The question is whether for all predicates there is some real property.
Being a doctor is a functional or role property, so you cannot find out whether somebody is a doctor by observing or examining her/his body. (If the person wears a white coat, this may give you a clue.)GE Morton wrote: ↑August 18th, 2022, 9:29 pmI have a different definition of the distinction between a property and a pseudo-property. We confirm that X has property P by (and only by) observing X. To confirm a pseudo-property Q of X we have to observe something external to X; the pseudo-property denotes some external, contingent fact about X. E.g., in "Alfie is 2 meters tall," being 2 meters tall is a property of Alfie. In "Alfie is a doctor," being a doctor is a pseudo-property of Alfie. We can't confirm that proposition by observing Alfie; we'll have to observe some school records, licensing records, etc.
Obviously these tests only apply to observable things. Propositions asserting or describing non-observable (imaginary or hypothetical/theoretical) things will also have predicates; these will denote hypothetical or defined properties.
I don't believe functional or role properties are a real kind of properties. There are doctors, but there is no such entity as the property of being a doctor.
By the way, there is a distinction between extrinsic (relational, relation-dependent) properties and intrinsic ones: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intrinsic-extrinsic/
By "pseudo-property" I generally mean an unreal, fictional, nonexistent property which is nothing but a semantic projection onto things by predicates or concepts.
Ice is frozen water, and frozenness is a real property of solid water; but it is a structural property of water molecules, which means that it's not a simple property. But frozenness as a structural and thus nonsimple property of a mass of water molecules can be said to be part of it—a "modal part" (not a substantial, spatial, or temporal part).GE Morton wrote: ↑August 18th, 2022, 9:29 pmIs ice, then, a "part" of water, or just part of our concept of water? Parts of things (in ordinary speech) don't necessarily correspond to our concepts of things.Consul wrote: ↑August 16th, 2022, 5:18 pmNote that I don't think mereological simplicitly requires absolute partlessness; that is to say, simple entities do not have to lack parts (components/constituents) of any kind—be they substantial, spatial, temporal, or "modal" ones. (By a "modal part" of a thing I mean a property aka a mode (way) of being which is part of it.)
Yes, every spatially or temporally extended object has spatial or temporal parts. Whether it has fundamental spatial or temporal parts depends on whether space or time itself has fundamental parts, i.e. either unextended space-points or time-points (instants) or minimal volumes of space of minimal intervals of time.GE Morton wrote: ↑August 18th, 2022, 9:29 pmEverything not a point will have spatial "parts," e.g., a left side and a right side, etc., and everything not instantaneous will have temporal parts (a beginning and an end).Consul wrote: ↑August 16th, 2022, 5:18 pmIn my understanding, mereological simplicity requires only the absence of substantial (or objectual) parts, i.e. parts which are themselves (smaller) objects or substances (and thus belong to the same ontological category). Mereological simples may still have spatial, temporal, or modal parts, such that e.g. they don't have to be spatially unextended or zero-dimensional like a mathematical point. The whole world might be one spatially/spatiotemporally extended simple object!
If the world (cosmos/universe) as a whole is one big simple substance, then all other apparent substances—particles, atoms, molecules, organisms, planets, stars—are really nothing but nonsubstantial complexes ("bundles") of attributes inhering in some region of the one world-substance. Neither property-bundles nor regions of space are substances. Locally present property-bundles are modal (attributional) parts of the world-substance, and its regions are spatial parts of it; and modal (attributional) or spatial parts aren't themselves substantial parts or smaller substances. So it is not the case that the one world-substance (really) "has many smaller parts of the same ontological category."
