Searle's Biological Naturalism view of Consciousness.

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3017Metaphysician
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Re: Searle's Biological Naturalism view of Consciousness.

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GE Morton wrote: August 10th, 2022, 10:27 pm
3017Metaphysician wrote: August 10th, 2022, 1:38 pm
To "scratch an itch" correct. But not in everydayness or everyday cognition (of self-aware beings). Which is the crux of the argument. Desires themselves, in most instances, take primacy over physical effects.
Felt desires are just the affective qualia --- "tags" --- representing certain neural processes in the phenomenal self-model I described above. They don't "take primacy" over those processes; they represent those processes. There are no desires without an underlying neural process.

Oh I see. Are you thinking then they are an illogical mix of both/and? How could that be?
The physical is subordinate to the desire . . .
Again, a felt desire is a phenomenal token representing a neural process.

Sure, a phenomenon that is metaphysical
Conversely, if you want to argue that 'brain stuff' or neurobiology in-themselves, causes people to choose dying over living, be my guest!
All animals, insofar as they have nervous systems which enable them to perceive and recognize threats, act to avoid or escape those threats. Houseflies fly away if they sense a flyswatter whooshing toward them. In creatures with nervous systems complex enough to allow creation of a self-model that innate neural programming is represented phenomenally as a "desire to live," or "the will to live."

The flaw in that reasoning is that like Searle, you've conflated or dichotomized instinct over quality of life. So thinking that instinct takes primacy, is where that theory fails. Conversely, you'd have to explain why people commit suicide when the primacy of instinct doesn't provide for such mental causation. Unless of course, you can somehow prove that other animals really don't like their lives' but are not able to end same.
But for now, you will need to demonstrate that things like math and music have biological survival advantages.
No, I don't, although the evolutionary advantages of mathematics should be obvious --- all sciences depend upon it, and those sciences have increased our lifespans, food supply, utilization of natural resources, expanded our means of communicating, etc. But it isn't necessary to explain in detail what evolutionary advantage a particular idiosyncratic desire or taste may confer. Evolution works by trial and error, and many of its experiments prove to be useless, or even detrimental. For some people different kinds of sounds may be relaxing or stimulating, enabling them to function more effectively in the world. For others those sounds may be annoying and unwelcome.

Knowledge of the laws of gravity are not needed to evade falling objects in the jungle. If they had survival value, by the time the computations were completed, the animals would not be alive to proclaim any of the results. Similar with music theory (scales, cadences, chord structures, time signatures and so on) and musical genius. Those 'qualities' of consciousness have no biological survival value whatsoever.
Here is one answer:

"Consciousness, via volitional action, increases the likelihood that an organism will direct its attention, and ultimately its movements, to whatever is most important for its survival and reproduction."
No, not really. Volition can cause not only euthanasia, but also 'mental' phenomenon like that of Hitler. In those cases, volition caused and causes death and destruction. And one can always choose the end their life, particular if it's perceived that they have no quality (i.e., Qualia) of same. Remember, Searle has fallen for the trappings of dichotomized science. Maslow teaches us not to be tempted by it.
It doesn't matter that volition can have detrimental effects. What matters is whether the positive effects outweigh the negative, and if they do, that evolutionary innovation will persist. I don't, however, think volitional action is a very complete answer to the survival advantage question.

In that regard, you may want to study-up on cognitive science a bit more. Not to worry, Searle also seems to have difficulties in piecing together a unified theory of consciousness too... . Though the pare from Hodges/Chalmers that was provided (by Consul) is a good start.
Confused questions. You're using "mind talk" terms to ask questions about non-mental phenomena. "Love," "caring about," "happiness," etc. are terms denoting different affective qualia. Those qualia are "tags" representing different dispositional states in the model, which states are induced by neural activity.
Of course they are. Because Searle dichotomized his theory, it begs those absurd kinds of questions of like and kind. But since that's his logical approach, and if one subscribes to it, you must consider them in order to make the case that dichotomizing (cognitive reality) the nature of conscious existence is the best approach to understanding same. Remember it's not either/or; consciousness is both/and. It's just at different times, the mind automatically vacillates between the two. Think of it like the insoluble differences between the mental phenomenon of the Will and the intellect all working together. Or, the conscious and subconscious minds. [/b]
Nearly everyone discussing these issues "dichotomizes" "reality" into "mind stuff" and "brain stuff" (mind/body dualism). Searle gives some reasons for thinking that analysis of the problem is misguided, and suggests a means of "taming" it.
No, Searle just say's 'the brain is the cause of consciousness'. An empty statement that just states the problem. Kind of like when you read Dennett's 'consciousness explained' book. A big thick book with a bunch of rationalized gibberish that in the end of it, basically acquiesces to not having a real answer. I'm sure there's another bunch of logically fallacies in there somewhere...but rest assured it's more than likely to be 'appeals to ignorance' and 'conjunction'. Worth noting, like most folks, there is good and bad philosophy. Many philosopher's think if they write more stuff, it will prove something.
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Re: Searle's Biological Naturalism view of Consciousness.

