Privative properties?

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Consul
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Re: Privative properties?

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Astro Cat wrote: June 29th, 2022, 7:52 amIs “the towel is dry” equivalent to “the towel is not-wet?” Is there a difference between that and “the towel is-not wet?”
If "dry" means "(completely) destitute of or free from moisture", then "dry" and "non-wet" are synonyms.

There is a relevant ontological difference between "a is-not F" and "a is non-F", which consists in the difference between something's not having some positive property and something's having some negative property.
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JackDaydream
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Re: Privative properties?

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Astro Cat wrote: June 29th, 2022, 7:52 am Do you think properties can be privative?

What do you think is going on when someone says, “the towel is dry,” “the room is dark,” or “the drawer is empty?”

Is “the towel is dry” equivalent to “the towel is not-wet?” Is there a difference between that and “the towel is-not wet?”
It seems to me that your question is more about questions of grammar, as a way of framing. The problem which I have with your question is that such questions can seem tedious knots; although I am open to criticism of my outlook and the whole way in which binary positives and negatives have importance. The reason why I am writing this reply is because I am wondering to what extent the use of negative or positive grammar matters in understanding. To what extent is the wording of negatives or positive in the larger picture of understanding life, reality and ideas?
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Consul
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Re: Privative properties?

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Consul wrote: June 29th, 2022, 3:34 pmThere is a relevant ontological difference between "a is-not F" and "a is non-F", which consists in the difference between something's not having some positive property and something's having some negative property.
As for modal properties, there is an analogous ontological difference between "a is-necessarily/possibly F" and "a is necessarily/possibly-F". I think there are no modal properties as a kind of properties sui generis, because the modality belongs to the copula. Modality is about different ways of having (exemplifying/instantiating) non-modal properties rather than about different modal properties.
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Re: Privative properties?

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Consul wrote: June 29th, 2022, 3:51 pm As for modal properties, there is an analogous ontological difference between "a is-necessarily/possibly F" and "a is necessarily/possibly-F". I think there are no modal properties as a kind of properties sui generis, because the modality belongs to the copula. Modality is about different ways of having (exemplifying/instantiating) non-modal properties rather than about different modal properties.
Of course, having a property merely possibly is not a way of having it (actually).
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Re: Privative properties?

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As we find more dimensions in the manifold “sui generis” the fundamental correlation is in the understanding. That is: Is it possible for different people to grasp/approximate the same thought? In the case of the manifold or thought of positive and negative dimensions, I propose that a non-modal property is instantiated by a rogue object (the void). This property acts as a bias towards the thought supplanting the dimension of relevancy.
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Re: Privative properties?

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Surely, the problem which is described is a matter of positives and negatives, and how this is understood linguistically. It seems to me that the choices such as wet, or not wet, are linguistic constructions more than anything else..If this discussion becomes the main one on the forum, I will probably give up because it seems such a tedious discussion of grammar and linguistics, as opposed to the deeper questions of philosophy.
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Consul
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Re: Privative properties?

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Consul wrote: June 29th, 2022, 2:56 pmQUOTE>
"The void is deadly. If you were cast into a void, it would cause you to die in just a few minutes. It would suck the air from your lungs. It would boil your blood. It would drain the warmth from your body. And it would inflate enclosures in your body until they burst.

What I’ve said is literally true, yet it may be misleading. When the void sucks away the air, it does not exert an attractive force on the air. It is not like a magnet sucking up iron filings. Rather, the air molecules collide and exert repulsive forces on one another; these forces constitute a pressure that, if unresisted, causes the air to expand and disperse; the void exerts no force to resist the pressure; and that is why the air departs from the lungs.

Likewise, when the void boils the blood, there is no flow of energy from the void into the blood. It isn’t like a stove boiling a kettle of water. The blood is already warm enough to boil, if its vapor pressure is unresisted; the void exerts no counterpressure; and so the boiling goes unprevented.

Likewise, when the void drains your warmth, what happens is that your thermal energy, left to itself, tends to dissipate; and the void provides no influx of energy to replace the departing heat.

And when the void inflates enclosures, again what happens is that the enclosed fluids exert pressure and the void exerts no counterpressure. So nothing prevents the outward pressure from doing damage.

