Re: Why the West must ban Muslim immigration
Posted: August 21st, 2018, 5:06 am
Jesus: Jewish immigrant from Judea
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Philosophy for Philosophers
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Fooloso4 wrote: ↑August 20th, 2018, 11:43 am Dachshund:
You can recall it in any way you want, but there is a record of what was said by whom and when. It clearly shows that you did not initially understand Burke at all and over the course of the discussion learned much more about him.As I recall, Fooloso4 , while you huffed and puffed about how horrible a person I was for daring to request a justification for the assumption of equal human dignity that grounds the contemporary pro- human rights discourse, you never did provide any kind of theoretical (or other) justification for them - DID YOU ?
I am not going to rehash the argument. Your fundamental misunderstanding of Burke is evident in the following:
You stumbled when attempting to walk this back after it was pointed out the Burke claimed the the natural rights of mankind are “sacred things”.While Burke does say that the "natural rights" of man exist, he regards them to be of no real importance with respect to the conduct of human affairs …
As to the question of human dignity, on page 2 I said:
What assumptions underlie the idea that human dignity is something that requires justification? Perhaps you’ve got it backwards. Instead of starting with abstract rational concepts begin with considerations of man in his natural state as we find him rather than the fictional “state of nature”. Man is by nature a social animal that from a very early age displays care and empathy. From this perspective what is justified must be justified in terms of what is beneficial and unjustified what is harmful to us considered both individually and as a society. Care and consideration do not need justification, justification is based on it.
Evidently, you still do not understand how this answers your challenge. Evidently, you still do not understand Kant’s answer to your challenge either - dignity is not a matter of one’s worth or value to another. A human being is not a means to the ends of some other human being. Or, perhaps you do understand this and think that others must justify their existence to you.
So you seem to be implying that your personal set of criteria would offer rights more or less to whosoever you deem fit?Dachshund wrote: ↑August 22nd, 2018, 7:54 am ... But here's the big problem, Fooloso4; namely, if the capacity for rational agency is a capacity that varies continuously in magnitude ( and it is, BTW, a concrete, cold fact that this is indeed the case in human human beings) one wonders how on Earth will we ever be able to pick out some threshold level of capacity such variations in rational agency capacity above the threshold do not generate corresponding differences in fundamental moral status ?
Thus spake Dachshund (WOOF, WOOF !!)
Once again, there is a record of who said what and when. It was only after I pointed out to you that Burke advocated ancient rather than modern natural rights that you changed your story. All of the following is from page 3.You misunderstand him because you are ignorant of the fact that Burke used the word "nature" in the social and political context in two very different ways.
You began to talk about “true natural rights”, and pretended it was necessary to warn me about the very thing I had just pointed out to you. Prior to this you said:Natural rights philosophy did not begin with the modern natural rights philosophers, all, including Burke, were influenced by Cicero, who in turn was influenced by Plato and Aristotle.
Clearly you had not yet made the distinction between ancient and modern natural rights traditions, and so, you said you were in disagreement with Burke about the existence of natural rights.In short, my only disagreement with Burke is that I do not believe that what refers to (reluctantly and in and disapproving terms) as the purely "abstract", "theoretical", "metaphysical" ( natural ) "rights of man" do actually exist in reality. Briefly, I do not believe that they do. I do not believe they are things that actually exist as components of reality.
In the present discussion you say:He is not opposing natural rights but natural rights founded on "abstract", "theoretical", "metaphysical" claims. Natural rights are, according to Burke, sacred, that is, from God.
Note carefully, how Burke attributes these type (sic) of "natural rights" to men, not to some individual or group of men, but to all men. In Burke's own words:Note carefully, how Burke attributes these type of "natural rights" to men, in the plural, and to mankind.
Dachshund:Permit me then to continue our conversation, and to tell you what the freedom is that I love, and that to which I think all men entitled. This is the more necessary, because, of all the loose terms in the world, liberty is the most indefinite. It is not solitary, unconnected, individual, selfish liberty, as if every man was to regulate the whole of his conduct by his own will. The liberty I mean is social freedom. It is that state of things in which liberty is secured by the equality of restraint. A constitution of things in which the liberty of no one man, and no body of men, and no number of men, can find means to trespass on the liberty of any person, or any description of persons, in the society. This kind of liberty is, indeed, but another name for justice; ascertained by wise laws, and secured by well-constructed institutions. [emphasis added] (http://oll.libertyfund.org/quotes/473)
Society, according to Burke, does not confer rights, it protects man’s God given rights. He is in this respect in agreement with the modern natural rights philosophers. Once again, this was covered on page 3. Where he differs is with regard to the sovereignty of the individual.The fact that he does this indicates that he was thinking of rights enjoyed by men living together in society, not of rights attributed to the individual in a pre-social state of nature.
