My thoughts on the Free Will Debate - Soft Determinism

[Marvin_Edwards]

The specific meaning of duress, undue influence, insanity, irresistible impulse, and other factors are defined by court precedents and expert witnesses. It is a judgement call, but it is a judgement based on objective evidence and expert testimony. So, no, it is not "full of ambiguity".

People face all sorts of external and internal pressures that vary in strength to act (or not act) in certain ways. Where can lines be meaningfully drawn: between influence that is undue and not undue; between sanity and insanity; between impulses that are resistable and irresistable?

Can anyone provide a method that can be unambiguously applied to objective data in order to determine if the will of a defendant is free or not?

That's not the right question. The specific question is whether the defendant was free to choose for himself what he would do. It is the choosing that is free or not free.

And that question has been answered unambiguously in most cases. Coercion is pretty obvious. The choice of a minor who is under the influence of a parent or older sibling can also be determined, usually by the age of the minor. Some insanity defenses may be very clear, while others may be open to debate by the attorneys. The question with insanity is whether the nature of the mental illness sufficiently influenced the choice in this particular crime. And that's where the expert testimony comes in.

There will be some cases that are debatable, but over time most issues will become settled in precedents. So, yes, I believe that most cases of free will or its absence can be unambiguously identified.

No one is ever punished for having free will. They are punished because of the harm they have inflicted upon others.

A number of people may inflict the same harm upon others, but only those who are judged to have had free will (not judged to have been insane or otherwise lacking free will) may be found guilty and punished (with imprisonment - reduced freedom for exercising freedom in a way that is judged to be unacceptable).

A criminally insane person can be imprisoned in a secure medical facility as long as he remains a threat to anyone.

The correction is always applied to the cause. If the criminal behavior is due to a brain tumor, the the tumor is removed. If it is due to other brain disease or injury then that too may be treated medically.

But if the cause of the crime was the deliberate decision by a sane adult, then we must apply methods that will correct that deliberation process, like counseling, addiction treatment, job training, etc. However, these only work if the offender is willing to change. Punishment, such as imprisonment, helps induce the offender to take advantage of the rehabilitation offered.

The programmer is held responsible for any damage that his programmed robot does.

What if John says he didn't program the robot to kill humans; he programmed it to have free will so it is responsible for its actions?

First, John's robot will be decommissioned. Second, John must be convinced not to create any more robots with free will, and that may require some time in prison.

It's not that complicated. We observe ourselves choosing and acting upon that choice. That's how we know.

A robot could say the same thing: "I know I have free will because I observe myself choosing and acting upon that choice".

And, if he is one of John's robots, he may indeed have free will. And he will likely be destroyed to prevent further harm to our species.

[4ever1friend]

Hello,
I've wrote my view about this actually a few days ago. I cannot provide the link, search for: just1friend freewill .

One a side: freewill vs destiny
I've compared the freewill with the driver of a car - this is the freewill.
Each road has its own destination - I've compared the path and destination with predeterminate and destiny.

Basically, you choose on what road you want to go, however that road has a certain destination. Whenever you choose to leave the road, you'll choose a new destination, however, you can do that only when there is an intersection, else, if you try to create the road, everything will be against you.

On the other side: freewill under constrains
Now, if you go towards what is moral and what is legal, I'll ask you one more question: When there is someone condemned to death, who is the guilty of his death, the judge or the executioner?

No matter what is the pressure, if you choose to kill someone, even if your life is under threat, in the end, you choose your own action and each action, has a reaction.

[Jack D Ripper]

Many words and phrases are full of ambiguity. That does not mean that they are not useful.

How useful are they philosophically?

We can relate this back to your killer robot. We would blame John for creating and programming the robot, and we would want to stop him from repeating that. So we would likely lock him up. But we also would try to stop the robot. We might try to rehabilitate it by reprogramming it (a much easier task than rehabilitating a human), or we might destroy it or otherwise remove it from society. In other words, we do basically the same thing to the robot that we do with a man; we remove it from society until we can rehabilitate it. It does not matter if we judge it to have "free will" or not; it does not get to run about as is.

If this was true - if society responded to people and robots similarly based purely on their actions regardless if they are judged to have free will or not - would the free will debate become irrelevant?

What motivation is there to judge if a being has free will or not if there is no desire to respond differently depending on this judgement?

If it doesn't matter whether a being has free will or not, does it also not matter what the definition of free will is?

