Is Water Hydrogen Hydroxide?

In Naming and Necessity Kripke notes that "water is H₂0." He then goes on to observe that "We identified water originally by its characteristic feel, appearance and perhaps taste." And that "If there were a substance, even actually, which had a completely different atomic structure from that of water, but resembled water in these respects, would we say that some water wasn't H₂0?"¹

That is, is it possible for "water" to refer to something that is not H₂0?

I used to agree with this view of naming, but I've recently had some doubts.

For instance, we might use "water" abstractly (1); or we might say that a cup has tea in it (when the main constituent is H₂0, yet with "tea" in it) (2); or the opposite, that the substance we drink from the tap is water (when the main constituent is H₂0, yet with impurities) (3).

(1) Water is life.
(2) The contents of the cup is tea.
(3) The contents of the tap is water.

Surely, if Kripke is right, then in the above examples we are making referential failures.

But then I think: well, in (2) and (3) H₂0 is present (along with other substances), so do they really count as counterexamples?

So if anyone has any insight to give, that would be helpful.

¹ Naming and Necessity (Saul Kripke), p. 128.

Well, there is heavy water in verry small amounts in the lakes and oceans of the world, I believe it is produced in nuclear reactors as a by product in the cooling of the radioactive rods.

In chemistry there are a plethora of terms to name "water" in the various states you have mentioned it.

Water is the traditional name for H₂O, H₂O is the actual physical thing it self.

But as Shakespeare said: what's in a name.

Chemists identify water as H20 . Everyday people identify water by the use to which water is put. Artists idfentify water by the various looks of it. Musicians and sound technicians identify water by the sound of it. Cooks identify water by whether or not it is potable.All of those users may borrow from each other.

We identified water originally by its characteristic feel, appearance and perhaps taste." And that "If there were a substance, even actually, which had a completely different atomic structure from that of water, but resembled water in these respects, would we say that some water wasn't H20?

A good subject on which we can test this concept is sugar. Recently, advances in chemistry have allowed us to create sugar molecules which are the inverse of regular molecules. They taste more-or-less like sugar, but the body doesn't recognize them as sugar, and so doens't obtain nutrition from them. Do we call this alternative molecular formula [sugar] or do we call it something else, like [sugar substitute].

I think the most important thing to understand (for this discussion) is that WORDS are generally context sensitive. When a house wife tells her kid to get a drink of water, she may well be talking about something different from the scientist who is discussiong the properties of water/H₂O. In common, everyday speech, the definition of water includes the notion that it usually has some impurities in it. So the fact that [water] is not identical to H₂O is accounted for by the definition that is appropriate for the given context.

That's why when you go to the store, and buy less tained H₂O it's not called water--it's called purified water or distilled water. We have to distinguish pure H₂O from tap water, but it is the tap water that retains the most fundamental name WATER.

Given this, we can reexamine the contents of a [cup of tea]. The definition of tea is a flavoring substance that is steeped in hot water. So the fact that Tea contains water is accounted for by the definition of TEA. If we're expecting a cup of tea, then it makes no sense to discribe it as tained (or impure) water. On the other hand, if we're expecting water and we're handed a cup of tea, then it would make perfect sense to say something like, "This water is bad."

Because we are defining our drink in the context of water, it makes sense to describe the drink in terms of the taint (or impurity) that is in the water.

For the first example you gave, "Water is life" ... what's going on here is that we are using a sense of [is] that does not indicate equivalence. We are not saying that water is the same thing as live. We are saying that water is one of the characteristics (or requirements) of life. Thus, it is not accurate to suggest that this "water" doesn't contain H₂O as surely as example (2) and (3). It's just that we are using the word in a different way.

Thus, I would argue that none of your examples are referential failures. This, however, doesn't mean I think Kripke is right, at least not as you've explained his view.

In Naming and Necessity Kripke notes that "water is H₂0." He then goes on to observe that "We identified water originally by its characteristic feel, appearance and perhaps taste." And that "If there were a substance, even actually, which had a completely different atomic structure from that of water, but resembled water in these respects, would we say that some water wasn't H₂0?"¹

That is, is it possible for "water" to refer to something that is not H₂0?

I used to agree with this view of naming, but I've recently had some doubts.

For instance, we might use "water" abstractly (1); or we might say that a cup has tea in it (when the main constituent is H₂0, yet with "tea" in it) (2); or the opposite, that the substance we drink from the tap is water (when the main constituent is H₂0, yet with impurities) (3).

