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Post Number:#1
April 1st, 2012, 4:18 am
Did you know?
Post Number:#2
April 1st, 2012, 6:51 pm
Post Number:#3
April 2nd, 2012, 9:22 am
Scott wrote:Does she have any argument to support that claim? If not, then I see no reason to believe it and coming up with arguments against seems to be an instance of the shifting the burden of proof fallacy.
Anyway what does she mean by a right?
As I referenced in my article about freedom, a universal right must be consistent. For instance, it is illogical to say one person has the right to punch whoever he wants but another man has the right to not be punched. In that way, in any sense of the word right, a right also entails a corresponding restriction. With that understood I think we can see that the right of grass to live is logically inconsistent with the right of cows to eat grass which they apparently need to do to live; thus both cannot have a right to life in the positive sense. It might be logically consistent at least for them both to have it what could be called the negative sense but which might be more clearly described as the right to not be killed by another lifeform's actions' as opposed to the right to life. Of course, giving all life the right not be killed by other life would seem to sentence to death almost all the forms of life on Earth except those that feed through photosynthesis. I neither see any reason to want such a thing to be the case nor to believe that it is the case.
Post Number:#4
April 3rd, 2012, 12:04 am
Post Number:#5
April 4th, 2012, 4:29 am
Scott wrote: I think the premise that animals and humans are equal is false
Post Number:#6
April 12th, 2012, 8:50 pm
Post Number:#7
April 13th, 2012, 3:47 am
.Arne Næss argues that this right -- whatever she means by that -- cannot be quantified
Empathy, that much underused trait, is discouraged in animal testing laboratories, in favour of objectivity, and it’s this cold professionalism that allows otherwise well-adjusted human beings to burn, blind, electrocute, and mutilate a wide variety of other living animals, some of which are, by intention, very closely related to us in their DNA coding.
Post Number:#8
April 13th, 2012, 5:39 am
Scott wrote:With the premise that humans do not have an equal so-called 'right' to life as each other, I think it easily follows that the average pig, mouse or ant does not have the same so-called 'right' to life as the average human.
Even if we take it as so, the factors that determine whether or not someone has the right can be quantified just like the individual grades on schoolwork performed by a student taking a pass/fail class. It seems quite possible to me that any given species of non-humans animals would get an average grade of 59% on the metaphorical, pass or fail right to life scale and the average human would get a 70%, which in the metaphorically scholastic pass/fail analogue of Arne Næss's desired black-and-white thinking would mean animals fail and humans pass.
Belinda wrote:I applaud Catchy Title for raising this topic.
I think that we have to quantify rights, apportion them as we see fit. It is not a pleasant thing to have to do, but such is power that it brings responsibilities with it.
However the premiss is wrong that there exist natural rights. Theer are no natural rights.Rights are conferred upon beings by other beings' or a being's intention, usually conscious intention.
I fully support animal rights not because those rights are conferred by Mother Nature or by God but because animals can suffer and it is therefore immoral and repugnant to add to their suffering.
I suppose I have to admit that it is a natural extension of natural human sympathy and natural human reason to feel repugnance to causing suffering no matter what is the subject that suffers. But I still think that it is not correct to call any natural process 'rights'.Empathy, that much underused trait, is discouraged in animal testing laboratories, in favour of objectivity, and it’s this cold professionalism that allows otherwise well-adjusted human beings to burn, blind, electrocute, and mutilate a wide variety of other living animals, some of which are, by intention, very closely related to us in their DNA coding.
The labs claim that the animal technicians,the animals' living conditions, and their veterinary care are animal-centred. I would very much like the labs to admit unannounced spot inspections by animal protection bodies, and that the labs do not do this is cause for concern. Where vivisection is used, and it is used, lab animals are supposed to be adequately unconscious. I would also like disinterested , unannounced and frequent spot inspections of procedures. I understand that the great apes already have rights conferred upon them by the more enlightened societies, such as Western Europe and North America at least, not to be vivisected.
The quotation above is horrific as it should be. We should all know what we do to animals. Testing of cosmetics and cleaning products upon animals should be completely discontinued.
Testing upon animals when the tests are unnecessarily repetitive and done only because labs and commerce do not share their previous results should also be stopped and the labs forced by law to share information among themselves and with all their customers alike.
