Another argument for the existence of the mind

1. Names are rigid designators.
2. If R and R1 are both rigid designators which have the same reference (that is, that they are identical), then R and R1 are necessarily identical.
3. 'Mind' and 'Brain' are both rigid designators.
4. 'Mind' and 'Brain' are not necessarily identical.
C: Therefore, 'Mind' and 'Brain' do not have the same reference and are not identical.

1. Names are rigid designators.
2. If R and R1 are both rigid designators which have the same reference (that is, that they are identical), then R and R1 are necessarily identical.
3. 'Mind' and 'Brain' are both rigid designators.
4. 'Mind' and 'Brain' are not necessarily identical.
C: Therefore, 'Mind' and 'Brain' do not have the same reference and are not identical.

Kripke!

"C: Therefore, 'Mind' and 'Brain' do not have the same reference and are not identical," necessarily.

I always felt I wasn't identical. Now I understand why. Neither side could figure out what the other side was up to which often caused mutual suspicion and little cooperation...a situation in which I'm caught in the middle! Oh Woe!!

[Scott]

Of course the word mind and the word brain do not refer to the same exact thing. Otherwise I could conclude that, because my brain weighs roughly 3lbs, my mind weighs 3lbs. Anyone would suggest such a thing is clearly using the terms in a very idiosyncratic way.

Needless to say, this has little impact on the field of the philosophy of mind or metaphysics, since monism, materialists and physics do not claim such a thing as the word brain is rigidly synonymous with the word mind, and dualists and all claim a lot more than simply the word mind refers to something different than the word brain.

1. Names are rigid designators.
2. If R and R1 are both rigid designators which have the same reference (that is, that they are identical), then R and R1 are necessarily identical.
3. 'Mind' and 'Brain' are both rigid designators.
4. 'Mind' and 'Brain' are not necessarily identical.
C: Therefore, 'Mind' and 'Brain' do not have the same reference and are not identical.

How is this an argument for the EXISTENCE of minds? Does this argument also work with "God"? Does it work with "Santa Claus"? Does it work with "Pegasus"? Obviously not. And your argument doesn't work either.

You're attempting to argue from the (true) premise that there is a term "mind" to the conclusion that minds exist. The main objection is that you've begged the entire question. And, funny enough, you left out a premise in your argument, one which you need for validity, and this is the premise: "Mind" and "Brain" are names.

You seem to think that for a name to designate rigidly implies that it designates something real. So, by your lights, if I accept that "Mind" and "God" are indeed names, then I'm thereby accepting that there are minds and that there is a God. But this isn't part of Kripke's argument, which you're obviously borrowing. Rigid designation simply means that a name picks out the same individual across all possible worlds irrespective of the descriptions applicable to him in any given possible world. So, the name "Wittgenstein" picks out the guy we all have come to love and learn about, and it picks him out in every possible world in which that very guy exists -- even if that very guy, in any given possible world (including the actual one) never did philosophy, never wrote a book, never played the piano, never brandished a poker, etc. Kripke's argument was to say that if names are tacit definite descriptions, then the descriptions would have to apply to that very guy in every possible world in which he exists, and thus would be necessary properties of that guy, because that's the definition of 'necessity' in possible worlds semantics. You've misapplying Kripke's argument. I also think you don't really understand his argument, but certainly you haven't given an argument for the existence of minds.

1. Names are rigid designators.
2. If R and R1 are both rigid designators which have the same reference (that is, that they are identical), then R and R1 are necessarily identical.
3. 'Mind' and 'Brain' are both rigid designators.
4. 'Mind' and 'Brain' are not necessarily identical.
C: Therefore, 'Mind' and 'Brain' do not have the same reference and are not identical.

How is this an argument for the EXISTENCE of minds? If a term is a name only in so far as it designates something and does it rigidly (that is, across all possible worlds in which the 'something' exists), then you've got to prove that minds exist before you can start treating the word "mind" as a name. Basically, you've begged the entire argument in Premise 3.

