I don't really see a factual disagreement between
Xris's position that the event of the Big Bang and material particles are not factual on the one hand, and
Wooden shoe's notion of these "facts" as regulative ideas or
A Poster He or I's notion of "facts" as aspects of models or
Insext notion of "facts" as pragmatic results or
Belinda's notion of "facts" in context of explanation, on the other hand. I think the disagreement is verbal (and unfortunately in some cases, attitudinal).
I think everyone would agree that it's not very useful to suppose that there is such a thing as a fact that is not fallible, as Peirce would put it. I think
Xris would agree that the current state of scientific understanding will continue to evolve, and what are considered facts at present are subject to revision.
Norwood Russell Hanson's example of
facts being theory dependent is a striking example of the difficulty of understanding what constitutes a scientific fact:
Hanson wrote:Do Kepler and Tycho see the same thing in the east as dawn? (Norwood Russell Hanson's
Patterns of Discovery, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1958, 5)
We say it's a fact that the sun rises in the morning, but it's also a fact that it's the earth that turns so the sun couldn't really rise.
Or why is it a fact before 2006 that Pluto is a planet, but Pluto is no longer a planet after that date. The notion of "fact" turns on linguistic behavior, in this case the definition of "planet" and of "dwarf planet" by the International Astronomical Union.
So a fact is perhaps thought of as a paraphrase of true statement. And a statement is considered true or false in reference to contextual statements. (This is in part what is meant in the claim that facts are theory dependent).
For example, for everyday purposes, if I say the ruler I hold in my hand is 30 cm long, is this statement not a
fact if it's actual length is not exactly 30 cm? Since it's actual length depends on temperature, pressure, coefficient of expansion, and so forth, the length would vary somewhat depending upon the conditions under which it is observed. We can introduce the notion of standard conditions, but again this makes the fact of the ruler's length a linguistic artifact somewhat like the definition of "planet."
Moreover, since the length of the ruler varies over time, we really don't want to conclude that the length of the ruler is relative so the ruler doesn't really have a real length.
The notion of the nature of subatomic particles or the notion of the occurrence of a big bang have something more than the notion of some sort of pragmatic truths as being "useful fictions," as Nietzsche put it.
However, to conclude that no facts exist is to throw the baby out with the bathwater. It makes sense to view a fact as a true statement, and true statements ought be regarded as provisional truths, depending upon currently available evidence.