Zombies Should Have Human Rights

Belinda,

I'm more than happy to drop this zombie discussion with respect to human rights.

I can't say I'm all that geeked about entering an animal rights debate either, but I do have some thoughts on the matter. I am not pretending to be read-up on animal rights debates. And some of this stuff is just some ignorant formulations, which is not to say that it's wrong. But I won't pretend to be an authority of any kind here.

I think animals don't have human rights or animal rights. They have no rights. I don't think intelligence is a necessary or sufficient condition for attaining human rights. Hence, babies have human rights but are downright stupid. I think only moral agents (that is, human beings) and their offspring have human rights. Now, I don't think any human being has human rights in virtue of being human but, rather, because he belongs to a group whose members recognize each other as having human rights. And every human belongs to this group and you can't un-belong to this group. There are exceptions, but I'd rather not worry about them now.

I think people who argue for the rights of animals -- even philosophers like Peter Singer -- and use arguments relying on the intrinsic properties of those animals (e.g. dolphins are really smart, or great apes are capable of sophisticated feelings), usually to compare them to that of babies or the severely retarded, are putting on a ruse. Human rights are not acquired in virtue of having this or that intrinsic property, so nothing rests on those animals having them.

We moral agents readily bestow upon babies and the severely retarded human rights, so they have human rights. If you kick an baby, even an orphan, you have acted morally. If you kick an orphan rabbit, you have not acted morally, and the reason is because we members don't as a whole don't bestow upon rabbits human rights (or any rights).

Animal rights activists have (what seems like to me at least) absolutely terrible philosophical arguments. What they do effectively though is put up enough of an argument to make their idea more palatable and, they hope, one day much more fashionable among the majority of us. Peter Singer isn't a philosopher, he's in advertising.

He doesn't have to have a good argument for why animals have rights. He only needs to sell the idea to the masses until one day we grant them rights.

I don't think intelligence is a necessary or sufficient condition for attaining human rights. Hence, babies have human rights but are downright stupid. I think only moral agents (that is, human beings) and their offspring have human rights. Now, I don't think any human being has human rights in virtue of being human but, rather, because he belongs to a group whose members recognize each other as having human rights. And every human belongs to this group and you can't un-belong to this group. There are exceptions, but I'd rather not worry about them now.

How does your ethical theory handle situations in which moral agents don't have an interest in the well-being of some of their offspring? Or situations where there's the tempting possibility of factory farming infants of other races for some benefit? It seems your theory allows for cases in which it's okay to torture babies, even in the absence of compelling consequentialist reasons. And that's pretty messed up. Can you formulate an argument that a) couldn't have been used to justify racism, and b) doesn't lead to it being acceptable to torture human infants (in the absence of consequentialist reasons)? If not, I think it's fair to say that Singer's approach is superior.

I think people who argue for the rights of animals -- even philosophers like Peter Singer -- and use arguments relying on the intrinsic properties of those animals (e.g. dolphins are really smart, or great apes are capable of sophisticated feelings), usually to compare them to that of babies or the severely retarded, are putting on a ruse. Human rights are not acquired in virtue of having this or that intrinsic property, so nothing rests on those animals having them.

Yes, human rights aren't acquired that way. But that's exactly what Singer's criticizing, so it would be circular to reject his view on these grounds. If you give out human rights qua human DNA, you'd have to treat an embryo like a person. The traditional conception runs into absurdities, and it needs an approach that ignores group-membership, one that isn't discriminatory, to solve this.

If you kick an orphan rabbit, you have not acted morally, and the reason is because we members don't as a whole don't bestow upon rabbits human rights (or any rights).

It seems like you're using "not morally" as in "outside the scope of ethics". At least that would make sense, given the context. Is that's how it was meant? If yes, do you really think there's nothing wrong about kicking rabbits? Or burning cats? (Also, I'd question the assumption that there even are possible acts "outside the scope of ethics", but that's another topic.)

We moral agents readily bestow upon babies and the severely retarded human rights, so they have human rights.

Yes, it just so happens that we do that. What if we didn't? Should we do it? What if we only want some babies to have it? The whole thing becomes arbitrary here. If I were a baby, I'd become scared at this point.

