Objective vs Subjective Truth

[Sculptor1]

All truths are subjective. They are subject to the conditions upon which parameters of interest are cast. In most cases truths are uttered from a subject and are subject to the experience of that individual.

Being uttered by a subject (a person) is not what defines a subjective proposition or differentiates it from an objective one --- which is the purpose of that adjective as applied to propositions.

Really? WHy?

[Sculptor1]

Well, of course a different term that denoted different things would have a different meaning. It's meaning would be whatever set of things it denoted.

If the meaning is literally in or of the object itself, though, the object hasn't changed, so how does the meaning change? Something would be changing other than the object.

GE has fallen into his own elephant trap by asserting the subjective nature of truth.
This is SO funny!!

[Steve3007]

The items denoted by the term are their denotational meanings.

The item isn't literally a meaning.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denotation

Assuming that the Wikipedia entry for "Denotation" is an accurate reflection of the standard meaning of that word, the denotation is the item. So the quibble appears to be with GE using the phrase "denotational meaning" rather than simply "denotation".

Seems to me like a relatively minor point of terminology, fairly easily settled. But with the best will in the world (together with contributions from people like Sculptor1 always trying to turn such things into matters where notions like pride, embarrassment and derisive laughter are applicable) these things usually end in mutual ridicule.

[Steve3007]

(I like the way the Wikipedia article says "not to be confused with detonation". Lucky they cleared that up or the argument might have got seriously explosive.)

[Terrapin Station]

The items denoted by the term are their denotational meanings.

The item isn't literally a meaning.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denotation

Assuming that the Wikipedia entry for "Denotation" is an accurate reflection of the standard meaning of that word, the denotation is the item. So the quibble appears to be with GE using the phrase "denotational meaning" rather than simply "denotation".

Seems to me like a relatively minor point of terminology, fairly easily settled. But with the best will in the world (together with contributions from people like Sculptor1 always trying to turn such things into matters where notions like pride, embarrassment and derisive laughter are applicable) these things usually end in mutual ridicule.

First, the discussion clearly isn't over what the conventional definition of "denotation" is. The discussion is an ontological discussion about meaning.

So when we're talking about meaning in general, and more specifically denotational meaning, the first question is "what exactly is (denotational) meaning ontologically?" In other words "What does it exist 'as'?" "What things/processes/etc. is it a property of?" or "If it's a thing/process/etc. itself then just what thing/process/etc." Or more generally "How does it obtain?"

I'm arguing that in terms of what meaning is ontologically, denotational meaning doesn't exist/occur in objects like rocks. In other words, whatever meaning amounts to ontologically, those existents/processes/properties/etc. are not found in rocks. This is the case even though rocks are the denotation of "rocks." That's not the issue. The issue is "just how does it obtain, ontologically, that rocks are the denotation of 'rocks.'"

If we're doing philosophy about meaning, we can either engage with this or we can ignore it because we don't care about the ontology of meaning, we don't find it interesting, etc.

[Terrapin Station]

Meanings are not "in" things. "Meaning" is a relational word . . .

So when I wrote above "but the item itself isn't meaning," do you agree with that or not?

You responded with, "Yes, it is literally a meaning."

Are you saying that the item itself it literally the relation in question?

Next, we can move on to just how the relation obtains ontologically. Just what it is ontologically.

[Terrapin Station]

All truths are subjective. They are subject to the conditions upon which parameters of interest are cast. In most cases truths are uttered from a subject and are subject to the experience of that individual.

Being uttered by a subject (a person) is not what defines a subjective proposition or differentiates it from an objective one --- which is the purpose of that adjective as applied to propositions.

Propositions can be about subjective or objective things, but ontologically, in terms of what a proposition is (how it exists/what it exists as/how it obtains/etc.), a proposition can't have the property of being objective.

It's just like you can have a desire about your own mental states, and you can have a desire about a pair of shoes, say, but in terms of what the desire is/what desire exists as, etc., the desire can't be something with the same properties as shoes.

X being about y doesn't confer the properties of y on x.

[Hans-Werner Hammen]

Truths ARE properties.
Properties ARE truths

The question/assertion, (whether) truth be subjective or objective is DEEMED pointless by me.
Truth cannnot be this or that, bcz it does not exist.
When I am effectively obligated by the language, to assert that truth is imaginary, then I do not even symbolize a property. "Imaginary" merely symbolizes "does not exist", not as such, not on its own...
Truth IS as such, per se, a subject-ISATION = no-thing, INDIVIDIUALLY made up FROM/ABOUT some-thing.
ONLY! The assertion OF a truth can be - individually - DEEMED: Subjective or objective.

[popeye1945]

All meaning is the property of the conscious subject about the physical world, the concept of truth/meaning is relative to the biology of the subject.