The mereological distinction between simplicity (partlessness, non-compositeness) and non-simplicity is very important in ontology too; but there is also a meta-mereological distinction between mereological realism and mereological idealism. According to the latter, questions of composition and division are a thought-dependent matter of conceptual, intellectual association, separation, and classification, whereas according to the former there are objective, thought- and concept-independent facts about the mereological structure of reality.GE Morton wrote: ↑August 18th, 2022, 9:29 pm Due to the intractable vagueness of "part of" when applied to things, we should give up trying to decide "ontologically" whether a thing is "simple" or "complex." Does so characterizing a thing convey any useful information about it? It will always be possible to divide anything, other than spatiotemporal points, into "parts" in some sense of the word. But we can still speak of simple, or primitive, descriptive terms for denoting things, namely, those terms that can only be taught and learned ostensively. We can then, perhaps, define a simple "thing" as one denoted by a primitive term (if so describing it has any communicative utility). This illustrates my larger point --- how existents are categorized or related is a function of what say or can say about them in a given language (yes, there is some Wharfism there). Ontologies are implicit in language, and attempts by philosophers to regiment those categories, assume those "refined" categories describe "reality," then declare some of them to be "fundamental" is fatuous. They only describe "reality" as it is portrayed in some model, some theory, of reality.
It is important to mention that there are different kinds of divisibility:
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The simplest argument:GE Morton wrote: ↑August 18th, 2022, 9:29 pmWhat makes them ontologically indispensible, other than the fact that talking about the world demands them?Consul wrote: ↑August 16th, 2022, 5:18 pmWhat (kinds of) properties there really are is one question; but that there really are properties is not in question for me, because I am convinced that properties (attributes, modes, features, characteristics) are ontologically indispensable parts of the furniture of the world.
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"Without properties, objects are empty and predicates blind."
(Martin, C. B. The Mind in Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. p. 80)
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Without properties, objects would have a "naked" Dasein (being-there) without Sosein (being-thus), an existence without any essence or nature.
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"The Jobs Properties Do
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Properties are things that different objects can have in common.
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Properties mark genuine similarities.
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Properties serve as semantic values of predicates.
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Properties serve as semantic values of abstract singular terms.
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Properties ground duplication.
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Properties ground the causal powers of objects."
(Edwards, Douglas. Properties. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2014. pp. 10-1)
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Being a particularist rather than a universalist about properties, I reject the first "job"; but I accept all others as reasons for affirming property realism.
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"What is wrong in nominalism?
We can truly predicate 'freezes when cooled to 0°C' of water. There are facts of predication. It seems perfectly reasonable to ask for a robust, ontologically grounded, explanation of the fact that a predicate applies to an object. Such explanations are often available, and they typically present as explanans the existence of some properties borne by some objects. According to explanations of this type, it is the having if those properties that determines what predicates an object satisfies. Nominalism, being globally anti-realist about properties, cannot offer any such explanations. Instead it restates the semantic criterion for the correct application of the predicate: it is correct to say that a is F if a belongs to the extension of 'F', or if a satisfies 'F', or if a is among the Fs, and so on. This gives a formally adequate answer to the request for a truthmaker for the claim 'a is F'. But it is not metaphysically adequate. It is not the robust explanation that one can reasonably expect. The nominalist's formalist substitute for a robust explanation faces an obvious Euthyphro question: Do some things freeze when cooled to 0°C because they satisfy the predicate 'freezes when cooled to 0°C', or do these things satisfy the predicate 'freezes when cooled to 0°C' because they in fact freeze when cooled to 0°C? Once formulated the question looks easy to answer. Surely a belongs to the extension of 'F' because of some property or properties it has, and not conversely. For the nominalist, however, belonging to the extension of a predicate is just an inexplicable ultimate fact. The trope-theoretic verdict on What is wrong in nominalism? is that nominalists' well-founded distrust of universals misleads them into denying the reality of properties as such."
(Molnar, George. Powers: A Study in Metaphysics. Edited by Stephen Mumford. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. pp. 23-4)
The quoted is what I assert, which you may call question-begging; but then to reject reductive neurophysicalism about secondary (phenomenal) qualities is no less question-begging.
If "objective" means "ontologically objective" in Searle's sense, then an objective property is a nonexperiential, experience-independent property.
There is a confusing distinction between ontological emergentism and epistemological emergentism—but I think I've made it sufficiently clear here that by "emergentism" I always mean "O-emergentism" and by "emergent" always "O-emergent"!GE Morton wrote: ↑August 18th, 2022, 9:29 pmUsually "emergence" is used when the causal chain cannot be fully articulated. It is a confession of ignorance. But though we can't articulate all the steps in the causal chain, we can still say "Neural processes cause consciousness," just as pre-atomic theory people could say, "Heating water to 100C (at sea level) causes steam."