Animal rights activists have (what seems like to me at least) absolutely terrible philosophical arguments.

Are you talking about arguments for why it's wrong to kill animals, or why it's wrong to inflict suffering on animals? I can assure you that the one supporting the latter conclusion are pretty sound. But if you find a response that doesn't involve torturing babies, let me know.

(You could bite the bullet and accept the baby thing, then we'd have to move the discussion to some other aspect. I'd then ask you why you think suffering is bad for persons, but not for babies. Why would the spatio-temporal location of suffering make a difference here? Do you not think suffering is intrinsically bad? If there's one thing that's "intrinsically anything", isn't it suffering being bad?)

[Scott]

I do not believe p-zombies could actually exists because I am not a dualist. As I understand it, to actually believe p-zombies exist one would have to be a dualist in regards to philosophy of mind. I can't imagine how such a person would come at a topic like 'human rights' because it seems to me that such a belief would make it hard to give anyone human rights at all instead being comparable to solipsism in its heavy doubting the very existence of other people's minds and thus bordering on a philosophical argument in support of an artificial psychopathy.

How does your ethical theory handle situations in which moral agents don't have an interest in the well-being of some of their offspring?

This wouldn't pose a problem. The theory says that our offspring have human rights. And non-action by the parents -- that is, letting them die by not feeding or caring for them -- is a moral violation because the offspring have the right to be fed and cared for by the parents. This is a special right babies and children have but not adults. I think we all recognize this.

Or situations where there's the tempting possibility of factory farming infants of other races for some benefit?

I'm not a fan of dealing with fictional entities to pose a problem that doesn't teach us anything. Can't we simply extend the definition of 'offspring' to include those that were farmed? But I think you're missing the point. It's not that our offspring have rights in virtue of being given birth by a woman, it's that they have rights because we bestow it upon them (all of them, not this one but not that one). The only reason I used the term 'offspring' is because farming of infants doesn't exist, so there was no reason to accommodate such beings, but we can easily.

It seems your theory allows for cases in which it's okay to torture babies, even in the absence of compelling consequentialist reasons. And that's pretty messed up.

Seeing as how my theory specifically states that babies have human rights, I don't see how this follows at all. Can you explain how it's supposed to follow?

Can you formulate an argument that a) couldn't have been used to justify racism, and b) doesn't lead to it being acceptable to torture human infants (in the absence of consequentialist reasons)? If not, I think it's fair to say that Singer's approach is superior.

Again, I don't follow any of this. And if you're going to invoke Singer's approach as a counter-example, perhaps you can give us an account of it.

Yes, human rights aren't acquired that way. But that's exactly what Singer's criticizing, so it would be circular to reject his view on these grounds. If you give out human rights qua human DNA, you'd have to treat an embryo like a person. The traditional conception runs into absurdities, and it needs an approach that ignores group-membership, one that isn't discriminatory, to solve this.

Like I said, it's not bestowing rights to babies or embryos because they have human DNA. I specifically said that babies have rights in virtue of us agreeing that they have rights too. So, whether embryos have rights is up to us. And whether animals have rights is up to us. Hence, the ploy I mentioned earlier. No absurdities are forced upon us by my theory. We're not going to bestow rights upon embryos, so no absurdities will arise, and even if they do it wouldn't be forced by my theory. It would be our decision.

It seems like you're using "not morally" as in "outside the scope of ethics". At least that would make sense, given the context. Is that's how it was meant? If yes, do you really think there's nothing wrong about kicking rabbits? Or burning cats? (Also, I'd question the assumption that there even are possible acts "outside the scope of ethics", but that's another topic.)

Yes, I'm using 'not morally' as in 'outside the scope of ethics'. When I mean morally good, I say
morally good'. I try very hard not to use 'morally' to mean 'morally good'.

Yes, it just so happens that we do that. What if we didn't? Should we do it? What if we only want some babies to have it? The whole thing becomes arbitrary here. If I were a baby, I'd become scared at this point.

I'm not sure why choosing some babies to have rights and others not to would be arbitrary. That's not my theory, but selection isn't always arbitrary.