As long as there isn't presented a clear definition of "free will", it does not matter. It cannnot be applied to anything if it does not exist. That is, if there is no definition, there is nothing to talk about. It is just empty words unless defined.


As for some of your other questions, "free will" is overrated regardless of which sort of common use one makes of the phrase. It has less importance than many people seem to imagine, as my comments indicate.


With Marvin's idea:

...
Free will is when we decide for ourselves what we will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence (mental illness, deception, authoritative command, etc.). That's the "operational" definition, the one that everyone understands and uses to assess a person's moral and legal responsibility for their actions. It requires nothing supernatural. It makes no claim of being uncaused. It simply performs its function of distinguishing between a sane adult's deliberate actions versus a person whose actions are coerced or controlled by something other than their own purposes and their own reasons.

...

If we were all discussing that, then we could say things about it. It is not the only possible definition, but it is one of the most common ones. It is, perhaps, a banal and unexciting definition, but it has the virtues of being intelligible and coherent and is also consistent with a significant amount of common usage of the phrase. It also does not rely on a particular metaphysical view of what people are (which makes it compatible with a variety of metaphysical theories; some metaphysical definitions of "free will" stand or fall with a particular metaphysical theory).

In response to your first question, that definition does contain ambiguity. It is, however, useful for a discussion of when and whether one holds someone responsible for something. One can see this illustrated by reading Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. As for the ambiguity, as Aristotle observes:

Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the
subject-matter admits of, for precision is not to be sought for alike
in all discussions, any more than in all the products of the crafts.
Now fine and just actions, which political science investigates, admit
of much variety and fluctuation of opinion, so that they may be thought
to exist only by convention, and not by nature. And goods also give
rise to a similar fluctuation because they bring harm to many people;
for before now men have been undone by reason of their wealth, and
others by reason of their courage. We must be content, then, in speaking
of such subjects and with such premisses to indicate the truth roughly
and in outline, and in speaking about things which are only for the
most part true and with premisses of the same kind to reach conclusions
that are no better. In the same spirit, therefore, should each type
of statement be received; for it is the mark of an educated man to
look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature
of the subject admits; it is evidently equally foolish to accept probable
reasoning from a mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician scientific
proofs.

http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.mb.txt

Not everything allows for the same level of precision. For example, with pure mathematics, there can be absolute precision, but when you measure the length of a piece of wood, there is a limit to how exact your measurement can be. It is silly to expect absolute precision when measuring a piece of wood (though it is not silly to require as much precision as is reasonably possible).


If someone means something else (other than Marvin's definition) by the phrase "free will", they should clearly indicate what it is that they mean. It is useless and silly to discuss until they explain their meaning.


One of the issues that commonly appears is that people often imagine that if they deny determinism, then they somehow get freedom. That, however, is far from clear, as, again, my second post in this thread indicates:

...

Adding in random events does not seem to help anything. If your actions are random, how would that make them "free"? And how would those actions relate to you; in what sense would they be your actions? Don't your actions have to be caused by you in order to be your actions?

If you do something, then, presumably, you do something based on what you are. Otherwise, it would not be you doing it, would it? The thing is, you did not create yourself. It does not matter whether you were caused to be what you are, or randomly sprang into being for this. Either way, what you started out as was not a matter of your choice. Everything you do after starting to exist is based on what you are (or, to be more precise, were at the time you did whatever you did).

It is entirely unclear how one is more free in a universe that is indeterminate than in one that is determined.

What seems to be motivating a rejection of Marvin's definition is the feeling that one wants more freedom, the feeling that it somehow constrains what one can do in a way that seems objectionable to people. But it is far from clear how one would get any more freedom, no matter what one says about the world.

[LuckyR]

Yes, in the abstract.

The usual term for that is "indeterminism":

https://www.lexico.com/definition/indeterminism

Suppose that we are having this discussion before the advent of science. You tell me that strep throats have a cause, ie they are Determined. I respond, OK what causes strep throats? You reply either "I don't know" ie a Black Box, "the devil" or "evil humors in the ether". From the perspective of that era, are strep throats Determined? You can answer "yes, of course". OK what causes them? If you use answers available in that era, you are incorrect, they aren't caused by that. If you answer "Strep bacteria", you are also incorrect, you are opening the Black Box (which would be impossible in that era) and pulling out a future answer to use at an inappropriate time. Thus the cause that Determines strep throats in the pre-scientific era is purely theoretical, which is OK except that Determinism is supposed to be practical,

Where did you get that idea? What makes you think determinism is supposed to be anything other than the doctrine that every event has a cause?

since it is retrospectively provable (which Free Will is not, since Free Will is the absence of Determinism and you can't prove a negative).

