal likely to lead to happiness. By adhering to the above principles, you're forfeiting the possibility of ever improve one nature. Your ethical theory then contains a very arbitrary variable called "human nature", and that's not a good thing imo.

I disagree with the latter. the principles that I presented do not need to refer to human nature. Neither to primate nature or dry nosed ape nature. It looks at the individuals, what they need in order to survive.

Yeah, that's my point exactly, we should stay open-minded for such kinds of interventions.
Some people are suggesting that this could be done in the future, reprogramming predators. But they wouldn't be completely "natural" after that anymore, would that be a problem? Not to me.

it's a good question. Does biodiversity decrease if we replaced predators by genetically modified predators? I don't know. Anyway, suppose the plan for complete intervention might be feasible and work. I would say that in that case, the principle to decrease suffering would trump the biodiversity principle (because the latter is not even clear). But if everyone says that biodiversity has more intrinsic value and is really lost if we manipulate predators, I would not strongly resist. I would simply invite for more thinking on this. I can see that whatever we choose, each choice can be consistent with a consistent ethics. It's as if we have two consistent physical theories about the world, and we lack good data to determine which theory best fits the data. My data (intuitions) on this issue are unreliable for the moment, so we might need to do more (thought) experiments... Perhaps we should first need to genetically manipulate the animals so that they can speak and think about it as well

good night

I'm glad that it looks like our differing ethical views seem to lead to very similar practical consequences. I won't respond all the details, just a couple of comments on the most important points I tried to make:

I see that, my point is that the input data is systematically biased towards gene survival and doesn't likely result in what's best for sentient beings. So I think if use unfiltered intuitions, you'll get stuck in some arbitrary valleys, unfortunate ways in which evolution has shaped our intuitions.

well, so is the intuition behind utilitarianism. Happines is correlated with satisfying needs, which is correletad with survival. that is a reaso why we prefer things that generate happines. Maximizing happines for people who share our genes, means that we maximize their need satisfaction, and hence also maximize vital need satisfaction... So utilitarianism is actually a clear example of an ethic rooted in biology. Not that that is a problem. But biology also seems to make things more complex. Not that that is a problem...

Gene survival determines WHAT makes us happy or unhappy, and in that sense, there's some arbitrariness to it. But utilitarianism doesn't state: "Do the things that make Homo sapiens happy!". It states: "Act as to maximize the surplus of happiness over suffering", or preference utilitarianism: "act as to fulfill the most preferences" (or negative utilitarianism: "minimize suffering"). That's a big difference! So utilitarianism does not rely on the arbitrariness of genes, the only "empirical" thing it depends on is that suffering is intrinsically bad. And well, if someone disagrees, they should put their finger on a table and whack it with a hammer, then we'll talk again. I don't think there's a single more obvious fact ethics should be based on than the fact that suffering is bad.

The fact that the particular environment our ancestors evolved in -- small social groups -- led to the evolution of an aversion to killing of group members through physical contact, is hardly a good reason as to why we should let these intuitions trump all other considerations!

I doubt whether that is the case. The persons on the track might equally belong to the ingroup as the fat man on the bridge. Gene survival rate would be five times higher if individuals were used as means.

There's a misunderstanding. Sorry my comment there was very brief and the issue is somewhat complex. The point about ingroup is irrelevant for the trolley situation, I just wrote it because, while humans do have an aversion to killing, this aversion can, unfortunately, easily be overcome by adopting an "us vs. them" mentality. In modern society, most people have come to accept that all humans belong to the ingroup.
Indivduals obviously never think consciously about gene survival, evolution works by hard-wiring intuitons ("rules of thumb") into us. There weren't any trolleys in the ancestral environment, so utilitarian situations didn't really arise. What probably arised often, however, were situations of conflict or opportunity, where killing a member initially seems like a good idea. But because shunning mechanisms evolved and basic moral codes (I think chimpanzees have some of that too, actually!), most people developped an aversion to killing, and the aversion is stronger (because it rests on emotions) than rational thinking. The important point is the following: Had there been many trolleys in the ancestral environment, and had it been comon that people (who are significantly related in order for kin selection to kick in) would get trapped on tracks, and had there occasionally been fat men on bridges, we'd all have utilitarian intuitions now! So: Intuitions are too arbitrary, let's try to focus on what's more certain, namely that suffering is bad.

that's an easy one. For the fox it was not necessary to kill the rabbit. When I think about the predation problem, I think about complete extinction of all predators.