(1) Water is life.
(2) The contents of the cup is tea.
(3) The contents of the tap is water.

Surely, if Kripke is right, then in the above examples we are making referential failures.

But then I think: well, in (2) and (3) H₂0 is present (along with other substances), so do they really count as counterexamples?

So if anyone has any insight to give, that would be helpful.

¹ Naming and Necessity (Saul Kripke), p. 128.

If two things are identical, then they are necessarily identical. So, if water is identical with H20, then water is necessarily identical with H20. Contingent identity, I think, is not possible, and it mainly relies on the false view that our knowledge of p determines the modality of p. Hence, it can be necessary that H20=water without our knowing it. Examples such as the morning star/evening star fail to recognize mistaken identity claims.

About the statements you have provided. I don't see why substituvity doesn't work here. For example, (1) can be translated into 'H20 is life'. And it still has the same truth value. It is clear that 'water' can have many different senses. For example, before chemistry, water=this clear, tasteless, liquid stuff. After chemistry, water=this liquid stuff made out of such-and-such atoms. The senses are different, but nonetheless, the referent remains the same. It's just one thing being described in more than one way. I don't see why the "before chemistry" definition can't also be true.

But it is impossible for two things to be identical: if they were identical they would not be two things but would be the same thing.

If someone claimed that some substance was water, and a chemist came along and said " no, it's not H2O" the chemist would have changed the language game, but only on condition that the chemist were heard and understood.In real life the chemist may have been dismissed as irrelevant to the topic of conversation. In other words, iff the universe of discourse is chemistry something that is not H2O is not water, but not every language game, let alone every person, has any notion of chemistry.You need to state the context before your claim makes sense.

It is a fact that I and most of us here are so familiar with H2O being the necessary condition for something's being water, that for us H2O is also a sufficient condition for something's being water. But this fact is not sufficient to prove that everybody would agree, nor that there is a heavenly definer of substances.

About the statements you have provided. I don't see why substituvity doesn't work here. For example, (1) can be translated into 'H20 is life'. And it still has the same truth value. It is clear that 'water' can have many different senses. For example, before chemistry, water=this clear, tasteless, liquid stuff. After chemistry, water=this liquid stuff made out of such-and-such atoms. The senses are different, but nonetheless, the referent remains the same. It's just one thing being described in more than one way. I don't see why the "before chemistry" definition can't also be true.

But in (1), we are not using "water" to mean H₂0. We are talking abstractly, and H₂0 is concrete, not abstract. And you have to remember that H₂0 is a concept of chemistry; on this usage water is a concept of everyday language. So I don't think that there are any concepts of chemistry that are: this clear, tasteless, liquid stuff. That is a concept of common sense, not chemistry. And so the concepts of chemistry (H₂0) are concepts restricted to a certain domain of inquiry. I think this is an important distinction.

Also worth note is that H₂0 is the molecular structure of water. I don't think that that relation, the molecular structure of, is a relation of identity.

About the statements you have provided. I don't see why substituvity doesn't work here. For example, (1) can be translated into 'H20 is life'. And it still has the same truth value. It is clear that 'water' can have many different senses. For example, before chemistry, water=this clear, tasteless, liquid stuff. After chemistry, water=this liquid stuff made out of such-and-such atoms. The senses are different, but nonetheless, the referent remains the same. It's just one thing being described in more than one way. I don't see why the "before chemistry" definition can't also be true.

But in (1), we are not using "water" to mean H₂0. We are talking abstractly, and H₂0 is concrete, not abstract. And you have to remember that H₂0 is a concept of chemistry; on this usage water is a concept of everyday language. So I don't think that there are any concepts of chemistry that are: this clear, tasteless, liquid stuff. That is a concept of common sense, not chemistry. And so the concepts of chemistry (H₂0) are concepts restricted to a certain domain of inquiry. I think this is an important distinction.

Also worth note is that H₂0 is the molecular structure of water. I don't think that that relation, the molecular structure of, is a relation of identity.

As I just wrote in the other thread on this same issue, just because 'water' doesn't mean 'H20' does not mean water is not identical with H20. Just think of the morning star/evening star example. 'Morning star' has a very different sense from the 'Evening star', yet, they still share the same referent.