Many negatives can be proven. If you were here, I could prove that there are no elephants in my room with me. There are many examples like that. There are also other kinds of examples, like there are no triangles that are squares, and there are no bachelors who are married.


You are also using "free will" in a very nonstandard way, as what you are talking about is normally called "indeterminism" (see link above). And it is entirely unclear how indeterminism makes someone more free than determinism. I discussed that in my second post in this thread:

...


Adding in random events does not seem to help anything. If your actions are random, how would that make them "free"? And how would those actions relate to you; in what sense would they be your actions? Don't your actions have to be caused by you in order to be your actions?

If you do something, then, presumably, you do something based on what you are. Otherwise, it would not be you doing it, would it? The thing is, you did not create yourself. It does not matter whether you were caused to be what you are, or randomly sprang into being for this. Either way, what you started out as was not a matter of your choice. Everything you do after starting to exist is based on what you are (or, to be more precise, were at the time you did whatever you did).

For example, in the current era one can prove that strep throats are caused by Strep bacteria. Thus they are Determined, though there are many aspects of common experience, such as human and animal decision making, that cannot be shown to be Determined. Any proof today must make at least partial use of a Black Box, not unlike strep throats in previous eras.

It is one thing to say that an event was caused, and quite another to say what caused it. For example, if you come home after you have been out, and one of your windows is broken, would you say that was uncaused? Or would you assume that something caused it, and then try to figure out what might have caused it? Perhaps a branch broke off a tree and the wind blew it into the window, or children were playing baseball and the ball hit the window, or etc. Aren't those the kinds of things you would consider?

Of course, if indeterminism is correct, it may be that there was no cause of the window being broken.

Let's take your broken window example, since you're obviously conversant in that level of thing.

I am trying to point out the difference between unknown causality (broken windows) and unknowable causality (human decision making). The former can be solved by installing a Ring camera the latter can't be solved.

As to the rest of your commentary, we all acknowledge that different folks use "Free Will" differently. One example is Marvin's definition, which we all agree is completely compatible with Determinism. Similarly everyone also knows there has been a great historical debate between Determinism and Free Will, thus many if not most view the two as incompatible and thus competitors, of a sort. If you want to add a third wording to the mix, go ahead, but it is less about wording and more about concepts.

[Jack D Ripper]

The usual term for that is "indeterminism":

https://www.lexico.com/definition/indeterminism





Where did you get that idea? What makes you think determinism is supposed to be anything other than the doctrine that every event has a cause?





Many negatives can be proven. If you were here, I could prove that there are no elephants in my room with me. There are many examples like that. There are also other kinds of examples, like there are no triangles that are squares, and there are no bachelors who are married.


You are also using "free will" in a very nonstandard way, as what you are talking about is normally called "indeterminism" (see link above). And it is entirely unclear how indeterminism makes someone more free than determinism. I discussed that in my second post in this thread:










It is one thing to say that an event was caused, and quite another to say what caused it. For example, if you come home after you have been out, and one of your windows is broken, would you say that was uncaused? Or would you assume that something caused it, and then try to figure out what might have caused it? Perhaps a branch broke off a tree and the wind blew it into the window, or children were playing baseball and the ball hit the window, or etc. Aren't those the kinds of things you would consider?

Of course, if indeterminism is correct, it may be that there was no cause of the window being broken.

Let's take your broken window example, since you're obviously conversant in that level of thing.

I am trying to point out the difference between unknown causality (broken windows) and unknowable causality (human decision making). The former can be solved by installing a Ring camera the latter can't be solved.

Whether human decision making is unknowable in principle or not is, at present, not something that has been demonstrated. Neuroscientists are working on this issue presently, and they seem to be making some progress on the matter, though there is still a long way to go. Given the progress that has been made, it seems likely that, eventually, they will figure it out, though, again, it is not demonstrated one way or the other.

As to the rest of your commentary, we all acknowledge that different folks use "Free Will" differently. One example is Marvin's definition, which we all agree is completely compatible with Determinism. Similarly everyone also knows there has been a great historical debate between Determinism and Free Will, thus many if not most view the two as incompatible and thus competitors, of a sort. If you want to add a third wording to the mix, go ahead, but it is less about wording and more about concepts.

