Searle's Biological Naturalism view of Consciousness.

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Gertie
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Searle's Biological Naturalism view of Consciousness.

Post by Gertie »

As I understand it Searle suggests phenomenological conscious experience (''what it is like'' to see a red apple, have an itchy toe, think about philosophy, , feel, remember, have emotions, imagine, etc)  is caused by certain physical processes found in brains (and perhaps other systems too). 

That phenomenal first person experience is a way brains are, there is no substance dualism.  Brains are both third person observable physical stuff, and first person conscious experience.  This is simply how some physical systems like working brains naturally are.

But while conscious experience is caused by physical brain processes (causally reducible), and is ontologically the same stuff as brains, phenomenal experience isn't a property of brains which is ontologically reducible to brain processes.   

So the claim is physical brain processes and conscious experience are the same stuff, conscious experience is causally reducible to physical processes, but isn't ontologically reducible to physical brain processes the way emergent physical properties are.

Thoughts?  How could this be? 

Is it coherent to say conscious experience is brain stuff, but has different properties to physical brain stuff, but isn't ontologically reducible to brain stuff?   What would be needed to make it coherent?



Here's wiki's section on Biological Naturalism - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biological_naturalism


''Biological naturalism is a theory about, among other things, the relationship between consciousness and body (i.e. brain), and hence an approach to the mind–body problem. It was first proposed by the philosopher John Searle in 1980 and is defined by two main theses: 1) all mental phenomena from pains, tickles, and itches to the most abstruse thoughts are caused by lower-level neurobiological processes in the brain; and 2) mental phenomena are higher-level features of the brain.


This entails that the brain has the right causal powers to produce intentionality. However, Searle's biological naturalism does not entail that brains and only brains can cause consciousness. Searle is careful to point out that while it appears to be the case that certain brain functions are sufficient for producing conscious states, our current state of neurobiological knowledge prevents us from concluding that they are necessary for producing consciousness. In his own words:


"The fact that brain processes cause consciousness does not imply that only brains can be conscious. The brain is a biological machine, and we might build an artificial machine that was conscious; just as the heart is a machine, and we have built artificial hearts. Because we do not know exactly how the brain does it we are not yet in a position to know how to do it artificially." (Biological Naturalism, 2004)    

Overview
Searle denies Cartesian dualism, the idea that the mind is a separate kind of substance to the body, as this contradicts our entire understanding of physics, and unlike Descartes, he does not bring God into the problem. Indeed, Searle denies any kind of dualism, the traditional alternative to monism, claiming the distinction is a mistake. He rejects the idea that because the mind is not objectively viewable, it does not fall under the rubric of physics.


Searle believes that consciousness "is a real part of the real world and it cannot be eliminated in favor of, or reduced to, something else"[1] whether that something else is a neurological state of the brain or a computer program. He contends, for example, that the software known as Deep Blue knows nothing about chess. He also believes that consciousness is both a cause of events in the body and a response to events in the body.


On the other hand, Searle doesn't treat consciousness as a ghost in the machine. He treats it, rather, as a state of the brain. The causal interaction of mind and brain can be described thus in naturalistic terms: Events at the micro-level (perhaps at that of individual neurons) cause consciousness. Changes at the macro-level (the whole brain) constitute consciousness. Micro-changes cause and then are impacted by holistic changes, in much the same way that individual football players cause a team (as a whole) to win games, causing the individuals to gain confidence from the knowledge that they are part of a winning team.


He articulates this distinction by pointing out that the common philosophical term 'reducible' is ambiguous. Searle contends that consciousness is "causally reducible" to brain processes without being "ontologically reducible". He hopes that making this distinction will allow him to escape the traditional dilemma between reductive materialism and substance dualism; he affirms the essentially physical nature of the universe by asserting that consciousness is completely caused by and realized in the brain, but also doesn't deny what he takes to be the obvious facts that humans really are conscious, and that conscious states have an essentially first-person nature.


It can be tempting to see the theory as a kind of property dualism, since, in Searle's view, a person's mental properties are categorically different from his or her micro-physical properties. The latter have "third-person ontology" whereas the former have "first-person ontology." Micro-structure is accessible objectively by any number of people, as when several brain surgeons inspect a patient's cerebral hemispheres. But pain or desire or belief are accessible subjectively by the person who has the pain or desire or belief, and no one else has that mode of access. However, Searle holds mental properties to be a species of physical property—ones with first-person ontology. So this sets his view apart from a dualism of physical and non-physical properties. His mental properties are putatively physical.''
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Consul
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Re: Searle's Biological Naturalism view of Consciousness.

