Hereandnow wrote: ↑
April 7th, 2019, 9:28 am
Certainly while objectivity is about propositions, the determination as to whether a proposition is objective or not is about how it has come to be known.
True. It is not about how the truth of a proposition has come to be known (by someone), but about the fact that the proposition asserts is publicly observable.
"The sun is bright today": this proposition is a subjective one, resting for its truth on the description of my perception. Being bright is entirely a localized judgment, aside from, it must be said, the language learned to account for it IN a proposition, and aside from the history of agreement I have assimilated in order to associate the term bright to this particular occasion, and aside from occurrent agreement among those around me, and; but wait--what is all this about the objective conditions such as these taking part in what is clearly a subjective response to the sun? How does one make its way beyond the boundaries of subjectivity?
Yes, "The sun is bright today" is subjective, because "bright" is vague, and different people may consider different levels of luminosity "bright." I.e., there is no generally accepted criterion or threshold of "brightness." However, a similar proposition, "The sun is delivering 98,000 lumens at this spot today" would be objective.
Much of modern philosophy takes an "object" in all of its objectivity to be essentially bound to things that are clearly subjective: these sensations, feelings, thoughts, all gatherings within.
"Objects" are not objective or subjective. Only propositions about them are. If every interested person (with normal vision) can observe a patch of grass and confirm (or disconfirm) that it is green, then the proposition "This grass is green" is objective, regardless of any thoughts or feelings they may have about it.
I am saying they are private and public: public propositions, all of them, are public because we agree.
Well, no. Whether the truth conditions for a proposition are public does not depend upon any agreement, other than agreement as to the meanings of the words used to construct it. If it asserts a state of affairs observable by anyone who cares to look, then those truth conditions are public.
My point in all of this is to say that there are entanglements that arise when the terms of distinction are examined, so much so that the conditions for establishing objectivity cannot even be conceived if what is decidedly subjective are removed.
Methinks you're tacitly, perhaps subconsciously, taking "objective" to mean, "true of the thing itself, independent of anyone's perceptions of it." There are no "objective" propositions in that sense (as Kant has schooled us). There are no "objective" things-in-the-world. The adjective applies only to propositions we assert about those things, and whether the observations necessary to establish their truth are accessible to the public or only to the speaker.
There is some confusion there. Being shared with others (i.e., you and I both believe proposition P is true) is not what makes P objective. What is shared is a common understanding of the referents of the terms of which P is constructed. The truth condition for "It's raining outside" is (per Tarski) the fact that it is raining outside. Anyone who understands the common meanings of "raining," "outside," and English syntax will know how to determine whether that proposition is true (go outside and see if you get wet). The proposition is objective because that observation can be made by anyone at that time and place, and everyone who performs that exercise at that time and place will get the same answer.
I detect a contradiction here: Being shared with others is not what makes P objective...but it is "a common understanding..." How is what is common not a matter of what is shared? And then "anyone who understands common meanings..." Of course,if you look only to the language and its convenstions, and base your claims on the way we talk, the terms and assumptions in place, then you have a very clear picture of the distinction. But here, we are looking closer, analyzing whether the distinction really holds up.
No contradiction. "P" in the statement denotes a proposition. The common understanding is of the meanings of the words used to construct it. The latter does not imply that belief in the truth of the proposition is shared. I'm not sure what you think a "closer look" would reveal, or how one would do that. The difference between "objective" and "subjective" does not depend upon any esoteric metaphysical or epistemological theses or assumptions. It is quite a simple and straightforward distinction. A proposition asserts some state of affairs. If that state of affairs (or absence of it) is publicly verifiable, then the proposition is objective. There is nothing more to it.