It is true that many say that free will is incompatible with determinism, but, typically, such people never give a coherent definition of the phrase "free will". They give a characteristic (i.e., actions are not all determined by conditions preceding the existence of the person or some such thing), but that does not explain what it is. That is about as useful as me saying to you that I am thinking about something that is not compatible with being inside a bread box (it is too big). Knowing that one thing is not very helpful for having any real idea of what it is that is being discussed.

So, sure, many people intend to be discussing something other than what Marvin thinks of as "free will", but that does not mean that they even have a coherent idea of what it is themselves. If they did have a coherent view of what it is, then they should be able to explain it. One finds, though, that in discussions about "free will", virtually no one ever gives a coherent explanation of what it is that they are discussing (if any ever do).

That is one of the main reasons that most discussions about "free will", in which someone is taking an incompatibilist approach (incompatible with determinism), are pretty much always going nowhere and end up being a waste of everyone's time. Most people don't seem to think it necessary to have any idea of what it is that they are talking about and go ahead and say many things about something, of which they themselves are unable to give any explanation of what they are talking about.

[Terrapin Station]

Re what we're talking about, it's (a) ontological freedom (b) in the realm of will phenomena.

So, re ontological freedom, the issue is whether from some antecedent state of affairs, A, there are at least two possible immediately consequent states of affairs, B and C, where B and C are different from each other (if so, this is what it means for there to be ontological freedom), or whether from antecedent state A, one and only one immediately consequent state is possible (which would be determinism.)

So then we consider will phenomena--for example, pondering a decision. Free will obtains when will phenomena leading to a decision can be ontologically free as above.

[LuckyR]

Let's take your broken window example, since you're obviously conversant in that level of thing.

I am trying to point out the difference between unknown causality (broken windows) and unknowable causality (human decision making). The former can be solved by installing a Ring camera the latter can't be solved.

Whether human decision making is unknowable in principle or not is, at present, not something that has been demonstrated. Neuroscientists are working on this issue presently, and they seem to be making some progress on the matter, though there is still a long way to go. Given the progress that has been made, it seems likely that, eventually, they will figure it out, though, again, it is not demonstrated one way or the other.

As to the rest of your commentary, we all acknowledge that different folks use "Free Will" differently. One example is Marvin's definition, which we all agree is completely compatible with Determinism. Similarly everyone also knows there has been a great historical debate between Determinism and Free Will, thus many if not most view the two as incompatible and thus competitors, of a sort. If you want to add a third wording to the mix, go ahead, but it is less about wording and more about concepts.

It is true that many say that free will is incompatible with determinism, but, typically, such people never give a coherent definition of the phrase "free will". They give a characteristic (i.e., actions are not all determined by conditions preceding the existence of the person or some such thing), but that does not explain what it is. That is about as useful as me saying to you that I am thinking about something that is not compatible with being inside a bread box (it is too big). Knowing that one thing is not very helpful for having any real idea of what it is that is being discussed.

So, sure, many people intend to be discussing something other than what Marvin thinks of as "free will", but that does not mean that they even have a coherent idea of what it is themselves. If they did have a coherent view of what it is, then they should be able to explain it. One finds, though, that in discussions about "free will", virtually no one ever gives a coherent explanation of what it is that they are discussing (if any ever do).

That is one of the main reasons that most discussions about "free will", in which someone is taking an incompatibilist approach (incompatible with determinism), are pretty much always going nowhere and end up being a waste of everyone's time. Most people don't seem to think it necessary to have any idea of what it is that they are talking about and go ahead and say many things about something, of which they themselves are unable to give any explanation of what they are talking about.

Your brevity on the "progress" of Neuroscientists in the area of human decision making, implies weight and certainty where there is none. Not only are we nowhere near predicting human and/or animal decision making at essentially 100% accuracy (the standard proof of causality), there is not even a theoretical pathway to get there. Until there is even a conceptual possibility of demonstrating that "antecedent state A always leads only to outcome B", it is pure hubris to pontificate that the Special Case of human decision making is Determined, given that all direct human experience since the beginning of time contradicts that supposition. Don't get me wrong, I agree with you that decision making could be Determined (I can't prove it isn't, since you can't prove a negative), but none of our grandchildren will live to see it proven, so since the sum total of human experience acts as if it isn't Determined, there is no downside to using a working model that implies it isn't. In fact it is infinitely more practically useful to do so.