Vivisection when done with empathy and proper care of the lab animals, including euthanasia at early stages, is not good, but is probably the best we can manage in an imperfect world.
Belinda wrote:I applaud Catchy Title for raising this topic.
I think that we have to quantify rights, apportion them as we see fit. It is not a pleasant thing to have to do, but such is power that it brings responsibilities with it.
However the premiss is wrong that there exist natural rights. Theer are no natural rights.Rights are conferred upon beings by other beings' or a being's intention, usually conscious intention.
I fully support animal rights not because those rights are conferred by Mother Nature or by God but because animals can suffer and it is therefore immoral and repugnant to add to their suffering.
I suppose I have to admit that it is a natural extension of natural human sympathy and natural human reason to feel repugnance to causing suffering no matter what is the subject that suffers. But I still think that it is not correct to call any natural process 'rights'.Empathy, that much underused trait, is discouraged in animal testing laboratories, in favour of objectivity, and it’s this cold professionalism that allows otherwise well-adjusted human beings to burn, blind, electrocute, and mutilate a wide variety of other living animals, some of which are, by intention, very closely related to us in their DNA coding.
The labs claim that the animal technicians,the animals' living conditions, and their veterinary care are animal-centred. I would very much like the labs to admit unannounced spot inspections by animal protection bodies, and that the labs do not do this is cause for concern. Where vivisection is used, and it is used, lab animals are supposed to be adequately unconscious. I would also like disinterested , unannounced and frequent spot inspections of procedures. I understand that the great apes already have rights conferred upon them by the more enlightened societies, such as Western Europe and North America at least, not to be vivisected.
The quotation above is horrific as it should be. We should all know what we do to animals. Testing of cosmetics and cleaning products upon animals should be completely discontinued.
Testing upon animals when the tests are unnecessarily repetitive and done only because labs and commerce do not share their previous results should also be stopped and the labs forced by law to share information among themselves and with all their customers alike.
Vivisection when done with empathy and proper care of the lab animals, including euthanasia at early stages, is not good, but is probably the best we can manage in an imperfect world.
Post Number:#9
April 13th, 2012, 10:08 pm
CatchyTitle wrote:So simply because not all humans have the same right to life, it then automatically follows that animals must fall in line with this reasoning? I can't see any logic in this at all.
CatchyTitle wrote:The examples you gave to determine this (capital punishment, etc) don't apply to animals at all. "Sorry little chimp, we're testing chemicals on you because we humans aren't all equally justified in our own lives."
CatchyTitle wrote:You also invent a test, which due to your own subjective opinion, shows that humans will pass with higher grades than animals, despite no criteria selection to justify this. I like the detail you put in, with the actual estimated percentages.
CatchyTitle wrote:The question I pose to you, Scott, is what makes you think you're more valuable to your environment (the reason we're here in the first place) than, lets say, a rabbit?
Post Number:#10
April 13th, 2012, 10:55 pm
CatchyTitle wrote:The Norwegian philosopher Arne Næss once said that "...the right of all forms [of life] to live is a universal right which cannot be quantified. No single species of living being has more of this particular right to live and unfold than any other species."
In order for this to be an acceptable philosophy, can anyone think of a reason that this should not be the case?
Post Number:#11
April 14th, 2012, 1:31 pm
Post Number:#12
April 17th, 2012, 4:31 am
Scott wrote:CatchyTitle wrote:So simply because not all humans have the same right to life, it then automatically follows that animals must fall in line with this reasoning? I can't see any logic in this at all.