In short, you are kept alive by forces and flows of energy that come from the objects that surround you. If, instead of objects, you were surrounded by a void, these life-sustaining forces and flows would cease. Without them, you would soon die. That is how the void causes death. It is deadly not because it exerts forces and supplies energy, but because it doesn’t."
(p. 277)

"[W]henever any effect is caused by an absence of anything, we have the problem of the missing relatum. (And likewise whenever anything causes an absence.) A void, being the absence of any objects at all, is just the most extreme case of an absence.

Faced with the problem of the missing relatum, we have four possible lines of response.

(1) We could deny, in the face of compelling examples to the contrary, that absences ever cause anything. We could deny, for instance, that the void is deadly. (Likewise, we could deny that anything ever causes an absence. In other words, we could deny that there is any such thing as prevention.) Simply to state this response is to complete the reductio against it.

(2) We could reify absences nonreductively. A void, so we might say, is a sui generis entity, but it is none the worse for that. It is eligible to serve as a causal relatum. It springs up automatically and necessarily whenever, and only whenever, all else goes away; it is conceptually impossible not to have a void between the walls and not to have anything else there either. So much the worse, says the reifier, for the combinatorial principle, which claims that existential statements about distinct things are independent.

(3) We could reify absences reductively. We could identify absences with comparatively uncontroversial objects that, as others would say, are somehow associated with those absences. For instance, we could identify a hole with the hole-lining that, as we’d normally say, immediately surrounds the hole. (Strange to say, some holes are made of cheese and some of limestone! Strange to say, no holes are exactly where we would have thought they were!) Or we could identify an absence with a bit of unoccupied spacetime, if we were not such uncompromising combinatorialists as to countenance an absence of spacetime itself. One way or another, we can cook up ersatz absences to serve as relata of the causal relation—though surely they will seem to be the wrong relata, since we don’t really think of these ersatz absences as having the same effects (or causes) as the absences they stand in for. We might, for instance, imitate the identification of holes and hole-linings on a grander scale. Take the most inclusive void of all; and take the mereological fusion of all objects of whatever kind. On the principle of identifying hole with hole-lining, and void with surrounding objects, we might identify this greatest void with the greatest object.

(4) The best response is to concede that a void is nothing at all, and that a lesser absence is nothing relevant at all and therefore cannot furnish causal relata. Yet absences can be causes and e.ects. So I insist, contra Menzies, that causation cannot always be the bearing of a causal relation. No theory of the causal relation, neither Menzies’s theory nor any other, can be the whole story of causation.

The intrinsic character of causation is not our present problem. I do indeed fear that the intrinsic character of causation is more a hasty generalization than an a priori desideratum. But even if we struck the intrinsic character of causation off our list of folk platitudes, we’d still be trying to characterize the causal relation, so we’d still be in trouble. Any relation needs relata, whether it is intrinsic or not. So the problem of missing relata hits any relational analysis of causation.

But does any analysis escape the problem of missing relata?—Yes; a counterfactual analysis escapes. We do not have to reify the void in order to ask what would have happened if the void had not been there. The void causes death to one who is cast into it because if, instead, he had been surrounded by suitable objects, he would not have died. (Here we must assume that if the victim had not been surrounded by the void, he would instead have been surrounded by the life-sustaining objects that normally surround us—not by liquid nitrogen, or clouds of nerve gas, or a hail of bullets.) Likewise for lesser absences. If the cause is an absence, then to suppose away the cause counterfactually is not to attend to some remarkable entity and suppose that it does not exist. Rather, we need only suppose that some unremarkable entity does exist. Absences are spooky things, and we’d do best not to take them seriously. But absences of absences are no problem.

