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Arbu123 wrote: ↑March 22nd, 2022, 10:27 pm
Example: If I do action A (throw a pencil), effect B is determined to happen (it falls to the ground). The same is true for all actions, so do we have any scenario where there’s absolute determinism or absolute free Will or do they just mix?
The commonsensical, or incompatibilist, position says that if something is free then it is not determined, and if something is determined then it is not free.
But different things have different properties and behavior. The reason the pencil falls to the ground is because it is not free vis-a-vis gravity. The reason you can freely throw the pencil is because you are free to cause the pencil to fly through the air, or not to cause the pencil to fly through the air.
Freedom presupposes causal regularities. If there were no causal regularities then I would not be free to do the things I want to do, because I would have no way to effect them. For example, if pencils and gravity and air did not act in a predictable way, then I would not be able to throw pencils.
Not only restrictions are causes of events. Other causes are of your throwing a pencil are its size and mass relative to your strength, and you perceived need to do the experiment.
Gravity is a cause that is common to most events. Science can tell of other common causes such as the circling of Earth around the Sun, and animal metabolism, and many more of such rule-like connections. Some of us believe that universe is itself a connected and rule-like system where every event is a necessary event.
Nothing a person does is uncaused by some event that is not that person.To put it the other way round, everything a person does is cause by events tht are not that person.
Belindi wrote: ↑April 2nd, 2022, 3:13 pmNothing a person does is uncaused by some event that is not that person.To put it the other way round, everything a person does is cause by events tht are not that person.
Those are two completely distinct claims. Most people believe in agent causation - that free agents are themselves the cause of their free acts. Just as the sun causes heat, so a free agent causes free actions. It is just the nature of a person that they have that sort of freedom. Now all of us that believe in agent causation would agree with your first sentence, but not your second.
Belindi wrote: ↑April 2nd, 2022, 3:13 pmNothing a person does is uncaused by some event that is not that person....Now all of us that believe in agent causation would agree with your first sentence, but not your second.
Or perhaps I misread your first sentence. The triple negative makes it cumbersome.
"The commonsensical, or incompatibilist, position says that if something is free then it is not determined, and if something is determined then it is not free."
A raging storm over a virulent sea is determined. Why can't it be free then?
'Freedom presupposes causal regularities. If there were no causal regularities then I would not be free to do the things I want to do, because I would have no way to effect them. For example, if pencils and gravity and air did not act in a predictable way, then I would not be able to throw pencils."
I agree. How can a determined process not be free if there is no determined process in the first place?
Free will can be defined as our domain over the 'deterministic' aspect of the deterministic world, being able to freely determine as a result.
Therefore, free will and determinism are the same phenomenon looked at from a different perspective. One (Free will) from the perspective of the self, and the other (Determinism) from the perspective of the world.
People perceive gray and argue about whether it's black or white.
GrayArea wrote: ↑April 7th, 2022, 2:18 am
Free will can be defined as our domain over the 'deterministic' aspect of the deterministic world, being able to freely determine as a result.
Therefore, free will and determinism are the same phenomenon looked at from a different perspective. One (Free will) from the perspective of the self, and the other (Determinism) from the perspective of the world.
That is true... from the Free Will perspective. Many Determinists argue that the self is also determined, just like the rest of the world.
GrayArea wrote: ↑April 7th, 2022, 2:18 am
Free will can be defined as our domain over the 'deterministic' aspect of the deterministic world, being able to freely determine as a result.
Therefore, free will and determinism are the same phenomenon looked at from a different perspective. One (Free will) from the perspective of the self, and the other (Determinism) from the perspective of the world.
That is true... from the Free Will perspective. Many Determinists argue that the self is also determined, just like the rest of the world.
The self can be determined, just like the rest of the world. But determined by what, I wonder? By the world, or by itself? Perhaps both, as the self is both defined as itself and a part of the world.
People perceive gray and argue about whether it's black or white.
GrayArea wrote: ↑April 7th, 2022, 2:18 am
Free will can be defined as our domain over the 'deterministic' aspect of the deterministic world, being able to freely determine as a result.
