What philosophy offends you most?

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GE Morton
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Re: What philosophy offends you most?

Post by GE Morton »

Consul wrote: June 24th, 2022, 8:27 pm
There are both unstructured collectives/pluralities and structured ones. I call the latter complexes or systems. For example, a social organization is always a complex or system, since it is more than a mere plurality of people.
A large, meta-stable group of people who interact, but are not engaged in pursuit of of a common interest or goal, is a CAS (as defined earlier). But it is not an organism or a collective.
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Sy Borg
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Re: What philosophy offends you most?

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The labels don't matter, the dynamics do. Feynman said it best.


Societies have a socioeconomic metabolism, rhythmically distributing goods and services via its "veins and arteries". Societies consume, grow, develop, spread out, and die like the life they contain (and we do the same as the trillions of lives that we contain too).

Whatever the labels used, this is the situation.
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Re: What philosophy offends you most?

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Sy Borg wrote: June 24th, 2022, 8:53 pm The labels don't matter, the dynamics do. Feynman said it best.
Oh, you're quite right. But it is precisely the dynamics that distinguishes an organism from a CAS, and a collective from a collection.
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Re: What philosophy offends you most?

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GE Morton wrote: June 24th, 2022, 9:03 pm
Sy Borg wrote: June 24th, 2022, 8:53 pm The labels don't matter, the dynamics do. Feynman said it best.
Oh, you're quite right. But it is precisely the dynamics that distinguishes an organism from a CAS, and a collective from a collection.
The dynamics are identical - societies are born, they consume, they grow and develop, spread their influence, and then they die. How many collections do you know that do it? A stamp or coin collection? A collection of houses?

Consider your claim that societies had no interests. Yet, consider the interests of Monterrey. The city is dehydrated and badly in need of water. In some neighbourhoods there has been no water coming through the pipes and there is growing unrest: https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/ ... 022-06-20/
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Re: What philosophy offends you most?

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GE Morton wrote: June 24th, 2022, 8:41 pm
Consul wrote: June 24th, 2022, 8:06 pmIn the broadest sense of the term, "a collective object is anything which is a plurality."
Well, that may be the "broadest sense of the term," but it is not the commonly understood sense of the term. That "broad sense" collapses the difference between a collective and a collection.
As far as an alternative general term for (unstructured or structured) pluralities or multitudes of things is concerned, I prefer "collective" to "collection", because the latter is closely associated with set theory; and I don't regard the pluralities or multitudes I call collectives as sets (or classes) qua abstract objects which are different from the plurality or totality of their members.
"We may philosophize well or ill, but we must philosophize." – Wilfrid Sellars
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Re: What philosophy offends you most?

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Consul wrote: June 24th, 2022, 9:52 pm... I don't regard the pluralities or multitudes I call collectives as sets (or classes) qua abstract objects which are different from the plurality or totality of their members.
No synergies?
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Re: What philosophy offends you most?

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Sy Borg wrote: June 24th, 2022, 10:01 pm
Consul wrote: June 24th, 2022, 9:52 pm... I don't regard the pluralities or multitudes I call collectives as sets (or classes) qua abstract objects which are different from the plurality or totality of their members.
No synergies?
You mean "the interaction or cooperation of two or more organizations, substances, or other agents to produce a combined effect greater than the sum of their separate effects"? (https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/synergy)

Synergies are dynamic relations between (the members of) collectives.
"We may philosophize well or ill, but we must philosophize." – Wilfrid Sellars
GE Morton
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Re: What philosophy offends you most?

Post by GE Morton »

Gertie wrote: June 22nd, 2022, 7:40 am
Saying we "create" knowledge is, for most knowledge, inaccurate. As Consul said, we acquire it; it comes to us unbidden and with no effort on our part.
No. That's a linguistic habit. The tree doesn't give me its knowledge when I look at it because presumably the tree doesn't know anything.