Think of 'water' before chemistry as having the ostensive definition "this liquid stuff" and 'water' after chemistry having the stipulative definition "such-and-such atoms". It still nevertheless denotes the same object.

As I just wrote in the other thread on this same issue, just because 'water' doesn't mean 'H20' does not mean water is not identical with H20. Just think of the morning star/evening star example. 'Morning star' has a very different sense from the 'Evening star', yet, they still share the same referent.

Think of 'water' before chemistry as having the ostensive definition "this liquid stuff" and 'water' after chemistry having the stipulative definition "such-and-such atoms". It still nevertheless denotes the same object.

Ok. I meant to say "refers" not "means."

But you have to remember that "water is identical with H20" holds for only a small case of utterances. Strictly speaking, water is not identical with H20; what you really mean to say is: this (concrete instance of) water is identical with H20. For water is a concept, and concepts have no molecular structure, making "water is H20" false. This is partially my point. Water, as a noun, is not just used to refer to H20.

Secondly, I don't see how the relation, molecular structure of, is equivalent to the identity relation. Call the relation, molecular structure of, M, and call the identity relation I. Is M equivalent to I? I don't think so.

For if I drop and smash a plate, I don't smash the plates molecular structure. But if molecular structure of were equivalent to the identity relation, then in smashing the plate I would be smashing its molecular structure. But this doesn't happen. It's molecular structure is still the same M.

So, all you can say is a concrete instance of water's molecular structure is H20. Not that a certain common noun is identical to a certain molecular structure.

Any referent, even water and even the planet Venus, is both concept and reality. The ontological status of concepts and realities is the question.

Any referent, even water and even the planet Venus, is both concept and reality. The ontological status of concepts and realities is the question.

It is nothing to do with the "ontological status of concepts and realities," whatever the "ontological status of realities" means. We are talking about how words are used, and whether nouns are rigid designators (which I think not). The ontological status of anything is irrelevant in this case.


To Fhbradley:

In talking about water, Richard Feynman considers a case in which "air dissolves in the water; oxygen and nitrogen molecules will work their way into the water and the water will contain air."

I assume you agree with Leibniz's Law: If two names, x and y, co-refer, then any property of x is a property of y.

And I'll assume water is a rigid designator that refers to H₂0.

Then, in Feynman's case and by Leibniz's Law, you are committed to this argument:

(1) Water = H₂0
(2) Water contains air
(C) H₂0 contains air

But that is clearly false. H₂0 does not contain air (here, oxygen and nitrogen molecules), by definition. H₂0 contains two parts hydrogen and one part oxygen; there is simply no mention of nitrogen, for if there were, then we would be talking about something other than H₂0, as it would have a different molecular structure.

Thus, by modus tollens: names do not rigidly designate.

Metaman wrote:

Belinda wrote:

Any referent, even water and even the planet Venus, is both concept and reality. The ontological status of concepts and realities is the question.

It is nothing to do with the "ontological status of concepts and realities," whatever the "ontological status of realities" means. We are talking about how words are used, and whether nouns are rigid designators (which I think not). The ontological status of anything is irrelevant in this case.

I suppose I should have explained further. The evening star and the morning star both of which are names for the planet Venus was mentioned.This is an example of how the same referent has alternative names and alternative sets of attributes. The example of the planet Venus demonstrates how the noun phrases 'evening star' and 'morning star' do not designate the same concept as 'the planet Venus' or even the same concept as each other.
'The ontological status' of a concept means how a conceptualisation correlates or corresponds with reality. Since individuals' concepts of reality differ we cannot proceed with evaluating any concept's or ots referent's ontological status(i.e. in what way the conceptualisation can be held to exist) unless we have a criterion for measuring such a status.

As for whether or not nouns are rigid designators, particular speech sounds have evolved along with the anatomy of the human head . The meanings of words in everyday language depends upon 1. the social context in which the word is used and 2. the user's neurophysiology.By 'user' I mean both transmitter and receiver.
In academic language the meanings of jargon words are artificially sequestered from everday usage by the use of Latin of Greek derived terminology, although in modern physics such words as 'quark' may be invented from other sources.

As for whether or not nouns are rigid designators, particular speech sounds have evolved along with the anatomy of the human head . The meanings of words in everyday language depends upon 1. the social context in which the word is used and 2. the user's neurophysiology.By 'user' I mean both transmitter and receiver.
In academic language the meanings of jargon words are artificially sequestered from everday usage by the use of Latin of Greek derived terminology, although in modern physics such words as 'quark' may be invented from other sources.