[Faustus5]

Not only are we nowhere near predicting human and/or animal decision making at essentially 100% accuracy (the standard proof of causality), there is not even a theoretical pathway to get there.

This doesn't contradict your central point at all, but don't discount the advances we have made in predicting behaviors via cognitive neuroscience. The circumstances have to be extremely controlled, but we have gotten to the point where scientists looking at a brain scan can tell which of a limited number of choices a subject will make as long as 10 seconds before the subject is even aware of having made a choice.

[LuckyR]

Not only are we nowhere near predicting human and/or animal decision making at essentially 100% accuracy (the standard proof of causality), there is not even a theoretical pathway to get there.

This doesn't contradict your central point at all, but don't discount the advances we have made in predicting behaviors via cognitive neuroscience. The circumstances have to be extremely controlled, but we have gotten to the point where scientists looking at a brain scan can tell which of a limited number of choices a subject will make as long as 10 seconds before the subject is even aware of having made a choice.

Your post actually proves mine. The only way to make any headway in this area is to remove essentially all of the variables. Unfortunately for Determinists, Real Life doesn't exist in that plane. What makes decision making unknowable (not merely "currently unknown") are the essentially infinite variables.

I'll start to reconsider when you can predict the pathway of an ant across a tabletop with a pinch of sugar granules strewn on it.

[Jack D Ripper]

Re what we're talking about, it's (a) ontological freedom (b) in the realm of will phenomena.

So, re ontological freedom, the issue is whether from some antecedent state of affairs, A, there are at least two possible immediately consequent states of affairs, B and C, where B and C are different from each other (if so, this is what it means for there to be ontological freedom), or whether from antecedent state A, one and only one immediately consequent state is possible (which would be determinism.)

So then we consider will phenomena--for example, pondering a decision. Free will obtains when will phenomena leading to a decision can be ontologically free as above.

How would one discover whether that is true or not?

Also, if it is not me determining which of those outcomes obtains, then how would it be me having freedom? And if it is me determining it, then it is based on what I am, isn't it? Which brings us back to determinism and saying that it is false that there are two possible outcomes, as it is just the one I want (and what I want is based on what I am).

Your description sounds like some random event that has nothing to do with giving me freedom at all.

[Jack D Ripper]

Whether human decision making is unknowable in principle or not is, at present, not something that has been demonstrated. Neuroscientists are working on this issue presently, and they seem to be making some progress on the matter, though there is still a long way to go. Given the progress that has been made, it seems likely that, eventually, they will figure it out, though, again, it is not demonstrated one way or the other.





It is true that many say that free will is incompatible with determinism, but, typically, such people never give a coherent definition of the phrase "free will". They give a characteristic (i.e., actions are not all determined by conditions preceding the existence of the person or some such thing), but that does not explain what it is. That is about as useful as me saying to you that I am thinking about something that is not compatible with being inside a bread box (it is too big). Knowing that one thing is not very helpful for having any real idea of what it is that is being discussed.

So, sure, many people intend to be discussing something other than what Marvin thinks of as "free will", but that does not mean that they even have a coherent idea of what it is themselves. If they did have a coherent view of what it is, then they should be able to explain it. One finds, though, that in discussions about "free will", virtually no one ever gives a coherent explanation of what it is that they are discussing (if any ever do).

That is one of the main reasons that most discussions about "free will", in which someone is taking an incompatibilist approach (incompatible with determinism), are pretty much always going nowhere and end up being a waste of everyone's time. Most people don't seem to think it necessary to have any idea of what it is that they are talking about and go ahead and say many things about something, of which they themselves are unable to give any explanation of what they are talking about.

Your brevity on the "progress" of Neuroscientists in the area of human decision making, implies weight and certainty where there is none. Not only are we nowhere near predicting human and/or animal decision making at essentially 100% accuracy (the standard proof of causality),

That is just false. We can't predict with 100% accuracy that someone will get cancer from smoking. So, if we followed your standard, then smoking does not cause cancer.

there is not even a theoretical pathway to get there. Until there is even a conceptual possibility of demonstrating that "antecedent state A always leads only to outcome B", it is pure hubris to pontificate that the Special Case of human decision making is Determined, given that all direct human experience since the beginning of time contradicts that supposition.