Post by Consul »

Recommended reading:

John Searle: Why I Am Not a Property Dualist (PDF)


Excerpts:

"I have argued in a number of writings that the philosophical part (though not the neurobiological part) of the traditional mind-body problem has a fairly simple and obvious solution: all of our mental phenomena are caused by lower-level neuronal processes in the brain and are themselves realized in the brain as higher-level, or system, features. The form of causation is “bottom up,” whereby the behaviour of lower-level elements, presumably neurons and synapses, causes the higher-level or system features of consciousness and intentionality. (This form of causation, by the way, is common in nature; for example, the higher-level feature of solidity is causally explained by the behaviour of the lower-level elements, the molecules.) Because this view emphasizes the biological character of the mental, and because it treats mental phenomena as ordinary parts of nature, I have labelled it “biological naturalism.”

To many people biological naturalism looks a lot like property dualism. Because I believe property dualism is mistaken, I would like to try to clarify the differences between the two accounts and try to expose the weaknesses in property dualism."

(p. 152)

"We can summarize property dualism in the following four propositions. The first three are statements endorsed by the property dualist, the fourth is an apparent consequence or difficulty implied by the first three:

(1) There are two mutually exclusive metaphysical categories that constitute all of empirical reality: they are physical phenomena and mental phenomena. Physical phenomena are essentially objective, in the sense that they exist apart from any subjective experiences of humans or animals. Mental phenomena are subjective, in the sense that they exist only as experienced by human or animal agents.
(2) Because mental states are not reducible to neurobiological states, they are something distinct from and over and above neurobiological states. The irreducibility of the mental to the physical, of consciousness to neurobiology, is by itself sufficient proof of the distinctness of the mental, and proof that the mental is something over and above the neurobiological.
(3) Mental phenomena do not constitute separate objects or substances, but rather are features or properties of the composite entity, which is a human being or an animal. So any conscious animal, such as a human being, will have two sorts of properties, mental properties and physical properties.
(4) The chief problem for the property dualists, given these assumptions, is how can consciousness ever function causally? There are two possibilities, neither of which seems attractive. First, let us assume, as seems reasonable, that the physical universe is causally closed. It is closed in the sense that nothing outside it, nothing non-physical, could ever have causal effects inside the physical universe. If that is so, and consciousness is not a part of the physical universe, then it seems that it must be epiphenomenal. All of our conscious life plays no role whatever in any of our behaviour."

(p. 154)

"Then what about irreducibility? This is the crucial distinction between my view and property dualism. Consciousness is causally reducible to brain processes, because all the features of consciousness are accounted for causally by neurobiological processes going on in the brain, and consciousness has no causal powers of its own in addition to the causal powers of the underlying neurobiology. But in the case of consciousness, causal reducibility does not lead to ontological reducibility. From the fact that consciousness is entirely accounted for causally by neuron firings, for example, it does not follow that consciousness is nothing but neuron firings."
(p. 155)

"The property dualist and I are in agreement that consciousness is ontologically irreducible. The key points of disagreement are that I insist that from everything we know about the brain, consciousness is causally reducible to brain processes; and for that reason I deny that the ontological irreducibility of consciousness implies that consciousness is something “over and above,” something distinct from, its neurobiological base. No, causally speaking, there is nothing there, except the neurobiology, which has a higher-level feature of consciousness. In a similar way there is nothing in the car engine except molecules, which have such higher-level features as the solidity of the cylinder block, the shape of the piston, the firing of the spark plug, etc. “Consciousness” does not name a distinct, separate phenomenon, something over and above its neurobiological base, rather it names a state that the neurobiological system can be in. Just as the shape of the piston and the solidity of the cylinder block are not something over and above the molecular phenomena, but are rather states of the system of molecules, so the consciousness of the brain is not something over and above the neuronal phenomena, but rather a state that the neuronal system is in.

So there is a sense in which consciousness is reducible: the mark of empirical reality is the possession of cause and effect relations, and consciousness (like other system features) has no cause and effect relations beyond those of its microstructural base. There is nothing in your brain except neurons (together with glial cells, blood flow and all the rest of it) and sometimes a big chunk of the thalamocortical system is conscious. The sense in which, though causally reducible, it is ontologically irreducible, is that a complete description of the third-person objective features of the brain would not be a description of its first-person subjective features. (3) I say consciousness is a feature of the brain. The property dualist says consciousness is a feature of the brain. This creates the illusion that we are saying the same thing. But we are not, as I hope my response to points 1 and 2 makes clear. The property dualist means that in addition to all the neurobiological features of the brain, there is an extra, distinct, non-physical feature of the brain; whereas I mean that consciousness is a state the brain can be in, in the way that liquidity and solidity are states that water can be in."

(p. 156)

"Because irreducible consciousness is not something over and above its neural base, the problems about epiphenomenalism and the causal closure of the physical simply do not arise for me. Of course, the universe is causally closed, and we can call it “physical” if we like; but that cannot mean “physical” as opposed to “mental”; because, equally obviously, the mental is part of the causal structure of the universe in the same way that the solidity of pistons is part of the causal structure of the universe; even though the solidity is entirely accounted for by molecular behaviour, and consciousness is entirely accounted for by neuronal behaviour. The problems about epiphenomenalism and the causal closure of the physical can only arise if one uses the traditional terminology and takes its implications seriously. I am trying to get us to abandon that terminology.

