Are we forced to accept moral relativism?

[GE Morton]

Yes, claims of harm are all subjective. Obviously.

HARM: An involuntary reduction in an agent's welfare (Def.).

WELFARE: The extent to which an agent's goals and interests are fulfilled (Def.).

Premises:

1. Alfie has invested time and effort earning the money to buy a bicycle, which he uses regularly. Hence,

2. The bicycle contributes to Alfie's welfare.

3. Bruno steals Alfie's bicycle (he takes the bicycle without Alfie's permission, thereby denying Alfie the use of it).

Conclusion: Bruno's act has harmed Alfie.

A proposition is objective if its truth conditions are public. If the premises of an argument are objective, then so is the conclusion.

Which of the above premises are not objective?

No, not all humans act to "increase their welfare".

They act to secure what they deem to be good. If the good sought is a means good people can be mistaken about whether the good is actually useful or necessary for securing the end good for which the good sought is believed to be a means. But their aim, intention, in acting is to improve their welfare. If you disagree, please cite an exception.

[GE Morton]

GE Morton: A duty to aid is derivable from those postulates and the Axiom.

Well then, state it . . .

"But there is a duty to aid which captures the thrust of your reciprocity argument. It is a conditional one: A moral agent has a duty to aid another moral agent in distress whenever he can do so without thereby sacrificing or risking his own welfare to a comparable or greater degree, provided the helping agent has no reason to believe the distressed agent would not reciprocate were the situation reversed. Moreover, by accepting the aid the distressed agent incurs a debt to the helping agent, which he has a duty to repay as soon as the emergency is resolved. E.g., if you save me, a non-swimmer, from drowning by pulling me to safety, and in the process are bitten by a shark, I have a duty to pay your medical bills."

https://www.onlinephilosophyclub.com/fo ... id#p330210

. . . and explain how an objective duty or duties can be derived from the relative subjective values you outline in your moral theory, i.e., "All goods and evils, and the values thereof, are relative to moral agents;" "Goods and evils and the values thereof differ among agents;" and "Agents do not necessarily take an interest in the interests of other agents."

Moral duties and constraints are not derived from values. They are derived from the Axiom, together with the postulates. The Axiom states the aim of the theory: To devise principles and rules of interaction which allow all agents to maximize their welfare. A duty to aid another agent, when there will be no loss of welfare to other agents, advances that goal. The acting agent does not necessarily take an interests of the agent in distress. He acts because it is in his interests that everyone observe that rule.

[Felix]

GE Morton: "But there is a duty to aid which captures the thrust of your reciprocity argument. It is a conditional one: A moral agent has a duty to aid another moral agent in distress whenever he can do so without thereby sacrificing or risking his own welfare to a comparable or greater degree, provided the helping agent has no reason to believe the distressed agent would not reciprocate were the situation reversed. Moreover, by accepting the aid the distressed agent incurs a debt to the helping agent, which he has a duty to repay as soon as the emergency is resolved. E.g., if you save me, a non-swimmer, from drowning by pulling me to safety, and in the process are bitten by a shark, I have a duty to pay your medical bills."

That is too abstract to be practical.... If preserving one's own welfare and protecting oneself from harm is one's primary concern that over-rides all others, one will be unwilling to take any action that threatens it. And attempting to save someone's life or protect them from harm will threaten one's welfare, there is no way around that.

GE Morton: The acting agent does not necessarily take an interests of the agent in distress. He acts because it is in his interests that everyone observe that rule.

Yeah right, the acting agent will risk his own life not because he has any personal interest or feelings re: the individual in danger but simply because such risk is prescribed by the moral policy he has endorsed - that's just absurd. Your moral system would be applicable to automatons but it is not to living feeling human beings.

[Karpel Tunnel]

Moral duties and constraints are not derived from values. They are derived from the Axiom, together with the postulates. The Axiom states the aim of the theory: To devise principles and rules of interaction which allow all agents to maximize their welfare. A duty to aid another agent, when there will be no loss of welfare to other agents, advances that goal. The acting agent does not necessarily take an interests of the agent in distress. He acts because it is in his interests that everyone observe that rule.

maybe this is why we evolved empathy, iow why we react to other 'agents' in distress, and what we need is to keep people from doing things to us to inhibit our caring for others. And I gotta agree with felix, it sounds like programming for robots. I am not sure how human people would be who thought of aiding others in these terms. And then what kinds of adults would be raised from children by people who could think but not feel.

[Sy Borg]

Yes, claims of harm are all subjective. Obviously.

HARM: An involuntary reduction in an agent's welfare (Def.).

WELFARE: The extent to which an agent's goals and interests are fulfilled (Def.).

Premises:

1. Alfie has invested time and effort earning the money to buy a bicycle, which he uses regularly. Hence,

2. The bicycle contributes to Alfie's welfare.

3. Bruno steals Alfie's bicycle (he takes the bicycle without Alfie's permission, thereby denying Alfie the use of it).

Conclusion: Bruno's act has harmed Alfie.

