I've already chewed this over with you before.chewybrian wrote: ↑October 24th, 2019, 8:16 pmhttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/Compatibilism is the thesis that free will is compatible with determinism.
^This is the issue compatibilism attempts to resolve. You are claiming to resolve it simply by saying we have a will which is determined. But, that is not a free will at all, but rather a complex instinct. I could offer another 'resolution' by saying we are fully determined, but past events have determined that we are free. Neither resolves the problem or makes these two incompatible theories work together.If a person acts of her own free will, then she could have done otherwise (A-C).
If determinism is true, no one can do otherwise than one actually does (D-E).
Therefore, if determinism is true, no one acts of her own free will (F).
As I see it, I have these 3 options:
1-Accept that for at least some actions, I could have acted differently under the same conditions. I have free will.
2-Accept that I am fully determined and every action I took was always the only possible course based on prior events.
3-Accept that there is some middle ground which defies logic or is too complex to understand.
You could not answer HOW you could do otherwise.