If a kind of particle is really nonsimple, but is deemed simple by physicists for model-theoretic reasons, then this is an idealization. Things get even easier theoretically and particularly mathematically if single particles are regarded as both non-composed and non-extended. Physicists speak of "point-particles"; but this is an idealization, because they don't know (on the basis of their empirical/experimental data) whether their so-called "elementary" particles are really zero-dimensional.GE Morton wrote: ↑August 18th, 2022, 9:29 pmWhether a theoretical thing (such as a proton) is deemed simple or complex will depend upon how much explanatory power the theory postulating it has. E.g., if imagining protons to be composed of quarks helps us explain (and predict) some of the results observed in particle accelerator experiments then we can deem the quarks "real." We can also deem the quarks "simple" if imagining more elementary components gains us no additional explanatory power. The basis for the distinction is different, however, for empirically apprehensible things. Then we deem them "simple" if they are denotable by a primitive term.
A basic ontological category scheme is or should be neutral between physical realism and idealism. If "is real" is used synonymously with "exists" rather than with "exists mind-independently", then property realism is compatible with Kantian and even Berkeleyan idealism. (Kant's category system includes qualities and quantities, which are kinds of properties.)GE Morton wrote: ↑August 18th, 2022, 9:29 pmOh, much worse. I'm an "ontological nominalist." What exists, beyond experiential phenomena, is whatever we SAY exists, provided that what we say exists enables us to predict and control future experience.
We postulate an external cause for the phenomena of experience (the noumena). We then construct a model of that postulated external world, and populate it with entities and processes which render the flux of experience coherent, predictable, communicable, and therefore more manageable. We have no knowledge of, and no grounds for claiming the existence of, anything not directly perceived or which has some utility for making sense of what is perceived and enabling communication about what is perceived. Thus trees and cats and stars are real because those terms denote complexes within our phenomenal experience we can use to direct someone else's attention to corresponding (but not necessarily identical) complexes within their phenomenal experience. Quarks and electromagnetic fields and the "strong force" are real because they enable us to predict and control certain types of experience. Gods and (disembodied) spirits and unicorns and Santa Claus are not "real" because they have no utility for predicting or controlling future experience or for communicating about it.
Don't minds, their subjects, and empirical phenomena (observables) have properties too? Doesn't thought itself have qualities? Don't concepts themselves have properties? Aren't experiential/phenomenal qualities real qualities? Is the phenomenological-psychological realm devoid of qualities, empty of Sosein, of essence or nature?
It's a mistake to suppose that idealism includes concept/predicate nominalism about properties.
I am aware that one is confronted with the problem of unobservables in the philosophy of science even if one rejects Kant's idealism with its absolute separation of knowable phenomena and unknowable noumena.
Theoretical Terms in Science: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/theo ... s-science/
"A simple explanation of theoreticity says that a term is theoretical if and only if it refers to nonobservational entities."
I disbelieve in universals both in the Platonic sense (universalia ante rebus) and in the Aristotelian sense (universalia in rebus).GE Morton wrote: ↑August 18th, 2022, 9:29 pm …In short, phenomena, being real, have real properties. Hypothesized external entities have only those properties that are predicated of them via propositions having communicative utility. I do deny, of course, the existence of "universals" (in the Platonic sense). That is a postulate with no communicative or explanatory utility.
Here you explicitly affirm property (quality) realism (relative to Kantian phenomena), which, as I already said above, is compatible with Kantian idealism.
Why should it satisfy "Occam's Razor"?GE Morton wrote: ↑August 18th, 2022, 9:29 pmThat perhaps rids us of the mysticism of universals, but it doesn't satisfy Occam's Razor any better.Consul wrote: ↑August 16th, 2022, 5:18 pmThe good news is that particularists can offer formally equivalent substitutes for universals: sets of perfectly similar property-particulars (modes or "tropes"), i.e. sets of property duplicates, which are qualitatively but not numerically identical to one another. One such set of many duplicates can be represented by one predicate or concept. We can even use one predicate or concept to represent a set of many imperfectly (more or less) similar qualities. For example, we can use the one predicate "red" to represent an entire range of imperfectly similar shades of red.