I mean, step back and look at what you're doing: you're attempting to argue from the fact that there is a term "mind" to the conclusion that minds exist. Does this argument also work with "God"? Does it work with "Santa Claus"? Does it work with "Pegasus"? Obviously not. And your argument doesn't work either.

Aside from your argument never getting off the ground, it's rather apparent that you don't understand Kripke very well.

To ask whether a mind exists is just to ask whether mental phenomenon are ontologically distinct from physical phenomenon rather than being merely descriptively distinct. If they are only descriptively distinct, they can still ontologically identical. The intention of the argument is to show that that mental phenomenon are not merely descriptively different but ontologically different. So:

1) There exists mental events. (e.g qualia, intentionality).
2) If mental events are ontologically identical with physical events, then they are identical in all possible worlds.
3) They are not identical in all possible worlds
C) Mental events are not ontologically identical with physical events.

To ask whether a mind exists is just to ask whether mental phenomenon are ontologically distinct from physical phenomenon rather than being merely descriptively distinct. If they are only descriptively distinct, they can still ontologically identical. The intention of the argument is to show that that mental phenomenon are not merely descriptively different but ontologically different. So:

1) There exists mental events. (e.g qualia, intentionality).
2) If mental events are ontologically identical with physical events, then they are identical in all possible worlds.
3) They are not identical in all possible worlds
C) Mental events are not ontologically identical with physical events.

Obviously you're arguing for the view that the Mind and Brain are not identical, which isn't exactly an argument for the existence of the mind -- as Mind/Brain identity theorists concede the existence of the mind: they simply say that mental processes are brain processes. I think the ones who actually claim that the Mind and Brain themselves are identical are few in number. Nevertheless, shouldn't you have to argue for the existence of qualia? And then explain how qualia are used to undermine the view that mental processes are distinct from brain processes.

There's also the simple rejoinder that mental processes (or mental states) are higher order events. Thus, a complete description of a brain state would include its corresponding mental state, but a complete description of a mental state wouldn't require the neurological description. It wouldn't be a problem, then, to say that mental states don't have neurological properties. It wouldn't make mental events distinction in the relevant way. You'd need an argument, one which you are not giving.

Frankly, I'm not moved by Kripke's argument. But then I'm not moved by anything which so heavily relies on Possible Worlds semantics.

The mind and brain are distinctively different in that the brain is the generator of ideas/thoughts/mental and the mind is the result, we experience this as consciousness. The ontological stautus of X is acknowledged by the mind, however the informtaion itself exists in the brain. The ontology of X maybe identical to the physical existence of X in principal, but so what? All that demonstrates is our ability to form & understand concepts of X. A video camera can record a moment in time, upon the replay of the video the image will be a exact replica of the time it was recorded, it will be identical in every sense, yet in reality when your watching the video all you'll be doing is experiencing an actaul event, but in a different format.

The mind and brain are distinctively different in that the brain is the generator of ideas/thoughts/mental and the mind is the result, we experience this as consciousness.

I honestly had no intention of getting into a debate about Mind/Brain identity. It's a great topic, but I'm not as read-up on it as I'd like to be. And what I read was many years ago, so I'd brush up before I went too deeply into anything here. I found fault with the OP's original post because of the title, which led me to believe he was off course. But the OP is just stating Kripke's argument. Kripke is obviously someone you must take seriously, but I see no purpose in someone else giving his argument here unless he's going to do more than give a laundry list of his premises and conclusions. I'd rather just read Kripke then. If you're not going to explain Kripke's argument, perhaps in layman terms or in your own words, then what's the point? Finally, you should re-title this thread "Kripke's argument against Mind/Brain identity" because that's all it is. It certainly isn't an argument for the existence of the mind.

The ontological stautus of X is acknowledged by the mind, however the informtaion itself exists in the brain.

This is confusing. I'm not sure what it means to say "The ontological status of X is acknowledged by the mind...." I mean, what does the ontological status of X have to do with anything? Why not, instead, "X is acknowledged by the mind"? At this point, it's unclear which side of the argument you're taking, because what you're saying is, well, muddled.

But, really, all you're doing is painting us a picture. You're not arguing for anything.