False.

"Contributes to welfare" is subjective. Worse, this technical approach is pointless.

As I have mentioned here before many times - and always been ignored by you - the best you can manage with such robotic, piecemeal methodology, are the simple edicts not to kill, bash, rape or steal (with many conditions). Well, duh!

So I suspect you have a larger agenda here, that you are trying to find a proof for a certain issue close to your heart. I'm guessing that you are trying find a logical proof against abortion, based on your tribal political affiliations and beliefs.

[Sy Borg]

No, not all humans act to "increase their welfare".

They act to secure what they deem to be good. If the good sought is a means good people can be mistaken about whether the good is actually useful or necessary for securing the end good for which the good sought is believed to be a means. But their aim, intention, in acting is to improve their welfare. If you disagree, please cite an exception.

I don't think that is true either. You see, people are not binary and they are often not rational agents.

Did you know that? The humanoids to whom you refer have more settings than "yes" and "no", as you assume. Some also have a "maybe" setting. Others have an "I couldn't be arsed" setting, or a "screw them all" setting, an "I don't care" setting or a "they deserve everything they get" setting.

You see, people have these funny things called E-M-O-T-I-O-N-S and these can lead people not be behave rationally or, indeed in their own interest. Sometimes they are S-P-O-N-T-A-N-E-O-U-S.

I appreciate that these concepts will be foreign to you. Perhaps there are settings outlined in your user manual that can help you comprehend what it is like to be a human?

[GE Morton]

HARM: An involuntary reduction in an agent's welfare (Def.).

WELFARE: The extent to which an agent's goals and interests are fulfilled (Def.).

Premises:

1. Alfie has invested time and effort earning the money to buy a bicycle, which he uses regularly. Hence,

2. The bicycle contributes to Alfie's welfare.

3. Bruno steals Alfie's bicycle (he takes the bicycle without Alfie's permission, thereby denying Alfie the use of it).

Conclusion: Bruno's act has harmed Alfie.

False.

"Contributes to welfare" is subjective.

Er, no, it is not. Per the premise Alfie has invested time and effort to acquire the bicycle. That premise in empirically verifiable, and hence objective. Hence having a bicycle is an interest of his. Alfie's welfare is a function of the extent to which his goals and interests are fulfilled, per the definition of "welfare." Propositions which follow logically from objective premises are themselves objective. Hence the proposition, "the bicycle contributes to Alfie's welfare," is objective. Per the definitions of "welfare" and "harm," Alfie was harmed by Bruno's theft. That proposition is also objective.

At least, per the definition of "objective" given earlier. Perhaps you're relying upon that mystical concept of objective/subjective you've previously invoked. But when criticizing an argument you have to assume the definitions stipulated in the argument. So I'll ask again: Is the argument's conclusion objective per the stipulated definition of "objective"?

So I suspect you have a larger agenda here, that you are trying to find a proof for a certain issue close to your heart. I'm guessing that you are trying find a logical proof against abortion, based on your tribal political affiliations and beliefs.

Well, you missed that one by a mile. I'm a pro-choicer (because fetuses are not moral agents).

[GE Morton]

If preserving one's own welfare and protecting oneself from harm is one's primary concern that over-rides all others, one will be unwilling to take any action that threatens it. And attempting to save someone's life or protect them from harm will threaten one's welfare, there is no way around that.

Methinks you don't understand the concept of a moral duty. A duty is something one is obliged to do whether he is willing to do it or not; whether it is in his interests to do it or not. Someone who is willing to give aid, who desires to give aid, or who values the person in distress, or empathizes with him and does not wish to see him suffer, does not need a moral rule to urge him to act. The moral duty only comes into play when the agent has no personal incentive to act. For Kant and others, an act is morally praiseworthy only when it is done from duty, when it is motivated by the imperative to "do one's duty," especially when that duty commands one to act in a way contrary to one's preference or interests. Acts motivated by self-interest, empathy, love, or any other subjective, personal incentive, while they may be morally acceptable, are not praiseworthy. You get no pats on the back for doing something just because you want to do it, or because it will make you feel better.

Yeah right, the acting agent will risk his own life not because he has any personal interest or feelings re: the individual in danger but simply because such risk is prescribed by the moral policy he has endorsed - that's just absurd.

Tell that to Kant.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-moral/

See Sec. 2.

[GE Morton]

They act to secure what they deem to be good. If the good sought is a means good people can be mistaken about whether the good is actually useful or necessary for securing the end good for which the good sought is believed to be a means. But their aim, intention, in acting is to improve their welfare. If you disagree, please cite an exception.

I don't think that is true either. You see, people are not binary and they are often not rational agents.

You don't seem to have grasped the point made earlier that the soundness of a moral theory does not depend upon how anyone behaves. Of course people often act irrationally. That fact is irrelevant. The only rationality germane to a moral theory is the rationality of the theory itself --- whether its premises are true and its theorems follow from them.