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3017Metaphysician wrote: August 11th, 2022, 10:07 amNo, Searle just say's 'the brain is the cause of consciousness'. An empty statement that just states the problem.
No, it's not an empty statement, even though it isn't accompanied by a detailed neuroscientific explanation of how certain kinds of neural processes cause experiences, and what kinds of neural processes cause what kinds of experiences.
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Re: Searle's Biological Naturalism view of Consciousness.

Post by GE Morton »

3017Metaphysician wrote: August 11th, 2022, 10:07 am
GE Morton wrote: August 10th, 2022, 10:27 pm
Felt desires are just the affective qualia --- "tags" --- representing certain neural processes in the phenomenal self-model I described above. They don't "take primacy" over those processes; they represent those processes. There are no desires without an underlying neural process.
Oh I see. Are you thinking then they are an illogical mix of both/and? How could that be?
Er, what is "an illogical mix of both/and"? "Mix" of what?

Though not sure what you're saying there, I think what I said is fairly clear: felt desires are phenomenal tokens, "tags," representing neural processes underway in brain. They are the brain's way of portraying that process in the phenomenal model of itself that it creates.
Again, a felt desire is a phenomenal token representing a neural process.
Sure, a phenomenon that is metaphysical
Well, I suppose that depends on what you mean by "metaphysical." If that term implies the existence of entities, processes, substances, "realities" beyond the reach of perception and cognition, then no, they are not "metaphysical." But perhaps you're using "metaphysical" to denote anything not "physical," i.e., within the scope of the science of physics. But that use would include such things as law, morality, language, games, and slew of other products of the intellect which are not normally considered "metaphysical."

You can probably find some definition of "metaphysical" which would embrace conscious phenomena. But so classifying it does nothing to further our understanding of it. Moreover, since those phenomena are unquestionably products of physical processes, there is good reason for considering them "physical."
All animals, insofar as they have nervous systems which enable them to perceive and recognize threats, act to avoid or escape those threats. Houseflies fly away if they sense a flyswatter whooshing toward them. In creatures with nervous systems complex enough to allow creation of a self-model that innate neural programming is represented phenomenally as a "desire to live," or "the will to live."
The flaw in that reasoning is that like Searle, you've conflated or dichotomized instinct over quality of life. So thinking that instinct takes primacy, is where that theory fails. Conversely, you'd have to explain why people commit suicide when the primacy of instinct doesn't provide for such mental causation. Unless of course, you can somehow prove that other animals really don't like their lives' but are not able to end same.
The "will to live" is not the only innate programming in our brains (and those of other animals). There is also an innate propensity to avoid pain and other discomforts. In the face of prolonged, debilitating pain, the latter impulse can prevail over the will to live. There are also pathologies, such as depression, that can thwart programming. In any case, ANY decision one makes results from a neural process; no decision precedes such a process. The conscious decision just is that process, as represented in the phenomenal self-model.
Knowledge of the laws of gravity are not needed to evade falling objects in the jungle.
Oh, but such knowledge certainly does improve our ability to avoid such events, not to mention controlling our own falls, and causing things (such as mortar shells) to fall on an enemy. Not to mention enabling us to build and control aircraft, send probes to other planets, plot the courses of asteroids and comets which could wipe us out, etc. --- all of which yield knowledge which improves our survival prospects.
Similar with music theory (scales, cadences, chord structures, time signatures and so on) and musical genius. Those 'qualities' of consciousness have no biological survival value whatsoever.
Already answered. Why music has psychological effects (it can be stimulating, arousing, soothing, annoying, etc.) is indeed mysterious, but that it does have such effects is sufficient evolutionary explanation for its appearance and continued production and appeal.
It doesn't matter that volition can have detrimental effects. What matters is whether the positive effects outweigh the negative, and if they do, that evolutionary innovation will persist. I don't, however, think volitional action is a very complete answer to the survival advantage question.
In that regard, you may want to study-up on cognitive science a bit more.
Ah. A non-response.
Searle also seems to have difficulties in piecing together a unified theory of consciousness too...
Searle was not attempting to "piece together a unified theory of consciousness" in that paper, and did not claim that he had. He was only trying to bring some clarity to the concept of "reducibility," and give reasons to reject both substance and property dualism.
Nearly everyone discussing these issues "dichotomizes" "reality" into "mind stuff" and "brain stuff" (mind/body dualism). Searle gives some reasons for thinking that analysis of the problem is misguided, and suggests a means of "taming" it.
No, Searle just say's 'the brain is the cause of consciousness'.
Perhaps you can re-read the paper(s) and respond to his actual arguments.

https://web.archive.org/web/20060501002 ... mOct04.doc
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Re: Searle's Biological Naturalism view of Consciousness.

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Consul wrote: August 12th, 2022, 11:44 am
3017Metaphysician wrote: August 11th, 2022, 10:07 amNo, Searle just say's 'the brain is the cause of consciousness'. An empty statement that just states the problem.
No, it's not an empty statement, even though it isn't accompanied by a detailed neuroscientific explanation of how certain kinds of neural processes cause experiences, and what kinds of neural processes cause what kinds of experiences.
Let's parse the statement to see whether (flush-out your assessment) it says anything at all, about explaining the nature of conscious existence.