The ontology of X maybe identical to the physical existence of X in principal, but so what? All that demonstrates is our ability to form & understand concepts of X.

Again, why the 'ontology' talk? Frankly, I have no idea what you're saying. I mean, I can make a good guess, but that's kinda useless, so I won't.

A video camera can record a moment in time, upon the replay of the video the image will be a exact replica of the time it was recorded, it will be identical in every sense, yet in reality when your watching the video all you'll be doing is experiencing an actaul event, but in a different format.

And still I have no idea which side of the argument you're taking. The only thing I can glean here -- at least that's worth gleaning -- is that cameras store content in the way brains store content. That's a worthy thing to say, but it's just an analogy: it alone doesn't make your case. Are you defending Mind/Brain identity?

And, no, when you're watching the video you won't be experiencing an actual event. When I watch a video of a hurricane in close proximity, I don't experience the wind on my face. Like you said, it's a replica -- better: a representation -- of an actual event. I'm not sure why we're even talking about this stuff, since (one) it has no bearing on the question and (two) it doesn't help make your position any clearer -- whatever your position actually is.

Again, this isn't my attempt to get into this debate. I don't see the point of posting on a philosophy forum unless you're here to explain things in clearer terms than professional philosophers do. Their use of technical jargon is understandable: they're talking with other philosophers. Typically, they're not confused by the jargon, whereas here people are. This goes for the people who use it too. Even if you're wrong, which most of us are most of the time, you should strive to be intelligible to other members. Again, otherwise, what's the point of coming to a forum like this? Make your case in clear terms and try to be coherent. I'll buy you ice-cream if you're also concise, precise, and cogent.

Apples, my previous post wasn't actually directed at you, it was to the OP, which wasn't me so I can not rename the title. I agree the OP wasn't clear as to exactly what he/she was wanting to achieve.

Ontological status refers to the mental representation of a specific object i.e X. I was painting a picture in hopes the OP would atempt to critique some aspect of it, other wise all he/she is merely trying to say, is that the mind and brain refer to the same element so they are identical, but theye not. Im saying the brain is matter and the mind is what it creates, they are two seperate things.

The camera analogy was in reply to Fhbradelly's premise number 2, it was basically to describe the irrelevence of the statement, furthermore I don't believe it's accurate. Mental and physical events aren't necesarrily identical, there's all sorts of problems such as the lack of awareness when observing physical events, this means what the mind experiences may differ from what actually happened.

TC,

Yeah, I ended up addressing the OP and you in the same post. I should have made that explicit. A little ironic for a guy on his soapbox about clarity.

Anyway, the OP is actually saying what you're saying -- at least it's the same conclusion, namely that the mind and the brain are not identical. It's just Kripke's argument except without all that bothersome explanatory stuff.

I think the way you've tried to paint this picture is the wrong way to go about. I mean, there are widely used terms within the philosophy of mind to choose from. It's fine if you're going to forego using them, especially if they're technical terms, but you can't replace them with more confusing terms such as "acknowledged by" and "exist in". These terms you've chosen are too vague to help us. Again, here is what you said:

The ontological stautus of X is acknowledged by the mind, however the informtaion itself exists in the brain.

Here you're talking about the mind acknowledging things, namely the ontological status of things. Here you're talking about information (which is supposed to be what exactly?) being stored in the brain. How is information stored in the brain? The brain is a physical thing. So is 'information', as you use it, a physical thing? That's not a normal reading of 'information', so you have questions to answer. Anyway, I just think you talk about stuff that doesn't need to be talked about and you were unclear in talking about it.

1. Names are rigid designators.
2. If R and R1 are both rigid designators which have the same reference (that is, that they are identical), then R and R1 are necessarily identical.
3. 'Mind' and 'Brain' are both rigid designators.
4. 'Mind' and 'Brain' are not necessarily identical.
C: Therefore, 'Mind' and 'Brain' do not have the same reference and are not identical.

Fhbradley, I agree with Fiveredapples that this probably isn't a very effective argument. (even though I agree with your basic conclusion.)

