Thank you TS, I’ve found your response and the discussion that followed from it to be helpful and very thought-provoking. I agree it’s an interesting topic. It’s taking me some time to digest and think over all this, and I still haven’t quite formulated my thoughts very well, but didn’t want to wait too long again before responding, so I'll give it a try and see what happens.Terrapin Station wrote: ↑January 16th, 2022, 7:12 amI see the problem here, and it's actually interesting. Hopefully pointing this out will help straighten it out but I don't know.Thomyum2 wrote: ↑January 15th, 2022, 3:46 pm So as I see it, perception/observation is what ontology is built upon, not the other way around. We are not born knowing what exists or does not exist – we discover what exists through multiple observations over time, and by comparing our observations with those of other conscious observers with whom we communicate. So over time and after multiple observations, we can formulate what elements of our observations endure – not just across time and space within our own experience, but also from one observer to another. Of those aspects or components that endure from one observation to another or one observer to the next, we say ‘exist’ – which is what I understand an ontology to be. I see ontology as a kind of compendium of observations - a mental model of the intrinsic nature of these existing objects which we formulate that is consistent to explain the set of observations we’ve had. So that’s why I ‘introduced’ observation here, not because I’m talking about something different – I see it as an essential and necessary building block of ontology. Let me know if I’m off base here.
You're not actually "doing ontology" above, you're "doing epistemology." You're looking at how we know what exists. That's not what ontology is. That's epistemology. If we're looking at or answering how we know something, we're doing epistemology. That's the subject matter of epistemology.
We can point out that we can't do ontology, as an activity that humans do, without there being knowledge issues there. And sure, that's the case.
Likewise, we can't do epistemology without simply assuming that various things exist, like us, our observations, other people, etc.--all of which you're doing above. Or, we could say, we can't begin to address knowledge--what knowledge is, how we know things, etc. without there being knowledge, knowing, etc. in the first place, so there has to be something that exists (something "ontological") prior to even beginning epistemology.
So epistemology and ontology are going to be entwined. But when we do ontology, we can't just do epistemology, or we're not actually doing ontology.
Likewise when we do epistemology. We can't just do ontology, otherwise we're not actually doing epistemology.
This is the case despite them being entwined (as activities that we can engage in).
One thing that's worth pointing out re the parenthetical there is that "ontology" is often used in a sense of NOT being the activity, not being a "study of" or "theory of" per se but so that the referent is simply the stuff that's being talked about. When we use the term in that sense, ontology and epistemology aren't necessarily entwined, or at least if we're going to argue that they are, we'd need an actual argument that plausibly supports that idea.
I do see the distinction you’re making between epistemology and ontology, and that part makes sense. And perhaps I am using the terminology incorrectly or in a way that’s creating confusion. So maybe before moving forward I should go back to your statement that originally got me off track here and seek clarification. You had said above:
It's a change because it's ontologically DIFFERENT. If some state of affairs x, with respect to a, b and c, is different than some state of affairs y with respect to a, b and c, then there has been a change. It doesn't matter one bit if there's an observation of it or not.
So in the context of what you’ve said about ontology, what then does it mean to say that two states are ‘ontologically different’? I took this to mean that the two states are what I’d call ‘intrinsically different’ - some might say ‘objectively different’ (though that’s another term known to create confusion), and so what I’m understanding it to mean is that they’re different in their own nature, independent of whether or when or how they are observed. But if you look back to my example earlier, where I was saying there are the two ways that the three particles could be approaching each other – one in which observer is stationary but the three particles are moving toward each other, and one in which the particles are fixed in positions but the observer is moving away from them – it seems to me that, yes, in either of those two situations I just described, the first state is ‘ontologically different’ from the next. But if the observer is removed from equation, and there is no possibility of knowing (yes, switching to epistemology here, but bear with me) which of the two is the case. Are the three particles changing their relationship or are they remaining in the same relationship? This now becomes an unanswerable question without the key ingredient of knowing the observer's frame of reference. It's not that we don't know - this is a universe where we can't know. So the ‘state of affairs’ in an observerless universe becomes somewhat meaningless to me – it’s a notion that becomes a purely a mental construct, and I don’t see how there can be anything ‘ontological’ one way or another about such a universe.
Another way I could say this that might help is that subject and the object are the two components of any observation – there can be no observation without both of these components. We can take away one subject and replace it with another subject, keeping the same object, and say that the object has existence independent of any one given subject. But to postulate that an object could have existence independent of any and all subjects – this is what I’m struggling with as it seems to create something of a paradox. Such an object, by definition, is a mental construct because if it is never observed, its existence is never confirmable, so that makes it in essence an object of belief or imagination. Yet, if it’s an object of belief, then it can’t be an object that has existence independent of any subject - it 'exists' only as a belief by a believing subject. Do you see what I'm trying to get at, or does this make any sense at all?
A couple of times in this thread you used the term ‘believe’ which leads me to think that perhaps any ontology has to assume a mutual understanding or shared set of premises about what constitutes existence first as a starting point for discussion? Or is ontology itself an axiomatic endeavor? Is it about discussing or creating beliefs that are effective starting points for the philosophy that proceeds from it rather than about reaching conclusions? I’m interested to hear your thoughts.
And believe it or not, this does relate to my thoughts about time on this thread.