But if consciousness has no causal powers in addition to its neurobiological base, then does that not imply epiphenomenalism? No. Compare: the solidity of the piston has no causal powers in addition to its molecular base, but this does not show that solidity is epiphenomenal (try making a piston out of butter or water). The question rather is: Why would anyone suppose that causal reducibility implies epiphenomenalism, since the real world is full of causally efficacious higher-level features entirely caused by lower-level micro phenomena? In this case the answer is: Because they think that consciousness is something distinct from, something “over and above,” its neuronal base. The typical property dualist thinks that the brain “gives rise to” consciousness, and this gives us a picture of consciousness as given off from the brain as a pot of boiling water gives off steam. In the epiphenomenalist version of property dualism, the consciousness given off has no causal powers of its own, though it is caused by the brain. In the full-blooded version consciousness has a kind of life of its own, capable of interfering with the material world."

(pp. 157-8)

Why Searle wrongly thinks he is not a property dualist (of any sort):

* To say that all mental events are "causally reducible" to (lower-level) neural events is simply to say that they are caused by, and thus effects of, (lower-level) neural processes.

* Generally, effects are different from their causes; so if mental events are caused by (lower-level) neural events, the former are something "over and above" the latter, even if the former are themselves (higher-level) neural events—unless, of course, "over and above" means "independent" rather than just "different"/"non-identical", in which case effects are nothing over and above their causes, since they aren't independent of them.
Mental events may be higher-level brain events caused by lower-level brain events; but then there is still an ontological difference and irreducibility between mental-neural events and the nonmental-neural events causing them, which means that we have a materialistic/naturalistic property dualism here, which is a sort of property dualism!

* Is his argumentation against epiphenomenalism convincing? Well, I'm not convinced he can consistently avoid epiphenomenalism, since his biological naturalism (aka causal materialism) posits ontologically irreducible higher-order mental properties or states that are brain properties or states sui generis; that is, they aren't composed of or constituted by, and thus aren't reductively identifiable with any other kinds of brain properties or states. So when Searle says that "consciousness has no causal powers in addition to its neurobiological base," I fail to see how mental events can be non-epiphenomenal despite lacking causal powers of their own. Isn't "epiphenomenal" synonymous with "lacking causal powers", such that "non-epiphenomenal causally powerless event" is a contradiction in terms?
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Re: Searle's Biological Naturalism view of Consciousness.

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Consul wrote: August 8th, 2022, 4:51 pm …Mental events may be higher-level brain events caused by lower-level brain events; but then there is still an ontological difference and irreducibility between mental-neural events and the nonmental-neural events causing them, which means that we have a materialistic/naturalistic property dualism here, which is a sort of property dualism!
"If all it means to say that the mental is physical is merely that mental properties are 'higher-level features of the brain', I doubt that many would disagree; in that sense, most everyone would be happy to endorse the view that mental properties are 'physical features of the brain'. But this is only a verbal move which leaves a crucial metaphysical question unanswered, and it is this: Are these higher-level physical features of the brain (a.k.a. mental properties) reducible to, or reductively identifiable with, the lower-level properties (on which they supervene)? Searle's answer, like the property dualist's, is a forceful no. But it is precisely this negative answer that defines property dualism."

(Kim, Jaegwon. "Mental Causation in Searle's 'Biological Naturalism'." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55/1 (1995): 189–194. p. 192)
"We may philosophize well or ill, but we must philosophize." – Wilfrid Sellars
Gertie
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Re: Searle's Biological Naturalism view of Consciousness.

Post by Gertie »

Consul
"The property dualist and I are in agreement that consciousness is ontologically irreducible. The key points of disagreement are that I insist that from everything we know about the brain, consciousness is causally reducible to brain processes; and for that reason I deny that the ontological irreducibility of consciousness implies that consciousness is something “over and above,” something distinct from, its neurobiological base. No, causally speaking, there is nothing there, except the neurobiology, which has a higher-level feature of consciousness. In a similar way there is nothing in the car engine except molecules, which have such higher-level features as the solidity of the cylinder block, the shape of the piston, the firing of the spark plug, etc. “Consciousness” does not name a distinct, separate phenomenon, something over and above its neurobiological base, rather it names a state that the neurobiological system can be in. Just as the shape of the piston and the solidity of the cylinder block are not something over and above the molecular phenomena, but are rather states of the system of molecules, so the consciousness of the brain is not something over and above the neuronal phenomena, but rather a state that the neuronal system is in.
Ah thank you. I'm still working my way through your reply but I need to take a step back. I didn't realise property dualists who rely on emergence also don't believe the novel properties are ontologically reducible to the 'lower level' processes.  I assumed they must do. Can we sort this out? 