Only Subjects are Knowers, we each know directly via our interaction with the world which results in us each creating experiential representations of that world. And we compare notes with other Subjects about their private models to create a shared model of the world we share. This shouldn't be controversial.
Well, you just confirmed what I said: " . . . we each know directly via our interaction with the world which results in us each creating experiential representations of that world": We know X which results in Y. The knowledge results in a model; hence it precedes the model. We created the model, but not the knowledge from which it was built. Or if we did create it we have no knowledge of how or when we did that, nor any explanation for it.
Crusoe might be having a dream, he might be deaf and not know sound, he might be colour blind, psychotic, etc.
He could be, but if he knows that birds sing and roses are red, he will not be deaf or color blind. And he is able to distinguish between dream experience and waking experience.
Fair point. But if we're to escape solipsism we each have to assume our experience represents some ontological reality. As soon as you said ''we'' you'd made that assumption, and that's fair enough otherwise you're just talking to yourself.
Yes, I agree. We have to postulate an external world if wish to explain experience, to supply a cause for the effect of experience. Explanation consists in finding causes for effects, and according to Kant, the impulse to demand causes for effects is a "category," a piece of cognitive programming "wired into" our brains (so to speak). So it is either assume an external world, or settle for solipsism. And the latter is profoundly unsatisfying, as well as boring. It is also simpler to explain the apparent existence of other minds by assuming they have an independent existence also, inhabitants of the external world we postulate. Those are both very productive, useful assumptions, but assumptions nevertheless.
Same with Kant I think, as soon as he generalises about ''our'' phenomenal experience rather than his own, he's made the assumption other people (experiencing subjects) exist. He's assumed there is an ontological world containing other Subjects. And his knowledge of that comes packaged within a whole lot of other experienced knowledge too, that trees and gravity and Paris exist,etc.
Well, not quite. Knowledge of trees, gravity, etc., is not "packaged with" the assumption of an external world. Those facts would exist even if we content ourselves with solipsism. The tree, gravity, etc., are just features within my experience. To say they exist is to say nothing more than that. It is only to explain their existence that requires an external world.
That "real ontological world" is a theoretical world --- one we have invented.
If you disentangle this I think you're actually left with either -

A) Your personal experience represents something else (a world independant of your experience) which ontologically exists, or -

2) All that exists is your own experience.

Either solipsism is true, or there is an ontological world your experience is representing. We each can't know the answer to that, but solipsism literally isn't worth talking about, so we assume a real world exists which we can inter-subjectively compare experiential notes about.
Agree, except that "representing" is presumptuous. Unless meant in the token sense (e.g., a cross symbol represents Christianity) that term implies some similarities, some sort of isomorphy, between the subject and its "representation." That assumption is not justified. That some sort of external reality causes our experience does not entail any isomorphy between the cause and effect.
Having made that assumption, we're left with the problem of knowing how accurate our individual and shared representations are. And we devise methodologies like predictability and inter-subjective third person falsifiability to assign more or less credibility and value.
Yes indeed --- "having made that assumption," we start wondering about the "accuracy" of the "representation." But as above, that assumption is not justified, and questions about accuracy are irrelevant.
But the problem remains that we are flawed and limited observers and thinkers who create models of the real world we interact with.
Your belief that we are "flawed and limited" derives from that "representation" assumption. We may be flawed and limited (in various respects), but not because we can't "accurately" describe the noumena.
The tree we see (and can touch, climb, savor its fruit), is the "real tree." That those sensory experiences "represent" something beyond them is an assumption --- a theory --- we've conjured up (though it's a pretty good theory).
If ''we'' see the tree, there is already an assumed world containing other seeing Subjects, right?. The choice here is solipsism, or a real world exists containing experiencing subjects who each create representations of it, then compare notes to agree something we call a tree exists which we similarly see, touch, etc.
The subjects agree on a description of it and a theory explaining it. That description and theory do not necessarily "represent" it, in other than, perhaps, a token sense.
Oh, no. The table is still solid, brown, has defined edges, etc. What our physical theories do is provide us explanations for "solidity," color, geometric properties, etc. Those explanations are not more "real" than the experienced properties; they're less "real," being theoretical. But highly useful.
(Again, as soon as you say ''we'', ''us'', ''our'' you've assumed the ontological world exists -the options are solipsism or a real world exists containing other Subjects who are known to us in the same experiential package as tres and tables and every other experience).