Therefore, free will and determinism are the same phenomenon looked at from a different perspective. One (Free will) from the perspective of the self, and the other (Determinism) from the perspective of the world.
That is true... from the Free Will perspective. Many Determinists argue that the self is also determined, just like the rest of the world.
The self can be determined, just like the rest of the world. But determined by what, I wonder? By the world, or by itself? Perhaps both, as the self is both defined as itself and a part of the world.
Many Determinists feel that the physical state of the brain at the time a decision needs to be made determines what the "decision" will be, thus it isn't really a choice since it could not happen any other way.
GrayArea wrote: ↑April 7th, 2022, 2:18 am
Free will can be defined as our domain over the 'deterministic' aspect of the deterministic world, being able to freely determine as a result.
Therefore, free will and determinism are the same phenomenon looked at from a different perspective. One (Free will) from the perspective of the self, and the other (Determinism) from the perspective of the world.
That is true... from the Free Will perspective. Many Determinists argue that the self is also determined, just like the rest of the world.
The self can be determined, just like the rest of the world. But determined by what, I wonder? By the world, or by itself? Perhaps both, as the self is both defined as itself and a part of the world.
Many Determinists feel that the physical state of the brain at the time a decision needs to be made determines what the "decision" will be, thus it isn't really a choice since it could not happen any other way.
But isn't the physical state of our brain just the self anyway?
People perceive gray and argue about whether it's black or white.
That is true... from the Free Will perspective. Many Determinists argue that the self is also determined, just like the rest of the world.
The self can be determined, just like the rest of the world. But determined by what, I wonder? By the world, or by itself? Perhaps both, as the self is both defined as itself and a part of the world.
Many Determinists feel that the physical state of the brain at the time a decision needs to be made determines what the "decision" will be, thus it isn't really a choice since it could not happen any other way.
But isn't the physical state of our brain just the self anyway?
Belindi wrote: ↑April 2nd, 2022, 3:13 pmNothing a person does is uncaused by some event that is not that person.To put it the other way round, everything a person does is cause by events tht are not that person.
Those are two completely distinct claims. Most people believe in agent causation - that free agents are themselves the cause of their free acts. Just as the sun causes heat, so a free agent causes free actions. It is just the nature of a person that they have that sort of freedom. Now all of us that believe in agent causation would agree with your first sentence, but not your second.
The Sun causes what is not the Sun to heat up but the Sun does not "causes" heat. Heat partly defines the Sun.
Free Will does not define men not even partly.
Moreover that men are alone as originators of events is not credible.The Sun is a necessary part of nature and so is mankind.
A free will needs a deterministic structure to be free. The fire burns determined, but freely. Likewise, we are determined bodies, between determined processes in our inner world and outer physical world. Likewise, determined but free. Only other free wills can impair our free will, if our surroundings and brain are in good order and we can move unhindered by injuries.
If the physical universe is the unique interpretation of the unknown and elusive Theory of Everything (ToE), i.e. if the ToE is truly categorical, then the history of the physical universe can be entirely calculated from the ToE, and then free will is not possible.
In that sense, we recognize just one "cause" or reason for every event in the physical universe, i.e. the fact that the ToE can calculate that the event will happen. That is a simplified take on determinism.
It is rather unlikely that the ToE would be categorical (i.e. interpreted by exactly one single physical universe).
It would mean that the ToE does not contain the relevant fragment (Robinson's Q) of arithmetic theory that would trigger the provability of Gödel's incompleteness theorem. Few people believe that.
If, on the contrary, Gödel's incompleteness is provable from the ToE, which is what more people seem to believe, then there exist Gödelian statements in the physical universe that are true but not calculable from the ToE. The collection of these Gödelian statements represent free will.
The answer to the question therefore depends on whether the Theory of Everything contains at least fragment Q from standard Arithmetic Theory (PA).
Here’s a hypothetical question. Say you went to a psychic because you were drunk and frisky and when she leaned over, she dropped her magic ball and you saw the future…if you could change what you saw, would determinism be incorrect?