Can property dualists  provide any other physical examples of this in nature which has no conscious subjects involved (eg no  flocks of birds, flow of traffic)?  Because it sounds like magic.  Surely the novel properties are either made of the same stuff doing different things, and therefore ontologically reducible, or they are a different type of stuff and not ontologically reducible. How do they get around that? 

If we take the solidity and shape of the cylinder block for example, that is clearly ontologically reducible to the state of the molecules in the cylinder block.  Physics isn't troubled by this.

However, if we take the experience of seeing a green tree over there, the brain is in a different location to the tree being experienced, not made of the tree's molecules, not the same colour, has a first person perspective, etc which actually contradict the states the brain molecules are in.  It would be equivalent to saying the cylinder's molecules are in a different location to the cylinder, the cylinder is both third person observable and not, black colour and invisible, etc. Yes?  How do property dualists answer that?
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Re: Searle's Biological Naturalism view of Consciousness.

Post by GE Morton »

Gertie wrote: August 8th, 2022, 2:58 pm
Is it coherent to say conscious experience is brain stuff, but has different properties to physical brain stuff, but isn't ontologically reducible to brain stuff?   What would be needed to make it coherent?
Provocative and interesting post.

I agree with most of what Searle says, but point out that his analysis doesn't solve the "hard problem." I'd also suggest the difference he suggests between "causal reducibility" and "ontological reducibility" isn't needed because "reducible" is ambiguous, but because "ontology" is.

More later.
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Re: Searle's Biological Naturalism view of Consciousness.

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Yes, it appears that Searle has not attempted to solve the hard problem of consciousness. If consciousness is a state of the brain, what do we call the state of the liver, the lungs, the stomach, and other organs? If consciousness is a state of matter, what are the equivalent others? The answer is obviously not solid, liquid, gas or plasma. Life is a blend of solids, liquids and gases, so consciousness is not an equivalent state, but tangential.

So what are the "peers" of consciousness? The alternative "states"? Or is consciousness a quasi-digital phenomenon, purely on or off, with no equivalents or similar states?

Looking at the evidence, we have much evidence of brains playing a major role in many body functions, including consciousness, but zero evidence of brains without bodies being conscious (aside from some distorted expressions for a few seconds in some of those who were beheaded). I suggest that the body's role in consciousness is greater than that of just an energy provider for the brain.
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Re: Searle's Biological Naturalism view of Consciousness.

Post by 3017Metaphysician »

Gertie wrote: August 8th, 2022, 2:58 pm As I understand it Searle suggests phenomenological conscious experience (''what it is like'' to see a red apple, have an itchy toe, think about philosophy, , feel, remember, have emotions, imagine, etc)  is caused by certain physical processes found in brains (and perhaps other systems too). 

That phenomenal first person experience is a way brains are, there is no substance dualism.  Brains are both third person observable physical stuff, and first person conscious experience.  This is simply how some physical systems like working brains naturally are.

But while conscious experience is caused by physical brain processes (causally reducible), and is ontologically the same stuff as brains, phenomenal experience isn't a property of brains which is ontologically reducible to brain processes.   

So the claim is physical brain processes and conscious experience are the same stuff, conscious experience is causally reducible to physical processes, but isn't ontologically reducible to physical brain processes the way emergent physical properties are.

Thoughts?  How could this be? 

Is it coherent to say conscious experience is brain stuff, but has different properties to physical brain stuff, but isn't ontologically reducible to brain stuff?   What would be needed to make it coherent?



Here's wiki's section on Biological Naturalism - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biological_naturalism


''Biological naturalism is a theory about, among other things, the relationship between consciousness and body (i.e. brain), and hence an approach to the mind–body problem. It was first proposed by the philosopher John Searle in 1980 and is defined by two main theses: 1) all mental phenomena from pains, tickles, and itches to the most abstruse thoughts are caused by lower-level neurobiological processes in the brain; and 2) mental phenomena are higher-level features of the brain.


This entails that the brain has the right causal powers to produce intentionality. However, Searle's biological naturalism does not entail that brains and only brains can cause consciousness. Searle is careful to point out that while it appears to be the case that certain brain functions are sufficient for producing conscious states, our current state of neurobiological knowledge prevents us from concluding that they are necessary for producing consciousness. In his own words:


"The fact that brain processes cause consciousness does not imply that only brains can be conscious. The brain is a biological machine, and we might build an artificial machine that was conscious; just as the heart is a machine, and we have built artificial hearts. Because we do not know exactly how the brain does it we are not yet in a position to know how to do it artificially." (Biological Naturalism, 2004)    

Overview
Searle denies Cartesian dualism, the idea that the mind is a separate kind of substance to the body, as this contradicts our entire understanding of physics, and unlike Descartes, he does not bring God into the problem. Indeed, Searle denies any kind of dualism, the traditional alternative to monism, claiming the distinction is a mistake. He rejects the idea that because the mind is not objectively viewable, it does not fall under the rubric of physics.


