What philosophy offends you most?

[GE Morton]

I thought you wrote: "A proposition is objective if its truth conditions are public, i.e., anyone can perform the observation which will confirm or fail to confirm its truth." The public certainly thought they were performing observations confirming Christianity.

They thought no such thing. The Bible ("God's Word") and the assurances of priests ("God's representatives on Earth") justified their beliefs. No observations were necessary. Religion is the antithesis of empiricism.

Your premises are no more objective or self-evident than theirs.

A strangely presumptuous claim, given that I haven't stated any premises.

[GE Morton]

That is anthropo-exclusive since animals cannot express their own moral terms, moral judgements naturally exclude their own needs from moral rules, and are enslaved by the whims of the anthrop-

That animals can't assert their rights has no bearing on whether they have them. Neither can infants or comatose persons. Neither do moral judgments "naturally exclude" the needs of animals. That depends upon the moral theory upon which those judgments are based.

[Ecurb]

I thought you wrote: "A proposition is objective if its truth conditions are public, i.e., anyone can perform the observation which will confirm or fail to confirm its truth." The public certainly thought they were performing observations confirming Christianity.

They thought no such thing. The Bible ("God's Word") and the assurances of priests ("God's representatives on Earth") justified their beliefs. No observations were necessary. Religion is the antithesis of empiricism.

Your premises are no more objective or self-evident than theirs.

A strangely presumptuous claim, given that I haven't stated any premises.

Feel free to state them, if you're so almighty sure of their being objective and self-evident. I assure you that in the religious ages, religion was thought to be objective and self-evident. You have merely traded one form of idolatry for another.

[Ecurb]

By the way, I can see why you despise Post-Modernism, as it casts your false idols into the flames.

[GE Morton]

I assure you that in the religious ages, religion was thought to be objective and self-evident. You have merely traded one form of idolatry for another.

You can "assure me"? I doubt that any of those believers even knew the meanings of those terms.

[Ecurb]

I assure you that in the religious ages, religion was thought to be objective and self-evident. You have merely traded one form of idolatry for another.

You can "assure me"? I doubt that any of those believers even knew the meanings of those terms.

Yes -- you're so much smarter than all those great Christian Theologians, GE. You are certainly better than they at making yourself look like a conceited , know-it-all buffoon. (Although you are probably right that Augustine and Thomas Acquinas didn't speak English.)

[GE Morton]

By the way, I can see why you despise Post-Modernism, as it casts your false idols into the flames.

Ah, another retreat to ad hominems.

[Sculptor1]

That is anthropo-exclusive since animals cannot express their own moral terms, moral judgements naturally exclude their own needs from moral rules, and are enslaved by the whims of the anthrop-

That animals can't assert their rights has no bearing on whether they have them. Neither can infants or comatose persons. Neither do moral judgments "naturally exclude" the needs of animals. That depends upon the moral theory upon which those judgments are based.

Infants and comatose persons are humans and not animals and enjoy the same categorical rights as other humans. They are not animals.
Are you implying that animals have the same rights as humans?

[GE Morton]

Infants and comatose persons are humans and not animals and enjoy the same categorical rights as other humans.

Well, no, they don't. They have rights to life (as do all other animals), but no rights to liberty, for instance. The actions of infants, young children, and comatose persons are mostly controlled by other persons.

They are not animals.

Huh? Are they plants?

Are you implying that animals have the same rights as humans?

No. They, like humans, have rights to whatever they have first possessed. And keep in mind that the moral question is not what rights they have, which is a factual question, but what obligations moral agents have to respect their rights.

[Pattern-chaser]

Even restricting ourselves to philosophy — this is a philosophy forum, after all — the word "objectivity" carries a whole spectrum of meanings, and it is highly likely that you are both using a different definition, and that your definitions are not the same as the one I'm thinking of. We need to define this term if we are to avoid the pointless semantic squabbles we have all seen so often in the past.

