Modal Ontology Terms

[Astro Cat]

I was wondering if someone could help me with terminology. I understand modal ontology, I know the difference between possibility, necessity, impossibility, etc.

However, it got me to wondering what we call something that isn't logically impossible, but isn't instantiated in any world?

Without spoiling anything about the film "Everything, Everywhere, All At Once" (which I highly recommend watching, what a ride), it made me think about modality during the scene where the protagonist accesses a universe where humans have hot dogs for fingers.

I really doubted there would be any evolutionary history that would produce such an outcome, yet at the same time it didn't contain any internal inconsistencies (isn't logically impossible). This made me ask, "well, is there a possible world where this happened?" I can't tell if I'm just being incredulous or whether it's actually possible there is no world in which humans have hot dog fingers.

So what is it called if something isn't impossible, yet isn't instantiated in any possible world?

Part of me responds to myself, "you just aren't conceiving infinity well enough, if it's possible then there is a possible world where it happens." I have conflicting intuitions on this.

[Tom Butler]

I was wondering if someone could help me with terminology. I understand modal ontology, I know the difference between possibility, necessity, impossibility, etc.

Not my field. I assume you looked at something like Argument from ignorance https://www.logicallyfallacious.com/log ... -Ignorance.

[Consul]

…So what is it called if something isn't impossible, yet isn't instantiated in any possible world?

Part of me responds to myself, "you just aren't conceiving infinity well enough, if it's possible then there is a possible world where it happens." I have conflicting intuitions on this.

If modal logic is interpreted in terms of possible-world semantics, then "it is possible that p" is logically equivalent to "there is a possible world where p", such that "it is possible that p, but there is no possible world where p" is self-contradictory. However, if we distinguish between different kinds of modality—logical, ontological/metaphysical, nomological/physical—, then you can consistently say e.g. "it is logically possible that p, but there is no physically possible world where p".

The Epistemology of Modality > Varieties of Modality: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moda ... rgEpisModa

Modal Logic: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logi ... #PosWorSem

Possible Worlds: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/possible-worlds/

[Consul]

If modal logic is interpreted in terms of possible-world semantics…

Footnote: Possible-world semantics doesn't entail ontological realism about possible worlds, because it may be regarded as nothing more than a useful façon de parler.

[Consul]

…However, if we distinguish between different kinds of modality—logical, ontological/metaphysical, nomological/physical—, then you can consistently say e.g. "it is logically possible that p, but there is no physically possible world where p".

To use your example, "a universe where humans have hot dogs for fingers" is logically possible but physically impossible; so there is a logically possible world but no physically possible world where humans have hot dogs for fingers.

[Astro Cat]

…However, if we distinguish between different kinds of modality—logical, ontological/metaphysical, nomological/physical—, then you can consistently say e.g. "it is logically possible that p, but there is no physically possible world where p".

To use your example, "a universe where humans have hot dogs for fingers" is logically possible but physically impossible; so there is a logically possible world but no physically possible world where humans have hot dogs for fingers.

This explanation sits best with me. Thanks