I think what you say here would be right if ontological reality is fundamentally relational - by which I mean that there's no 'set' reality of the world to be discovered, rather the fundamental nature of everything exists only in relation to everything else. So to feel a table as solid is as real as to think about a table as made mostly of empty space. QM might be pointing us that way, I dunno.
I'm not sure what you mean there by "relational," or by "ontological reality." If by the latter you mean the noumena, then we don't know how it is related to anything else, other than it causes phenomenal experience, or how its parts are related, or whether it even has parts. And it may be a "set reality," if that means immutable, eternal, etc., but if so that is not something we can discover about it.

We need to distinguish between two kinds of models. The "phenomenal world model" proposed by Metzinger is produced autonomically by our brains. It is not a considered, intentional construct, nor does it depend upon any social consensus. All sentient creatures, whether social animals or solitary hunters or scavengers, create such models. Those models require no instrospection, reflection, or language. They develop over first few days or months (depending on species) of life, from a template encoded in DNA. They are "transparent," we see through them to what we take to be "the world, reality," unaware that we're beholding a model.

The other type of model is the explanatory model, e.g., the models proffered by science, which we do create intentionally, reflectively, and which do require a social context (being constructed in language). That they are reasonably successful in explaining experience is evidence that the phenomenal models created by the "other minds" we postulate are similar enough to our own to permit communication. E.g., if you ask me, "Please pass the salt," and I pass the salt, that is evidence something denoted by "you," "I", and "the salt" exist in your phenomenal model as well as mine. But that doesn't mean your phenomenal model is identical to mine --- and communication difficulties often reveal those differences. And, of course, the phenomenal models created by humans may be radically different from those created by dogs, or Nagel's bats.
"Limited, flawed" --- in what way? "Experience of X" is the same thing as "Knowing that X." Knowledge by acqaintance just is experience.
Yes! Knowledge by acquaintance is experience, experience is knowing. There is no other knowing than experientially by Subjects. If this experience results from interacting with a real ontological world it is either a perfect and complete knowing of that world or it is limited and flawed.
Non-sequitur. It may not be "knowledge of" that world at all. All that can be said of that "world" is that is the cause of that experience, that knowledge. But knowledge of an effect X doesn't imply knowledge of the cause Y, beyond that Y caused X, especially when the Y is an unobservable, postulated "reality." We can be confident that (say) a forest fire had some cause, but not know what was the cause or anything about that hypothesized cause.
Knowing is something experiencing Subjects do, whether it's intentional or not.
Methinks that fact that "know" functions in language as a verb and takes gerunds ("knowing") is misleading you into viewing it as an act. But it isn't. Looking up at the sky is an act; seeing the moon and thereby learning and knowing it is full are not. Similarly, not everything one "does" is an act either, that term can also denote things that happen to one, e.g., aging, or learning or dying.
''Publically confirmable'' = inter-subjectively comparing notes. When something is observable and measurable this third-person comparison is fairly straightforward, tho it doesn't mean we don't all just share the same flaws and limitations. This third-person falsifiability is what we generally treat as objectively true. But even objective truth is really just a form of inter-subjective agreement by flawed and limited observers and thinkers. . . .