I agree with 2. But I don't think social context has much relevance, because I don't think social language has any truth.

Each individual has an I-Language, which should be what is studied by a study of language. The I-Language is the internal, individualistic, state of the human, so I agree with 1. But this means that there are as many languages as there are people, and so I don't see what relevance social context has in determining meaning between two different I-Languages.

When studying the eye we don't take into account the social context of different eyes, whatever that could possibly mean. We study the eye internally, regardless of the social surroundings. The same should be the case with language.


Regarding rigid designators and a causal theory of reference, I think this approach to language removes the foundations for them; making them fundamentally flawed.

I agree with 2. But I don't think social context has much relevance, because I don't think social language has any truth.

I'm not quite sure what this is supposed to mean.

First, isn't all language social? I assume your intent is to distinguish between common speech and technical jargon, but even technical language (say that used by mathematicians when dealing with a formal laguage) is essentially social because the mean of the terms are held in common by a given community--and people outside that community are unlikely to guess what the terms mean.

Second, if social language has no truth... then what meaning can "truth" possibly have? Given this assessment, it seems to me that "truth" can have absolutely no practical purpose in any language--formal or otherwise.

The first social context is to understand which language is being used. Quite often terms are given a different meaning in common language than in technical language. For example, in geometry, a "point' is defined differently than it is outside of geometry, even when they both (more-or-less) refer to a [dot]. If we don't know the context of which language we are using, then the result is that we are obviously referring to two very different things.

The next social context is how the word is being used. If I point to a page with a dot on it and refer to a "point", I know that what I am referring to is the dot. And if I'm doing geometry, I know that dot refers to a "geometric point" instead of the actual physical smudge on the page. And If my friend listens to what I have to say and comments, "You have a point there," he is referring to yet another meaning for the term. Thus, I have demonstrated at least 4 different ways the term "point" can be used. How else would we know which meaning is implied but to observe the context of how it is being used.

this means that there are as many languages as there are people, and so I don't see what relevance social context has in determining meaning between two different I-Languages.

in all languages there are terms that have vague or multiple meanings. Most languages give us a lot of leeway in how we can use certain terms. For instance, if I said, "He had a snowy personality." Very few people would have much difficulty getting a pretty good sense of what was meant. "Snowy personality" is a somewhat unique phrase, but we have other terms like [icy], [cold], [frosty] which are commonly used to describe personalities, and we can compare snowy to these other terms and thus conclude that a "snowy personality" is not that different from a "frosty personality".

My point is that few words in common speech have a singular meaning. And we can take poetic liscence to push the boundaries of how words can be used. And in both cases, I think it's very clear that we MUST use context to determing the appropriate meaning for the word being used.

In fact, I think you have it backwards. The more "social" a language is the more heavily it relies on contexts.

When studying the eye we don't take into account the social context of different eyes, whatever that could possibly mean. We study the eye internally, regardless of the social surroundings.

This comment doesn't seem to make a lot of sense, to me. On the one hand, it's just wrong. When I look at my eye in the mirror, I distinguish what I see from my friends eye. An intern who is helping a doctor who is operating on an eye that has been impaled with a nail, will use the context of the injury to help decide which eye the doctor is referring to when he says, "Cut the cornea of the eye with the scalpel." If it weren't for the context of the injury, the intern would not know which eye to cut.

On the other hand, If a child looks at an eye, they may only know the terms [eye], [eyeball] and [eyelids]. A typical adult may know more, such as: [pupil], [cornea], [iris] and so forth. An eye specialist will know more, such as: [ganglion cells], [pigment epitelium], [amacrine cells], [bipolar neurons], etc. Now, if the child is listening to the doctor talk about the eye, the child will understand very little if any of what is said, because the child does not have a grasp on the the social context that would give the terms meaning.

The point is that (in the second sense) social context does not involve the differences between two different eyes, but the differences that are understood by the eyes of two different observers.

First, isn't all language social? I assume your intent is to distinguish between common speech and technical jargon, but even technical language (say that used by mathematicians when dealing with a formal laguage) is essentially social because the mean of the terms are held in common by a given community--and people outside that community are unlikely to guess what the terms mean.

