Hume and the is / ought problem

What I would like to accomplish here is a proper understanding of Hume's is ought problem. I'm not really interested (right now) in potential solutions to the problem, just whether I am correctly interpreting Hume's analysis of descriptive and evaluative statements. Please feel free to offer your thoughts on what needs to clarified, added, etc.

In the Treatise of Human Nature Book I Part I, Hume states:

In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark’d that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs, when of a sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, ‘tis necessary that it shou’d be observ’d and explain’d; and at the same time that a reason shou’d be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.

According to Hume, evaluative ought statements can not derive from descriptive statements or statements of fact. For example:

P1. The cat is in pain

C1. We should alleviate the cat's pain

According to Hume's analysis, a premise is missing in order for the argument to be valid. To do so we would need to insert the following premise:

P1. The cat is pain

P2. If something is in pain, we should alleviate that pain.

C1. So, we should alleviate the cat's pain.

The argument is now valid, but whether the argument is sound is debatable. Hume thought that the conditional statement in P2 is asserted but not deducible from P1. Observation alone does not provide us with knowledge of moral values. We may be able to know facts about the world based on observation, but how we observe what we should or ought to do is unclear. No matter how long you stare, smell, or listen to a cat in pain you won't be able to observe any "ought" or "should". Hence Hume argues values are "imperceptible". So simply put, how do we get the …should" from the …is"? Unless one is able to justify the necessary condition in P2, Hume's objection has to be taken seriously.

This is how I characterize Hume's is ought problem. The fundamental problem, it seems, is whether normative value is "imperceptible". In a narrow sense I take impereptible to mean empirically verifiable (according to Hume's empirical verificationism). In a wide sense I take "imperceptible" to mean epistemicly justified.

Is this a correct understanding of what Hume has to say? Any help/clarification would be great!

I don't have anything to add since your explanation is correct and clearly stated.

As I recall, Hume concludes that "ought" cannot be derived from "is" because there are only two ways to prove things:

[1] relations of ideas (logic and definition) and
[2] matters of fact (empirical observation).

Statements with "ought" are not of either kind and so for this reason are not reducible to either manner of knowing.

I don't have anything to add since your explanation is correct and clearly stated.

As I recall, Hume concludes that "ought" cannot be derived from "is" because there are only two ways to prove things:

[1] relations of ideas (logic and definition) and
[2] matters of fact (empirical observation).

Statements with "ought" are not of either kind and so for this reason are not reducible to either manner of knowing.

Hello and thanks for contributing. As obvious as it is I really should have included Hume's basic epistemology in the OP. In these terms I think Hume would say we have no idea of an "ought" since we only observe states of affairs followed by other states of affairs. No matter how inclined we are to think that alleviating someone in agony is something we ought to do, that we should do it, epistemicly speaking we have lack justification for normative concepts like "ought."

So it seems to me the is ought problem really turns on what we normatively mean by "ought". If we should do anything, or if there is anything we have good reason to do, we have to have a fact to which gives us a reason to do so. I don't want to get into potential soultions (I have my own) but this is the basic crux of the problem the way I see it. What do you think?

So it seems to me the is ought problem really turns on what we normatively mean by "ought".

One possible suggestion might be to define "ought" in terms of what's "moral," and next define "moral."

So the terms "moral" and "immoral" might be defined in non-normative terms such as actions which have the probability of helping others or ourselves and "immoral" as those actions which will probably harm oneself or others. "Nonmoral" matters would be anything that does not either help or harm human beings. (Almost any action affects others or ourselves in some manner.)

So a problem of moral concern could be non-normatively defined any problem which has the potential to help or harm anyone and/or oneself.

"Help" and "harm" then can be defined in terms of a naturalistic ethics, Aristotelian ethics, ethics of self-realization, "flow," mindfulness, harmony of ends, or some such empirically definable state of a human being.

So, for example, it might be claimed that we ought do that action most probably productive of that state of being -- this would probably end up with an ethics much like a virtue ethics with "knowledge" being defined as "good." The more one has (practical) knowledge, the more likely it is that one will make the "right" decisions.

This is just a sketch, but I think a plausible ethical system could be built from this outline.

I wondered if Hume as historian is concerned with trying not to let his interpretation which is inevitably coloured by his moral preconceptions, affect his rendering of historical facts .Hume's concern with causality could be attributed to the same motive, that of a trustworthy historian calling into question the very glue o narrative explanations.

Being moral are the actions that avoiding harm, and promote benefit.

Does the cat benefit from being in pain, no, highly unlikely. That is why it is moral to alleviate the cats pain.

The above dowhat1can has already sugested. To add to this I share my moral system.

Apply golden rule.+Apply principal of universality.+Promote benefits, reduce harm.+Be logically consistent.= Then you have morality.