Searle believes that consciousness "is a real part of the real world and it cannot be eliminated in favor of, or reduced to, something else"[1] whether that something else is a neurological state of the brain or a computer program. He contends, for example, that the software known as Deep Blue knows nothing about chess. He also believes that consciousness is both a cause of events in the body and a response to events in the body.


On the other hand, Searle doesn't treat consciousness as a ghost in the machine. He treats it, rather, as a state of the brain. The causal interaction of mind and brain can be described thus in naturalistic terms: Events at the micro-level (perhaps at that of individual neurons) cause consciousness. Changes at the macro-level (the whole brain) constitute consciousness. Micro-changes cause and then are impacted by holistic changes, in much the same way that individual football players cause a team (as a whole) to win games, causing the individuals to gain confidence from the knowledge that they are part of a winning team.


He articulates this distinction by pointing out that the common philosophical term 'reducible' is ambiguous. Searle contends that consciousness is "causally reducible" to brain processes without being "ontologically reducible". He hopes that making this distinction will allow him to escape the traditional dilemma between reductive materialism and substance dualism; he affirms the essentially physical nature of the universe by asserting that consciousness is completely caused by and realized in the brain, but also doesn't deny what he takes to be the obvious facts that humans really are conscious, and that conscious states have an essentially first-person nature.


It can be tempting to see the theory as a kind of property dualism, since, in Searle's view, a person's mental properties are categorically different from his or her micro-physical properties. The latter have "third-person ontology" whereas the former have "first-person ontology." Micro-structure is accessible objectively by any number of people, as when several brain surgeons inspect a patient's cerebral hemispheres. But pain or desire or belief are accessible subjectively by the person who has the pain or desire or belief, and no one else has that mode of access. However, Searle holds mental properties to be a species of physical property—ones with first-person ontology. So this sets his view apart from a dualism of physical and non-physical properties. His mental properties are putatively physical.''
Gertie!

I have a good news and bad news. First the good news:

1. Searle is an advocate of the primacy of Subjectivity, almost to the extend of epistemic subjective idealism. However, much like Hume, Searle embraces experience. But Hume also believed that reason itself was the 'slave to passion' (which I would agree). And that leads to the bad news.

2. Searle has a sketchy academic past (I won't go there now), and presents his arguments for consciousness as a exclusive material extremist (my term for someone who portrays a false dichotomy in an attempt to deny the opposite element). His narrative is to dichotomize mind 'stuff' as being exclusively physical, which denies the non-physical components of Being (Ontology). Much like the invisible force of gravity needs particles to manifest its phenomena, cognition needs the physical to produce the metaphysical; the metaphysical needs the physical.

Generally, (and since you like Hume) if we were to parse Hume's metaphysical notion of (the human condition) reason itself being the slave to human passions, we would see that Searle's theory of causation is only half the equation. Meaning, to say conscious experience is exclusively caused by physical brain activity 'stuff', is to dichotomize conscious existence by denying or excluding one's Will, feelings and 'passions', intentionality, intuition, and other sentient or otherwise non-physical phenomenon.

We can look at Kant's infamous metaphysical proposition/judgement that 'all events must have a cause'. In this context, the effect is the proposition or judgement itself, but the actual cause is one's metaphysical intuition from one's Will that causes the judgement itself. In that state of affairs, the truth maker is the subject-person who has the necessary feelings as an animate object that causes the judgement. One's own sense of wonder, is not exclusively physical mind stuff. It originates from a biologically animate object. In this sense, the physical is just a means to a metaphysical end. And that end relates to a person's purposeful existence, and so on. There are also many examples of how thoughts in-themselves, contribute to physical effects. Take for example emotional stress. The effects of physical pathologies have similar metaphysical causes of dread and despair. Another existential condition of finitude for sure.

Also, one can think of this biological problem in many other ways including how self-organized properties emerge from matter (the relationships between mind and matter, animate from inanimate, and so on). But as a philosophical matter, one can simple think abut how human affairs or 'states of affairs'' have an impact on the mind. As briefly discussed, in ontology, the metaphysical question about cause and effect is what kind of entity can be a cause, and what kind of entity can be an effect. In my view, ontological causes and effects are states of affairs, that include biological, animate, sentient Beings who feel and have an intrinsic need to feel.

To that end, ironically enough, tell Searle that his 'passions' or his passionate behaviors are all 'purely physical' things-in-themselves (the academic happenstance that caused revocation of his emeritus status). Sorry, but I couldn't resist the irony!

I know, I can be brutally honest sometimes :shock:
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Re: Searle's Biological Naturalism view of Consciousness.