Now that we have cleared that mess up, if there is another iteration of this, no doubt you will think it necessary to instruct me regarding the things I just corrected you on, as if I and not you had not understood.Now that we have cleared that mess up …
You seem to be avoiding the underlying question:… you seem to be suggesting that one can theoretically justify the modern notion of human rights by appealing to Kant's ethical theory.
You have missed the point. Justification must be based on something that does not need to be justified, otherwise nothing could be justified.What assumptions underlie the idea that human dignity is something that requires justification?
What is the theoretical justification for this? As I pointed out on the other topic:Power to be legitimate must be according to that eternal, immutable law, in which will and reason are the same.
Burke is in agreement that human rights need no justification. Only he bases this on God whereas Kant bases it on humanity.… one man’s eternal, immutable law is another’s metaphysical fantasy. And, of course, if that eternal, immutable law was Sharia law or Halakha, or some other law other than your particular version of Christianity, that would be a problem. Wouldn’t it?
There is no problem. Rational agency has to do with how we as ration agents ought to treat ALL persons, not how we should treat persons individually based on their rational capacities. Kant inherits Aristotle’s description of man as the rational animal. Prior to any determination of the limits of your capacities as a rational being Kant says you should not be treated merely as a means because of your humanity.In short, according to Kant, possession of the faculty for rational agency confers an EQUAL, FUNDAMENTAL status on ALLpersons … But here's the big problem, Fooloso4; namely, if the capacity for rational agency is a capacity that varies continuously in magnitude.
And that is why understanding requires more than a shallow reading and shallow thinking. Look beyond what you see on the face of things.One the face of it, the Kantian account of rational agency is like an account of moral status that identifies height as the characteristic of living beings that determines their moral status, proclaims that tall is better than short, and identifies beings over 6 feet tall as the first-class citizens of the moral universe.
I don’t think your lack of understanding is a big problem for anyone other than you.Do you see the problem (?) - it a quite a F**king big one Fooloso4, ISN'T IT ??!!
Sorry buddy. I don't think the irony of this is lost on anyone other than you.See you later, buddy.I hoped you've learned something !
No. What I am saying, briefly, is that I do not think it is possible, in theory, to specify a moral feature that is normatively significant, separates the being that we want to think of as persons (i.e. rights-bearers) from non-persons, and does not vary by degree (that is, one either has this moral feature or one does not). If we COULD successfully locate such a feature,then we would have solved the kind of problem that I said besets Kant's "rational agency" moral theory of human dignity.ThomasHobbes wrote: ↑August 22nd, 2018, 9:15 amSo you seem to be implying that your personal set of criteria would offer rights more or less to whosoever you deem fit?Dachshund wrote: ↑August 22nd, 2018, 7:54 am ... But here's the big problem, Fooloso4; namely, if the capacity for rational agency is a capacity that varies continuously in magnitude ( and it is, BTW, a concrete, cold fact that this is indeed the case in human human beings) one wonders how on Earth will we ever be able to pick out some threshold level of capacity such variations in rational agency capacity above the threshold do not generate corresponding differences in fundamental moral status ?
Thus spake Dachshund (WOOF, WOOF !!)
So if Doggy says tall people get all the prizes, or people with blonde hair and blues eyes, or those with higher IQs, area allowed certain rights and privileges, that means people who happen to fail the criteria fail to get rights?
Is that what you are saying?
The problem of placing hard all-or-nothing dividing lines on the continua of Nature has been discussed numerous times before. So your comment above is nothing new. The difference with you, as ever, is your inconsistency:Dachshund wrote:In short, if the basis for according beings the enhanced moral status of persons (i.e. bearers of rights) is some moral feature - let's call it "X"- and "X" does not vary by degree, then everyone who has "X" at all possesses it to the same extent, so there would be no evident ground for denying an equal fundamental moral status to all "X" -bearers, and everything would be sweet. The only problem we have is identifying "X"; and in my opinion it's a F**King BIG problem because I simply do not believe that "X" exists. No one has been successful in identifying such an "X" to date, and I am convinced that no one ever will.
viewtopic.php?p=301562#p301562Dachshund wrote:My view is that the abortion ( medical/chemical destruction) of a live fertilized ovum in a woman2s womb at any time after moment after conception should be banned because it effectively represents the cold-blooded, premeditated murder of a defenseless and utterly vulnerable (potential) human being.