Note well that in defending a counterfactual analysis, I am not claiming that all causation consists in a relation of counterfactual dependence between (distinct) events. That theory would not escape the problem of missing relata. A relation of counterfactual dependence is still a relation, a relation still needs relata, and absences still fail to provide the needed relata. The counterfactual analysis escapes the problem because, when the relata go missing, it can do without any causal relation at all."
(pp. 281-3)

(Lewis, David. "Void and Object." In Causation and Counterfactuals, edited by John Collins, Ned Hall, and L. A. Paul, 277-290. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004.)
<QUOTE
Note that Lewis doesn't equate a void with a physical vacuum or "empty" space:

QUOTE>
"The deadly effects of a void would be just like those of a commonplace vacuum. Nevertheless, I distinguish the two. The more we learn about the vacuum, the more we find out that it is full of causally active objects: force fields, photons, and ‘‘virtual’’ particles. Spacetime itself, if curved, can serve as a repository of energy. And perhaps that is not the end. The void, on the other hand, is entirely empty. Thus, if there is a vacuum within these four walls, there may be quite a lot of objects between the walls that are capable of exerting forces and supplying energy. Whereas if there is a void within these walls, then (even though the walls are some distance apart) there is nothing at all between the walls. What?—Not even any spacetime? Not even any flat, causally inert spacetime?—No, not even any spacetime. Nothing at all. The void is what we used to think the vacuum was."

(Lewis, David. "Void and Object." In Causation and Counterfactuals, edited by John Collins, Ned Hall, and L. A. Paul, 277-290. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004. pp. 277-8)
<QUOTE
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Consul
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Re: Privative properties?

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JackDaydream wrote: June 29th, 2022, 5:40 pm Surely, the problem which is described is a matter of positives and negatives, and how this is understood linguistically. It seems to me that the choices such as wet, or not wet, are linguistic constructions more than anything else..If this discussion becomes the main one on the forum, I will probably give up because it seems such a tedious discussion of grammar and linguistics, as opposed to the deeper questions of philosophy.
The question is whether there are negative entities as ontological counterparts of logical negation and negative linguistic predication (by means of negative predicates or sentences)! – My answer is no, because in my view negative (nonlinguistic) entities are nonentities, i.e. things that don't exist.
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Re: Privative properties?

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The Beast wrote: June 29th, 2022, 5:11 pm As we find more dimensions in the manifold “sui generis” the fundamental correlation is in the understanding. That is: Is it possible for different people to grasp/approximate the same thought? In the case of the manifold or thought of positive and negative dimensions, I propose that a non-modal property is instantiated by a rogue object (the void). This property acts as a bias towards the thought supplanting the dimension of relevancy.
What is something and nothingness? Are they objective or subjective constructions? What is the 'void', is it something objective in terms of physics and objective reality? How much is it about objective or subjective constructions or the blur of philosophy gobbblegook, L L in creating discussions which have so little meaning in understanding life? Language may be of importance in understanding, but it can also create ridiculous knots. It is not that I am wishing to gloss over the duality of the positives and negatives, but at times it may result in the ideas being reduced to linguistic abstractions which become so remote from life, making them trivial in the grasp of human meaning. Academic philosophy is useful, but it may be a deadend for some, as abstraction as an exercise, which have some or little relevance for understanding life. I am not opposed to theory, as a basis for understanding, but the question may be how useful it is for understanding life?
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Re: Privative properties?

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Consul wrote: June 29th, 2022, 5:51 pm
JackDaydream wrote: June 29th, 2022, 5:40 pm Surely, the problem which is described is a matter of positives and negatives, and how this is understood linguistically. It seems to me that the choices such as wet, or not wet, are linguistic constructions more than anything else..If this discussion becomes the main one on the forum, I will probably give up because it seems such a tedious discussion of grammar and linguistics, as opposed to the deeper questions of philosophy.
The question is whether there are negative entities as ontological counterparts of logical negation and negative linguistic predication (by means of negative predicates or sentences)! – My answer is no, because in my view negative (nonlinguistic) entities are nonentities, i.e. things that don't exist.
The deeper question may be about linguistics and how far it may go in philosophical understanding. Human beings construct ideas in the context of binary distinctions and logic. It may be difficult to step outside of these limits, including negation, but it may also be important to understand the contexts of human thought and how it is constructed, rather than being carried away by it as if it is reality itself. There may be illusions and complications of interpretations, but there is also a danger of abstraction as a way of deciphering ideas, and understanding, abstract or not, as a way of thinking with clarity.
.
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Re: Privative properties?