Many vegans would be really surprised and puzzled if they read this paper. And many of them would probably come up with (bad?) reasons why they disagree with the conclusions. But I too think it's an easy one. And maybe it will be possible to sidetrack the predator problem by reprogramming them. Even though I think it wouldn't be bad if all predators went extinct, I don't see why species membership should suddenly become an ethically relevant criterion when it comes to biodiversity. Humans are the only animals on earth that are even capable of understanding the concept of "species", why should our appreciation of it -- a purely aestethetic value -- be worth more than the suffering of billions of prey animals?

Does biodiversity decrease if we replaced predators by genetically modified predators? I don't know. Anyway, suppose the plan for complete intervention might be feasible and work. I would say that in that case, the principle to decrease suffering would trump the biodiversity principle (because the latter is not even clear). But if everyone says that biodiversity has more intrinsic value and is really lost if we manipulate predators, I would not strongly resist. I would simply invite for more thinking on this.

Great, I think it's very important that more thinking is done into that direction, and that people realize there's an important question here. I would however be careful mentioning the issue to non vegans, they might think you're crazy when you talk about stuff that sounds too outlandish, and then they'll think that veganism altogether is crazy. Before people understand the problem with speciesism, it's not really effective to talk about issues further down the road.

"I would not strongly resist" -- Haha, I'd give 'em hell! Argumentatively, that is

Gene survival determines WHAT makes us happy or unhappy, and in that sense, there's some arbitrariness to it. But utilitarianism doesn't state: "Do the things that make Homo sapiens happy!".

that is correct. Gene survival says: do the things that make others with similar genes (and who can procreate) happy. It doesn't say that all and only Homo sapiens are the ones with similar genes. Now, utilitarianism says nearly the same as what gene survival says, only it drops the "with similar genes" part.

The important point is the following: Had there been many trolleys in the ancestral environment, and had it been comon that people (who are significantly related in order for kin selection to kick in) would get trapped on tracks, and had there occasionally been fat men on bridges, we'd all have utilitarian intuitions now!

I might perhaps add: and if we happened to push those fat man and our plan of saving the five worked very well most of the time...

So: Intuitions are too arbitrary, let's try to focus on what's more certain, namely that suffering is bad.

this needs more reflection. That suffering is bad, is an intuition that I have. It's a strong one. But yes, it is also arbitrary, because we have three kinds: good, bad and neutral. So now, to which one do we couple the notion "suffering? How to decide without using your intuition? Suppose you were blind, and I say that there are three colours: red, green and blue. Now I ask you: and grass, is it red, green or blue? How would you be able to decide, if you could not rely on data (observations,...)?

Even though I think it wouldn't be bad if all predators went extinct, I don't see why species membership should suddenly become an ethically relevant criterion when it comes to biodiversity.

we do not have to refer to species membership, neither to genus membership, infra order membership class membership or any othet biological membership. These biological classiufications are abstract and arbitrary. But biodiversity is real. I'm not talking about intrinsic values of species. Compare with well-being: that is real, and it has intrinsic value. Now, if I squeeze your little finger, your well-being drops. But that doesn't mean that your left little finger has intrinsic value. That would be arbitrary and farfetched indeed.

Humans are the only animals on earth that are even capable of understanding the concept of "species", why should our appreciation of it -- a purely aestethetic value -- be worth more than the suffering of billions of prey animals?

apart from my intuition that gives intrinsic value to biodiversity, I don't know.
I do know that it is not aesthetic value, because I give also intrinsic value to future biodiversity, even after I die, even after all aestheticists are dead.

that is correct. Gene survival says: do the things that make others with similar genes (and who can procreate) happy. It doesn't say that all and only Homo sapiens are the ones with similar genes. Now, utilitarianism says nearly the same as what gene survival says, only it drops the "with similar genes" part.