I think the terms [house] and [home] are words that are in some ways very similar to [mind] and [brain]. In both cases, there are times when the words can be used interchangeably--but there are also times when it doesn't make sense to use the terms that way. If we want to emphasize the love and personalization of the building, then we HAVE to call it a home. Thus, there are very distinct scenarios in which the words do not have identical uses.

But this fact doesn't imply that the building we refer to as a [house] somehow becomes a different structure when we refer to it as a [home].

I tend to believe Rupert Sheldrake's theory of Morphic Resonance... so I believe there is a qualitative difference between mind and brain. However, even if this sort of distinction isn't valid, I still believe there is sufficient cause to logically distinguish between the [working of the brain] and the [nature of the mind].

Radio Wave Analogy
I think the difference between mind and brain is somewhat analogous to the difference between a radio station and the sounds we hear on the radio, where the [sounds we hear] correspond to [mind], and the [activity of the radio station] correspond to [brain].

Without the activity in the [brain/radio staion] there would clearly be no [mind/sound]. But this fact does not change the fact that the two have uniquely different and reciprocal qualities. The [mind/sound] is something that we can know, or perceive--while the [brain/radio staion] does mysterious and unknown things that we cannot perceive.

The [radio staion] engages in physical phenomena and processes, and this create radio waves which travel to my radio and become [sound]. I hear the sound through another process, but the thing to understand is that the [radio station] processes are not the same processes as the [perceiving sound] processes. Both are physical, but they are not the same physical process. In many ways, they are reciprocal processes--but they are not the same.

In much the same way, the electrical activity of the brain gives rise to a conceputal understanding which is of a fundamentally different nature than electrical activity. The fact that one cannot exist without the other does not change the fact that they have a fundamentally different nature--and are in many ways the opposite of one another. Brain impulses have nothing to do with concepts and ideas... and mental ideas have nothing to do with electrical impulses.

We may be able to describe one in terms of the other... just as we can describe [2] using the term [1/2] as [1/1/2]. Or we can describe [cat] in terms of [not cat] by saying [not, not cat]. In much the same way, we can describe [mind] in terms of [brain activity] and vice versa. But [mind and brain] are not the same, they are reciprocal. If we try to treat them as if they are the same in questions of logic, we will get erroneous results, just as surely as if we used [2 and 1/2] or [cat and not cat] interchangeably.

There's also the simple rejoinder that mental processes (or mental states) are higher order events. Thus, a complete description of a brain state would include its corresponding mental state, but a complete description of a mental state wouldn't require the neurological description.

Emergent Properties
I think there's is something to this "higher order" argument... but I don't think its necessarily a higher order, just a different order. For example, it seems to me that [Brain activity] includes a lot of processes that typically would not be considered part of [mind]. For example, regulating my blood flow, or dialating my pupils. These things may (of course) influence [mind]. For instance, dialating my pupils allows me to see better in the given environment. If this didn't happen, I wouldn't be able to see as well and my ideas about my environment would be differnt. Similarly, changing blood flow may affect my mood, etc. And this may change the way I view the world. But while they may influence mind, they are not a PART of mind.

I believe, however, that mind is an emergent property--which means (basically) that the whole is greater (or different) than the sum of its parts. Sometimes, simple structures can develop very complex patterns of self-organization. For example, a McCulloch-Pitts networks are complex electrical networks where each node can be switched on or off, depending on the activity of surrounding nodes. Rules for determining when the nodes are switched can be created and then set into motion, so that the continued behavior of the networks can be observed. The result was that after a short time of random flickering most of the tested networks settled down into an ordered pattern of repetitive behavior.

This repetitive behavior is of a different order than the physical structure that creates it. Obviously, this "higher order" phenomena could not emerge if it weren't for the physical network that carries it. But they are distinctly different in nature. The words we use to describe the physical network would have very little to do with the language we used to describe the emergent behavior.

There is a connection between the two. Using the appropriate mathematical system, we may be able to predict the pattern that will emerge from a specific network when given a specific switch rule... but that doesn't make the two aspects the same. Also, although it may be a more difficult problem, I suspect that we can also produce a mathematical means of deriving the specific network and switch rule from a particular pattern. So the relationship isn't bi-directional.