As such, share how that statement completely explains the nature of conscious existence. And please resist the temptation for hyperbole and please spare the gibberish, if you are so inclined. Let's keep it simple and use pure reason, if you can. Ready?

The brain is the cause of consciousness.

In your words, explain why that conclusion is both sound and valid, and what causes its premise(s) to be true. Be susinct and use logico-deductive reasoning.
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Re: Searle's Biological Naturalism view of Consciousness.

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3017Metaphysician wrote: August 12th, 2022, 5:55 pm
Consul wrote: August 12th, 2022, 11:44 am
3017Metaphysician wrote: August 11th, 2022, 10:07 amNo, Searle just say's 'the brain is the cause of consciousness'. An empty statement that just states the problem.
No, it's not an empty statement, even though it isn't accompanied by a detailed neuroscientific explanation of how certain kinds of neural processes cause experiences, and what kinds of neural processes cause what kinds of experiences.
Let's parse the statement to see whether (flush-out your assessment) it says anything at all, about explaining the nature of conscious existence.

As such, share how that statement completely explains the nature of conscious existence. And please resist the temptation for hyperbole and please spare the gibberish, if you are so inclined. Let's keep it simple and use pure reason, if you can. Ready?

The brain is the cause of consciousness.

In your words, explain why that conclusion is both sound and valid, and what causes its premise(s) to be true. Be susinct and use logico-deductive reasoning.
This thread is about Searle's view, and his view "is this: Consciousness and other sorts of mental phenomena are caused by neurobiological processes in the brain, and they are realized in the structure of the brain. In a word, the conscious mind is caused by brain processes and is itself a higher level feature of the brain."

(Searle, John R. "Consciousness". 2000. Reprinted in Consciousness and Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. p. 46)

In other words: Experiential properties are "emergent" higher-level properties of the brain the occurring of which is "upwardly" caused by the occurring of certain lower-level structural neural properties.

Searle's view isn't "empty" in the sense of being meaningless. Whether it is true is another question—one which I haven't answered in the affirmative!

If I wanted to defend his view, I would argue that manipulability is evidence for causation, and that consciousness and its subjective contents are in fact regularly manipulable (influenceable) through the manipulation of brain processes; so the most plausible explanation of this is that consciousness and its subjective contents are caused by brain processes.

Causation and Manipulability: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-mani/

"A commonsensical idea about causation is that causal relationships are relationships that are potentially exploitable for purposes of manipulation and control: very roughly, if C is genuinely a cause of E, then if I can manipulate C in the right way, this should be a way of manipulating or changing E."
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Re: Searle's Biological Naturalism view of Consciousness.

Post by GE Morton »

Consul wrote: August 12th, 2022, 7:56 pm
Causation and Manipulability: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-mani/

"A commonsensical idea about causation is that causal relationships are relationships that are potentially exploitable for purposes of manipulation and control: very roughly, if C is genuinely a cause of E, then if I can manipulate C in the right way, this should be a way of manipulating or changing E."
Yes indeed. I'd add that the above is the common and primary method of determining whether any X is the cause of any Y, more definitive than Hume's constant correlation.
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Re: Searle's Biological Naturalism view of Consciousness.

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Consul wrote: August 12th, 2022, 7:56 pm
3017Metaphysician wrote: August 12th, 2022, 5:55 pm
Consul wrote: August 12th, 2022, 11:44 am
3017Metaphysician wrote: August 11th, 2022, 10:07 amNo, Searle just say's 'the brain is the cause of consciousness'. An empty statement that just states the problem.
No, it's not an empty statement, even though it isn't accompanied by a detailed neuroscientific explanation of how certain kinds of neural processes cause experiences, and what kinds of neural processes cause what kinds of experiences.
Let's parse the statement to see whether (flush-out your assessment) it says anything at all, about explaining the nature of conscious existence.

As such, share how that statement completely explains the nature of conscious existence. And please resist the temptation for hyperbole and please spare the gibberish, if you are so inclined. Let's keep it simple and use pure reason, if you can. Ready?

The brain is the cause of consciousness.

In your words, explain why that conclusion is both sound and valid, and what causes its premise(s) to be true. Be susinct and use logico-deductive reasoning.
This thread is about Searle's view, and his view "is this: Consciousness and other sorts of mental phenomena are caused by neurobiological processes in the brain, and they are realized in the structure of the brain. In a word, the conscious mind is caused by brain processes and is itself a higher level feature of the brain."

(Searle, John R. "Consciousness". 2000. Reprinted in Consciousness and Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. p. 46)

In other words: Experiential properties are "emergent" higher-level properties of the brain the occurring of which is "upwardly" caused by the occurring of certain lower-level structural neural properties.

Searle's view isn't "empty" in the sense of being meaningless. Whether it is true is another question—one which I haven't answered in the affirmative!

If I wanted to defend his view, I would argue that manipulability is evidence for causation, and that consciousness and its subjective contents are in fact regularly manipulable (influenceable) through the manipulation of brain processes; so the most plausible explanation of this is that consciousness and its subjective contents are caused by brain processes.