In what way does human experience contradict determinism? I always do what I want (within the limits of physical possibility; e.g., I do not fly without the aid of any device). But what I want is determined by what I am. For example, I do not want to stick my hand in a fire until it burns completely off, because of the fact that it would be extremely painful and it would leave me disabled. I don't like pain and I don't like the idea of being disabled, if I can easily avoid it by not sticking my hand in a fire frivolously (I did not choose to dislike those things; I just find myself not liking those things). The fact that it would be painful is not a fact I have chosen, and the fact that losing a hand would be disabling is not a fact I have chosen. What I do is what I want, but what I want is not chosen by me. What I want is based on what I am. So, everything I have done in my entire life is perfectly compatible with an absolutely rigid determinism. Not only that, but everything I have observed others doing is also perfectly compatible with an absolutely rigid determinism. They do what they want, but what they want is not a matter of their choice.

Don't get me wrong, I agree with you that decision making could be Determined (I can't prove it isn't, since you can't prove a negative), but none of our grandchildren will live to see it proven, so since the sum total of human experience acts as if it isn't Determined, there is no downside to using a working model that implies it isn't. In fact it is infinitely more practically useful to do so.

It makes no difference in one's ordinary life if one supposes that one has some metaphysical freedom or not. You still eat ice cream if you want to and are able to do so, either way. There is nothing you can do when believing that you have some metaphysical freedom that you cannot do believing that everything you do is rigidly determined.

Like metaphysics generally, it makes absolutely no difference in the practical matters of life.

[Terrapin Station]

Re what we're talking about, it's (a) ontological freedom (b) in the realm of will phenomena.

So, re ontological freedom, the issue is whether from some antecedent state of affairs, A, there are at least two possible immediately consequent states of affairs, B and C, where B and C are different from each other (if so, this is what it means for there to be ontological freedom), or whether from antecedent state A, one and only one immediately consequent state is possible (which would be determinism.)

So then we consider will phenomena--for example, pondering a decision. Free will obtains when will phenomena leading to a decision can be ontologically free as above.

How would one discover whether that is true or not?

Also, if it is not me determining which of those outcomes obtains, then how would it be me having freedom? And if it is me determining it, then it is based on what I am, isn't it? Which brings us back to determinism and saying that it is false that there are two possible outcomes, as it is just the one I want (and what I want is based on what I am).

Your description sounds like some random event that has nothing to do with giving me freedom at all.

First, these are different issues than whether we have a clear, coherent idea of what we're referring to, aren't they? The task was first to clearly specify what is being referred to by free will.

[Jack D Ripper]

How would one discover whether that is true or not?

Also, if it is not me determining which of those outcomes obtains, then how would it be me having freedom? And if it is me determining it, then it is based on what I am, isn't it? Which brings us back to determinism and saying that it is false that there are two possible outcomes, as it is just the one I want (and what I want is based on what I am).

Your description sounds like some random event that has nothing to do with giving me freedom at all.

First, these are different issues than whether we have a clear, coherent idea of what we're referring to, aren't they? The task was first to clearly specify what is being referred to by free will.

The thing is, there seems to be no reason to call that "free will" since it appears to have nothing whatever to do with personal freedom. I could define "free will" as "leaves used for brewing a popular beverage in the UK, which is also called the same thing as the leaves" and it would be a definition, but why one would call that "free will" would be a bit mysterious. But it seems to have as much to do with personal freedom as what you are calling "free will".

[LuckyR]

Your brevity on the "progress" of Neuroscientists in the area of human decision making, implies weight and certainty where there is none. Not only are we nowhere near predicting human and/or animal decision making at essentially 100% accuracy (the standard proof of causality),

That is just false. We can't predict with 100% accuracy that someone will get cancer from smoking. So, if we followed your standard, then smoking does not cause cancer.

there is not even a theoretical pathway to get there. Until there is even a conceptual possibility of demonstrating that "antecedent state A always leads only to outcome B", it is pure hubris to pontificate that the Special Case of human decision making is Determined, given that all direct human experience since the beginning of time contradicts that supposition.