[GE Morton]

maybe this is why we evolved empathy, iow why we react to other 'agents' in distress, and what we need is to keep people from doing things to us to inhibit our caring for others. And I gotta agree with felix, it sounds like programming for robots. I am not sure how human people would be who thought of aiding others in these terms. And then what kinds of adults would be raised from children by people who could think but not feel.

The trouble with empathy (which has been discussed at length elsewhere on this forum) is that it is not universal, with respect either to its subjects or its motivating power. Trying to prescribe how people ought to feel is idle; there is no accounting for feelings and little likelihood of changing anybody's. Morality is not concerned with feelings; it is only concerned with acts. What acts promote or advance the welfare of agents a question to be answered via rational inquiry, not appeals to idiosyncratic emotional impulses.

[Karpel Tunnel]

The trouble with empathy (which has been discussed at length elsewhere on this forum) is that it is not universal,

Sure, but teaching people the logic of the self-interest in taking care of others in distress will not end up universally followed either. So, it's not a problem in cmparison, it is a limitation. .

Trying to prescribe how people ought to feel is idle;

I never said anything about prescribing how people should feel. We are social mammals, we do have tendencies to experience the pain of others, in our proximity or whom we can see or hear somehow, with empathy. It seemed odd to create a kind of mandatory heuristic when we have already evolved one. Sure, it's fallible. If anyone here thinks they have a panacea, I think that's hubris.

there is no accounting for feelings and little likelihood of changing anybody's.

And my point was to encourage people not to interfere with empathy. Racism is one way to interfere with empathy. Teach people that blacks, say, are less human, and whitechildren will learn not follow a more natural empathy and connection to them.

Morality is not concerned with feelings; it is only concerned with acts.

But the choices of the acts that are considered moral have a lot to do with feelings. You were specifically trying to recreate, to some significant degree, what evolution has instilled in our nervous systems already: empathy. Flawed sure.

What acts promote or advance the welfare of agents a question to be answered via rational inquiry, not appeals to idiosyncratic emotional impulses.

Notice what happens when you - implicitly it would seem not for emotional reasons - try to get people to follow your heuristics. Suddenly you will find these social mammals resisting you emotionally, and I think in part on good grounds.

[Karpel Tunnel]

Er, no, it is not. Per the premise Alfie has invested time and effort to acquire the bicycle. That premise in empirically verifiable, and hence objective. Hence having a bicycle is an interest of his. Alfie's welfare is a function of the extent to which his goals and interests are fulfilled, per the definition of "welfare." Propositions which follow logically from objective premises are themselves objective. Hence the proposition, "the bicycle contributes to Alfie's welfare," is objective. Per the definitions of "welfare" and "harm," Alfie was harmed by Bruno's theft. That proposition is also objective.

Alfie spends a lot of time and energy trying to get heroin for himself and his addicted pregnant girlfriend. His family refuses to give him money and calls the cops on him when they see him breaking into the house across the street. The heroin would contribute to Alfie and his girlfriend's welfare - she's also working hard trying to snatch purses at the local mall. Alfie's family harmed him when they called the cops, there was some real good jewelery ready to be hocked in the neighbors house. This is all objective.

[Felix]

Felix: Yeah right, the acting agent will risk his own life not because he has any personal interest or feelings re: the individual in danger but simply because such risk is prescribed by the moral policy he has endorsed - that's just absurd.

GE Morton: Tell that to Kant.

Yes indeed, you are repeating Kant's error. His categorical imperative fails for the same reason: it disassociates moral obligation from human desires and psychology.

[GE Morton]

Alfie spends a lot of time and energy trying to get heroin for himself and his addicted pregnant girlfriend. His family refuses to give him money and calls the cops on him when they see him breaking into the house across the street. The heroin would contribute to Alfie and his girlfriend's welfare - she's also working hard trying to snatch purses at the local mall. Alfie's family harmed him when they called the cops, there was some real good jewelery ready to be hocked in the neighbors house. This is all objective.

Yes, all those statements are objective. You could have added that the neighbors across the street and the purse-snatching victims were harmed by Alfie's and his girlfriend's actions. Those propositions would also be objective.

The point?

[Sculptor1]

Alfie spends a lot of time and energy trying to get heroin for himself and his addicted pregnant girlfriend. His family refuses to give him money and calls the cops on him when they see him breaking into the house across the street. The heroin would contribute to Alfie and his girlfriend's welfare - she's also working hard trying to snatch purses at the local mall. Alfie's family harmed him when they called the cops, there was some real good jewelery ready to be hocked in the neighbors house. This is all objective.

Yes, all those statements are objective.

No. You clearly do not understand the meaning of the world.
The first sentence contains a value judgement. To wit "a lot of time and energy" is clearly not objective. "Trying hard" also fails your assertion.

You could have added that the neighbors across the street and the purse-snatching victims were harmed by Alfie's and his girlfriend's actions. Those propositions would also be objective.

The point?