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Consul wrote: June 29th, 2022, 2:32 pm...We might judge, therefore, that it is appropriate to say insoluble, in the case of rocks, because it indicates what we might call a meta-level privation or meta-privation. It is not that the rock is lacking something qua rock, when it is insoluble, since rocks in general have no tendency to dissolve. But at a higher level of abstraction, a rock is a kind of thing—a solid physical object—where some things of that higher kind are soluble.

The distinction between internal and external negation can be used to separate privations from non-privations, where it is desirable to do so. Hence, we might say, using external negation:

(1) It is not the case that a rock can see

But we would use internal negation when we say:

(2) The man is unseeing.

A person typically can see but some have a privation of this capacity, which the internal negation indicates. The rock has no (first-order) privation of this ability since rocks do not ever have a capacity to see...
This is in some sense helpful but I would disagree in part. I believe that for Aristotle (and Aquinas) a so-called "meta-level privation," "meta-privation," or, "external negation," is not a privation. It is rather a negation or an absence, as the third term states. Aristotle is not altogether clear about whether such a thing should be called a privation, but in certain places he does make the more subtle distinction:

"Now since it is the work of one science to investigate opposites, and plurality is opposed to unity-and it belongs to one science to investigate the negation and the privation because in both cases we are really investigating the one thing of which the negation or the privation is a negation or privation (for we either say simply that that thing is not present, or that it is not present in some particular class; in the latter case difference is present over and above what is implied in negation; for negation means just the absence of the thing in question, while in privation there is also employed an underlying nature of which the privation is asserted)..." (Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book IV, Part 2)

"For of contraries, one is a privation no less than it is a contrary-and a privation of the essential nature; and privation is the denial of a predicate to a determinate genus." (Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book IV, Part 6)

The reason Mumford's "[second-order] privation" is not correctly called a privation is because it is not contrary to the essential nature or determinate genus. In his example, it is not contrary to "solid physical objects" to be not-soluble. The number 6 and the rock do lack solubility in a different sense, but neither sense is privative, for solubility is not proper to either object.
Consul wrote: June 29th, 2022, 2:56 pm
Astro Cat wrote: June 28th, 2022, 9:51 pmI've actually spent a lot of time thinking about whether there can be privative properties. I'm really fascinated by how we think that a towel can be dry, for instance (which is clearly an example of "a is not F"). I don't know if I've come to any final conclusions about this or anything, just noting this is something I think about surprisingly a lot.
I'm convinced that there are no negative or "privative" entities of any ontological kind: Existence is positive!
Absences, lacks, and omissions aren't entities.

Someone might object: Wait a minute! Can't an absence or lack of oxygen kill me? If it can, it must be something rather than nothing, since nonentities cannot cause anything.
Well, although a person's death can depend counterfactually on an absence of oxygen—in the sense that the person wouldn't have died if oxygen hadn't been absent—, there is no efficient causation by the absent oxygen in terms of chemical/physical force or energy. For what causes your death in the event of an absence of oxygen is not the absent oxygen (as a negative entity) but the collapse of your life-sustaining functions which depend physiologically on oxygen.
Yes, and as I said above, blindness has a cause although it is not a being in itself. It is not a positive ontological entity. Any "effects" of blindness are therefore effects of the causes of blindness.
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Re: Privative properties?

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JackDaydream wrote: June 29th, 2022, 6:00 pm
The Beast wrote: June 29th, 2022, 5:11 pm As we find more dimensions in the manifold “sui generis” the fundamental correlation is in the understanding. That is: Is it possible for different people to grasp/approximate the same thought? In the case of the manifold or thought of positive and negative dimensions, I propose that a non-modal property is instantiated by a rogue object (the void). This property acts as a bias towards the thought supplanting the dimension of relevancy.
What is something and nothingness? Are they objective or subjective constructions? What is the 'void', is it something objective in terms of physics and objective reality? How much is it about objective or subjective constructions or the blur of philosophy gobbblegook, L L in creating discussions which have so little meaning in understanding life? Language may be of importance in understanding, but it can also create ridiculous knots. It is not that I am wishing to gloss over the duality of the positives and negatives, but at times it may result in the ideas being reduced to linguistic abstractions which become so remote from life, making them trivial in the grasp of human meaning. Academic philosophy is useful, but it may be a deadend for some, as abstraction as an exercise, which have some or little relevance for understanding life. I am not opposed to theory, as a basis for understanding, but the question may be how useful it is for understanding life?
It is that a psychological truth (Jung) might be true and correct based in habitual modes of thinking, feeling and behaving…which experience has proved appropriate and useful.
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Re: Privative properties?

