Again you offer no explanation of what this means. Is there a difference between pure and impure intuition? Must what one intuits be true or is it only true that they intuit it?Again pure intuition has to be genuine.
Are these part of the same question or two different questions? Understanding intuition as an aspect of psychology is quite different than understanding intuition epistemologically. The paragraph addresses the question you are avoiding. I don’t know what proof has to do with a psychological understanding of intuition.Could we agree that understanding intuition is an aspect of psychology that we cannot prove? Do you agree with this paragraph?
Why do you evade what is a simple question: is intuition infallible?
In short, in order to have knowledge (justified true belief)
In short, this is anachronistic. Knowledge is not for Plato justified true belief. The scholarship in the last fifty years or so makes this clear.
It is not a rational order. If it were it could be grasped by reason, but see the Divided Line (the one I link to), reason (dianoia) cannot grasp the higher Forms.… we have to transcend the ever-changing flux of the physical world and grasp a permanent rational order behind the flux …
Again, see the Divided Line and the distinction between the mathematical, which can be grasped by reason, and the Forms, which cannot. The Good is not a mathematical object. It is seen directly by the mind in a way that is analogous to the eyes seeing what is before them.This "grasping" is an intellectual act of the mind, which, in its purest manifestation, is exclusively formal (i.e., mathematical).
But after suggesting the existing of such innate ideas the dialogues always show that such an idea is problematic. Innate ideas are not even mentioned in the Republic.Such an intellectual act can take place only if there are certain innate ideas upon which it can be based.
No, knowledge is the grasping of these intelligible truths. One cannot show the relation unless one first knows the eternal intelligible truths.Knowing, then, is an act of making the observable world intelligible by showing how it is related to an eternal order of intelligible truths.
Plato was not an idealist and did not deny the reality of the changing physical world.Physical objects are real only insofar as they are intelligible, but they can be intelligible only in terms of that which does not change.
Close, but misleading. We do not need knowledge of the Forms to identify a horse or a man. We would, however, need knowledge of the Forms to know what the truth, beauty, justice, and the good are.But since the visible world is constantly changing, it cannot be used as the basis for identifying what things are.
Here is a clearer and more accurate diagram of the divided line:Look at the diagram at the end of that section. Is there anything you disagree with?
books.google.com/books?id=TofYaAFbloQC& ... mp;f=false
Note the confusion in your diagram regarding the intelligible realm.
That is Aristotle not Plato, and he arrives at the distinction rationally.“universal in the particular”
Once again you have mistaken Plato’s image for the truth. The link I provided contains the whole of Bloom’s excellent translation of the Republic. Find the section where Socrates is pressed to say what the Good itself is. Pay careful attention to what he says. There are two problems: first, they would still not know what the Good is, and, second, Socrates himself does not know what it is. The whole thing is an image of what he says "seems most likely".… the balance of heart and mind which leads one on the inner path of "being" directed towards the “Good.”
Compare also, the description of the philosopher in the Republic with the description in the Symposium. The philosopher in the Symposium is a lover of wisdom, one who pursues wisdom, but does not possess it. Only the gods possess wisdom. This fits the description given in the Apology. Both the Symposium and the Apology make a distinction between human and divine wisdom. The philosopher possesses human wisdom, which is knowledge of one’s ignorance. In the Republic, however, there is a shift from the lover of wisdom to the possessor of wisdom that occurs when one sees the Forms themselves. The philosopher of the Republic is a god.
Nowhere in the Platonic literature do we find such gods. Socrates, the paradigmatic philosopher possessed human not divine wisdom. He knew he was ignorant, but was wiser than all others because he knew he did not know. His image of true knowledge was not based on transcendent experience but rather serves to show the gap between the truth itself, which we do not possess, and the opinions we do.