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I recommend Jennefer Hodges well-written PhD thesis "Making Sense of Biological Naturalism":

https://uhra.herts.ac.uk/bitstream/hand ... sequence=1 (PDF)

She argues that…

"By highlighting the difference between the meaning of irreducibility intended by the property dualist and Searle I show that there is sufficient difference in their use of the term so as to reject an interpretation of Biological Naturalism as a form of property dualism. Chapter 6 is where I turn to the other end of the physicalism/dualism spectrum and assess whether Searle should be seen as holding a form of identity theory. I first argue for a neutral form of identity that I call real identity, which does not include the inherent reductive privileging of standard identity. I then argue that Searle should be seen as advocating a form of real identity theory; a form of token identity theory which does not privilege the physical over the mental."
(p. 5)

"Searle’s view of the property dualist position: Searle believes the property dualist to be claiming, when they argue for the ontological irreducibility of experiences, that

‘Because mental states are not reducible to neurobiological states, they are something distinct from and over and above neurobiological states. The irreducibility of the mental to the physical, of consciousness to neurobiology, is by itself sufficient proof of the distinctness of the mental, and proof that the mental is something over and above the neurobiological’

The key difference between Searle’s notion of irreducibility and that of the property dualist is that he denies the first sentence. That is to say, just because experiences are not reducible to neurological states, does not imply that they are distinct from and over and above those neurological states. I think this is the essence of Searle’s triviality clause for irreducibility and is his way of restraining the ontological consequences of the irreducibility to avoid experiences being “over and above” neurological states, as he thinks the property dualist believes them to be."

(pp. 120-1)

It depends on what exactly is meant by "distinct from" and "over and above". To say that x is ontologically irreducible to y is to say that x is different from/non-identical with y or y1+…+yn; so if "distinctness" and "over-and-aboveness" simply mean "difference/non-identity", then ontological irreducibility does entail distinctness and over-and-aboveness. However, if the latter expressions are used to mean "difference plus independence (non-supervenience)", then ontological irreducibility does not entail distinctness and over-and-aboveness.

Minimal property dualism merely requires that the two basic kinds of properties in question—physical (nonpsychophysical) ones and mental (psychophysical) ones—be irreducibly different from one another. It doesn't also require that they be (existentially or causally) independent of one another. Searle's causal materialism, according to which mental events are higher-level neural events sui generis caused by lower-level nonmental-neural events, is minimally property-dualistic at least.

Pace Hodges, given his repeated affirmation of ontological antireductionism about mental/experiential events, I see no possible way of coherently interpreting Searle's texts as expressing a form of materialist identity theory aka physicalist property monism. For even if the irreducible mental events can properly be counted among the neural/physical events, they are neural/physical events sui generis that do not contain any neurological or physical properties which are (reducible to/reductively identifiable with) combinations of other, nonmental kinds of neurological or physical properties. Therefore, we still have a property dualism in Searle's biological naturalism, even if it is a materialistic/naturalistic one rather than a supermaterialistic/supernaturalistic one!
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Re: Searle's Biological Naturalism view of Consciousness.

Post by GE Morton »

Sy Borg wrote: August 9th, 2022, 12:22 am I suggest that the body's role in consciousness is greater than that of just an energy provider for the brain.
The body supplies much more than energy; it supplies all the data the brain processes. It also regulates brain activities, via hormonal and other biochemical controls.
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Re: Searle's Biological Naturalism view of Consciousness.

Post by Consul »

I agree with Dmytro Sepetyi in his paper "John Searle’s Naturalism as a Hybrid (Property-Substance) Version of Naturalistic Psychophysical Dualism" that "despite Searle’s protestations, his doctrine is not substantially different from the epiphenomenalistic property dualism…. In particular, his recognition that consciousness is unique in having an irreducible first-person ontology makes his disavowal of property dualism purely verbalistic."
"We may philosophize well or ill, but we must philosophize." – Wilfrid Sellars
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Re: Searle's Biological Naturalism view of Consciousness.

Post by Consul »

Sy Borg wrote: August 9th, 2022, 12:22 amYes, it appears that Searle has not attempted to solve the hard problem of consciousness. If consciousness is a state of the brain, what do we call the state of the liver, the lungs, the stomach, and other organs? If consciousness is a state of matter, what are the equivalent others? The answer is obviously not solid, liquid, gas or plasma. Life is a blend of solids, liquids and gases, so consciousness is not an equivalent state, but tangential.
Physicists use the term "state of matter" narrowly in the sense of "phase of matter", referring to a mass of matter being solid, liquid, gassy, or plasmic; but Searle uses "state" in the broad ontological sense, in which it can be read as an abbreviation of "state of affairs". Entities of the ontological form x-being-Y or x-being-R-related-to-y are (nonrelational or relational) states (of affairs).

Searle doesn't mean to say that consciousness is an additional state of matter in the physicists' special sense of the term "state".
"We may philosophize well or ill, but we must philosophize." – Wilfrid Sellars
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Re: Searle's Biological Naturalism view of Consciousness.