But how can animals be equal to humans if humans aren't equal to each other? If A does not equal B and B does not equal C and C does not equal A, isn't reasonable to conclude D doesn't A-C? It seems like valid reasoning to me. Let's break it down, have me elaborate and see:
Premise 1: Some humans lives are more intersubjectively valuable to me and the typical person not in a black-and-white way and not based on one single factor but on a sliding scale. Premise 2 (supported by examples in previous post): The noticeable differences between those whose lives are more valuable and less valuable include the following quantifiable traits: activity in the neocortex, overall activity in the brain, likelihood to ever be conscious in the future, estimated sum of the expected length of consciousness in the future, intelligence, ability to communicate to others, ability to be communicated with, ability to consciously perceive sensory input, ability to understand perceived sensory input, ability to achieve and maintain social/financial independence versus how much assistance is needed, availability of necessary assistance for non-independent beings, propensity towards aggressive violence or antisocial behavior, and likely expected contribution to civilized society whether positive or negative and the degree. Conclusion 1 (inferred from premise 1 and premise 2): Some humans' have more of at least some quantifiable qualities that make their lives intersubjectively more valuable to me and the typical person*. Premise 3: Non-mammal animals and at least certain non-human mammal species such as rats, sheep and deer on average have less activity in the neocortex (counting the absence of a neocortex as no such activity), less overall brain activity overall, shorter lifespans, less intelligence, less ability to communicate, less ability to be communicated with, less ability to consciously perceive and understand sensory input, less ability to be socially/financially independent as opposed to requiring assistance, less availability of needed assistance, more of a propensity towards aggressive violence and antisocial behavior, and less of a positive contribution to civilized society and/or more of a negative contribution to civilized society. Conclusion 2 (inferred from Conclusion 1 and Premise 3) : Some of the differences between certain animal species and humans include these species of animals on average having less of the quantifiable qualities that make their lives less valuable. Conclusion 3 (inferred from Conclusion 1 and Conclusion 2): On average, animal's lives are less intersubjectively valuable to me and the typical person than human lives. Conclusion 4 (inferred from Conclusion 3): The intersubjective value of animals lives is unequal to the intersubjective value of human lives to me and the average person.
That argument could be elaborated further and worded/structured better with more clarity and more explicit deduction, but for our purposes I think it will work as a tool to identify where you are not following me. It contains 3 premises and 4 inferences. Please specify exactly each and every premise of the 3 with which you disagree. Please specify exactly each and every inference that you do not think follows. *which upon reaching a certain threshold may mean the being has an allegedly non-quanifiable so-called 'right to life' whatever is meant by that by Næss.
***CatchyTitle wrote:The examples you gave to determine this (capital punishment, etc) don't apply to animals at all. "Sorry little chimp, we're testing chemicals on you because we humans aren't all equally justified in our own lives."
If one uses the principle of charity in the context of all I wrote in my previous post, I think one could come up with a connection between, for instance, the debate in the Terry Shivo case, the reasons organs are harvested from an otherwise breathing, heart-alive brain-dead person and the claim that it is slightly preferable to perform a potentially lethal experiment on a non-consenting rat than a non-consenting human. Although, I'm not sure what the relevance is of the proposed dialogue anyway, since I never said I supported animal testing especially on high-order mammals like chimps especially in non-exceptional circumstances. What I said is that I wouldn't argue against animal testing using the premise that animals are equal to humans because I don't think animals are completely equal to humans. Since I (as a vegetarian!) generally wouldn't test on a chimp or even eat a chicken and would generally prefer no chimps to be tested upon and no chickens to be eaten, I'm not sure what the proposed dialogue has to with what I wrote. Nonetheless, I think I could come up with dialogue that more accurately reflects what I wrote in context using the principle of charity to interpret me: "I'm sorry rat; we would ever so slightly rather perform this experiment on you that will give us the information we need to cure cancer and save countless human lives that may hurt and kill you without your consent than perform it on a human without their consent for reasons that parallel why we would rather let a coma patient never expected to awaken die than let an organ-donor receiving little girl die or why we would rather perform the test on a human rapist than on the typical human rape victim. It's not that we don't value your life at all or that we don't sympathize with you at all, rat; it's just that the level of value we have for your life and sympathy we have for you is not quite completely equal to that we have for the average human." I don't see what is so unsound with saying that to the rat; please explain it to me.CatchyTitle wrote:You also invent a test, which due to your own subjective opinion, shows that humans will pass with higher grades than animals, despite no criteria selection to justify this. I like the detail you put in, with the actual estimated percentages.
It was just an example of the way a spectrum of quantifiable factors can be the basis for a singular binary trait. The exact percentages were just a hypothetical possible example to illustrate the point in preceding sentence, not an actual guess of what the exact percentages would be if such a test was actually construed.CatchyTitle wrote:The question I pose to you, Scott, is what makes you think you're more valuable to your environment (the reason we're here in the first place) than, lets say, a rabbit?
I never said that I was more valuable than a rabbit to my environment. Indeed, I'm not even sure what that would mean or if it even makes sense and has meaning. How can an environment value something? Doesn't the act of valuing require conscious desire or conscious preference? I like the metaphor of mother nature, but you're not suggesting we take it literally; are you?
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