An argument for solipsism

I like the pluralism that from early on a human being gets both to believe in solipsism - alone alone all all alone - and in anti-solipsism - dammit Mum I need you.

Don't we get tied up in knots believing that one and only one truth is really really true?

Then the belief in other minds is a neat third stage of development. There's some speculation that a few other 'higher' animals can do this. See here for instance a description of chimpanzees assessing what might be in the minds of their audience: http://www.bbc.co.uk/nature/16305600

What philosophers view differently from ordinary people is something else.

It seems that at least since Plato, there have been philosophers who delight in distinguishing themselves from "ordinary people" and their concerns. I agree with Dewey that there has been a tendency in philosophy to disdain the "problems of men" and focus instead on the "problems" of philosophy, and that this has been to the detriment of philosophy and humanity. I also agree with Dewey and with pragmatism generally that the only true problems are problems which create real doubt and admit of resolution, and that we only think reflectively and critically when we encounter problems. Philosophers may be the the only people who take pride in the fact that they address questions which by their nature cannot be answered.

Again, this may have value as an exercise, and in promoting open-mindedness and creative thinking. But I think philosophy can do more than that, and question the value of doubting when there is no reason to do so.

Personally I believe philosophy should deal with both the speculative (the awe and wonder, not focus on doubting) and the practical down to earth experiences.

It is not 'nature cannot be answered', rather there it cannot be answered with absolute certainty. I think Dewey would agree with this.

From what I read of Dewey's 'Reconstruction of Philosophy', what he is against is the dogmatism and arrogance in Western Philosophy, e.g.

Even at the best, it has tended to produce an overdeveloped attachment to system for its own sake, and an over-pretentious claim to certainty.
They have insisted that they were more scientific than the sciences that, indeed, philosophy was necessary because after all the special sciences fail in attaining final and complete truth.

Philosophy has arrogated to itself the office of demonstrating the existence of a transcendent, absolute or inner reality and of revealing to man the nature and features of this ultimate and higher reality.
It has therefore claimed that it was in possession of a higher organ of knowledge than is employed by positive science and ordinary practical experience, and that it is marked by a superior dignity and importance a claim which is undeniable if philosophy leads man to proof and intuition of a Reality beyond that open to day-by-day life and the special sciences.

It would appear from the above he was condemning the academics, logical positivists and the analytics.

In anycase, I think the analytics, the non-analytics (note Kant as pointed out by Prismatic) had contributed to humanity in various ways. What is negative with these philosophies is when anyone of them hold arrogant and dogmatic view of their theories.

It would appear from the above he was condemning the academics, logical positivists and the analytics.

His attack in that book was primarily against Idealism, and philosophies based generally on the assumption of some kind of absolute or which rely on some form of absolute knowledge. Certainly he believed, as you note, that certainty is a chimera, and that philosophy's demand for certainty has contributed to need for reconstruction. That reconstruction was, as I understand it, to be achieved through the application of what Dewey believed to be the experimental method, the method of intelligent inquiry, to problems.

Which brings us back to the OP's demand for a certain refutation of solipsism, which seems to require, as far as the OP is concerned, that the existence of an "external world" be established with what he believes to be absolute certainty. Simply put, there can be no absolute certainty, and to demand is futile and representative of the kind of philosophy Dewey criticizes.

ciceronianus- I am not asking for absolute certainty! I'm simply asking for anything that indicates that the belief in other beings and the outside world is justified.

ciceronianus- I am not asking for absolute certainty! I'm simply asking for anything that indicates that the belief in other beings and the outside world is justified.

You use words. Where do they come from?

You ask us questions. Why do you bother, if we might not be here?

If surprises happen, what are they?

Context is all. You're acting as if belief in other beings and the outside world is justified. Maybe that's all you're going to get, even from philosophy.

I think that Ciceronianus is right;

Which brings us back to the OP's demand for a certain refutation of solipsism, which seems to require, as far as the OP is concerned, that the existence of an "external world" be established with what he believes to be absolute certainty. Simply put, there can be no absolute certainty, and to demand is futile and representative of the kind of philosophy Dewey criticizes.

Solipsism is one of several theories of existence and we make our choice among them probably based upon moral, or cognitive grounds for those choices. To choose to not believe that solipsism is correct is to choose naturalism, or materialism/physicalism, or the double aspect monism.

E.g. the only belief that saved that persistent sceptic George Berkeley from solipsism was his faith in God.

-- Updated Fri May 11, 2012 4:52 am to add the following --

ciceronianus- I am not asking for absolute certainty! I'm simply asking for anything that indicates that the belief in other beings and the outside world is justified.

It is morally jusifiable by reference to The Golden Rule, or human rights, or animal rights, or love for the natural environment.

It is psychologically justifiable by reference to our peace of mind.Each human more or less is a social animal.

It is cognitively jusitfied by reference to the facts of scientific progression from ignorance to empirical truths.By contrast the solipsist has no need to change the status quo because he is himself the essence of the status quo.

ciceronianus- I am not asking for absolute certainty! I'm simply asking for anything that indicates that the belief in other beings and the outside world is justified.

"Anything"? I must assume, then, that nothing which has mentioned or is indicated in this thread constitutes "something" of the kind you feel is adequate, including, presumably, the fact that you're participating in and indeed initiated this discussion. So, I'll ask again: what is it you consider to be a "good reason" to believe in the existence of those with whom you are communicating and the "external world"? What is proof you would consider satisfactory?

If you can't think of any, or have problems forumulating an explanation of it, I suggest this should tell you something about the usefulness of your inquiry.

ciceronianus- how do those things constitute proof of an outside world? In other words what about any of those things indicates that they are not just my experience through the five senses, but actually exist independently of me?

belinda- so an atheist in Berkeley's position would have to be a solipsist?

