Materialist, are you? Forget objective reality, then.
- thrasymachus
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Materialist, are you? Forget objective reality, then.
Of course, we don't speak of epistemology between mountains, but we do between people and mountains. I know that mountain there, is there, and has white peaks and a sloping northern side, and so on.
How is it that a materialist model allows for "knowledge" of that mountain to be possible? For such knowledge would require something more than material accounts can give.
No. I'm afraid we are bound to one form of idealism or another.
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Re: Materialist, are you? Forget objective reality, then.
I don't really get what this is saying:
"For such a system can only be a localized conception of a material thing:"
or this:
"there is a mountain, and here is a mountain, and the two . . . have no mutual intimation of their existence" (Mutual intimation???)
or this:
"that is, one mountain, a thing, is delimited physically so as not to allow it to 'enter' into the other." ("Enter" the other??? In what way?)
or this:
"They are, you might say, epistemologically altogether separate." (it seems like maybe you'd want to say that they're ontologically separate instead. No idea, really, what "epistemologically separate" would refer to.)
And then none of those unclear things seem to have anything to do with this question:
"How is it that a materialist model allows for 'knowledge' of that mountain to be possible?"
The answer there isn't anything unusual. You make observations, you reason about them, etc., and you wind up making statements of justified true belief.
Finally, this is a claim that you made no argument for: "For such knowledge would require something more than material accounts can give."
- thrasymachus
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Re: Materialist, are you? Forget objective reality, then.
There is a pen on the table and I know this. But then, the pen is supposed to be out there, not me, but "it" entirely separate from me. Now, look at the materialist model, which is derived from observations of the world of things. Two things, say, entirely separate, just like me and my pen, yet how do these exhibit the properties that can explain the knowing relationship I have with my pen? After all, if I am a material thing, then the model of materiality must be such at I can derive from it my epistemological dealings with the pen.Terrapin Station wrote
Huh?
I don't really get what this is saying:
"For such a system can only be a localized conception of a material thing:"
or this:
"there is a mountain, and here is a mountain, and the two . . . have no mutual intimation of their existence" (Mutual intimation???)
or this:
"that is, one mountain, a thing, is delimited physically so as not to allow it to 'enter' into the other." ("Enter" the other??? In what way?)
or this:
"They are, you might say, epistemologically altogether separate." (it seems like maybe you'd want to say that they're ontologically separate instead. No idea, really, what "epistemologically separate" would refer to.)
And then none of those unclear things seem to have anything to do with this question:
"How is it that a materialist model allows for 'knowledge' of that mountain to be possible?"
The answer there isn't anything unusual. You make observations, you reason about them, etc., and you wind up making statements of justified true belief.
Finally, this is a claim that you made no argument for: "For such knowledge would require something more than material accounts can give."
The things, separate, me and the pen. How does that pen get in my head such that I actually perceive the pen rather than what is in my head? How does it epistemologically traverse space to get to me at all? Let's see, visual event: light rays are variously reflected and absorbed, and those reflected are, well they are NOT the object that reflects them. Nor is the eye where the light is received by rods and cones then down the optic nerve...I mean, this is elementary school science.
Knowledge is supposed to be knowledge OF the object. How does this actually get accomplished?
- Sculptor1
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Re: Materialist, are you? Forget objective reality, then.
Strawman.thrasymachus wrote: ↑August 10th, 2020, 10:27 am The trouble with materialist models of the world is that they don't like to hold themselves accountable for the implications of their position. For such a system can only be a localized conception of a material thing: there is a mountain, and here is a mountain, and the two (notwithstanding quantum entanglement, which certainly hasn't the content to make for a discussion about the matter discussed here) have no mutual intimation of their existence, that is, one mountain, a thing, is delimited physically so as not to allow it to "enter" into the other. They are, you might say, epistemologically altogether separate.
Of course, we don't speak of epistemology between mountains, but we do between people and mountains. I know that mountain there, is there, and has white peaks and a sloping northern side, and so on.
How is it that a materialist model allows for "knowledge" of that mountain to be possible? For such knowledge would require something more than material accounts can give.
No. I'm afraid we are bound to one form of idealism or another.
- Sculptor1
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Re: Materialist, are you? Forget objective reality, then.
It's interesting when a materialist looks at some of their supposed descriptions they do not recognise them.Terrapin Station wrote: ↑August 10th, 2020, 7:36 pm Huh?
I don't really get what this is saying:
"For such a system can only be a localized conception of a material thing:"
or this:
"there is a mountain, and here is a mountain, and the two . . . have no mutual intimation of their existence" (Mutual intimation???)
or this:
"that is, one mountain, a thing, is delimited physically so as not to allow it to 'enter' into the other." ("Enter" the other??? In what way?)
or this:
"They are, you might say, epistemologically altogether separate." (it seems like maybe you'd want to say that they're ontologically separate instead. No idea, really, what "epistemologically separate" would refer to.)