Yes indeed. I just posted my definitions of "objective" and "subjective" in a reply to Sy (also posted many times before in other threads):

Perhaps I should reiterate what "objective" and "subjective" mean. Both terms are properties of propositions, like "true" and "false." A proposition is objective if its truth conditions are public, i.e., anyone can perform the observation which will confirm or fail to confirm its truth. E.g., "Paris is the capital of France." A subjective proposition is one whose truth conditions are private, confirmable only by the speaker, e.g., "I have a headache," "I prefer Beethoven to Mozart."

That's a perfectly workable definition of a word, but it is very different to other definitions used widely by others. To you, "objective" means 'testable', in the sense that your proposition might be verified or falsified. This meaning will surely result in confusion and misunderstanding, don't you think?

[Pattern-chaser]

The axioms and postulates of every theory are unjustified assumptions --- which means that no justification for them is given within the theory; they're accepted as true a priori. But that doesn't mean they have no justification.

Er, yes, it does. If we had a justification for these assertions, we would use it. But, thanks to Herr Gödel, we know that any logical system is — must be — incomplete, and these assertions simply reflect that. Nevertheless, they remain unjustified.

Sorry, but that leads to a reductio ad absurdum, namely, an infinite regress. Hence no argument could ever reach a conclusion. All theories begin from some premises assumed to be true and self-evident.

No, all theories begin from premises assumed to be true. But they are not considered or declared to be "self-evident". They are honestly declared as "axioms" or as "assumptions", making it clear that these are things we believe to be true, but which might not actually be true, because we have no conclusive proof to offer or present.

And Gödel's result regarding completeness has nothing to do with the necessity for self-evident premises in theories or arguments.

Correct. Perhaps this is because there is no "necessity" for "self-evident" premises in theories or arguments?

Usually the justification lies in common understanding and experience.

In other words, there isn't one. The 'justification' you describe is unfounded and unjustified.

Common experience doesn't justify "The sun rises in the East and sets in the West"? What, in your view, WOULD justify it?

If it is offered as a certain conclusion, then nothing could justify it. If it is offered as what it is — something that has always happened, as far as we know, and is therefore expected to continue happening in the same way — then it is already quite acceptable without any qualification.

"self-evident (​ADJECTIVE):
1. obvious, and therefore not needing any explanation"

Yes, I'm as aware of such definitions as you are. I assert that such definitions continue a long-standing misunderstanding. They might be OK in everyday parlance/life, but such things are unacceptable in science or in philosophy.

Everything is either a guess/assumption/axiom/etc, or it is an assertion supported by some kind of evidence, or some logical equivalent of evidence. Nothing is "obvious" in science or philosophy; nothing at all.

[GE Morton]

That's a perfectly workable definition of a word, but it is very different to other definitions used widely by others. To you, "objective" means 'testable', in the sense that your proposition might be verified or falsified. This meaning will surely result in confusion and misunderstanding, don't you think?

I don't see why. What other definitions do you have in mind?

There is one other widely-used definition, where it is applied to persons, not propositions, and means that the person has reached some judgment or made some decision dispassionately, without bias, prejudice, etc. E.g., judges regularly admonish jurors to base their verdicts on the evidence presented, and not on their sympathies with the victims or feelings regarding the litigating parties.

But when doing philosophy we're asked to evaluate what someone says; all we have are the propositions he asserts.

[Pattern-chaser]

That's a perfectly workable definition of a word, but it is very different to other definitions used widely by others. To you, "objective" means 'testable', in the sense that your proposition might be verified or falsified. This meaning will surely result in confusion and misunderstanding, don't you think?

I don't see why. What other definitions do you have in mind?

I have in mind the spectrum of meanings, starting from 'absolute and mind-independent correspondence with that which actually is', and ending up with meanings like "detached", "unbiased", or 'we tried our best not to be too emotional'. These are the meanings that, in philosophy, are used almost exclusively.