Also, could anyone please explain to me Moore and Wittgenstein's viewpoints on this issue? I am confused by Moore's here is a hand argument, as well as Wittgenstein's criticism of it.

ciceronianus- I am not asking for absolute certainty! I'm simply asking for anything that indicates that the belief in other beings and the outside world is justified.

The proposition 'There is a no world outside me' is in as much need of justification as the proposition 'There is a world outside me' is. You're committing an informal fallacy called an argument from ignorance. That is, you're saying

If you cannot prove p, then p is false.

So,

If you cannot prove there is a world outside me, then there is no world outside of me.

But that clearly is invalid. So, what I'm conveying is that fact that there are no good arguments against solipsism is not itself an argument (or a reason to believe in) for solipsism.

-- Updated May 11th, 2012, 10:54 pm to add the following --

E.g. the only belief that saved that persistent sceptic George Berkeley from solipsism was his faith in God.

Berkeley was no skeptic, in fact, his philosophy was against what he thought was skepticism. Oddly enough, he believed he was brining back common sense. The reason why is that his idealism entails direct awareness with objects (in this case sense-data), so unlike Locke's representationalism, there is no problem about the external world and so forth.

Solipsism is incoherent and realistically should be a non-issue.
It is only a pejorative term raised by the dogmatic realist who insist there is an absolute independent external world.

Although the number of individuals sincerely espousing solipsism has been small, it is not uncommon for one philosopher [imo, the dogmatic realist] to accuse another's arguments of entailing solipsism as an unwanted consequence,..

Thus anyone who acknowledge s/he is a solipsist (I have not come across any philosopher?) and tries to argue for it, has already lost the argument to the dogmatic realist from the start.

As such, if anyone who wants to argue for any non-realist theory, they should avoid, ignore, and reject the solipsism label to be attached to their theory. Just go ahead an argue why there is or there is no external world and the likes. The same goes for the loose term 'idealism'.

Jackwhitlocke wrote:

belinda- so an atheist in Berkeley's position would have to be a solipsist?

I believe so, because his scepticism rivalled that of Hume, and but for Berkeley's God who created order by harmonising and coordinating mind and body there would have been been no order. But there is order it is plain to see, so there must be something that harmonises and coordinates. I cannot see that for the idealist there can be an alternative to solipsism excpt for God. I think that the idealist must always be forced to presume a transcendent control of one sort or the other.Berkeleyism begins as idealism but is a sort of dualism because of the entirely other substance of God.

For myself, sitting through a good performance of Hamlet, reading Carol Ann Duffy's latest volume or standing before Rembrandt's paintings is reasonable enough proof of an external world. If you think your mind made those things up, well...

ciceronianus- how do those things constitute proof of an outside world? In other words what about any of those things indicates that they are not just my experience through the five senses, but actually exist independently of me?

There are problems with rejecting what you and everyone else has experienced every moment of life. First, you don't do so in fact; like any organism, you quite naturally go on interacting with others and your environment all the time. You do so actively and intentionally as well. You may as well question your own existence (perhaps you do).

Second, I personally cannot help but think that a solipsist must be vastly self-important, if not deranged. The idea that one is the only thing that exists, or that the universe is simply a great show being put on for one's benefit or to amuse someone or something, requires a degree of self-love I like to think no human could possess.

But more important is the fact that solipsism requires that there can be no proof of any kind that it is incorrect. That's because everything which would normally be considered proof by any reasonable definition is inadequate; the solipsist may simply claim that the proof whatever it may be does not exist or may not exist.

The fact is that we have every reason to believe that others exist and there is an "external world." This brings us back to absolute certainty. Solipsism, in rejecting the possibility of proof, in effect demands that we be absolutely certain that there are others and the "external world" and requires that we accept that they may not exist without any proof that this is the case.

ciceronianus- how do those things constitute proof of an outside world? In other words what about any of those things indicates that they are not just my experience through the five senses, but actually exist independently of me?

But more important is the fact that solipsism requires that there can be no proof of any kind that it is incorrect. That's because everything which would normally be considered proof by any reasonable definition is inadequate; the solipsist may simply claim that the proof whatever it may be does not exist or may not exist.

The fact is that we have every reason to believe that others exist and there is an "external world." This brings us back to absolute certainty. Solipsism, in rejecting the possibility of proof, in effect demands that we be absolutely certain that there are others and the "external world" and requires that we accept that they may not exist without any proof that this is the case.

Proof is always difficult to come by except in very carefully confined precincts and it inevitably depends on presuppositions at least as potent as what is to be proved.

Solipsism itself is parsimonious compared to realism in that it supposes far fewer things exist, but if you begin with the presupposition that only your mind exists, then it seems that no proof can contradict that. If you begin with the presupposition that anything exists outside of your mind, then solipsism is prevented by that very assumption.

Since things appear to happen that are against my will or without my knowledge, solipsism requires me to think that some part of my mind—the unconscious perhaps—is working against me. If I am going to be solipsistic and agree that nothing exists outside of my mind—food, sex, opera, books—then it seems only fair that it all be according to my wishes. I ought to get that much for giving up the universe.

If nothing exists outside the mind, that means that mind would be some sort of omnipotent God, or at least potent to create all that it know to exist. Can this "God" not understand its own creation? You could argue it's created by some "sub-conscious forces", but it seems unlikely to me that this "creator" would be as unknowing as it is, and encounter so many other "people" which it could say have a greater understanding of the creation, than the creator itself.