And then none of those unclear things seem to have anything to do with this question:
"How is it that a materialist model allows for 'knowledge' of that mountain to be possible?"
The answer there isn't anything unusual. You make observations, you reason about them, etc., and you wind up making statements of justified true belief.
Finally, this is a claim that you made no argument for: "For such knowledge would require something more than material accounts can give."
I'm not sure who he is criticising? Maybe a nominalist?
But there's no way that materialism is recognisable in the OP
- Sculptor1
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Re: Materialist, are you? Forget objective reality, then.
Actually materialism has a pretty good explanation of that.thrasymachus wrote: ↑August 10th, 2020, 9:06 pm
The things, separate, me and the pen. How does that pen get in my head such that I actually perceive the pen rather than what is in my head?
Let's hear yours - that is to say, your explanation that is not materialist of the same phenomenon.
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Re: Materialist, are you? Forget objective reality, then.
Materialism and idealism are frames for inspecting where you find yourself here and now in the world. Each frame has its uses. It's useful to be able to distinguish between one mountain and another when you want to find your way to the mountain pass, as if the two mountains and the mountain pass really exist. It's also useful to be able to recognise optical illusions for what they are and so understand everything is not as it seems but may be mind stuff.thrasymachus wrote: ↑August 10th, 2020, 10:27 am The trouble with materialist models of the world is that they don't like to hold themselves accountable for the implications of their position. For such a system can only be a localized conception of a material thing: there is a mountain, and here is a mountain, and the two (notwithstanding quantum entanglement, which certainly hasn't the content to make for a discussion about the matter discussed here) have no mutual intimation of their existence, that is, one mountain, a thing, is delimited physically so as not to allow it to "enter" into the other. They are, you might say, epistemologically altogether separate.
Of course, we don't speak of epistemology between mountains, but we do between people and mountains. I know that mountain there, is there, and has white peaks and a sloping northern side, and so on.
How is it that a materialist model allows for "knowledge" of that mountain to be possible? For such knowledge would require something more than material accounts can give.
No. I'm afraid we are bound to one form of idealism or another.
My preferred stance is therefore dual aspect monism.
- Terrapin Station
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Re: Materialist, are you? Forget objective reality, then.
I'm still not really following you. By the way, if it wasn't clear, I am a "materialist," though I prefer "physicalist," and naturally enough I'm a realist, too.thrasymachus wrote: ↑August 10th, 2020, 9:06 pmThere is a pen on the table and I know this. But then, the pen is supposed to be out there, not me, but "it" entirely separate from me. Now, look at the materialist model, which is derived from observations of the world of things. Two things, say, entirely separate, just like me and my pen, yet how do these exhibit the properties that can explain the knowing relationship I have with my pen? After all, if I am a material thing, then the model of materiality must be such at I can derive from it my epistemological dealings with the pen.Terrapin Station wrote
Huh?
I don't really get what this is saying:
"For such a system can only be a localized conception of a material thing:"
or this:
"there is a mountain, and here is a mountain, and the two . . . have no mutual intimation of their existence" (Mutual intimation???)
or this:
"that is, one mountain, a thing, is delimited physically so as not to allow it to 'enter' into the other." ("Enter" the other??? In what way?)
or this:
"They are, you might say, epistemologically altogether separate." (it seems like maybe you'd want to say that they're ontologically separate instead. No idea, really, what "epistemologically separate" would refer to.)
And then none of those unclear things seem to have anything to do with this question:
"How is it that a materialist model allows for 'knowledge' of that mountain to be possible?"
The answer there isn't anything unusual. You make observations, you reason about them, etc., and you wind up making statements of justified true belief.
Finally, this is a claim that you made no argument for: "For such knowledge would require something more than material accounts can give."
The things, separate, me and the pen. How does that pen get in my head such that I actually perceive the pen rather than what is in my head? How does it epistemologically traverse space to get to me at all? Let's see, visual event: light rays are variously reflected and absorbed, and those reflected are, well they are NOT the object that reflects them. Nor is the eye where the light is received by rods and cones then down the optic nerve...I mean, this is elementary school science.
Knowledge is supposed to be knowledge OF the object. How does this actually get accomplished?
For one, your notion of "entirely separate" isn't that clear. Sometimes when people use terms like that it turns out that they're thinking of things as more or less being isolated from each other as if they were separated not only by vacuums but so there's no possibility of the things in question interacting or being intertwined in any way. So you'd need to clarify that. If you have in mind something like I'm describing, then I'd not say that any two things are "entirely separate" from each other.
Re the comment about perception, sure, the light waves are not identical to the pen, but they have a relationship to the pen, otherwise the whole notion of light waves reflected off the pen and received at your eyes, etc. wouldn't even make any sense.