What if we didn't bestow rights on babies? Oh, then they wouldn't have rights. This will never happen, of course, but it would follow from my theory. I'm happy to accept a consequence that will never actually occur. And i think the story for why we include babies in our community of entities that have rights is an obvious one, so I won't tell it.

Are you talking about arguments for why it's wrong to kill animals, or why it's wrong to inflict suffering on animals? I can assure you that the one supporting the latter conclusion are pretty sound. But if you find a response that doesn't involve torturing babies, let me know.

I mean any and all of them that construe the killing of animals or the torturing of animals moral acts, whether morally good or morally bad. They are not moral acts.


Again, you'll just have to explain to me how my theory has the consequence that it's morally acceptable to torture babies.

Respect man. That's what we need respect. My flesh may be hanging off, my eyes look like golf balls, stink like a wet dog and only ask for half the human extras wages but we need respect man.

Where do we start or stop our concern for life. Buddhist look at every step they take determined not to kill without understanding. We must debate the concerns but equally understand the limitations of human existance. Hunger can drive a man to sacrifice and cannibalism but that same man would not consider killing for his daily meal.

How does your ethical theory handle situations in which moral agents don't have an interest in the well-being of some of their offspring?

This wouldn't pose a problem. The theory says that our offspring have human rights. And non-action by the parents -- that is, letting them die by not feeding or caring for them -- is a moral violation because the offspring have the right to be fed and cared for by the parents. This is a special right babies and children have but not adults. I think we all recognize this.

What I meant are cases in which society as a whole had no interest in their offspring. Or at least part of their offspring. You say infants have rights because we give them rights. You'd probably say the same for people with severe cognitive handicaps. That's quite trivial, my question is WHY do we give them rights? Why should we give them rights? If we just do it because we want to, our "wants" could be different, and in such a case, your theory allows the torturing of infants.

I'm not a fan of dealing with fictional entities to pose a problem that doesn't teach us anything. Can't we simply extend the definition of 'offspring' to include those that were farmed? But I think you're missing the point. It's not that our offspring have rights in virtue of being given birth by a woman, it's that they have rights because we bestow it upon them (all of them, not this one but not that one). The only reason I used the term 'offspring' is because farming of infants doesn't exist, so there was no reason to accommodate such beings, but we can easily.

I think the thought experiment does teach us something, that's why I brought it up. And just because a thought experiment is outlandish doesn't mean it can't be useful. Thought experiments are "intuition pumps", they can show when there's something inconsistent with one's advocated principles. It really doesn't matter whether it's "realistic" or not, the only thing that matters is whether the relevant variables are simple enough so the thought experiment remains informative. If you think the thought experiment is misleading then I'd be interested to hear why.

It seems your theory allows for cases in which it's okay to torture babies, even in the absence of compelling consequentialist reasons. And that's pretty messed up.

Seeing as how my theory specifically states that babies have human rights, I don't see how this follows at all. Can you explain how it's supposed to follow?

You might not notice it, but there's a lot of arbitrariness in your theory. You give no criteria why we should give babies rights, you just state that we obviously do so. And it's true, we do it, and we would find it outrageous not to do it. But this hasn't always been the case, and it is not the case in all cultures even now. If your theory would claim that human infants have human rights just because they have human DNA, the very same reasoning could be used to justify racism if you replace "humans" with i.e. "whites", or sexism if you replace it with "men". If, on the other hand, you hold that only individuals capable of moral thinking, and whoever else they want to include, deserve rights, then you have the problem that the moral agents have all the power and can arrange things as they want. And if their wants don't correspond with the way we think things should be -- and why should they, your theory doesn't specify criteria here -- then cases in which infants can be rightfully tortured could follow.

That's the dilemma, I don't see a way how you can avoid unpleasant conclusions. Unless you drop the "only moral agents" thing and focus on something more fundamental like the capacity for suffering. Which would then include most animals too.

By the way, what are your views on chimpanzees that have been trained in language? There are bonobos that understand language pretty well, and they may even understand the terms "good" and "bad". Would you give them human rights?

And if you're going to invoke Singer's approach as a counter-example, perhaps you can give us an account of it.