Also, Stephen Wolfram's work with cellular automaton indicates that the same (or very similar) patterns can be obtained from very different network/switch rule combinations--which leads in to my next point, which is that there doesn't seem to be a precise correlation between a specific brain configuration and a specific mental concept.

The basic pricinples of biology clearly suggest that each person has a unique brain structure, which means that we must be creating the same mental concepts in unique ways. Conversely, I would argue that each of us have a slightly different mental concept about what any given concept means. Thus, logically speaking, we cannot simply talk about [x brain activity] invariably giving rise to [y mental phenomanon]. Yes, one is causal to the other, but it is not a simple, linear mathematical formula. We can NOT say that Jim, Tom and Fred all have [x brain activity] and there for they will have necessarily have [y mental phenomanon]. So here again we see reason for not treating [brain] and [mind] as logical equivalents.

[Mind] must be seen as something distinctly different from [brain], even if one is completely causal of the other... which, as I said, I do not believe.

Frankly, I'm not moved by Kripke's argument. But then I'm not moved by anything which so heavily relies on Possible Worlds semantics.

I'm not very fond of the possible world's language either.

The mind and brain are distinctively different in that the brain is the generator of ideas/thoughts/mental and the mind is the result, we experience this as consciousness.

The Computer Analogy
I agree. Another good analogy for this distinction is the difference between the [1/0 of a running computer program] and the [images that appear on the screen because of that program]. The image that appears is an emergent property of the program. And we must use different language to effectively and accurately describe the [world of bits] verus the [world of images].

And again, we can use different formats to save a picture--so that aspect is maintained as well.

I was painting a picture in hopes the OP would atempt to critique some aspect of it...

The Sculpture Analogy
This isn't directly addressed to your comment, but I got the idea from your comment, so I included it above.

Another analogy for the mind/brain distinction is that of a sculpture (or painting).

The carver uses physical tools, to manipulate physical material, and the final result is also a physical object.

We can use specific language to talk about the material: is it wood? If so what type? Where are the knot holes? ect. We can talk about the carver's tools and techniques: is he using a pocket knife, chisels, a drummel drill, a chainsaw, a soldering iron, etc. Each of these discussions, however, requires very different terms than the discussion that describes the shape and purpose of the the final object that is produced.

This is largely just the distinction between subsance and form. You can't actualize form without substance... but the two aspects cannot be used interchangeably in philosophy discussions without eventually creating logical difficulties. And again, we see uniqueness playing an inportant role. For each carver who is asked to carve say a [bird sitting in a nest] will create a slightly different carving, possibly using different materials, tools and techniques. And any two people who see the same carving will also describe it in slightly different language. Thus, while there is a causal relationship between a [specific carving] and the [specific materials, tools and techniques] used to create it... there is NO such relationship betwee a [general carving form] and the [materials, tools and techniques] which must be used to create it.

To ask whether a mind exists is just to ask whether mental phenomenon are ontologically distinct from physical phenomenon rather than being merely descriptively distinct. If they are only descriptively distinct, they can still ontologically identical. The intention of the argument is to show that that mental phenomenon are not merely descriptively different but ontologically different. So:

1) There exists mental events. (e.g qualia, intentionality).
2) If mental events are ontologically identical with physical events, then they are identical in all possible worlds.
3) They are not identical in all possible worlds
C) Mental events are not ontologically identical with physical events.

Obviously you're arguing for the view that the Mind and Brain are not identical, which isn't exactly an argument for the existence of the mind -- as Mind/Brain identity theorists concede the existence of the mind: they simply say that mental processes are brain processes. I think the ones who actually claim that the Mind and Brain themselves are identical are few in number. Nevertheless, shouldn't you have to argue for the existence of qualia? And then explain how qualia are used to undermine the view that mental processes are distinct from brain processes.

