An argument for Idealism

1) If there is a distinction between mind and brain, then dualism is at least true.
2) There is a distinction between mind and brain.
C1) Therefore, dualism is at least true.

1) If dualism is at least true, we should opt for Idealism.
2) Dualism is at least true.
C2) Therefore we should opt for Idealism.

(Note that what is meant by at least is that it is not possible for pure materialism to be true).

Essentially, since dualism is so problematic, we should adopt an Idealist model of reality. Also, it satisfies Occam's Razor.

1) If there is a distinction between mind and brain, then dualism is at least true.
2) There is a distinction between mind and brain.
C1) Therefore, dualism is at least true.

1) If dualism is at least true, we should opt for Idealism.
2) Dualism is at least true.
C2) Therefore we should opt for Idealism.

(Note that what is meant by at least is that it is not possible for pure materialism to be true).

Essentially, since dualism is so problematic, we should adopt an Idealist model of reality. Also, it satisfies Occam's Razor.

I disagree with 1 of the first argument. As in Neutral Monism there is a distinction between mind and brain, but it is essentially a materialist theory.

Although, I think your second argument is interesting. (Not often do I see advocates for idealism.)

1) If there is a distinction between mind and brain, then dualism is at least true.
2) There is a distinction between mind and brain.
C1) Therefore, dualism is at least true.

1) If dualism is at least true, we should opt for Idealism.
2) Dualism is at least true.
C2) Therefore we should opt for Idealism.

(Note that what is meant by at least is that it is not possible for pure materialism to be true).

Essentially, since dualism is so problematic, we should adopt an Idealist model of reality. Also, it satisfies Occam's Razor.

I disagree with 1 of the first argument. As in Neutral Monism there is a distinction between mind and brain, but it is essentially a materialist theory.

Although, I think your second argument is interesting. (Not often do I see advocates for idealism.)

Well, in nuetral monism, there is only a distinction in a descriptive sense, not an ontological sense. When I say there is a distinction between the two, I mean an ontological difference. And yes, us Idealists are of the minority. In fact, last semester in my philosophy class I presented some of my mind/body distinction arguments to my professor. He responded by saying my view doesn't make sense since I must posit a 'ghost in the machine'. When I told him that wasn't a problem for me since I am an Idealist, he would not believe me! He literally thought I was trying to piss people off!

Well, in nuetral monism, there is only a distinction in a descriptive sense, not an ontological sense. When I say there is a distinction between the two, I mean an ontological difference. And yes, us Idealists are of the minority. In fact, last semester in my philosophy class I presented some of my mind/body distinction arguments to my professor. He responded by saying my view doesn't make sense since I must posit a 'ghost in the machine'. When I told him that wasn't a problem for me since I am an Idealist, he would not believe me! He literally thought I was trying to piss people off!

Right, I see what you mean.

So, obviously, if there is an ontological distinction between mental and physical categories, then, of course, at the very least, dualism is true - by definition.

You then say that there is a distinction, and so "dualism is at least true." Which is equivalent to saying that there exist at least two ontological categories, physical and mental.

However, isn't it contradictory to assert that both idealism and dualism are true? Since idealism is the theory that everything that exists is immaterial, and mental, which makes it a monist ontology - as opposed to the dualist ontology.

I don't see how you can assert both. For if monism is true, then dualism is false.

Well, in nuetral monism, there is only a distinction in a descriptive sense, not an ontological sense. When I say there is a distinction between the two, I mean an ontological difference. And yes, us Idealists are of the minority. In fact, last semester in my philosophy class I presented some of my mind/body distinction arguments to my professor. He responded by saying my view doesn't make sense since I must posit a 'ghost in the machine'. When I told him that wasn't a problem for me since I am an Idealist, he would not believe me! He literally thought I was trying to piss people off!

Right, I see what you mean.

So, obviously, if there is an ontological distinction between mental and physical categories, then, of course, at the very least, dualism is true - by definition.

You then say that there is a distinction, and so "dualism is at least true." Which is equivalent to saying that there exist at least two ontological categories, physical and mental.

However, isn't it contradictory to assert that both idealism and dualism are true? Since idealism is the theory that everything that exists is immaterial, and mental, which makes it a monist ontology - as opposed to the dualist ontology.

I don't see how you can assert both. For if monism is true, then dualism is false.

I'm not asserting that they are both true, however. I'm asserting that pure materialism is false. That is, there exists mental stuff. This is where the second argument comes in. If there exists mental stuff, we should abandon dualism and come to embrace only mental stuff. Essentially, dualism for me is sort of a bridge from materialism to idealism.

I'm not asserting that they are both true, however. I'm asserting that pure materialism is false. That is, there exists mental stuff. This is where the second argument comes in. If there exists mental stuff, we should abandon dualism and come to embrace only mental stuff. Essentially, dualism for me is sort of a bridge from materialism to idealism.