Gene survival isn't about making others happy, it's about making them (related individuals) procreate, and mainly, it's about procreating yourself. That often leads to stress instead of happiness. Sure, the two coincide often as well, but the reasoning behind utilitarianism is very different.

this needs more reflection. That suffering is bad, is an intuition that I have. It's a strong one. But yes, it is also arbitrary, because we have three kinds: good, bad and neutral. So now, to which one do we couple the notion "suffering? How to decide without using your intuition? Suppose you were blind, and I say that there are three colours: red, green and blue. Now I ask you: and grass, is it red, green or blue? How would you be able to decide, if you could not rely on data (observations,...)?

Is it an intuition? If your finger gets crushed with a hammer, or when you put your hand in a candle flame, or when you lose a loved one, do you rely on intuitions to figure out that that's bad? Every sentient being avoids suffering. I even agree with you that this is an empiric discovery though, if someone can't suffer, he won't necessarily understand how it would be bad (as with your color example). But that goes away as soon as he would experience it himself.

that is correct. Gene survival says: do the things that make others with similar genes (and who can procreate) happy.

of course, but genes created us so that behaviour that is good for procreation of genes, makes us happy.
But things got more complicated of course... I was exagerating But still genes programmed us so we would be happy when we do things that helps the genes procreate.

It doesn't say that all and only Homo sapiens are the ones with similar genes.

indeed, that it doesn't say

Is it an intuition? If your finger gets crushed with a hammer, or when you put your hand in a candle flame, or when you lose a loved one, do you rely on intuitions to figure out that that's bad?

I could say that morality does not exist, that I am a rational egoist, and that results in contractarianism. But that doesn't say suffering in general is morally bad. It is something I dislike. Now, of course I don't defend rational egoism and contractarianism, because my intuition also say that impartiality is important. And I mean impartiality behond the contractors in contractarianism. That is an intuition, I cannot further justify it and convince a rational egoist with arguments. To move from contractarianism to utilitarianism, you need intuitions (that some people donet have). I am lucky that you also value impartiality.

This doesn't make sense to me. Isn't it the other way around?

It starts with the personal observation that suffering is bad. If a being enjoys suffering, it wouldn't be "suffering" for the being, so this is a universal fact. And then one can start thinking ethically: It can't just be the case that suffering is bad because it is "my" suffering, why only choose particular locations in space-time while ignoring all the others where there's suffe ring too? Combined, this leads to the obvious axiom that suffering is bad. And from that, consequentialism follows. Intuitions are needed to get AWAY from utilitarianism, look at all the intuitions you listed!

"Extra consideration for worst off"
"Not as a means"
"Biodiversity"

That's all leading away from utilitarianism, while utilitarianism would be the first step. And then we should ask whether these other intuitions are justified. (Admittedly, Kant found another "first step" that's quite different from utilitarianism, but are you familiar with the reasoning he used? He just postulated that there's teleology in nature, haha.) Every time one adds something that's supposed to be "intrinsically valuable" to an ethical system, one is willing to accept some amount of suffering for it that would otherwise be unnecessary.

Saying "utilitarianism is based on intuitions too" is kinda like saying "atheism is based on faith / is a religion". For the definitions of the terms that seem relevant here, neither is the case.

(Which doesn't a priori make utilitarianism best, it could well be the case that intuitions are valuable somehow, or that they point us towards something were further thinking will let us conclude that we should go there. But my point is that the burden of proof rests on non consequentialist positions, and that this burden has not been met. Instead, people just use the same "objections" all the time and act as if they were somehow decisive, while the utilitarians will happily bite all the bullets.)

This doesn't make sense to me. Isn't it the other way around?

It starts with the personal observation that suffering is bad. If a being enjoys suffering, it wouldn't be "suffering" for the being, so this is a universal fact.

I agree that it's a fact that I don't like suffering

And then one can start thinking ethically: It can't just be the case that suffering is bad because it is "my" suffering, why only choose particular locations in space-time while ignoring all the others where there's suffe ring too?

well, here comes the intuitions into play. We both share the intuition that ethics is important and that it involves impartiality and universalization, that we do not want to sticjh to particulars and ignore others,.... That's all intuition.
And as I explained in my text, there comes a second intuition: simplicity (and a third: efficiency), to take the sum of well-beings. Now, why the sum? In my unified theory of justice, I showed that there can be a factor Q. Why taking Q = +1 and not any other real number? For simplicity and efficiency, I would say. but that's all intuition, I cannot argue that further. I might add that when I look at my life, I try to maximize the sum of my momentarily well-beings (integral of intensity over lifespan). But actually I don't do that.