Causation and Manipulability: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-mani/

"A commonsensical idea about causation is that causal relationships are relationships that are potentially exploitable for purposes of manipulation and control: very roughly, if C is genuinely a cause of E, then if I can manipulate C in the right way, this should be a way of manipulating or changing E."
Consul!

Thank you. I agree with Chalmers that it's an empty statement.

GE is arguing the statement has meaning. So let's see whether he can support his claim using logic. Of course, I'm using logic to call his bluff. Unless of course, there's a claim for consciousness being something that is considered logically impossible or otherwise outside the confines of objective reasoning.

We'll see if he can support his claim that it has truth value.
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Re: Searle's Biological Naturalism view of Consciousness.

Post by GE Morton »

3017Metaphysician wrote: August 12th, 2022, 8:36 pm
Thank you. I agree with Chalmers that it's an empty statement.

GE is arguing the statement has meaning. So let's see whether he can support his claim using logic. Of course, I'm using logic to call his bluff. Unless of course, there's a claim for consciousness being something that is considered logically impossible or otherwise outside the confines of objective reasoning.

We'll see if he can support his claim that it has truth value.
You're juxtaposing and confusing two different charges here --- on the one hand, you're saying the proposition, "The brain causes consciousness" is "empty," and on the other, suggesting that it is false.

"Empty" is ambiguous, but when applied to propositions one meaning is that it is cognitively meaningless, i.e., it has no determinable truth value. So are you arguing that the proposition is cognitively meaningless, or that it is false?
"In your words, explain why that conclusion is both sound and valid, and what causes its premise(s) to be true. Be susinct and use logico-deductive reasoning."
Not sure to what conclusion you refer. The proposition "The brain causes consciousness" is not the conclusion of any argument; it is a free-standing empirical proposition whose truth value is established by observation. The empirical evidence for its truth is ubiquitous and beyond question.

BTW, Chalmers has never claimed (as far as I know, and I've read a lot of Chalmers), that Searle's "biological naturalism" is "empty." He just thinks it doesn't solve the "hard problem," and doesn't tell us any more than we already knew. And he certainly doesn't deny that the brain causes consciousness:

"In particular, a nonreductive theory of experience will specify basic principles telling us how experience depends on physical features of the world. These psychophysical principles will not interfere with physical laws, as it seems that physical laws already form a closed system. Rather, they will be a supplement to a physical theory. A physical theory gives a theory of physical processes, and a psychophysical theory tells us how those processes give rise to experience. We know that experience depends on physical processes, but we also know that this dependence cannot be derived from physical laws alone. The new basic principles postulated by a nonreductive theory give us the extra ingredient that we need to build an explanatory bridge."

https://www.introphilosophyofmind.com/u ... ism_22.pdf
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Re: Searle's Biological Naturalism view of Consciousness.

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GE Morton wrote: August 12th, 2022, 9:40 pmBTW, Chalmers has never claimed (as far as I know, and I've read a lot of Chalmers), that Searle's "biological naturalism" is "empty." He just thinks it doesn't solve the "hard problem," and doesn't tell us any more than we already knew. And he certainly doesn't deny that the brain causes consciousness:

"In particular, a nonreductive theory of experience will specify basic principles telling us how experience depends on physical features of the world. These psychophysical principles will not interfere with physical laws, as it seems that physical laws already form a closed system. Rather, they will be a supplement to a physical theory. A physical theory gives a theory of physical processes, and a psychophysical theory tells us how those processes give rise to experience. We know that experience depends on physical processes, but we also know that this dependence cannot be derived from physical laws alone. The new basic principles postulated by a nonreductive theory give us the extra ingredient that we need to build an explanatory bridge."

https://www.introphilosophyofmind.com/u ... ism_22.pdf
QUOTE>
"It remains plausible, however, that consciousness arises from a physical basis, even though it is not entailed by that basis. The position we are left with is that consciousness arises from a physical substrate in virtue of certain contingent laws of nature, which are not themselves implied by physical laws. This position is implicitly held by many people who think of themselves as materialists. It is common to hear, 'Of course I'm a materialist; the mind certainly arises from the brain.' The very presence of the word 'arises' should be a tip-off here. One tends not to say 'learning arises from the brain,' for instance—and if one did, it would be in a temporal sense of 'arises.' Rather, one would more naturally say that learning is a process in the brain. The very fact that the mind needs to arise from the brain indicates that there is something further going on, over and above the physical facts."

(Chalmers, David J. The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. pp. 125-26)
<QUOTE

"give rise to" = "cause to happen"
"arise from" = "occur as a result of"
(Oxford Lexico)

So Chalmers seems to share Searle's causal view. However, Searle stubbornly denies being a property dualist, whereas Chalmers happily calls his view "naturalistic dualism", which means that he explicitly accepts property dualism.
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Re: Searle's Biological Naturalism view of Consciousness.

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GE Morton wrote: August 12th, 2022, 9:40 pmNot sure to what conclusion you refer. The proposition "The brain causes consciousness" is not the conclusion of any argument; it is a free-standing empirical proposition whose truth value is established by observation. The empirical evidence for its truth is ubiquitous and beyond question.
"The simplest form of the mind body problem is this: What exactly is the relation of consciousness to the brain? There are two parts to this problem, a philosophical part and a scientific part. I have already been assuming a simple solution to the philosophical part. The solution, I believe, is consistent with everything we know about biology and about how the world works. It is this: Consciousness and other sorts of mental phenomena are caused by neurobiological processes in the brain, and they are realized in the structure of the brain. In a word, the conscious mind is caused by brain processes and is itself a higher level feature of the brain.