In Dachshund’s defense, he is consistent in his inconsistency, never failing to be inconsistent.The difference with you, as ever, is your inconsistency
In fact you are saying what I accused you of.Dachshund wrote: ↑August 22nd, 2018, 1:13 pmNo. What I am saying, briefly, is that I do not think it is possible, in theory, to specify a moral feature that is normatively significant, separates the being that we want to think of as persons (i.e. rights-bearers) from non-persons, and does not vary by degree (that is, one either has this moral feature or one does not). If we COULD successfully locate such a feature,then we would have solved the kind of problem that I said besets Kant's "rational agency" moral theory of human dignity.ThomasHobbes wrote: ↑August 22nd, 2018, 9:15 am
So you seem to be implying that your personal set of criteria would offer rights more or less to whosoever you deem fit?
So if Doggy says tall people get all the prizes, or people with blonde hair and blues eyes, or those with higher IQs, area allowed certain rights and privileges, that means people who happen to fail the criteria fail to get rights?
Is that what you are saying?
...
Regards
Dachshund
Fooloso4 wrote: ↑August 22nd, 2018, 1:03 pm
Dachshund:
There is no problem. Rational agency has to do with how we as ration agents ought to treat ALL persons, not how we should treat persons individually based on their rational capacities. Kant inherits Aristotle’s description of man as the rational animal. Prior to any determination of the limits of your capacities as a rational being Kant says you should not be treated merely as a means because of your humanity.In short, according to Kant, possession of the faculty for rational agency confers an EQUAL, FUNDAMENTAL status on ALLpersons … But here's the big problem, Fooloso4; namely, if the capacity for rational agency is a capacity that varies continuously in magnitude.
One the face of it, the Kantian account of rational agency is like an account of moral status that identifies height as the characteristic of living beings that determines their moral status, proclaims that tall is better than short, and identifies beings over 6 feet tall as the first-class citizens of the moral universe. ...And that is why understanding requires more than a shallow reading reading and shallow thinking.
Fooloso4,
I think I understand Kant's ethical theory perfectly well. I understand Kant's position to be that all human beings are all equal in terms of their fundamental moral worth, but I think it is clear that the arguments he uses to justify this radical moral egalitarianism are fatally flawed. As I have said to you, it is a self-evident fact, and one does not need to be a moral philosopher to know, that some human beings are more noble (morally superior) than others. Kant says so himself when he states:
"All human beings are equal to one another, and only he who is morally good has an inner worth superior to the rest".
I am surprised, BTW, Fooloso4, that a politically correct, liberal-progressive intellectual like yourself would have Kant as one of his heros; because the great German, was, for one thing, an out-and-out, confirmed racist. I have to say it is rather curious, is it not, Fooloso4, that a man who was convinced of the fact that all human beings were equally valuable as "ends in themselves", should regard Negroes as being racially inferior to White Europeans ? In "Observations on the Beautiful and the Sublime" he tells us, for instance:
" ...so fundamental is is the difference between (the Negro and White) races of man, and it appears to be as great in regard to mental capacities as in colour".
Had Kant published a remark like that today he would likely find himself in Court charged with a criminal offense, and although I will be excoriated as a hate-monger, etc; for saying this, his suspicion that Negros were, generally speaking, less intelligent than White Europeans has been now been scientifically validated. According to the empirical evidence that has been collected to date in several major research investigations conducted over the past 40 years, there is no denying the fact that the average IQ of Black Africans is substantially lower than that of White Europeans. Moreover, it now appears that the difference in cognitive capacity is driven to a large extent by innate biogenetic factors.
The reason I have mentioned Kant's view that Black Africans were less intelligent than White Europeans is to highlight how according to his own ethical theory this would mean that Negros were necessarily inferior ( less dignified) human beings and therefore not entitled to be afforded the same degree of respect that is extended to White Europeans. In short, Fooloso4 I am not prepared to let you get away with arguing that Kant's ethical theory can be used, in any way, to justify the claim, made in the UNDR (1948) and subsequent instruments of a similar kind, that such a thing as equal, universal human rights actually exist.
I will start by reminding you that human intelligence, where it is understood to be the capacity an individual has for rational cognition, demonstrates continuous variation.