(I didn't do so because initially it was you who mentioned Singer.)
Singer's approach states that group membership is irrelevant; instead, we should look at morally relevant criteria. He notes that intelligence can't be such a criterion because certainly we'd consider it absurd if someone claimed that Einstein was allowed to torture stupid people. He notes that pigs or cows surpass human toddlers in all kinds of cognitive abilities one can think of, and concludes that it would be inconsistent to grant basic ethical consideration only to the latter. And by "basic ethical consideration" he means that their interests should "count". But only the interests they actually have -- a pig doesn't have an interest in voting, so obviously it doesn't get a right to vote. Singer claims that pigs probably don't have an interest in continuing to life, so he doesn't think there's anything intrinsically wrong with killing them. That's a very crude summary, but it should do. One more thing maybe, Singer's approach is most intuitive when it comes to abortion, the progression from fetus to an adult person. The alternative would be the "absolute sanctity of human life" view, that may attribute full protection even to embryos, which would seem quite absurd.

I specifically said that babies have rights in virtue of us agreeing that they have rights too. So, whether embryos have rights is up to us. And whether animals have rights is up to us. Hence, the ploy I mentioned earlier. No absurdities are forced upon us by my theory. We're not going to bestow rights upon embryos, so no absurdities will arise, and even if they do it wouldn't be forced by my theory. It would be our decision.

Yeah, I'm glad to see that I interpreted your view correctly. I think you haven't finished in the task of ethical thinking if you just leave the question open like that: "whether embryos have rights is up to us". Sure it is, we are the ones talking about ethics here. Ethics doesn't grow on trees, we'll have to bring arguments for our views. So should they have rights, or should they not, and why?

What if we didn't bestow rights on babies? Oh, then they wouldn't have rights. This will never happen, of course, but it would follow from my theory. I'm happy to accept a consequence that will never actually occur. And i think the story for why we include babies in our community of entities that have rights is an obvious one, so I won't tell it.

So you'd bite the bullet? That's exactly the point I've been trying to make. And it doesn't matter whether the scenario I'm talking about is outlandish, your theory really does state that there can be cases where I can torture an infant just because I think it might be funny to do so. And that's pretty messed up. Don't you think protecting animals from unnecessary suffering would be the better choice here? Doesn't that seem more ethical than torturing babies?

What I meant are cases in which society as a whole had no interest in their offspring.

That's obviously conceivable but, I think we can safely say, will never happen. But if it did, then babies wouldn't have rights then.

Or at least part of their offspring. You say infants have rights because we give them rights. You'd probably say the same for people with severe cognitive handicaps. That's quite trivial, my question is WHY do we give them rights?

Why we give them rights might be interesting, but it's not philosophical.

Why should we give them rights? If we just do it because we want to, our "wants" could be different, and in such a case, your theory allows the torturing of infants.

No, my theory is based on empirical evidence. Ethics arises out of facts and the interactions of human beings. Our ethics would change if we were immortal, could predict the future, and spit bullets. It would be morally wrong to spit in my face in this different realm, or possible world, but it's not Ethics, because Ethics is particular to us here on Earth in the actual world.

I think the thought experiment does teach us something, that's why I brought it up. And just because a thought experiment is outlandish doesn't mean it can't be useful. Thought experiments are "intuition pumps", they can show when there's something inconsistent with one's advocated principles. It really doesn't matter whether it's "realistic" or not, the only thing that matters is whether the relevant variables are simple enough so the thought experiment remains informative. If you think the thought experiment is misleading then I'd be interested to hear why.

Again, I have no problem with thought experiments. They can be used to get at the essence of a problem. What I don't like is thought experiments that merely create other problems, problems that have nothing to teach us about our original problem. And Ethics is tricky because once you change the circumstances, then you probably changed the moral status of the act. So, thought experiments in Ethics tend to only cause confusion or teach us nothing about our original problem. I saw no benefit to your thought experiment.

You might not notice it, but there's a lot of arbitrariness in your theory. You give no criteria why we should give babies rights, you just state that we obviously do so.

I haven't given any criteria; I'm reporting (what I take to be) a fact. I'm not giving an argument for why babies should have rights. There is absolutely no arbitrariness in my theory, even if you say things like "you just can't see it."

I'll finish responding to the rest later. I'm watching Flyers hockey, and nothing is more morally important than that.