The philosophical part is relatively easy but the scientific part is much harder. How, exactly, do brain processes cause consciousness and how, exactly, is consciousness realized in the brain?"


(Searle, John R. "Consciousness". 2000. Reprinted in Consciousness and Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. p. 46)
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Re: Searle's Biological Naturalism view of Consciousness.

Post by GE Morton »

Consul wrote: August 12th, 2022, 10:10 pm
So Chalmers seems to share Searle's causal view. However, Searle stubbornly denies being a property dualist, whereas Chalmers happily calls his view "naturalistic dualism", which means that he explicitly accepts property dualism.
Yes. There is a dualism, but it is neither a "property dualism" nor a "substance dualism." It is only a linguistic dualism; two different vocabularies, one for communicating about experiential features and events, the other the features and events of a postulated external world --- which is itself a conceptual construct, but which we take to "stand-in" for the unknowable noumena. Neither vocabulary has any ontological implications (if ontology is regarded as an inquiry into what "really exists"). The only question is how well the two vocabularies help us communicate our experiences and render them coherent.
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Re: Searle's Biological Naturalism view of Consciousness.

Post by GE Morton »

Consul wrote: August 12th, 2022, 10:24 pm
The philosophical part is relatively easy but the scientific part is much harder. How, exactly, do brain processes cause consciousness and how, exactly, is consciousness realized in the brain?"[/i]
I think Metzinger's "phenomenal self-model" and "phenomenal world model" framework is promising. It answers the second part of Searle's question, but not the first. (And I think that part is unanswerable).
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Re: Searle's Biological Naturalism view of Consciousness.

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GE Morton wrote: August 13th, 2022, 12:20 am
Consul wrote: August 12th, 2022, 10:10 pm
So Chalmers seems to share Searle's causal view. However, Searle stubbornly denies being a property dualist, whereas Chalmers happily calls his view "naturalistic dualism", which means that he explicitly accepts property dualism.
Yes. There is a dualism, but it is neither a "property dualism" nor a "substance dualism." It is only a linguistic dualism; two different vocabularies, one for communicating about experiential features and events, the other the features and events of a postulated external world --- which is itself a conceptual construct, but which we take to "stand-in" for the unknowable noumena. Neither vocabulary has any ontological implications (if ontology is regarded as an inquiry into what "really exists"). The only question is how well the two vocabularies help us communicate our experiences and render them coherent.
No, Searle's and Chalmers' positions are clearly cases of existential property dualism (without substance dualism) rather than just representational concept/predicate dualism. Searle has stated many times that experiential properties are irreducibly ontologically subjective, having a distinctive "first-person ontology". Property dualism is the view that there are two basic kinds of properties in the world: physical ones and mental (experiential/phenomenal) ones. According to Searle, experiential/phenomenal properties are a basic kind of (emergent) properties, which are ontologically irreducible properties sui generis!

QUOTE>
"consciousness, its irreducibility. Many efforts have been made to identify consciousness with some other feature such as behaviour, functional states, or neurobiological states described solely in third-person neurobiological terms. All of these fail because consciousness has an irreducible subjective character which is not identical with any third-person objective features. Consciousness is irreducibly subjective in the sense that conscious states are experienced by and accessible to the individual who has them in a way that they are not experienced by or accessible to other individuals. To understand this point it is essential to distinguish between the epistemic sense of the distinction between objectivity and subjectivity and the ontological sense. In the epistemic sense, objectivity is a matter of propositions being ascertainable by any competent observer as opposed to subjective matters which are relative to individual tastes and preferences. But in the ontological sense of the objective-subjective distinction, there are certain phenomena which are intrinsically subjective and other phenomena which are intrinsically objective. Such matters as mass, force, and gravitational attraction are ontologically objective, but, in this sense, consciousness is ontologically subjective. Subjectivity in this case is not a matter of the epistemology by way of which we find out about consciousness but a matter of its ontological status. The objection, then, to any form of reductionism is that it is bound to fail because the ontologically subjective cannot be reduced to the ontologically objective."

("Irreducibility of Consciousness," by J. R. Searle. In The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, edited by Ted Honderich, 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. p. 161)
<QUOTE
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Re: Searle's Biological Naturalism view of Consciousness.

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Consul

Thanks for the further quotes.   I've picked out what I think are the salient parts, let me know if I've missed something important to my claim that Biological Naturalism and Property Dualism are incoherent without ontological reducibility.