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"What of parsimony, Ockham’s razor? Parsimony serves as a tie-breaker: other things equal, the more parsimonious theory is to be preferred. Things are never equal, however, not really. Parsimony figures in the endgame, not at the outset of theorizing. Parsimony wielded as a theoretical constraint is a straitjacket. The question in play is whether an ontology of particulars (tropes alone or substances and modes) could accomplish what an ontology of particulars plus universals could accomplish."
(Heil, John. "Universals in a World of Particulars." In The Problem of Universals in Contemporary Philosophy, edited by Gabriele Galluzzo and Michael J. Loux, 114-132. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. p. 123)
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I beg to differ! Material objects aren't imperceptible/unobservable "mental projections", because we can and do perceive material objects! The physical world isn't "noumenal" and hence perceptually and cognitively inaccessible in principle, because my mind/consciousness is not a windowless dungeon.
If qualia are the subjective, experiential content of (the state of) consciousness, then they are where the (state of) consciousness is whose content they are.
It depends on your metaphysical conception of causality. For example, if the cause/effect relationship is defined à la Hume as a non-necessary "constant conjunction", with y merely being regularly followed by x, then I wouldn't say that x causes y by producing it. I wouldn't say so either if the causal connection is defined merely in terms of statistical correlation, counterfactual dependence, or nomological subsumption.
In my understanding, a state of affairs S1 causes another state of affairs S2 by producing it only if S1 has the power to make it the case, and makes it the case that S2, with "making it the case" involving physical or ontological necessity, such that if S1 is the case, S2 must be(come) the case as S1's effect or product.
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What is the metaphysical basis for causal connection? That is, what is the difference between causally related and causally unrelated sequences?
The question of connection occupies the bulk of the vast literature on causation. One finds analyses of causation in terms of nomological subsumption (Davidson 1980d, Kim 1973, Horwich 1987, Armstrong 1999), statistical correlation (Good 1961 and 1962, Suppes 1970, Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines 1993, Kvart 1997 and 2004, Pearl 2000, Hitchcock 2001), counterfactual dependence (Lewis 1986a and 2000, Swain 1978, Menzies 1989b, McDermott 1995 and 2002, Ganeri, Noordhof, and Ramachandran 1996, Yablo 2002, Sartorio 2005), agential manipulability (Collingwood 1940, Gasking 1955, von Wright 1975, Price and Menzies 1993, Woodward 2003), contiguous change (Ducasse 1926), energy flow (Fair 1979, Castaneda 1984), physical processes (Russell 1948, Salmon 1984 and 1998, Dowe 1992 and 2000), and property transference (Aronson 1971, Ehring 1997, Kistler 1998). One also finds views that are hybrids of some of the above (Fair 1979, Dowe 2000, Paul 2000, Schaffer 2001, Hall 2004, Beebee 2004b), along with primitivism (Anscombe 1975, Tooley 1987 and 2004, Carroll 1994, Menzies 1996) and even eliminativism (Russell 1992, Quine 1966).
Fortunately, the details of these many and various accounts may be postponed here, as they tend to be variations on two basic themes. In practice, the nomological, statistical, counterfactual, and agential accounts tend to converge in the indeterministic case. All understand connection in terms of probability: causing is making more likely. The change, energy, process, and transference accounts converge in treating connection in terms of process: causing is physical producing. Thus a large part of the controversy over connection may, in practice, be reduced to the question of whether connection is a matter of probability or process."
The Metaphysics of Causation: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr ... taphysics/
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Believing that all experiential qualia are really nonsimple neural properties, I cannot give you any example of a neurologically simple quale; but I can give you an example of a phenomenologically simple one, i.e. one which is introspectively perceived as simple: a patch of homogeneous phenomenal blue in your visual field.