[GE Morton]

The axioms and postulates of every theory are unjustified assumptions --- which means that no justification for them is given within the theory; they're accepted as true a priori. But that doesn't mean they have no justification.

Er, yes, it does. If we had a justification for these assertions, we would use it. But, thanks to Herr Gödel, we know that any logical system is — must be — incomplete, and these assertions simply reflect that. Nevertheless, they remain unjustified.

Sorry, but that leads to a reductio ad absurdum, namely, an infinite regress. Hence no argument could ever reach a conclusion. All theories begin from some premises assumed to be true and self-evident.

No, all theories begin from premises assumed to be true. But they are not considered or declared to be "self-evident".

We're just quibbling here about the use of that phrase. Consul (above) posted an SEP link reviewing debates in the philosophy literature as to its meaning. The author quote Lockes's definition: "Locke says that a self-evident proposition is one that 'carries its own light and evidence with it, and needs no other proof: he that understands the terms, assents to it for its own sake.'” Others have adopted that definition, but the author also cites objections, which hold that mere understanding of a proposition surely can't be evidence of its truth, or provide a reason for believing it.

The only propositions which "carry . . . evidence within it" of their truth are tautologies, e.g., "All bachelors are unmarried." Someone who disputes this needs to explain just how any other sort of evidence is "carried" within a proposition.

They are honestly declared as "axioms" or as "assumptions", making it clear that these are things we believe to be true, but which might not actually be true, because we have no conclusive proof to offer or present.

Yes, the axioms of a theory might not have been true. But the evidence that they are true is so pervasive and consistent that there is no room for doubt about it --- we simply cannot doubt them (just try to doubt that the sun rises in the East and sets in the West --- and don't confuse doubting that it does with imagining it being otherwise).

The term "self-evident" is unfortunate, because the words themselves suggest something like Locke's definition. But that is not the understanding most theoreticians have in mind when they choose the axioms for their theories. What they mean by it is "obvious, beyond reasonable doubt, compelled by the available evidence."

Correct. Perhaps this is because there is no "necessity" for "self-evident" premises in theories or arguments?

Of course there is. Unless the theory proceeds from premises whose truth is not in question there can be no confidence in the conclusion.

Common experience doesn't justify "The sun rises in the East and sets in the West"? What, in your view, WOULD justify it?

If it is offered as a certain conclusion, then nothing could justify it.

Huh? Observations and experience can't justify synthetic propositions? We can never be sure that any of them are true or false?

Yes, I'm as aware of such definitions as you are. I assert that such definitions continue a long-standing misunderstanding. They might be OK in everyday parlance/life, but such things are unacceptable in science or in philosophy.

Ah, but they're ubiquitous in both science and philosophy. For example, one axiom of General Relativity is the Equivalence Principle:

https://www.britannica.com/science/equi ... -principle

That principle certainly can be imagined not to hold, but the evidence that it does is beyond doubt. So it's taken as self-evident, in the dictionary sense.

[GE Morton]

I have in mind the spectrum of meanings, starting from 'absolute and mind-independent correspondence with that which actually is', and ending up with meanings like "detached", "unbiased", or 'we tried our best not to be too emotional'. These are the meanings that, in philosophy, are used almost exclusively.

Ah, yes, the term is used that way, by some speculative metaphysicians who have no idea "what actually is," and thus no idea how well their claims "correspond" to it. That use of "objective" is presumptuous.

Here is the dictionary definition:

"Objective (adj.):

"2: of, relating to, or being an object, phenomenon, or condition in the realm of sensible experience independent of individual thought and perceptible by all observers : having reality independent of the mind"

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/objective

The only grounds we have for declaring something to be independent of the mind is that it is perceptible by all observers. (To "declare" something to be independent of the mind is, of course, to assert some proposition about it. That proposition will be objective if what it asserts is indeed perceptible by all observers).