Hodges introduces "a new terminology of real-identity, as opposed to privileging-identity, depending on whether a reductive privileging is incorporated within the identity claim." (p. 152)

"The main point I am trying to make is that identity itself does not imply reductive privileging of one description over another. In the case of philosophy of mind, this means that identity claims between experiences and brain states do not imply that brain states are more essential, fundamental or basic than experiences. Identity claims simply mean that experiential descriptions and neurobiological descriptions co-refer to the same conscious phenomenon." (pp. 152-3)

"In order to keep these ideas clear I will now use the following terminology:

Real-identity: The neutral metaphysical relation where two terms are found to co-refer to the same referent.
Privileging-identity: The compound claim found in traditional mind-brain identity theory, which amounts to a claim of real-identity plus an additional claim of the reductive privileging of the physical over the mental."
(p. 154)

"Summary of real identity theory: The real identity theory I am proposing is a form of token identity theory regarding the mind-body problem where for any particular brain state which occurs in the brain of an experiencing subject, there are two ways of picking out that token brain state – an experiential way and a neuronal way. That is to say, any particular token brain state which occurs when a subject is having an experience will fall under two different types – both the “experience” type and the “neuronal activity” type. As identity is a metaphysical relation between a thing and itself, the identity part of real identity theory is referring to the fact that where it was thought there was a neuronal state and a separate experience, in fact there is just a particular token brain state occurring in the brain of a subject, and that brain state is both an experience and a particular configuration of neuronal activity.

Hmmmm... she is effectively privileging the brain states tho, because ''brain''  refers to the physical lump of stuff in our heads.  She's saying there's this lump of brain substance, and when it's in motion this lump of brain stuff is both a configuration of brain stuff and experience.  To call this a single  identity tells us nothing more.  It looks like a way round having to explain the actuality of the mind-body relationship by just labelling it the same thing. 

What point then is there in Libet's experiments GE referred to, or trying to understand what's really going on if you just define the mind-body relationship into a single identity.

S
o, for any subject undergoing an experience, there is one token brain state going on in their brain which can be brought under two types; “experience” and “neuronal activity”. This view is token identity theory in as much as every time an experience is occurring for a subject, a particular state of their brain is coming under the type “experience” and, at the very same time, that very same brain state will also come under the type “configuration of neuronal activity”." (p. 155)

"Terminological precautions to avoid sliding into privileging-identity or property dualism: It is important to phrase my position carefully at this point, for it is very easy to either slide back into the locution of traditional privileging-identity, or in relation to experiences and brain states, to seem as if you are sliding towards property dualism. To avoid the latter, I must be clear that the property of having a particular experience, of an itchy foot say, just is the property of having certain configurations of neuronal activity going on in my brain. If I am now clear about this, the two different descriptions might seem disparate enough to warrant an interpretation of a dualism of properties. The problem with using the “just is” terminology is that it almost suggests an inherent reduction or privileging of physical over mental. I must be clear here that to avoid any confusion about a “just is” claim seeming reductive, when I claim that experiences “just are” certain patterns of neuronal activity going on in a brain, what I mean is that there is a single phenomenon going on in a subject’s brain, and that phenomenon can be picked out either in terms of neurological activity or in terms of being an experience – the two descriptions concerned co-refer. This avoids any sense of reduction that might be caught up with the “is” or particularly the “just is” expression, which might seem all too close to the “nothing but” reductive claim of traditional mind-brain privileging-identity theorists." (p. 156)



In other words, she doesn't need to explain the mind-body relationship, or why this one lump of brain stuff has only physical properties when still, but also these radically different experiential properties when in motion -  because she's asserted an 'identity' definition.

"How real identity theory compares to privileging mind-brain identity theory: A particular token brain process in a subject’s brain, one which is going on when they are undergoing an experience, falls both under the type “being an experience” and the type “being a pattern of neuronal activity”." (p. 158)



Nah, don't like it, it's a dodge. 


There's an annoying  thing in philosophy where people conceptualise from actual stuff and processes to create concepts which they then manipulate as if they were the actual things they're about.  But you can logically do things with concepts which don't properly capture the things the concepts are representing.  She's doing that I think. 

The problem is that her "real identity theory" qua token identity theory (i.e. identity theory with identical tokens of occurrences: events/states/processes) doesn't really get rid of property dualism! For if the experiential property and the structural neural property contained in (not possessed by!) one and the same brain occurrence
agreed
describable both phenomenologically/psychologically from the first-person point of view and neurophysiologically from the third-person point of view are mutually irreducible to and thus different from one another, we still have a property dualism within the same brain occurrence.
It's just word play, defining the prob away imo.  She's lost track of the wood for the trees by manipulating concepts without refering back to the actual thing in question.  There's a lump of material stuff made of cells (neurons) called a brain.  When it's in motion its neurons exchange electro-chemical stuff, nowt special there.  But some of those neurons also correlate with this whole different type of phenomenon called experience, which has totally different sorts of properties.   She says nothing to see here, because it's all the same stuff.  But the neurons in motion which correlate with experience, which are no different to the (non-conscious) ones which don't, are the same identity as the experience.  But there's no apparent different material properties between the neurons non-consciously controlling my breathing, and the neurons correlated with me feeling annoyed, seeing red, an itchy toe, etc.  Bah.


I'm unconvinced by Hodges, she's got nothing of substance to add I can see, just manipulating the abstracted concepts without checking back in with the reality the concepts are abstracted from. I'm gonna call this Gertie's Law, and there's a fixed penalty fine for professors and editors who let this slide.