Kant's theory of moral agency calls for considerable self-awareness. Seeing oneself as a Legislator of universal moral law and as a member of the Kingdom of Ends are both indicative of the great importance that self-awareness has in Kantian moral theory. And this is to say nothing of applying the Categorical Imperative or having self-respect. Kant makes a distinction between acting in accordance with duty and acting for the SAKE of duty (which is when an action has moral worth); the distinction is subtle; and the inability to reflect carefully will surely be an impediment to acting the right way. Even gifted people wrestle with applying the Categorical Imperative, so how can one realistically expect that a person who is intellectually inferior ( who has, for example, an Intellectual Deficit Disorder like Down's Syndrome, or some form of advanced dementia like Altzhiemer's disease) will be able to do so ?
Providing a masterful argument to the effect that all individuals are entitled to have the proper moral respect for themselves, and should do so, is not the same thing as showing that all individuals have the psychological wherewithal to have the proper moral respect for themselves. Moreover, if Kant thought that having the proper moral respect for oneself required no intellectual wherewithal, he was surely mistaken. Like I say, it is no small conceptual matter to see oneself as a Legislator of universal moral law and as a member of the Kingdom of Ends. No one thinks that children are capable of such an intellectual feat. So , if there is a group of adult persons who are so intellectually bereft that they are on a par with children, then it follows that members of this group will not be capable of the feat either.
So we can take the following as a given:
(A) For any person X: if X is so intellectually inferior that X cannot conceive of himself or herself as a member of the kantian Kingdom of Ends or as a Legislator of universal moral law ( and I would argue that any adult person with a confirmed IQ of 70 or less (probably even 80) would be utterly incapable of doing this,( a score 70 points or lower being the standard official threshold used by psychiatrists/psychologists to demarcate a diagnosis of "mental retardation"), then
(i) X is psychologically incapable of having the proper moral respect for him/ herself, and, moreover,
(ii) X is incapable of showing OTHERS the proper moral respect.
Thus (B) For any two people X any Y: (i) If (A) is true of both of them, then (ii) neither individual is capable of showing the proper moral respect to one another nor, individually or jointly, to other people.
In short, how can one possibly show the proper moral respect for any group of people, when in virtue of their own intellectual inferiority, they are completely incapable of having the proper moral respect for themselves ? Indeed what point can there be to doing so ?
The fact that there will always be many (many !) members of the human race who are afflicted with a an irremediable cognitive impediment such that they will lack the intellectual capacity/wherewithal to demonstrate the proper respect for both themselves or any others they encounter sounds the death knell for Kant's egalitarian ethical theory.
In sum, those like yourself, Fooloso4, who still appeal to Kantian moral theory in attempting to theoretically justify the presumption that such a thing as UNIVERSAL EQUAL human rights actually exist are simply flogging a dead horse.
Kindest Regards
Dachshund
Kant’s moral philosophy is not built on an evaluation of the moral worth of individuals, but the duties imposed on us by the moral law. The obligation to treat others with dignity has nothing to do with the inner worth of individuals. The inner worth of a person plays no role in the categorical imperative; it is, rather, a matter of unconditional a priori universal principles that do not allow of contingencies or exceptions.I think I understand Kant's ethical theory perfectly well. I understand Kant's position to be that all human beings are all equal in terms of their fundamental moral worth, but I think it is clear that the arguments he uses to justify this radical moral egalitarianism are fatally flawed. As I have said to you, it is a self-evident fact, and one does not need to be a moral philosopher to know, that some human beings are more noble (morally superior) than others. Kant says so himself when he states:
"All human beings are equal to one another, and only he who is morally good has an inner worth superior to the rest".
Kant is not one of my heroes. I do not ascribe to his abstract, artificial moral construct. I do, however, think it is necessary to understand something before deciding whether to accept it or reject it. I am not defending Kant, I am addressing your misunderstanding of Kant.I am surprised, BTW, Fooloso4, that a politically correct, liberal-progressive intellectual like yourself would have Kant as one of his heros.
In short, Fooloso4 I am not prepared to let you get away with arguing that Kant's ethical theory can be used, in any way, to justify the claim, made in the UNDR (1948) and subsequent instruments of a similar kind, that such a thing as equal, universal human rights actually exist.
You used Kant as your whipping boy in your attack on human rights. Specifically, you rejected the notion of the equality of human rights. Unfortunately for you, you were at the time unaware that Burke too supported the principle of equal human rights.… most today do not accept Kantian morals. Every idea and every practice has its antecedents.
… most today are not Kantians. Neither egalitarianism nor human dignity begins or ends with Kant.
Equality does not originate with Kant and it is not a western idea.