Why should we give them rights? If we just do it because we want to, our "wants" could be different, and in such a case, your theory allows the torturing of infants.

No, my theory is based on empirical evidence. Ethics arises out of facts and the interactions of human beings. Our ethics would change if we were immortal, could predict the future, and spit bullets. It would be morally wrong to spit in my face in this different realm, or possible world, but it's not Ethics, because Ethics is particular to us here on Earth in the actual world.

This is where our major disagreement lies. You include the current human nature and the current cultural background as a variable in your theory. But that's relativistic! Because other backgrounds would produce other ethics.

Think about future technologies and the possibility of reprogramming the human genome. Is it an ethical question whether we should reprogram our genomes, and if yes, where to? It certainly is, but according to your view of ethics, the question would never even come up because you have limited the scope of ethics in advance.

Why would an ethical theory change if we were immortal? The input would change, but not the foundation of the ethical framework. Suffering would still be bad, and it would still be important to reduce suffering.

I saw no benefit to your thought experiment.

Yeah, it's now obvious to me as to why that is. But think about a more broad system of ethics. Think of "ethics" as a comprehensive definition of "good" and "bad". What would the (a?) perfect world look like? Is that not an ethical question?

This is where our major disagreement lies. You include the current human nature and the current cultural background as a variable in your theory. But that's relativistic! Because other backgrounds would produce other ethics.

Of course Ethics is relativistic -- it's our Ethics. Language is also relativistic, but so what?

Other backgrounds would undoubtedly produce other Ethics. Why is this troubling? If we could fly, then we'd have a different Ethics. If we had the ability to fly, we'd have an Ethics with different Ethics. In this Ethics, it would be a moral duty, perhaps, to help someone bleeding to death on top of a steep mountain when you're at the bottom. And that's because you have the ability to fly to him, whereas now you don't, so you have no moral duty to help him because you can't.

Think about future technologies and the possibility of reprogramming the human genome. Is it an ethical question whether we should reprogram our genomes, and if yes, where to? It certainly is, but according to your view of ethics, the question would never even come up because you have limited the scope of ethics in advance.

My view is a view that can inform us on any moral case. Why would my view be limited any more than any other Ethical view?

If we could fly, then we'd have a different Ethics.

Would we?
Would it suddenly be okay to murder or rape?

If we had the ability to fly, we'd have an Ethics with different Ethics. In this Ethics, it would be a moral duty, perhaps, to help someone bleeding to death on top of a steep mountain when you're at the bottom. And that's because you have the ability to fly to him, whereas now you don't, so you have no moral duty to help him because you can't.

No, this is utterly confused. If we're going to talk about "duties", then the proper thing to say here would be the following:

"Whether we can fly or not, we have a duty to help, at least in cases where helping doesn't cause us significant trouble." (Personally I'd go much further than that, but let's leave it at this.)

That it only makes sense to talk about a "duty to help" in cases where this is physically possible is trivial.

So nothing about the duty would change, the only thing that changes are circumstances. If we can fly, we can help people further away, or people trapped at difficult spots. Just applying the duty will still get you the ethically desired results.

What you're doing is making absolute duties out of circumstances, instead of thinking about a universal ethics that's independent of circumstances. An example: Imagine all of us had strong intuitions that hurting plants is BAD. Just like people have strong intuitions against incest. According to your view, this would imply that hurting plants really is bad, and that we should only hurt them in extreme cases. Don't you see how silly that would be? The proper thing to do would be to ask whether there are normative reasons against hurting plants. And if there aren't, then we can safely ignore our intutions, or even get rid of them if this is possible.

Think about future technologies and the possibility of reprogramming the human genome. Is it an ethical question whether we should reprogram our genomes, and if yes, where to? It certainly is, but according to your view of ethics, the question would never even come up because you have limited the scope of ethics in advance.

My view is a view that can inform us on any moral case. Why would my view be limited any more than any other Ethical view?

Because your view doesn't seem to address the following question:

If we could change our ethical intuitions any way we want, what should we change them into?

What would be your answer? The way I understand your theory, this question couldn't even come up!

