To Heidegger the Meaning of Being is most fundamental, thus if this is wrong, then everything else that follow is 'wrong' and thus bad philosophy.
Subsequently those who attempt to raise the question of Being were condemned;It [the Question of Being] sustained the avid research of Plato and Aristotle but from then on ceased to be heard as a thematic question of actual investigation.
What these two thinkers achieved has been preserved in various distorted and "camouflaged" forms down to Hegel's Logic.
And what then was wrested from phenomena by the highest exertion of thought, albeit in fragments and first beginnings, has long since been trivialized.
Not only that. On the foundation of the Greek point of departure for the interpretation of being a dogma has taken shape which not only declares that the question of the meaning of being is superfluous but sanctions its neglect. pg 2
Thus what troubled ancient philosophizing and kept it [Question of being] being so by virtue of its obscurity has become obvious, clear as day, such that whoever persists in asking about it is accused of an error of method.
Heidegger accused Tradition Ontology's emphasis on the forms and cover up the real meaning of what is Being.
One significant example is Descartes' "I Think Therefore I AM" which promote an isolated 'I".The tradition that hereby gains dominance makes what it "transmits" so little accessible that initially and for the most part it [the tradition] covers it [the tradition] over instead.
What has been handed down it [the tradition] hands over to obviousness; it bars access to those original "wellsprings" out of which the traditional categories and concepts were in part genuinely drawn.
The tradition even makes us forget such a provenance [origin] altogether.
Indeed, it [the tradition] makes us wholly incapable of even understanding that such a return [to its origin] is necessary.
The tradition uproots the historicity of Da-sein to such a degree that it only takes an interest in the manifold forms of possible types, directions, and standpoints of philosophizing in the most remote and strangest cultures, and with this interest tries to veil its [tradition’s] own groundlessness.
Heidegger also look down upon the Philosophy of Realism and Idealism;Insofar as certain distinctive domains of being become visible in the course of this history and henceforth chiefly dominate the range of problems (Descartes' ego cogito, subject, the "I," reason, spirit, person), the beings[entities] just cited remain unquestioned with respect to the being and structure of their being, which indicates the thorough neglect of the question of being.
But the categorial content of traditional ontology is transferred to these beings[entities] with corresponding formalizations and purely negative restrictions, or else dialectic is called upon to help with an ontological interpretation of the Substantiality of the subject.
Throughout Being and Time, Heidegger make it point to 'condemn' Western Philosophy since the Greeks in a very condescending manner. Besides the above, I don't have all the other statements offhand, will post when I come across them again. One thing is he qualified 'Western Philosophy' and did not include Eastern Philosophy which he was familiar with [not as an expert].Realism and idealism alike thoroughly miss the meaning of the Greek concept of truth from which alone the possibility of something like a "theory of Ideas" can be understood as philosophical knowledge. -34
Do you agree with Heidegger that Western Philosophy since the Greeks [before Heidegger's 'Being and Time'] should be critique [condemned] as inferior philosophy re the meaning of Being?