Combined, this leads to the obvious axiom that suffering is bad. And from that, consequentialism follows. Intuitions are needed to get AWAY from utilitarianism, look at all the intuitions you listed!

"Extra consideration for worst off"
"Not as a means"
"Biodiversity"

You could say you'd prefer parsimony, and that you want to stick to the intuitions behind sum-utilitarianism (impartaility, simplicity and efficiency). Of course that's consistent. But to me, my intuitions are like observational data in science. Of course I can come up with a very simple and consistent theory: the law of gravity. That fits well with my observation that I just dropped my book. But that doesn't fit well with all observations.

That's all leading away from utilitarianism, while utilitarianism would be the first step.

So I could introduce new forces, that lead away from a theory of gravity

And then we should ask whether these other intuitions are justified.

that's always a good question. Perhaps I was hallucinating when I played with that magnet...

Saying "utilitarianism is based on intuitions too" is kinda like saying "atheism is based on faith / is a religion". For the definitions of the terms that seem relevant here, neither is the case.

one could say that atheism is based on intuitions or the faith that values parsimony and consistency. You have to acceot these values (unless you give good arguments not to do so) But note that most theists also value these things, but they are not consistent in that. You can clearly see that all theists are inconsistent atheists, because a person who believes in god does not believe on Krishna, Boeddha, Quetzal, Wodan, Thor, Apollo, Zeus, Zoroaster,... So he is 99,999999% atheist.
Note also that faith in values like parsimony and consistency is not a faith in a factual property of the world. But it s something that they cannot further justify (except perhaps that it "works", but then they have to justify "works"...)

Anyway, I'm still not convinced that utilitarianism is not based on intuitions. I hope to find an ethics not based on intuitions, but not found one yet.

Ah, you see impartiality as an intuition.. Okay, maybe one can view it that way. It certainly makes things much easier when one's talking ethics with people who have a desire for impartiality, or who take it for granted that ethics is about that. When you're talking with ethical egoists, it gets much more complicated. I'm not saying it's impossible to convince someone who lacks the "intuition" that ethics should be impartial, but it's certainly very difficult and, while I do have some strategies, I'm not yet fully satisfied on that front.

The point still stands though that utilitarianism is straightforward, and that other theories better come up with good reasons why they want to go "further" than utilitarianism. All major ethical theories value impartiality as well, so utilitarianism still seems the least arbitrary view. And you keep talking about intuitions as "data", but haven't I given a good argument as to why the data is systematically biased / flawed in many cases?

Ah, you see impartiality as an intuition.. Okay, maybe one can view it that way. It certainly makes things much easier when one's talking ethics with people who have a desire for impartiality, or who take it for granted that ethics is about that. When you're talking with ethical egoists, it gets much more complicated. I'm not saying it's impossible to convince someone who lacks the "intuition" that ethics should be impartial, but it's certainly very difficult and, while I do have some strategies, I'm not yet fully satisfied on that front.

The point still stands though that utilitarianism is straightforward,

straightforward in the sense of most parsimonious, I agree.

and that other theories better come up with good reasons why they want to go "further" than utilitarianism. All major ethical theories value impartiality as well, so utilitarianism still seems the least arbitrary view.

true, if you consider intuitions not as data. But if you consider a physical theory that includes gravity and magnetism is more arbitrary than only gravity, and that the magnet introduced a strange arbitrary element...

And you keep talking about intuitions as "data", but haven't I given a good argument as to why the data is systematically biased / flawed in many cases?

they can be, just like observations can be. At the end, my goal is a coherent reflective equilibrium; a theory of clear and coherent universalized principles that best fits strongest moral intuitions, without adding too many arbitrary elements. But of course, it depends on what you prefer: the more you add principles to match with intuitions, the more arbitrary you might say. But at least the principles that I gave, are clear and testable, and I've tested them and they satisfy very well my intuitions in moral dilemmas and thought experiments.