I agree that formal languages (i.e. arithmetic) are "essentially social." But it doesn't follow from that that "all language" is social. (Also, my intent is not "to distinguish between common speech and technical jargon.")

Second, if social language has no truth... then what meaning can "truth" possibly have? Given this assessment, it seems to me that "truth" can have absolutely no practical purpose in any language--formal or otherwise.

The conditional "If social language has no truth, then 'truth' has no meaning" isn't sound. For reasons to follow.

The first social context is to understand which language is being used. Quite often terms are given a different meaning in common language than in technical language. For example, in geometry, a "point' is defined differently than it is outside of geometry, even when they both (more-or-less) refer to a [dot]. If we don't know the context of which language we are using, then the result is that we are obviously referring to two very different things.

The next social context is how the word is being used. If I point to a page with a dot on it and refer to a "point", I know that what I am referring to is the dot. And if I'm doing geometry, I know that dot refers to a "geometric point" instead of the actual physical smudge on the page. And If my friend listens to what I have to say and comments, "You have a point there," he is referring to yet another meaning for the term. Thus, I have demonstrated at least 4 different ways the term "point" can be used. How else would we know which meaning is implied but to observe the context of how it is being used.

in all languages there are terms that have vague or multiple meanings. Most languages give us a lot of leeway in how we can use certain terms. For instance, if I said, "He had a snowy personality." Very few people would have much difficulty getting a pretty good sense of what was meant. "Snowy personality" is a somewhat unique phrase, but we have other terms like [icy], [cold], [frosty] which are commonly used to describe personalities, and we can compare snowy to these other terms and thus conclude that a "snowy personality" is not that different from a "frosty personality".

My point is that few words in common speech have a singular meaning. And we can take poetic liscence to push the boundaries of how words can be used. And in both cases, I think it's very clear that we MUST use context to determing the appropriate meaning for the word being used.

I don't disagree with that. If we are using a formal language, then we need to know that fact otherwise we won't understand what the vocabulary of that language refers to. However, your conclusion that meaning is determined socially doesn't follow from your point about points. It could be that meaning is determined by use, and so by syntax - something society has nothing to do with.

On the other hand, If a child looks at an eye, they may only know the terms [eye], [eyeball] and [eyelids]. A typical adult may know more, such as: [pupil], [cornea], [iris] and so forth. An eye specialist will know more, such as: [ganglion cells], [pigment epitelium], [amacrine cells], [bipolar neurons], etc. Now, if the child is listening to the doctor talk about the eye, the child will understand very little if any of what is said, because the child does not have a grasp on the the social context that would give the terms meaning.

The point is that (in the second sense) social context does not involve the differences between two different eyes, but the differences that are understood by the eyes of two different observers.

I think you have missed my point here.


There are two ways to approach the study of language. Either of these ways will be informed by the way you view language; whether language is a social object, or something else. I think it is pretty obvious that language is not a social object. This is because language is a faculty of the mind/brain. And the language faculty is an expression of our genes.

With this in mind, the two ways to study language are: the E-Language, and the I-Language (for: External language, and Internal language) (see Chomsky 1986) The E-Language is the way you would approach language as if it were a social object, or in some way external from the mind. The I-Language is the way you would approach language as if it were innate, which it is.

So the appropriate way to approach language is through the I-Language. The I-Language is essentially the internal, individualistic state of mind/brain that is the language faculty. Because each individual has his/her own language faculty, or I-Language, it follows that there are as many I-Languages as there are people.

And so the idea that there is a social object called English, or German, is nonsense. There are only I-Languages, no E-Languages. Now, like all the other mind/brain faculties, the I-Language is not determined by society, other than that a child's I-Language's (which is growing and developing) parameters are set by any available data.

So, the only role society plays is in setting the I-Language's parameters. The brain/mind does the rest - that is, it picks the syntax and semantics that the child will use.

You might wonder how, since there is no social object called English, we can communicate. This is where my analogue to the human eye comes in. Like a person's I-Language, which is genetically determined, a person's eyes are also genetically determined. And so, society plays no role in the growth and use of eyesight. But do you then ask: How do we see the same things, if there is no social object called Eyesight?

Well, because my eyes are similar to yous, like our I-Languages, which are similar, but not the same. So the way to look at language is as a biological/psychological object, unique to each individual; like memory, for which there is no social object called Memory that we all share. Language (or, our I-Language) is an expression of our genes.

I hope that helps clear my position up.