To assert that when my greyish brain 'sees' a green apple these are both irreducible aspects of the same type of stuff in motion sets up a contradiction you have to otherwise explain.  How is my brain simultaneously green and grey if one isn't reducible to the other.  How is the material apple here in my brain when my material brain is just neurons, without some ontological reducibility?   It doesn't wash any more for Hodges, Searle or Property Dualism.


So I want to get to my central prob with Searle and property dualism - how can this lump of brain stuff in motion somehow EITHER cause or have or be experience,  without that experience being ontologically reducible to  the lump of brain stuff in motion?
Gertie wrote: ↑August 9th, 2022, 7:48 pm
Consul wrote: ↑August 9th, 2022, 11:17 amIt depends on what exactly is meant by “distinct from” and “over and above”. To say that x is ontologically irreducible to y is to say that x is different from/non-identical with y or y1+…+yn; so if “distinctness” and “over-and-aboveness” simply mean “difference/non-identity”, then ontological irreducibility does entail distinctness and over-and-aboveness. However, if the latter expressions are used to mean "difference plus independence (non-supervenience)", then ontological irreducibility does not entail distinctness and over-and-aboveness.
Distinct from and over over and above must surely mean brain-stuff neural
processes have particular physical properties (neurons exchanging electro-chemicals) and experience has first person qualiative properties (seeing, feeling, thinking, etc).  These are radically distinct properties which as far as we know no other physical processes have and currently aren't accounted for by physics (or biology or chemistry).  Independence/non-supervenience would be more likely to imply non-reducibility imo.  Perhaps two separate substances interacting causally, or some property  of brain stuff which has 'escaped'  reducibility via some mechanism we haven't discovered.

But what would 'escaping reducibility' actually mean? Surely it means  all the same material brain-stuff, configuring in ways which simultaneously have radically different properties ('lower level neural interactions  and 'upper level' experience),  but the 'upper level' experiential properties can't be ontologically reduced to the material stuff, while being a configuration of that stuff.

Halp!
Searle's biological naturalism is different from substance dualism, but it is no different from property-dualistic causal emergentism insofar as according to it the instantiation of higher-level mental/experiential properties is caused by (causally emergent from) the instantiation of lower-level configurational or structural neural properties, in which case there are two different or distinct (kinds of) properties connected as cause and effect, such that ontological reductionism about mental/experiential properties is false, since X is a cause of Y/Y is an effect of X entails X ≠ Y.

Yes I know that's Searle's  claim.   Something's internal workings  causing some new property to emerge is fine, like water molecules slowing to cause the property of solidity.  But solid  ice and liquid water are both still ontologically  reducible to H2O molecules in motion.  Searle claims neurons in motion cause the experience of seeing a green apple, but AREN'T ontologically reducible to neurons in motion.  That's my issue.
Gertie wrote: ↑August 9th, 2022, 7:48 pmAgain I'm struggling to make sense of this.  To make sense of  two sets of of properties as being irreducible to each other,  we'd have to see them as like two forking branches in a tree, both reducible to the trunk, but not each other (assuming a property of something is a way something is). But that's not what either property dualism or Searle is saying.  Property dualism takes the physical brain processes as the lower level substance in motion, from which the higher level experiential propties somehow instantiate, right?  Brain-substance somehow instantiates as experience, which 'escapes' reducibility to brain stuff, but is still comprised of brain stuff.  Where-as Searle says brain stuff in motion somehow causes experience to  manifest as a different kind of thing with different properties which are irreducible to brain-stuff,  but  still made of brain stuff.

It strikes me that if you think about what the abstract terms really mean, neither positions  make sense. Both say experience is ontologically comprised of physical brain stuff, but not ontologically reducible to brain stuff.

Or have I confused myself?
Maybe. It depends on what you mean by "brain stuff".
The material stuff (substrate)  brains are composed of.  Neuron cells which in motion exchange electro-chemicals.

Searle is a materialist substance monist, i.e. both mental properties and the neural properties from which they emerge causally are instantiated by and in the same (kind of) material substance, viz. the brain.

But if, as Searle maintains, the relation between higher-level mental properties and lower-level neural properties is causation rather than composition or constitution, then the former are ontologically different from and hence irreducible to (configurations/combinations of) the latter.
Yes.   My point is, like property dualism, ontological irreducibility doesn't make sense, as I said -
Property dualism takes the physical brain processes as the lower level substance in motion, from which the higher level experiential propties somehow instantiate, right?  Brain-substance somehow instantiates as experience, which 'escapes' reducibility to brain stuff, but is still comprised of brain stuff.  Where-as Searle says brain stuff in motion somehow causes experience to  manifest as a different kind of thing with different properties which are irreducible to brain-stuff,  but  still made of brain stuff.

It strikes me that if you think about what the abstract terms really mean, neither positions  make sense. Both say experience is ontologically comprised of physical brain stuff, but not ontologically reducible to brain stuff.

Addressing irreducibility in terms of causation doesn't change that problem. He's not saying something else is causing neurons to cause experience, where-by the ontological reducibility now has to incorporate that something else (like heat causing ice to liquefy).  He's saying neurons in motion is all  that's needed to cause experience, that's all that's causally happening.  But at the same time saying experience isn't ontologically reducible to all that is happening.  It's incoherent. Right? 