It's not clear to me at all what you see as the problem there. It seems like you're thinking that the pen would have to literally be in you or be a part of you, but why you're thinking this I have no idea.
- Terrapin Station
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Re: Materialist, are you? Forget objective reality, then.
In order to say there are optical illusions we can't be idealists, because we have to believe that:Belindi wrote: ↑August 11th, 2020, 3:31 amMaterialism and idealism are frames for inspecting where you find yourself here and now in the world. Each frame has its uses. It's useful to be able to distinguish between one mountain and another when you want to find your way to the mountain pass, as if the two mountains and the mountain pass really exist. It's also useful to be able to recognise optical illusions for what they are and so understand everything is not as it seems but may be mind stuff.thrasymachus wrote: ↑August 10th, 2020, 10:27 am The trouble with materialist models of the world is that they don't like to hold themselves accountable for the implications of their position. For such a system can only be a localized conception of a material thing: there is a mountain, and here is a mountain, and the two (notwithstanding quantum entanglement, which certainly hasn't the content to make for a discussion about the matter discussed here) have no mutual intimation of their existence, that is, one mountain, a thing, is delimited physically so as not to allow it to "enter" into the other. They are, you might say, epistemologically altogether separate.
Of course, we don't speak of epistemology between mountains, but we do between people and mountains. I know that mountain there, is there, and has white peaks and a sloping northern side, and so on.
How is it that a materialist model allows for "knowledge" of that mountain to be possible? For such knowledge would require something more than material accounts can give.
No. I'm afraid we are bound to one form of idealism or another.
My preferred stance is therefore dual aspect monism.
(a) we have bodies, with eyes, that are situated in the world, where we receive visual data from things that are not identical to us,
(b) the visual data we receive can be interpreted incorrectly relative to what the source is really like in the external world, and
(c) we can know what the source is really like in the external world, so that we can know what we're getting wrong interpretively, which is necessary for the claim that we experienced an illusion in the first place.
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Re: Materialist, are you? Forget objective reality, then.
But all of your a) b) and c) are subsumed under mind stuff. Idealism is such that mind creates all ideas and all sensations.Terrapin Station wrote: ↑August 11th, 2020, 6:49 amIn order to say there are optical illusions we can't be idealists, because we have to believe that:Belindi wrote: ↑August 11th, 2020, 3:31 am
Materialism and idealism are frames for inspecting where you find yourself here and now in the world. Each frame has its uses. It's useful to be able to distinguish between one mountain and another when you want to find your way to the mountain pass, as if the two mountains and the mountain pass really exist. It's also useful to be able to recognise optical illusions for what they are and so understand everything is not as it seems but may be mind stuff.
My preferred stance is therefore dual aspect monism.
(a) we have bodies, with eyes, that are situated in the world, where we receive visual data from things that are not identical to us,
(b) the visual data we receive can be interpreted incorrectly relative to what the source is really like in the external world, and
(c) we can know what the source is really like in the external world, so that we can know what we're getting wrong interpretively, which is necessary for the claim that we experienced an illusion in the first place.
- RJG
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Re: Materialist, are you? Forget objective reality, then.
The experience of seeing a pen is certainly real, but the pen itself cannot be known to exist with certainty (...for it may be an illusion, dream, hallucination, etc).thrasymachus wrote:There is a pen on the table and I know this. But then, the pen is supposed to be out there, not me, but "it" entirely separate from me. Now, look at the materialist model, which is derived from observations of the world of things. Two things, say, entirely separate, just like me and my pen, yet how do these exhibit the properties that can explain the knowing relationship I have with my pen?
We can only know what is in our head, not outside it. Our experiences are certainly real, but the realness of the 'things' (content) that we experience are anyone's guess.
Not so. This does not mean that materialistic things like pens don't exist. It just means we can't directly experience them. (...we can only experience 'experiences'; the stuff in our head).thrasymachus wrote:I'm afraid we are bound to one form of idealism or another.
*****
Since the existence of non-materialistic objects (idealism) is logically impossible, then materialism is all that is truly real (truly exists). In other words, immaterial objects (such as "minds") don't/can't logically exist, therefore only physical material objects (physical bodies) can truly exist.
******
True knowledge is gained through 'objective' means (i.e. derived via logic/math), and not through 'subjective' means (i.e. derived experientially).thrasymachus wrote:Knowledge is supposed to be knowledge OF the object. How does this actually get accomplished?
Subjective experiences (by themselves) are never trustworthy to yield true knowledge! ...we can't ever get objectivity through subjectivity!
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Re: Materialist, are you? Forget objective reality, then.