There's also the simple rejoinder that mental processes (or mental states) are higher order events. Thus, a complete description of a brain state would include its corresponding mental state, but a complete description of a mental state wouldn't require the neurological description. It wouldn't be a problem, then, to say that mental states don't have neurological properties. It wouldn't make mental events distinction in the relevant way. You'd need an argument, one which you are not giving.

Frankly, I'm not moved by Kripke's argument. But then I'm not moved by anything which so heavily relies on Possible Worlds semantics.

Why should anyone have to argue for the existence of qualia? We all know qualia is real (that is, I experience pain or redness, etc.), it is just a matter of determining whether or not the phenomenon is mental or physical. Other than possible world arguments, I don't really have much else, and I'll admit that. But I see no problem with possible world semantics, especially in discerning identity problems. I'm sure you would agree that, if a is identical with b, then they are necessarily identical. Which is just to say it is not possible that, without a, there is still a b (If the morning star is identical with the evening star, then if the morning star doesn't exist, neither does the evening star). But what is meant by "necessary" and "it is not possible"? We can't understand these terms without employing the notion of possible worlds.

But I see no problem with possible world semantics, especially in discerning identity problems. I'm sure you would agree that, if a is identical with b, then they are necessarily identical. Which is just to say it is not possible that, without a, there is still a b (If the morning star is identical with the evening star, then if the morning star doesn't exist, neither does the evening star). But what is meant by "necessary" and "it is not possible"? We can't understand these terms without employing the notion of possible worlds.

I think the problem with Kripke's argument is that, although rigid designators are a nice technical concept, they have no relevance to proper nouns in English.

As you know in rigid designation terminology "a" is a rigid designator if it refers to the same object in every world. Well, that might be a nice technical notion for modal logic (although I'm not sure it is) but does English have any rigid designators? (Because remember rigid designator is a concept of philosophy.)

It doesn't seem that it does. For instance, "water," a proper name, can mean many different things - not just H₂0. This means that if "pain" and "C-fibre firing" are proper names, then it doesn't follow that they are rigid designators. If they are not rigid designators, the argument fails.

I think it is obvious that we have concepts of modal logic (rigid designators) and concepts of linguistics (proper names/nouns), which don't mean the same.


Perhaps though, rigid designators can be stipulated. So we take what is normally a proper noun in English, and stipulate it some conditions under which it is a rigid designator. For instance, we take "water" and then precisely define it, making it a rigid designator. But then, the "water" used here is no longer a concept of natural language, instead it is a concept of logic and philosophy.

Perhaps.

But I see no problem with possible world semantics, especially in discerning identity problems. I'm sure you would agree that, if a is identical with b, then they are necessarily identical. Which is just to say it is not possible that, without a, there is still a b (If the morning star is identical with the evening star, then if the morning star doesn't exist, neither does the evening star). But what is meant by "necessary" and "it is not possible"? We can't understand these terms without employing the notion of possible worlds.

I think the problem with Kripke's argument is that, although rigid designators are a nice technical concept, they have no relevance to proper nouns in English.

As you know in rigid designation terminology "a" is a rigid designator if it refers to the same object in every world. Well, that might be a nice technical notion for modal logic (although I'm not sure it is) but does English have any rigid designators? (Because remember rigid designator is a concept of philosophy.)

It doesn't seem that it does. For instance, "water," a proper name, can mean many different things - not just H₂0. This means that if "pain" and "C-fibre firing" are proper names, then it doesn't follow that they are rigid designators. If they are not rigid designators, the argument fails.

I think it is obvious that we have concepts of modal logic (rigid designators) and concepts of linguistics (proper names/nouns), which don't mean the same.


Perhaps though, rigid designators can be stipulated. So we take what is normally a proper noun in English, and stipulate it some conditions under which it is a rigid designator. For instance, we take "water" and then precisely define it, making it a rigid designator. But then, the "water" used here is no longer a concept of natural language, instead it is a concept of logic and philosophy.

Perhaps.

But difference in meaning does not entail difference in referent. 'H20' and 'water' might mean or connote different things to different people (say, in different time periods), yet, it does not follow that simply because they have different meanings that they are in fact different things.