We compare notes and use tools like third person falsifiable observation and measurement, and find commonalities and differences. The commonalities become part of our shared world model. How those individual and shared models relate to ontological reality independantly of Subjective experience is ultimately unknowable.
Ok. But if it is unknowable, what are your grounds for claiming we are "flawed" and "limited"? Do you just mean we can make mistakes, and don't know everything we'd like to know?
I get your point. Not sure. We can correct our own anomalies, we can theorise beyond what is observable, note patterns, make predictions, etc in meticulous detail. It seems to me this all likely reflects some aspects of ontological reality, if only in a limited and flawed way.
Well, what seems likely is subjective. The problem is, we have no means of estimating how likely that is.
To call it a ''different realm of discourse'' is to categorise types of knowing-experience, right? ''Facts'' are what we call one type of knowing-experience which are justified in particular ways - third person falsifiable subjective commonalities which comprise our shared model. Which we consider reliably consistent and predictive - until it isn't.
Yes, agree. When a model's predictions fail we tweak it, revise it. Or if the failures are numerous or refute the key premises of the theory, we discard it, replace it with a new theory (one of Kuhn's "paradigm shifts").
There are are different types of discourse afforded different types of authority. We should all easily agree on third person falsifiable issues amenable to observation and measurement, I ought to agree that when I move around Russell's table it is my perspective which changes not the table, that the table is mainly empty space even tho it feels solid, etc. But when it comes to areas like psychology, social issues, art, etc we don't have that observation and measurement falsification tool. We have a tradition of authoritative figures making their best guesses inevitably drawing from their own understanding and experience. Even creating the language that discourse is framed in.
Well, you're lumping together several disparate realms of discourse there. Art criticism is indeed subjective, almost entirely so. But psychology does have some factual data to work from, and "social issues" embrace many questions upon which factual information has a bearing, and may even be decisive. That some persons may be disapproving of or feel uncomfortable with those facts doesn't alter them.
Ignoring that isn't helpful, it perpetuates narrow (if often unintentional) bias. You ignored my points about Hobbes' mum and Shakespeare's sister. Our culture, the knowledge air we breathe, isn't someimpartial recording of the world, it's models authored and adapted by the individuals and groups afforded the ability and authority to do so.
Yikes, I had to hunt back for that. Here's the paragraph, for reference:
Or how about Hobbes' mum who presumably loved and nurtured him from a helpless baby, would she have concluded human nature is essentially cruel and warlike. If she'd had his authoritative platform would that view of human nature be what we're taught about? I doubt it. (Would Hobbes himself have thought that if he hadn't lived through a Civil War?). I remember first reading Hobbes and thinking ''Huh? That's not my experience...''. Wolfe prompts us to think about what received wisdoms we'd have learned about the world from the plays of Shakespeare's sister if she'd had her brother's opportunities.
I didn't respond to those because the questions you ask can only have speculative answers, and more importantly, because Hobbes' and Shakespeare's views are just two of all but an infinite range of views, and for many people, have contributed nothing to whatever "wisdom" they may claim. "Authority" doesn't consist in the influence or popularity of someone's views, but in the extent to which those views rest on objective evidence, and conclusions which can be logically drawn from that evidence.
We're still in a PM limbo I think, and the challenges it presents require responsible reflection. Not defensive dismissal or to take it as license to make everything about me-me-me.
"Challenges" that reject the very methodologies for resolving disagreements and meeting challenges, without offering alternatives, are vacuous. As previously pointed out, PM's "challenges" challenge PM itself.
It invites us to think about what knowledge is, who constructs it, how that plays out in a world of Subjects. The Death of the Author is metaphorically akin to the Death of God as the reliable authoritative voice. Shared knowledge is an inter-subjective process of creation by flawed first person Subjects, some of whom are given special privilege in the discourse.
Well, part of the reason PM seems plausible to you clearly rests on that notion that knowledge is "constructed," "created," that certain "privileged persons" have created it, and have used their "power" and privileges to brainwash the rest of us with it. But as previously argued, knowledge is not "created;" it is acquired, mostly inadvertently. And most of it can be acquired by anyone, privileged or not. The knowledge of a Cambodian rice farmer working in his paddy that the sun is shining is just as valid as that of a cosmologist at MIT, and his claim to that effect just as authoritative. Demagogues, ideologues, dictators, shamans, fraudsters, and common liars do, of course, constantly peddle pseudo-knowledge --- knowledge by description --- but we have a remedy for that: ignore it unless it can be confirmed by acquaintance. Russian housewives and Cuban refugees understand the failure of Marxist economics as well as any Nobel-winning economist.
PM is what happens when the old framings no longer hold water, don't do the work of the shared model.
Well, we disagree. PM is what happens when, after seeing their theses and admonitions repeatedly refuted by argument and experience, they propose discarding rationality itself, as an insidious tool of oppressors. And thereby throw their own baby out with all that dirty bathwater.

-------

Yikes, your posts are challenging, not to mention time-consuming.
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Re: What philosophy offends you most?

Post by Sy Borg »

Consul wrote: June 24th, 2022, 11:23 pm
Sy Borg wrote: June 24th, 2022, 10:01 pm
Consul wrote: June 24th, 2022, 9:52 pm... I don't regard the pluralities or multitudes I call collectives as sets (or classes) qua abstract objects which are different from the plurality or totality of their members.
No synergies?
You mean "the interaction or cooperation of two or more organizations, substances, or other agents to produce a combined effect greater than the sum of their separate effects"? (https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/synergy)

Synergies are dynamic relations between (the members of) collectives.
Indeed, such as the synergies within the collectives known as eukaryotic animals.
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Re: What philosophy offends you most?