In what way does human experience contradict determinism? I always do what I want (within the limits of physical possibility; e.g., I do not fly without the aid of any device). But what I want is determined by what I am. For example, I do not want to stick my hand in a fire until it burns completely off, because of the fact that it would be extremely painful and it would leave me disabled. I don't like pain and I don't like the idea of being disabled, if I can easily avoid it by not sticking my hand in a fire frivolously (I did not choose to dislike those things; I just find myself not liking those things). The fact that it would be painful is not a fact I have chosen, and the fact that losing a hand would be disabling is not a fact I have chosen. What I do is what I want, but what I want is not chosen by me. What I want is based on what I am. So, everything I have done in my entire life is perfectly compatible with an absolutely rigid determinism. Not only that, but everything I have observed others doing is also perfectly compatible with an absolutely rigid determinism. They do what they want, but what they want is not a matter of their choice.

Don't get me wrong, I agree with you that decision making could be Determined (I can't prove it isn't, since you can't prove a negative), but none of our grandchildren will live to see it proven, so since the sum total of human experience acts as if it isn't Determined, there is no downside to using a working model that implies it isn't. In fact it is infinitely more practically useful to do so.

It makes no difference in one's ordinary life if one supposes that one has some metaphysical freedom or not. You still eat ice cream if you want to and are able to do so, either way. There is nothing you can do when believing that you have some metaphysical freedom that you cannot do believing that everything you do is rigidly determined.

Like metaphysics generally, it makes absolutely no difference in the practical matters of life.

Uummmm... you're right, smoking doesn't cause cancer 100% of the time. Only a simpleton would suppose that it does. Determinism ie "antecedent state A always leads to outcome B" works for simple systems, like the path of billiard balls or asteroids. Complex systems like the weather, human decision making and your immune system (to use your example of smoking and cancer) don't pass the: antecedent state A leads to conclusion B test.

If anyone can explain the red comment, I would really appreciate it.

As to practical matters, the fact that we have a justice system implies that events, particularly decision making is NOT Determined by a set of preconditions, rather that we make decisions on the fly for which we (not our preconditions) are responsible.

[Belindi]

That is just false. We can't predict with 100% accuracy that someone will get cancer from smoking. So, if we followed your standard, then smoking does not cause cancer.





In what way does human experience contradict determinism? I always do what I want (within the limits of physical possibility; e.g., I do not fly without the aid of any device). But what I want is determined by what I am. For example, I do not want to stick my hand in a fire until it burns completely off, because of the fact that it would be extremely painful and it would leave me disabled. I don't like pain and I don't like the idea of being disabled, if I can easily avoid it by not sticking my hand in a fire frivolously (I did not choose to dislike those things; I just find myself not liking those things). The fact that it would be painful is not a fact I have chosen, and the fact that losing a hand would be disabling is not a fact I have chosen. What I do is what I want, but what I want is not chosen by me. What I want is based on what I am. So, everything I have done in my entire life is perfectly compatible with an absolutely rigid determinism. Not only that, but everything I have observed others doing is also perfectly compatible with an absolutely rigid determinism. They do what they want, but what they want is not a matter of their choice.






It makes no difference in one's ordinary life if one supposes that one has some metaphysical freedom or not. You still eat ice cream if you want to and are able to do so, either way. There is nothing you can do when believing that you have some metaphysical freedom that you cannot do believing that everything you do is rigidly determined.

Like metaphysics generally, it makes absolutely no difference in the practical matters of life.

Uummmm... you're right, smoking doesn't cause cancer 100% of the time. Only a simpleton would suppose that it does. Determinism ie "antecedent state A always leads to outcome B" works for simple systems, like the path of billiard balls or asteroids. Complex systems like the weather, human decision making and your immune system (to use your example of smoking and cancer) don't pass the: antecedent state A leads to conclusion B test.

If anyone can explain the red comment, I would really appreciate it.

As to practical matters, the fact that we have a justice system implies that events, particularly decision making is NOT Determined by a set of preconditions, rather that we make decisions on the fly for which we (not our preconditions) are responsible.

If we could predict effects of what we cause then we would be free from uncertainty. But we cannot predict what will be the effects of what we cause. The best predictions we make are probabilities only. It is probable if you stick your hand in the fire it will hurt, but as far as you can know it is not a certainty it will hurt.

The future is uncertain however that does not imply the future is uncaused; it implies only our lack of foreknowledge.

One thing is certain. To believe that a man is to blame for his actions and thoughts is an attitude strongly affiliated to Free Will belief. The corollary is the more you are a determinist the less you blame people for what they do and think. This is the foundation of psychoanalysis. And also the foundation of forgiveness.