But look. Your argument for idealism rests on the truth of dualism:

1) If dualism is at least true, we should opt for Idealism.
2) Dualism is at least true.
C2) Therefore we should opt for Idealism.

If the second premise is true, then idealism is false; if it is false, then the argument doesn't work. Either idealism is false, or your argument for idealism is unsound.

I'm not asserting that they are both true, however. I'm asserting that pure materialism is false. That is, there exists mental stuff. This is where the second argument comes in. If there exists mental stuff, we should abandon dualism and come to embrace only mental stuff. Essentially, dualism for me is sort of a bridge from materialism to idealism.

But look. Your argument for idealism rests on the truth of dualism:

1) If dualism is at least true, we should opt for Idealism.
2) Dualism is at least true.
C2) Therefore we should opt for Idealism.

If the second premise is true, then idealism is false; if it is false, then the argument doesn't work. Either idealism is false, or your argument for idealism is unsound.

It doesn't rest on dualism being true, it rests on there existing mental stuff. This is why I emphasized on what I meant by at least. I don't mean to say that, if dualism is true, then idealism is true. Obviously that would but a contradiction as you say. Rather, if mental stuff exists, then pure materialism is not true. If pure materialism is not true, then either dualism is true or idealism is true. Dualism is not true, therefore, Idealism is true.


Another way to put the argument:

(1) Either dualism is true or idealism is true.
(2) Dualism is not true
(3) Therefore, Idealism is true.

It doesn't rest on dualism being true, it rests on there existing mental stuff. This is why I emphasized on what I meant by at least. I don't mean to say that, if dualism is true, then idealism is true. Obviously that would but a contradiction as you say. Rather, if mental stuff exists, then pure materialism is not true. If pure materialism is not true, then either dualism is true or idealism is true. Dualism is not true, therefore, Idealism is true.


Another way to put the argument:

(1) Either dualism is true or idealism is true.
(2) Dualism is not true
(3) Therefore, Idealism is true.

Ok, I see what you are saying. I would suggest re-phrasing the first argument as well, because that seems confused by what you have said. Perhaps:

I)
(1) There is an independent mental ontological category.
(2) If there is an independent mental ontological category, then materialism is false.
(3) If materialism is false, then dualism or idealism is true.

Which then leads to your second argument:

II)
"(1) Either dualism is true or idealism is true.
(2) Dualism is not true
(3) Therefore, Idealism is true."

From your first argument before you had:

1) If there is a distinction between mind and brain, then dualism is at least true.
2) There is a distinction between mind and brain.

The problem with those two above is that you are already committing yourself to mind and body; or, mental and physical, which is obviously dualist, not idealist. Which explains my confusion.

It doesn't rest on dualism being true, it rests on there existing mental stuff. This is why I emphasized on what I meant by at least. I don't mean to say that, if dualism is true, then idealism is true. Obviously that would but a contradiction as you say. Rather, if mental stuff exists, then pure materialism is not true. If pure materialism is not true, then either dualism is true or idealism is true. Dualism is not true, therefore, Idealism is true.


Another way to put the argument:

(1) Either dualism is true or idealism is true.
(2) Dualism is not true
(3) Therefore, Idealism is true.

Ok, I see what you are saying. I would suggest re-phrasing the first argument as well, because that seems confused by what you have said. Perhaps:

I)
(1) There is an independent mental ontological category.
(2) If there is an independent mental ontological category, then materialism is false.
(3) If materialism is false, then dualism or idealism is true.

Which then leads to your second argument:

II)
"(1) Either dualism is true or idealism is true.
(2) Dualism is not true
(3) Therefore, Idealism is true."

From your first argument before you had:

1) If there is a distinction between mind and brain, then dualism is at least true.
2) There is a distinction between mind and brain.

The problem with those two above is that you are already committing yourself to mind and body; or, mental and physical, which is obviously dualist, not idealist. Which explains my confusion.

Well, again, what I meant by at least was that pure materialism could not be true. I guess I just worded it funny. At least implies that there are other possibilities, namely, Idealism.

Well, again, what I meant by at least was that pure materialism could not be true. I guess I just worded it funny. At least implies that there are other possibilities, namely, Idealism.

I'm not sure I agree. "At least dualism is true" implies that dualism is true - at the very least - perhaps along with something else. Although, I'm not sure what that "else" could be. In any case, "at least dualism is true" implies that idealism is false, as far as I can see. The two just aren't consistent.

Well, again, what I meant by at least was that pure materialism could not be true. I guess I just worded it funny. At least implies that there are other possibilities, namely, Idealism.