Apparently knowledge is a physical event. How would knowledge be possible without the physical brain?thrasymachus wrote: ↑August 10th, 2020, 10:27 am The trouble with materialist models of the world is that they don't like to hold themselves accountable for the implications of their position. For such a system can only be a localized conception of a material thing: there is a mountain, and here is a mountain, and the two (notwithstanding quantum entanglement, which certainly hasn't the content to make for a discussion about the matter discussed here) have no mutual intimation of their existence, that is, one mountain, a thing, is delimited physically so as not to allow it to "enter" into the other. They are, you might say, epistemologically altogether separate.
Of course, we don't speak of epistemology between mountains, but we do between people and mountains. I know that mountain there, is there, and has white peaks and a sloping northern side, and so on.
How is it that a materialist model allows for "knowledge" of that mountain to be possible? For such knowledge would require something more than material accounts can give.
No. I'm afraid we are bound to one form of idealism or another.
- Terrapin Station
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Re: Materialist, are you? Forget objective reality, then.
"We have bodies" is different than "we have an illusion that we have bodies." I didn't say the latter. Believing that optical illusions can occur requires the former. Otherwise we're talking about an entirely different sort of phenomenon.Belindi wrote: ↑August 11th, 2020, 7:43 amBut all of your a) b) and c) are subsumed under mind stuff. Idealism is such that mind creates all ideas and all sensations.Terrapin Station wrote: ↑August 11th, 2020, 6:49 am
In order to say there are optical illusions we can't be idealists, because we have to believe that:
(a) we have bodies, with eyes, that are situated in the world, where we receive visual data from things that are not identical to us,
(b) the visual data we receive can be interpreted incorrectly relative to what the source is really like in the external world, and
(c) we can know what the source is really like in the external world, so that we can know what we're getting wrong interpretively, which is necessary for the claim that we experienced an illusion in the first place.
Likewise for (b).
Re (c), the notion that something is an illusion is incoherent if we're not positing that we perceived something to be different than it is or was, and we know what it was really like.
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Re: Materialist, are you? Forget objective reality, then.
How is it, to put it another way, that my "knowledge" of my pen is qualitatively different from the knowledge a bat has of a baseball? Yes, of course, the latter is infinitely less complex, but then complexity does not pull this rabbit out of the hat. When I say I know the pen, I am saying the pen is not entirely out there, beyond me, but somehow enters into my knowledge, and that whatever has contact with my physical system abides by the law of sufficient cause, and such causal accounts are supposed to be exhaustive, even given the minutia of, say, molecular collision (again, putting quantum entanglement aside, for now), in explaining the relation IN the causal exchange (bat's force, the ball's yielding). How does causality explain knowledge? In the physicalist model, we are bound to a physicalist's standards of behavior regarding physical things.Terrapin Station wrote
I'm still not really following you. By the way, if it wasn't clear, I am a "materialist," though I prefer "physicalist," and naturally enough I'm a realist, too.
For one, your notion of "entirely separate" isn't that clear. Sometimes when people use terms like that it turns out that they're thinking of things as more or less being isolated from each other as if they were separated not only by vacuums but so there's no possibility of the things in question interacting or being intertwined in any way. So you'd need to clarify that. If you have in mind something like I'm describing, then I'd not say that any two things are "entirely separate" from each other.
Re the comment about perception, sure, the light waves are not identical to the pen, but they have a relationship to the pen, otherwise the whole notion of light waves reflected off the pen and received at your eyes, etc. wouldn't even make any sense.
It's not clear to me at all what you see as the problem there. It seems like you're thinking that the pen would have to literally be in you or be a part of you, but why you're thinking this I have no idea.
I am a physical thing, that is, my brain and all else is physical, but physicalist knowledge makes a stronger claim that this can provide for. Knowing my pen is on the table is supposed to be specifically about the pen and NOT the interceding causal processes that include light waves, air waves (sound), or, and it gets far worse here, neural systems of very causally complex operations, that bring the pen to perception. The pen never makes it perception, any more than the ball makes it to the bat.
- thrasymachus
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Re: Materialist, are you? Forget objective reality, then.
Meaning I misrepresented the case to make it appear easily assailable. How so?Sculptor1 wrote
Strawman
My position is clear: some form of idealism has to prevail. Details are pending on whether a physicalist account even gets off the ground. But the argument is, to me, simple in the extreme. Materialism/physicalism cannot provide conditions that make knowledge possible. Just tell me how this works in physicalist terms, and the argument is done. I will concede, but this is not going to happen.Actually materialism has a pretty good explanation of that.
Let's hear yours - that is to say, your explanation that is not materialist of the same phenomenon.
Phenomenon? You mean, physical object. The same physical object? Given that IT is a material object and that I am as well, the consistency of its appearance is not at issue, if this is what you have in mind. But WHAT is it that is consistently appearing? How does a material object like myself know that the thing which is consistently appearing is the independent pen-thing, out there? It is the process of exchange that concerns me.
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