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The Beast wrote: June 29th, 2022, 7:34 pm
JackDaydream wrote: June 29th, 2022, 6:00 pm
The Beast wrote: June 29th, 2022, 5:11 pm As we find more dimensions in the manifold “sui generis” the fundamental correlation is in the understanding. That is: Is it possible for different people to grasp/approximate the same thought? In the case of the manifold or thought of positive and negative dimensions, I propose that a non-modal property is instantiated by a rogue object (the void). This property acts as a bias towards the thought supplanting the dimension of relevancy.
What is something and nothingness? Are they objective or subjective constructions? What is the 'void', is it something objective in terms of physics and objective reality? How much is it about objective or subjective constructions or the blur of philosophy gobbblegook, L L in creating discussions which have so little meaning in understanding life? Language may be of importance in understanding, but it can also create ridiculous knots. It is not that I am wishing to gloss over the duality of the positives and negatives, but at times it may result in the ideas being reduced to linguistic abstractions which become so remote from life, making them trivial in the grasp of human meaning. Academic philosophy is useful, but it may be a deadend for some, as abstraction as an exercise, which have some or little relevance for understanding life. I am not opposed to theory, as a basis for understanding, but the question may be how useful it is for understanding life?
It is that a psychological truth (Jung) might be true and correct based in habitual modes of thinking, feeling and behaving…which experience has proved appropriate and useful.
I know that I cite Jung a lot, but it is hard to know what he would say on everything. I am inclined to think that he would regard the description of something as not wet or as dry as a rather trivial aspect of philosophy, but I would not wish to put words in his mouth simply based on my own views about what matters in life.
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Re: Privative properties?

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JackDaydream wrote: June 29th, 2022, 8:08 pm
The Beast wrote: June 29th, 2022, 7:34 pm
JackDaydream wrote: June 29th, 2022, 6:00 pm
The Beast wrote: June 29th, 2022, 5:11 pm As we find more dimensions in the manifold “sui generis” the fundamental correlation is in the understanding. That is: Is it possible for different people to grasp/approximate the same thought? In the case of the manifold or thought of positive and negative dimensions, I propose that a non-modal property is instantiated by a rogue object (the void). This property acts as a bias towards the thought supplanting the dimension of relevancy.
What is something and nothingness? Are they objective or subjective constructions? What is the 'void', is it something objective in terms of physics and objective reality? How much is it about objective or subjective constructions or the blur of philosophy gobbblegook, L L in creating discussions which have so little meaning in understanding life? Language may be of importance in understanding, but it can also create ridiculous knots. It is not that I am wishing to gloss over the duality of the positives and negatives, but at times it may result in the ideas being reduced to linguistic abstractions which become so remote from life, making them trivial in the grasp of human meaning. Academic philosophy is useful, but it may be a deadend for some, as abstraction as an exercise, which have some or little relevance for understanding life. I am not opposed to theory, as a basis for understanding, but the question may be how useful it is for understanding life?
It is that a psychological truth (Jung) might be true and correct based in habitual modes of thinking, feeling and behaving…which experience has proved appropriate and useful.
I know that I cite Jung a lot, but it is hard to know what he would say on everything. I am inclined to think that he would regard the description of something as not wet or as dry as a rather trivial aspect of philosophy, but I would not wish to put words in his mouth simply based on my own views about what matters in life.
C.G. Jung. Aion; IV The self :50 (page 27 in the second edition)
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Re: Privative properties?

Post by Astro Cat »

Woof, I posted this before bed and now there are a ton of great posts. I will try to respond when I can. I'm surprised such an idle curiosity about something that isn't very important garnered so much interest! I guess we are all philosophers after all, haha ^_^
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