And this isn't even an outlandish proposal, this is one of the most urgent ethical questions that the human species will have to answer in the twenty-first century! Sure, you can answer "we shouldn't change anything", but that answer needs an equal amount of justification as any other answer, you just can't take for granted that we're ideally equipped for "the good".

Would we?
Would it suddenly be okay to murder or rape?

Really, dude? I gave you an example of how our Ethics might change. I didn't say our ability to fly would change our Ethics entirely. That's just poor reading on your part.

No, this is utterly confused. If we're going to talk about "duties", then the proper thing to say here would be the following:

Oh, I'm not just confused but utterly confused? LOL. Okay, school me, please....

"Whether we can fly or not, we have a duty to help, at least in cases where helping doesn't cause us significant trouble." (Personally I'd go much further than that, but let's leave it at this.)

My example was that what 'duty-required helping' would constitute would be different if we had the power to fly. Ethics in the abstract is not ethics. What's required of us in an ethical situation is determined by many things, one of which is our ability. So, again, in a world where people could fly would have a different ethics because we would have a different ability, a significantly different one.

So, where is my confusion? And how is it 'utter' confusion? If anyone is confused, it's you. The fact that you think ethics is some absolute laws which we humans must discover -- and haven't determined -- then you have about a couple of thousands of years of futility behind you. Congratulations.

So nothing about the duty would change, the only thing that changes are circumstances. If we can fly, we can help people further away, or people trapped at difficult spots. Just applying the duty will still get you the ethically desired results.

The word "duty" wouldn't change, but what action it actually entails would change. And it's the specific action that we're interested in. Again, Ethics only exists in individual cases because it's the circumstances that determine the moral status of such acts.

What you're doing is making absolute duties out of circumstances, instead of thinking about a universal ethics that's independent of circumstances.

If you try making a list of these so-called universal ethical rules you'd come up with maybe five. And they would be so vague and useless that you'd be forced to do Ethics the way I do it in order to move from 'useless and vaguely stated tenets' to an actual living Ethics.

An example: Imagine all of us had strong intuitions that hurting plants is BAD. Just like people have strong intuitions against incest. According to your view, this would imply that hurting plants really is bad, and that we should only hurt them in extreme cases.

Again, it's not just about intuitions. You keep beating that straw horse to death though. I'm sorry, what's this notion of 'really bad' you speak of? Are you assuming there are meta ethical tenets? Hi. This is a philosophy forum. You know, we try to not concede philosophical positions which have failed to become popular after a few thousand years of debate. So, try arguing for your counter-intuitive views. Or, just for fun, you can continue to assume it's true and make snarky remarks about my views based on your counter-intuitive philosophy. Are you an Idealist too? Are my view that there is an external world independent from minds confused too? Oops, I mean, utterly confused?

Don't you see how silly that would be? The proper thing to do would be to ask whether there are normative reasons against hurting plants. And if there aren't, then we can safely ignore our intutions, or even get rid of them if this is possible.

I see nothing you see. I need reasons to see things. Unlike you, I don't assume enough to be clairvoyant or omniscient. You have done no work here. Work = philosophy.

If you try making a list of these so-called universal ethical rules you'd come up with maybe five. And they would be so vague and useless that you'd be forced to do Ethics the way I do it in order to move from 'useless and vaguely stated tenets' to an actual living Ethics.

That's interesting because I consider your views vague too. Not as vague as some other people's views, but still too vague for my taste.

I think there are at most two simple rules: Minimize suffering, and possibly also maximize pleasure. And that follows from the factual observation that suffering is intrinsically bad. (And analogically pleasure being intrinsically good.) There's nothing else we need.

Why am I not sure about pleasure? It's complicated. Very briefly: Imagine a world in which sentience had never developed. Could we say there's something bad about that world? That it's bad when there's nothingness instead of pleasure? That's a though question. I think I've got it figured out, but I'll leave it open for here.

Thinking ethically means thinking universally. If my suffering is bad, it's not bad because it's mine, it's bad because it's suffering. There's nothing special about the spatio-temporal location that makes it *my* suffering. So it follows from my first person knowledge of suffering that all suffering is bad. That's a fact about ethics. Now, this doesn't produce "duties". This reasoning can't tell you that you should care about making the world better. But it tells you which worlds are better than other worlds. And that's enough.

