Materialist, are you? Forget objective reality, then.

[Terrapin Station]

Okay, but the skeptics' point is that given there is no logical path from the mental "in here" to the alleged physical "out there", it's uncertain and doubtful that there is a (mentally irreducible) physical reality—or if there is one, that its nature or being-in-itself is discoverable and knowable through perception.

All empirical claims are uncertain and can be doubted. So it's a red herring to focus on that. Hence why what we need to focus on are simply good reasons to buy one claim over another, where our focus should be characteristics such as plausibility, justifiability, phenomenal verisimilitude, systematic coherence, practicality, etc.

[Atla]

Rorty talks about truth, and truth is predicative, as i, this table is made of wood. All that can be said of the world in language is predicative andpropositional, and these are NOT out there. They are in here, if "in here" can be made sense of all all. After all, all propositions are made by us and there truth conditions are caused by something out there, but, and this is important, this reference to out there to in here is propositional!! All meaningful language reference is predicative, truth bearing. This is the pragmatic theory of truth. even references to causality are propositional, material things: all propositional in the understanding.

Which meaning of materialism are you using though, an older one, which, in addition to claiming that the 'world is made of matter', claims that there is just the objective world, sort of 'out there' independent of us?

Because this second claim was thoroughly refuted by science itself at least a century ago, people generally don't take that stance anymore. (Even if people typically haven't realized the full implications yet.)
And an older idealism as the alternative, where there is just the subjective world, all things are sort of 'dependent on us', is equally ridiculous today.

[Belindi]

Okay, but the skeptics' point is that given there is no logical path from the mental "in here" to the alleged physical "out there", it's uncertain and doubtful that there is a (mentally irreducible) physical reality—or if there is one, that its nature or being-in-itself is discoverable and knowable through perception.

All empirical claims are uncertain and can be doubted. So it's a red herring to focus on that. Hence why what we need to focus on are simply good reasons to buy one claim over another, where our focus should be characteristics such as plausibility, justifiability, phenomenal verisimilitude, systematic coherence, practicality, etc.

But, Consul, sceptics (skeptics)include people for whom dual aspect of mental/physical is a possibility. Modern clinical practice takes the view mental/physical are two sides of the same coin.School teachers in poor districts are concerned to make sure the kids have some breakfast in them before they begin work.

If by "logical path" you mean rational path, that has been efficiently done by Spinoza who revised Descartes.

Moreover Spinoza's rational explanation of mind/body dual aspect ( like a coin) results in the most civilised sort of modern ethics and political practice.

[Consul]

Okay, but the skeptics' point is that given there is no logical path from the mental "in here" to the alleged physical "out there", it's uncertain and doubtful that there is a (mentally irreducible) physical reality—or if there is one, that its nature or being-in-itself is discoverable and knowable through perception.

All empirical claims are uncertain and can be doubted. So it's a red herring to focus on that. Hence why what we need to focus on are simply good reasons to buy one claim over another, where our focus should be characteristics such as plausibility, justifiability, phenomenal verisimilitude, systematic coherence, practicality, etc.

Perception is fallible, there being illusions and hallucinations. If ontological idealism were true, all apparent perception of (mentally irreducible) physical things would be hallucination, because there wouldn't really be any such things.

[Gertie]

Okay, but the skeptics' point is that given there is no logical path from the mental "in here" to the alleged physical "out there", it's uncertain and doubtful that there is a (mentally irreducible) physical reality—or if there is one, that its nature or being-in-itself is discoverable and knowable through perception.

All empirical claims are uncertain and can be doubted. So it's a red herring to focus on that. Hence why what we need to focus on are simply good reasons to buy one claim over another, where our focus should be characteristics such as plausibility, justifiability, phenomenal verisimilitude, systematic coherence, practicality, etc.

It's not a red herring.

- Each of us can only be certain of the contents of our own mental states, we cannot be mistaken about them. The nature of experiential states is an experiential 'awareness' of their content, that's what they are.

- Then the issue is whether our mental experience is referencing a real 'external' world at all (no way of knowing this, it requires a leap of faith). Idealists, some anyway, think it doesn't, but that requires a leap of faith too. Because there is no way of knowing.

- If we assume mental experience does reference a real external world, then we can ask how accurate our/human sensory perceptions, memories, reasoning, etc are. We have enough clues to assume our mental states are limited and flawed representations we create based on evolutionary utility, which cohere into useful working models of our selves and our world. And that is why their accuracy is uncertain, and empirical claims about that external world are uncertain.

[Terrapin Station]

It's not a red herring.

If all empirical claims are uncertain and can be doubted, then why wouldn't it be a red herring to bring up that some empirical claim is uncertain and can be doubted, as if that's an epiphany, or as if it's important for doing philosophy about any sort of empirical claim?

[Hans-Werner Hammen]

IF!
The symbol "objective reality" symbolizes "the detectable" or just "Referents" (Semiotic Triangle) and "world1" (Sire KR Popper) respectively -
THEN
The materialist can very well account for it.
I think that this is demonstrated by the scientific assertions, that the scientific community can agree on, bcz they are descriptive and predictive.
SURE IS! I totally disagree with the "modern" language and "recent" assertions.

The entity called "Energy" is an abstract object, it is epiphenomenal - iow it is not causal.
I assure you, the symbol "energy" symbolizes BUT a mathematical correlate of yet three other abstract objects, called mass, space, and time.
EACH of them three abstract objects as well as their correlate, called energy, they are merely measured - FROM/ABOUT that is, - namely the objective templates, as symbolized (defined) in my first sentence.

Any assertion that an entity called "energy" condensed, aggregated, solidified, materialized, THEN...
and produced an effect called "the universe" is deemed totally religious by me.

A "religious assertion" symbolizes that you made up an abstract object (property = subjectization) FROM/ABOUT the literally objective template, then you go assert that the abstract object be / had been causal at the objective template.

Another proclamation I DO have an issue with, is the assertion of dark matter and dark energy. The language in itself is, on this occasion, - deemed to be by me - categorically wrong, in that the symbol suggests that dark energy be yet another kind of a substance ie a causal agency.

Science means to explain to us the universe, yet is right now reducing itself to absurdity, this is MY assertion as regards the "assertions of the materialist worldview"
Cheers!