I'm not sure I agree. "At least dualism is true" implies that dualism is true - at the very least - perhaps along with something else. Although, I'm not sure what that "else" could be. In any case, "at least dualism is true" implies that idealism is false, as far as I can see. The two just aren't consistent.

Well, I'm sure we could go back and forth but as long as you understand what I mean there's no problem. I'll just reword by argument.

Well, I'm sure we could go back and forth but as long as you understand what I mean there's no problem. I'll just reword by argument.

Agreed.

Well, I'm sure we could go back and forth but as long as you understand what I mean there's no problem. I'll just reword [m]y argument.

I don't think it's possible to give a cogent argument along these lines ...

(1) Either dualism is true or idealism is true.
(2) Dualism is not true
(3) Therefore, Idealism is true.

... unless you can show for premise (1), ontologies other than dualism and idealism are mistaken, and for premiss two (2), some evidence dualism is also mistaken.

For example, your argument is structurally the same as ...

(1) Either dualism is true or idealism is true.
(2) Idealism is not true
(3) Therefore, Dualism is true.

Just as your argument does not prove idealism true, so likewise the second argument does not prove dualism true.

One of the more interesting arguments for idealism is that given in Berkeley's New Theory of Vision. In that work, he argues that we cannot see objects at a distance, and there is no idea in common between sight and touch. Many of his arguments stand up well in light of recent psychological investigation.

For example, a blind person suddenly made to see would be unable to tell the difference between seeing an orange sphere and a black box until he can touch each one and associate the ideas (i.e., sensations) "round by touch" and "round by sight." Berkeley's argument, in effect, concludes that positing external objects corresponding to these ideas of sight and touch is an unnecessary assumption by the principle of simplicity.

His arguments include a solution to the problem why the moon appears larger at the horizon than overhead (not just due to diffraction of light), why the mathematical treatment of perspective cannot explain how one learns to estimate distance by sight, and argued solutions for other problems if a physical external world is hypothesized.

In sum, the major reason, so far as I can see, for opting for idealism is it's simplicity in avoiding the problems of associating the mental and the physical realms. This reason, I take it, is what you were attempting to formulate in your original argument.

I think metaman's reconstruction is correct. The proof is rather messy if we unpack it, and it also reveals some nasty stuff that pfbradley sweeps under the carpett.

IMO the argument is highly suspect. It is a pretty simple case of begging the question.

1) Either materialism, idealism or dualism is the case. (exhaustive disjunction of possible ontologies of the world)
2) If materialism is the case, the mental is reducible to the physical& some physical substance exists. (minimal materialism)
3) If dualism is true, then the mental is not reducible to the physical & some mental & some physical exists. (minimal dualism)
4) If idealism is true, then the physical is reducible to the mental & some mental substance exists. (minimal idealism)
5) the mental is not reducible to the physical (Begging the question!)
6) it is not the case that some mental & some physical exists. (Begging the question)
7Assumption: idealism is false. (assumption used in deriving contradiction from 1)
Idealism (first disjunct of 1)
9) kontradiction from 7&8
10) materialism is false from 5&2. (via tollens)
11) materialism from 1.
12) kontradiction from 10&11
13) dualism is false from 3 &6 (via tollens)
14) dualism
15) kontradiction
16) kontradiction via disjunction elimination
17) double negate idealism
Hence: idealism is true.

This proof works solely because of the assumption that both dualism and materialism is false + the assumption that idealism is the only living position of the disjunction in 1. Apart from the fact that both the dualist and materialist position is given an unfair formulation, the argument is simply not persuasive. Of course you could try another type of argument relying on, say, simplicity. But then you have a weird account of simplicity, since idealism gains simplicity by killing of a lot of stuff that should have a spot in our theory of the world, for instance other minds. Also, materialism is a living contender, and new breeds of nonreductive materialism have gained popularity. Also, dualism is having a revival in western philosophy. A lot of exciting research is going on. The only position with no followers is, fyi, idealism.

Could you try giving some backing to the question begging premisses? For instance explain why we ought to think all types of materialism out of the game. Also, how about adressing the issues with idealism? It has at least as great problems as the other two. You are being unfair imo. By your standards we ought to rule out the disjunction of idealism, dualism and materialism and conclude the world has no ontology. Or perhaps we should admit that, at present, we can't rule out any of the positions. But given the status quo, I opt for some kind of softcore physicalism. Dualism has its charm, and contemporary philosophy is starting to face up the the problems of reductionism.

[Scott]

1) If there is a distinction between mind and brain, then dualism is at least true.

I think this premise is false, but to be completely sure I think I need you define distinction exactly. For instance, monists do not claim that the word brain is identical in meaning to the word mind, or they would say things like the human mind weighs 3lbs since the human brain weights 3 lbs which is absurd and would claim that a dead man who has donated his brain to science has a mind long after death and his mind is being dissected.