 
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Re: Searle's Biological Naturalism view of Consciousness.

Post by Consul »

Gertie wrote: August 13th, 2022, 11:02 amThanks for the further quotes. I've picked out what I think are the salient parts, let me know if I've missed something important to my claim that Biological Naturalism and Property Dualism are incoherent without ontological reducibility.

So I want to get to my central prob with Searle and property dualism - how can this lump of brain stuff in motion somehow EITHER cause or have or be experience,  without that experience being ontologically reducible to  the lump of brain stuff in motion?

…Yes. My point is, like property dualism, ontological irreducibility doesn't make sense, as I said.

It strikes me that if you think about what the abstract terms really mean, neither positions  make sense. Both say experience is ontologically comprised of physical brain stuff, but not ontologically reducible to brain stuff.

Addressing irreducibility in terms of causation doesn't change that problem. He's not saying something else is causing neurons to cause experience, where-by the ontological reducibility now has to incorporate that something else (like heat causing ice to liquefy).  He's saying neurons in motion is all  that's needed to cause experience, that's all that's causally happening.  But at the same time saying experience isn't ontologically reducible to all that is happening.  It's incoherent. Right? 
It's not incoherent within the context of ontological emergentism with its different layers or levels of being and irreducibly different, novel properties on every or at least some layer or level. Note that I'm talking about different, hierarchically organized levels of existence or reality rather than just about different levels of representation (conception, description)!

If we take the human brain as an example of a hierarchically organized physical system, there is the highest level of the cerebral system (brain) as a whole, and there is the lowest, basic level of single elementary particles, of which the human brain is fundamentally composed. There are also several intermediate levels ranging from single atoms, single molecules, single cells, to multicellular structures (tissues).

According to ontological property emergentism, there occur ontologically novel and irreducible emergent properties on at least one nonbasic level of being of the physical system in question.

Emergent properties occurring on level Ln are ontologically irreducible in the sense that they aren't constituted by, and thus aren't identical with any structural properties occurring on level Ln-1 or any lower level, including the fundamental one.

As opposed to an ontologically irreducible emergent property, a structural property on level Ln is an ontologically reducible complex property consisting of properties of and relations between objects or substances occurring on level Ln—be they (single) particles, atoms, molecules, cells, or tissues.

Emergent properties occurring on level Ln depend or supervene on lower-level structural properties existentially (and causally), but they are irreducibly different from these.

According to Searle, experiential properties are instantiated by the brain as a whole or by certain multicellular segments of the brain, but not by any lower-level cerebral structures: No single particle, atom, molecule, or cell in the brain has experiential properties, but certain active complexes or dynamic systems of particles, atoms, molecules, and cells in the brain have such emergent properties, which are essentially "holistic" or "systemic" features.

QUOTE>
"O'Connor and Wong offer an interesting account of the metaphysics of emergence: emergent states are caused by configurations of more fundamental items. Structural properties-by-courtesy, in contrast, are not caused by configurations, they are the configurations."

(Heil, John. The Universe As We Find It. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. p. 28)

"A property, S, is structural if and only if proper parts of particulars having S have properties not identical with S and jointly stand in relation R, and this state of affairs is the particular’s having S.

That is to say, there is nothing more to having the structural property than being composed by parts having certain other properties and bearing certain relations to one another—it is ontologically reducible.

Consider Armstrong’s favorite example of being a methane molecule, or CH4. Let us pretend for example’s sake that carbon and hydrogen atoms are mereological atoms and the properties of being a carbon atom and being a hydrogen atom are likewise basic. It will then be plausible to suppose that the property of being a methane molecule just consists in having as parts a carbon atom and four hydrogen atoms bound in the relationship characteristic of methane. The notion of an emergent property can then be understood in part by way of contrast with structural properties. An emergent property is a property of a composite system that is wholly nonstructural.

If we allow simple conjunctive properties, the conjunction F&G of emergent properties F and G will count as nonstructural in this sense, though we should not deem it basic. The basic properties and relations of our world will be those properties whose instantiation does not even partly consist in the instantiation of distinct properties by the entity or its parts. It is the thesis of emergentism that some basic properties are had by composite individuals.
Emergent properties are nonstructural properties of composite individuals."

(O'Connor, Timothy, and Hong Yu Wong. "The Metaphysics of Emergence." Nous 39 (2005): 658-678. p. 663)

"The central tenet of emergentism is the following claim:

Doctrine of Property Emergence. When aggregates of material particles attain an appropriate level of structural complexity ('relatedness'), genuinely novel properties emerge to characterize these systems." (p. 292)

"Irreducibility of Emergent Properties. Emergent properties are not reducible to their 'basal conditions'—the underlying conditions from which they emerge." (p. 293)

"Doctrine of 'Downward' Causation. Emergent properties have causal powers to influence phenomena at the level from which they have emerged." (p. 294)

(Kim, Jaegwon. Philosophy of Mind. 2nd ed. Boulder, CO: Westview, 2006.)
<QUOTE
"We may philosophize well or ill, but we must philosophize." – Wilfrid Sellars
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