People will come with all kinds of objections, i.e. "isn't there value in justice, truth, freedom, beauty etc.", but if one accepts a consequentalist framework, there'd have to be tradeoffs in the utility functions. And that causes huge problems, which I won't go into though.

They may also point out cases in which utilitarianism seemingly has counterintuitive conclusions. But think about it, by definition, the utilitarian choice will involve the least amount of suffering. By rejecting it, one is arguing for extra suffering. Why would anyone argue for extra suffering? Know the "veil of ignorance" thought experiment device? A rational agent behind the veil would choose utilitarianism. At least if he isn't risk averse (that's where Rawls is wrong btw). And there's a good case to be made that being risk averse would be irrational, at least in that particular situation. Since one's choice will set up the "ethical laws" for *all* beings concerned, so that's like making the same choice many times, once for each being. And if you have a large amount of events, risk-aversion definitely becomes irrational.

And of course, I can again refer to the fact that intuitions aren't very trustworthy, for evolutionary reasons.

What about the idea that transcending suffering or learning from suffering can yield a better outcome in the long run than if someone had never suffered. True, the "long run" is vague/undefined and not everyone is endowed with equal faculties which may facilitate transcendence but I think the idea does merit a thought.

What about the idea that people suffer in their own ways? Perhaps people react similarly in some ways to physical or psychological pain but does that mean that the totality of each individual person's reaction to pain identical? Is "suffering" objective, subjective, or both?

None of that means that we ought not to attempt to mitigate of alleviate human suffering, but it does make a case for a post conventional ethics.

Scottie wrote:

What about the idea that people suffer in their own ways? Perhaps people react similarly in some ways to physical or psychological pain but does that mean that the totality of each individual person's reaction to pain identical? Is "suffering" objective, subjective, or both?

Is it the case that if there were no seats(loci) of consciousness in a person's brain that person would not feel pain, but could nevertheless seem to others observing him that he was feeling pain because he reacts to some pain stimulus in the same way as any person with whole brains react? I believe that suffering is objective by which I mean that suffering and degrees of suffering can be observed by way of one of the many brain scans now available, together with whole body signs of suffering such as quickened heart beat, clammy pale skin and so on. To claim that suffering is subjective adds nothing to the physical fact of suffering.

To deny the subjective element of suffering is not to dismiss suffering as irrelevant to the ethic directed to relieving suffering. All conscious creatures feel and because complex living brain-whole individuals mirror what others are feeling we are enabled to practise moral and civil laws that preserve the necessary way of living that we call society.

What about the idea that transcending suffering or learning from suffering can yield a better outcome in the long run than if someone had never suffered. True, the "long run" is vague/undefined and not everyone is endowed with equal faculties which may facilitate transcendence but I think the idea does merit a thought.

It does indeed merit a thought. And it would also follow from utilitarianism that if this is the case, then we should indeed opt for the suffering in order to get the expected long-term benefit. A difficulty with that would be that it's incredibly hard to predict when these supposed benefits would outweigh the suffering. But that's not a problem with the ethical theory, that's just a practical problem that comes with the application of the theory.

What about the idea that people suffer in their own ways? Perhaps people react similarly in some ways to physical or psychological pain but does that mean that the totality of each individual person's reaction to pain identical? Is "suffering" objective, subjective, or both?

Let's make an example: Two people are beaten on the head with a club, both times they're beaten by the same club with the same force. One person is quite sensitive to pain and is in agony, the other person is a trained kung-fu master that smashes bricks with his head. While the first person will suffer severely from the blow, the kung-fu master will feel a little pain, but not much at all. In this case, even though the "simulus" is the same, people react in different ways. What counts isn't the "getting beaten by a club with force x", but much rather the conscious response to it, the actual suffering. And that would be much worse in the case of the first person.

Even though we can't really "measure" suffering quantitatively, we can certainly guess roughly what kinds of suffering are worse compared to other kinds, and we can make comparisons based on how we ourselves would choose between different alternatives. Some people say it's impossible to compare different kinds of suffering, but that's silly because we ourselves make decisions like that all the time. For instance, if we vaccinate our children, we judge that the pinprick they experience will overall be less distressing than them perhaps catching a really bad disease later in life.