Leontiskos wrote: ↑July 15th, 2022, 11:12 pm
I will be away for some time, but you are welcome to respond in that thread. Generally speaking a philosopher does not "disagree with a distinction," unless of course you think Hegel's distinction between the ethical and the moral is incoherent. Yet that seems highly unlikely. So what you say here seems like a quibble that misses the point.
That depends upon which "Hegel's distinction" you mean. From what I can gather he changed his views on that matter a number of times:
"Perhaps the most well-known feature of Hegel's ethical thought is his distinction between “morality” (Moralität) and “ethical life” (Sittlichkeit). But is the distinction well understood? One common interpretation is the following: “Morality” for Hegel means Kant's moral philosophy; it represents what is reflective, critical, and individualistic in the moral life. Hegel identifies “ethical life” with ancient Greek society; it stands for an attitude of unthinking, pious devotion to the traditional laws and customs of one's people. Hegel is a partisan of ethical life and an opponent of morality. He favors social conformism and moral traditionalism, and is an opponent of individualism and critical moral thinking.
"There is some truth in each of the elements of this picture, but in every case that truth is seriously oversimplified. The picture as a whole (summed up in the last two sentences of the previous paragraph) is a hopeless distortion. The picture comes closest to describing Hegel's views during his Jena period (1801–1806). But Hegel's views about morality and ethical life underwent quite radical changes in the course of his philosophical development, and during the Jena period itself Hegel's conception of morality presents us with a moving target."
https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/ab ... 729AF1BAD4
But the distinction as I drew it, i.e., "What he is trying to do with that distinction is to portray tribal customs, culture, "ethos, or "folkways," as having normative significance comparable to, or on a par with, morality (as philosophers understand it)," seems to express it fairly well. He wishes (at that point) to use "ethics" for customs and folkways, and endow them with some normative significance.
Stawrowski of course sees rights and responsibilities as being present in each conceptual political state. The OP is asking about what hinders a turn from entitlements to responsibilities and how such a thing might be accomplished. That both exist does not mean that they are indistinguishable or unable to come into conflict. If we use Stawrowski's models then the state of ethical minimum will be more concerned with individual rights and entitlements, whereas the homogenous state (along with the 'thicker' states which imitate it) will be more concerned with group responsibilities and solidarity.
Yes, I understand the OP's question. I'm claiming that question is misconceived, and relies upon a false premise, namely, the "organic fallacy." Civilized societies are not homogeneous states, and never can be. Nor we we ever find "solidarity" in them. Finally, groups are not moral agents, and hence have no responsibilities to any individual, nor any individual to them. So there can be no "turn from entitlements to responsibilities," if the responsibilities are imagined to be to some group, and derived merely from one's membership in the group.
There are no
a priori responsibilities (and I take a "responsibility" to be an obligation). Only individuals have obligations, and only to other individuals. Moreover, those obligations arise from some act of the agent --- they are not
a priori. For example, if Alfie makes a promise or enters into some sort of contract with Bruno, then he creates an obligation upon himself to keep that promise, fulfill his duties per the contract. Or if Alfie brings a child into the world, he acquires an obligation to care for it. If he injures someone, some obligation to make restitution.
So there is no conflict between entitlements and responsibilities --- since there are no "responsibilities" as Stawrorski (and the early Hegel) conceive them.