Post by 3017Metaphysician »

Consul wrote: August 9th, 2022, 11:17 am I recommend Jennefer Hodges well-written PhD thesis "Making Sense of Biological Naturalism":

https://uhra.herts.ac.uk/bitstream/hand ... sequence=1 (PDF)

She argues that…

"By highlighting the difference between the meaning of irreducibility intended by the property dualist and Searle I show that there is sufficient difference in their use of the term so as to reject an interpretation of Biological Naturalism as a form of property dualism. Chapter 6 is where I turn to the other end of the physicalism/dualism spectrum and assess whether Searle should be seen as holding a form of identity theory. I first argue for a neutral form of identity that I call real identity, which does not include the inherent reductive privileging of standard identity. I then argue that Searle should be seen as advocating a form of real identity theory; a form of token identity theory which does not privilege the physical over the mental."
(p. 5)

"Searle’s view of the property dualist position: Searle believes the property dualist to be claiming, when they argue for the ontological irreducibility of experiences, that

‘Because mental states are not reducible to neurobiological states, they are something distinct from and over and above neurobiological states. The irreducibility of the mental to the physical, of consciousness to neurobiology, is by itself sufficient proof of the distinctness of the mental, and proof that the mental is something over and above the neurobiological’

The key difference between Searle’s notion of irreducibility and that of the property dualist is that he denies the first sentence. That is to say, just because experiences are not reducible to neurological states, does not imply that they are distinct from and over and above those neurological states. I think this is the essence of Searle’s triviality clause for irreducibility and is his way of restraining the ontological consequences of the irreducibility to avoid experiences being “over and above” neurological states, as he thinks the property dualist believes them to be."

(pp. 120-1)

It depends on what exactly is meant by "distinct from" and "over and above". To say that x is ontologically irreducible to y is to say that x is different from/non-identical with y or y1+…+yn; so if "distinctness" and "over-and-aboveness" simply mean "difference/non-identity", then ontological irreducibility does entail distinctness and over-and-aboveness. However, if the latter expressions are used to mean "difference plus independence (non-supervenience)", then ontological irreducibility does not entail distinctness and over-and-aboveness.

Minimal property dualism merely requires that the two basic kinds of properties in question—physical (nonpsychophysical) ones and mental (psychophysical) ones—be irreducibly different from one another. It doesn't also require that they be (existentially or causally) independent of one another. Searle's causal materialism, according to which mental events are higher-level neural events sui generis caused by lower-level nonmental-neural events, is minimally property-dualistic at least.

Pace Hodges, given his repeated affirmation of ontological antireductionism about mental/experiential events, I see no possible way of coherently interpreting Searle's texts as expressing a form of materialist identity theory aka physicalist property monism. For even if the irreducible mental events can properly be counted among the neural/physical events, they are neural/physical events sui generis that do not contain any neurological or physical properties which are (reducible to/reductively identifiable with) combinations of other, nonmental kinds of neurological or physical properties. Therefore, we still have a property dualism in Searle's biological naturalism, even if it is a materialistic/naturalistic one rather than a supermaterialistic/supernaturalistic one!
Consul!

Thank you for taking the time to research that, and provide the link. I have not read it entirely, but a couple of sound bites from the paper that I happened to catch along with annotations (critique's) in bold:


The claim that experiences are caused by the brain usually conveys a picture where the two
are distinct and separate; the brain causes experiences, and those experiences are
metaphysically distinct from the brain. This is underpinned by a view of causation where two
distinct events are connected and ordered through time. So, if one phenomenon causes
another, there might seem to be a necessary distance between the two, a separation of
mental and physical in a way that Searle seems so at pains to deny.


Agreed Ms. Hodges. If my mind chooses, will's or otherwise causes my arm to move, and when I can look at it and it moves (or not look at it), the primary cause of my arm moving is not exclusively physical. Simply, the primacy of me wanting or willing my arm to move is the necessary cause or entity

Searle says:
‘Nothing is more common in nature than for surface features of a
phenomenon to be both caused by and realized in a micro-structure,
and those are exactly the relationships that are exhibited by the
relation of mind to brain.’12


Here Searle misinterprets Structuralism with his physicalism to advance a false narrative:


Structuralism:

The belief that phenomena of human life are not intelligible except through their interrelations. These relations constitute a structure, and behind local variations in the surface phenomena there are constant laws of abstract structure. Things that are abstract are not exclusively physical. Example: one's Will.



Because conscious states are real features of the real world, they
function causally. My conscious thirst causes me to drink water for
example.’12


There again, Searle conflates instinct with the Will (metaphysically speaking). Self-directed or regulated mental phenomena is both instinctive and produced or actualized by volition and Will. One's stream of consciousness is a self-directed entity that provides for a parade or flow of ideas that I can pick and choose from. The Will to move my arm is one of them; it's not an exclusive instinct. The Will's primacy over neurobiological processes means the cause of me wanting to move my arm, effects my neurobiological process in making my arm move. This is not to even mention the will for purpose, happiness, passion, love, or otherwise other qualities of consciousness (Qualia) that are critical to the survival of the human species (Ontology). We have a choice to either live or not live, depending upon one's own quality of life. He's got the cart before the horse there.