Post by GE Morton »

Sy Borg wrote: June 24th, 2022, 9:17 pm
GE Morton wrote: June 24th, 2022, 9:03 pm
Sy Borg wrote: June 24th, 2022, 8:53 pm The labels don't matter, the dynamics do. Feynman said it best.
Oh, you're quite right. But it is precisely the dynamics that distinguishes an organism from a CAS, and a collective from a collection.
The dynamics are identical - societies are born, they consume, they grow and develop, spread their influence, and then they die. How many collections do you know that do it? A stamp or coin collection? A collection of houses?
No, they're not identical. Go back and re-read the differences I listed.
Consider your claim that societies had no interests. Yet, consider the interests of Monterrey.
I didn't say that societies have no interests. I said they have no interests not reducible to the interests of their members. That is obviously the case with Monterray.
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Re: What philosophy offends you most?

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Gertie, you are falling down one of GE's rhetorical black holes and you have already invoked a "Yikes" and a huge broken down tit-for-tat from him. When he says "Egad" at you, then you know you really are in deep :mrgreen:
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Re: What philosophy offends you most?

Post by Sy Borg »

GE Morton wrote: June 24th, 2022, 11:48 pm
Sy Borg wrote: June 24th, 2022, 9:17 pm
GE Morton wrote: June 24th, 2022, 9:03 pm
Sy Borg wrote: June 24th, 2022, 8:53 pm The labels don't matter, the dynamics do. Feynman said it best.
Oh, you're quite right. But it is precisely the dynamics that distinguishes an organism from a CAS, and a collective from a collection.
The dynamics are identical - societies are born, they consume, they grow and develop, spread their influence, and then they die. How many collections do you know that do it? A stamp or coin collection? A collection of houses?
No, they're not identical. Go back and re-read the differences I listed.
Consider your claim that societies had no interests. Yet, consider the interests of Monterrey.
I didn't say that societies have no interests. I said they have no interests not reducible to the interests of their members. That is obviously the case with Monterray.
What are the interests of a houseplant that are not reducible to its cells? Same situation.
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Re: What philosophy offends you most?

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GE Morton wrote: June 24th, 2022, 6:55 pm Sure there are "collective intentionalities." The trouble is, societies are not collectives. There are thousands of collectives with "collective intentionalities" within a society (such as those mentioned in your quote), but society as a whole is not one. It is merely a collection of collectives.
You are bending over backward better than most limbo dancers! 😋 Now, it seems, you accept the sentient-like - not "sentient" - attributes of human social groupings up to a certain size. But when the groups get to the size of 'society', your objections re-surface. It is difficult to see how the size of a group can give rise to this change in attitude...? 🤔
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Re: What philosophy offends you most?

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Sy Borg wrote: June 24th, 2022, 8:53 pm Feynman said it best.
Was there ever a situation when Feynman didn't say it best? 🤔 I suspect not. 👍😉
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Re: What philosophy offends you most?

Post by GE Morton »

Pattern-chaser wrote: June 25th, 2022, 10:00 am
You are bending over backward better than most limbo dancers! 😋 Now, it seems, you accept the sentient-like - not "sentient" - attributes of human social groupings up to a certain size. But when the groups get to the size of 'society', your objections re-surface. It is difficult to see how the size of a group can give rise to this change in attitude...? 🤔
Well, you're ignoring the distinctions I've given several times. A collective is defined as a group cooperatively pursuing a common interest or goal. The size of the group is irrelevant. A jazz quintet is a collective, as is the Sierra Club, which has several thousand members. The members of both groups are engaged in pursuit of common interests, making music in the first case, conserving the natural environment in the latter. But there is no common, unifying interest among all members of (modern, civilized) societies. There is no common goal they are all cooperatively pursuing. Hence they are not collectives.

And any group of sentient creatures can be derivatively described as sentient, that imputed sentience of the group being derived from, a "shorthand" for, the sentience of its members.
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