Chalmers, for example, complains that Searle does not actually
achieve any progress on the mind-body problem,
‘Searle's all-purpose critique: "the brain causes consciousness".

Although this mantra (repeated at least ten times) is apparently
intended as a source of great wisdom, it settles almost nothing that
is at issue…Searle's claim is simply a statement of the problem, not a
solution’13


Yep, You are correct Ms. Hodges/Mr. Chalmers!
“Concerning matter, we have been all wrong. What we have called matter is energy, whose vibration has been so lowered as to be perceptible to the senses. There is no matter.” "Spooky Action at a Distance"
― Albert Einstein
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Re: Searle's Biological Naturalism view of Consciousness.

Post by Gertie »

GE Morton wrote: August 8th, 2022, 7:54 pm
Gertie wrote: August 8th, 2022, 2:58 pm
Is it coherent to say conscious experience is brain stuff, but has different properties to physical brain stuff, but isn't ontologically reducible to brain stuff?   What would be needed to make it coherent?
Provocative and interesting post.

I agree with most of what Searle says, but point out that his analysis doesn't solve the "hard problem." I'd also suggest the difference he suggests between "causal reducibility" and "ontological reducibility" isn't needed because "reducible" is ambiguous, but because "ontology" is.

More later.
It came to me as I was lying in a darkened room :wink:

Interested to see your take. First on how ontological irreducibility can reconcile with substance monism, then it might be clearer how causality could fit in.

My understanding of ontological reducibility is that the underlying parts are the same, but the novel properties arise from the parts doing something different. So in nature H2O molecules can have the different properties of liquid, gas and solid, or behave like waves. That's all understood as H2O molecules in motion, giving rise to these emergent properties, and can be 'reverse-engineered' to be reduced back to H2O molecules in motion.

Property dualists say conscious experience is a form of brain processes in motion manifesting these radically different experiential properties, but those properties aren't reducible back to the physical brain processes - neurons exchanging electro-chemicals. How do you make sense of that conceptually...

Searle says brain processes cause experience, which isn't how we generally think of the internal properties of a system, we don't say H2O molecules cause liquidity or solidity. We think of causation in terms of one thing acting on another thing. In that type of causality we don't expect the second thing to be ontologically reducible to the first thing. But Searle is claiming material brain substance processes cause a different type/iteration of brain substance (experience), which isn't reducible to the first (material) brain substance. As I understand it...
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Re: Searle's Biological Naturalism view of Consciousness.

Post by Gertie »

Sy Borg wrote: August 9th, 2022, 12:22 am Yes, it appears that Searle has not attempted to solve the hard problem of consciousness. If consciousness is a state of the brain, what do we call the state of the liver, the lungs, the stomach, and other organs? If consciousness is a state of matter, what are the equivalent others? The answer is obviously not solid, liquid, gas or plasma. Life is a blend of solids, liquids and gases, so consciousness is not an equivalent state, but tangential.

So what are the "peers" of consciousness? The alternative "states"? Or is consciousness a quasi-digital phenomenon, purely on or off, with no equivalents or similar states?

Looking at the evidence, we have much evidence of brains playing a major role in many body functions, including consciousness, but zero evidence of brains without bodies being conscious (aside from some distorted expressions for a few seconds in some of those who were beheaded). I suggest that the body's role in consciousness is greater than that of just an energy provider for the brain.
I agree with you he's not addressing the Hard Problem. It's more of a What If... hypothesis I think. But without addressing the Hard Problem I don't see how he gives us a framework where his What If makes sense in practice.
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Re: Searle's Biological Naturalism view of Consciousness.

Post by GE Morton »

3017Metaphysician wrote: August 9th, 2022, 2:08 pm
There again, Searle conflates instinct with the Will (metaphysically speaking). Self-directed or regulated mental phenomena is both instinctive and produced or actualized by volition and Will. One's stream of consciousness is a self-directed entity that provides for a parade or flow of ideas that I can pick and choose from. The Will to move my arm is one of them; it's not an exclusive instinct. The Will's primacy over neurobiological processes means the cause of me wanting to move my arm, effects my neurobiological process in making my arm move. This is not to even mention the will for purpose, happiness, passion, love, or otherwise other qualities of consciousness (Qualia) that are critical to the survival of the human species (Ontology). We have a choice to either live or not live, depending upon one's own quality of life. He's got the cart before the horse there.
Though Searle doesn't solve the "hard problem," he does have the horse and cart in the right order, while you have it wrong. The "will" (which is just awareness of an intention to do something, the intention resulting from a desire that it be done) is itself the result of a neurobiological process, as are all of the other mental "entities" and states you mention, and also that desire. There are no desires or "wills" in the absence of a living, functioning brain.
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