Searle's Biological Naturalism view of Consciousness.

[Gertie]

meta!

Generally, (and since you like Hume) if we were to parse Hume's metaphysical notion of (the human condition) reason itself being the slave to human passions, we would see that Searle's theory of causation is only half the equation. Meaning, to say conscious experience is exclusively caused by physical brain activity 'stuff', is to dichotomize conscious existence by denying or excluding one's Will, feelings and 'passions', intentionality, intuition, and other sentient or otherwise non-physical phenomenon.

I think Searle's position is that causality works both ways. Brain processes (somehow) cause conscious experience and conscious experience can (somehow) will behaviour /make choices, (in practice act causally on motor neurons). He believes there's a two-way causal relationship between two different ontologically irreducible iterations of the same brain stuff. I think.

[3017Metaphysician]

There again, Searle conflates instinct with the Will (metaphysically speaking). Self-directed or regulated mental phenomena is both instinctive and produced or actualized by volition and Will. One's stream of consciousness is a self-directed entity that provides for a parade or flow of ideas that I can pick and choose from. The Will to move my arm is one of them; it's not an exclusive instinct. The Will's primacy over neurobiological processes means the cause of me wanting to move my arm, effects my neurobiological process in making my arm move. This is not to even mention the will for purpose, happiness, passion, love, or otherwise other qualities of consciousness (Qualia) that are critical to the survival of the human species (Ontology). We have a choice to either live or not live, depending upon one's own quality of life. He's got the cart before the horse there.

Though Searle doesn't solve the "hard problem," he does have the horse and cart in the right order, while you have it wrong. The "will" (which is just awareness of an intention to do something, the intention resulting from a desire that it be done) is itself the result of a neurobiological process, as are all of the other mental "entities" and states you mention, and also that desire. There are no desires or "wills" in the absence of a living, functioning brain.

GE!

The cause of me willing to move my arm takes primacy in the physical process of moving it. Conversely, in support of your conclusion, you would have to demonstrate that the physical process somehow has a purpose to its own existence. In other words, neurological brain states in-themselves don't cause purposeful existence (or intentionality if you prefer). They are just a means to one end. The Will, intentions and desires in-themselves are not purely physical, or are they?

Think of it like the differences between self-aware Beings with higher intellect v. lower biological life forms. Neurological states are useful for propagation purposes, but not quality of life purposes...

[3017Metaphysician]

meta!

Generally, (and since you like Hume) if we were to parse Hume's metaphysical notion of (the human condition) reason itself being the slave to human passions, we would see that Searle's theory of causation is only half the equation. Meaning, to say conscious experience is exclusively caused by physical brain activity 'stuff', is to dichotomize conscious existence by denying or excluding one's Will, feelings and 'passions', intentionality, intuition, and other sentient or otherwise non-physical phenomenon.

I think Searle's position is that causality works both ways. Brain processes (somehow) cause conscious experience and conscious experience can (somehow) will behaviour /make choices, (in practice act causally on motor neurons). He believes there's a two-way causal relationship between two different ontologically irreducible iterations of the same brain stuff. I think.

Gertie!

I didn't see that particular argument so I may have very well missed it. I think part of this problem, though, is excruciatingly simple. If he wants to 'dichotomize' brainstate's or neurological processes then we really need to parse these kinds of questions for him:

Do brain states in-themselves talk to other brain states? Do brain states in-themselves love other brain states? Do neurological processes in-themselves move other neurological processes....Do neurological processes care about other neurological processes.... Do all brain states cause other brain states to have purpose. Do all neurological processes cause other neurological processes to behave differently? Ad nauseum.

[GE Morton]

The cause of me willing to move my arm takes primacy in the physical process of moving it.

That is open question. In the 1980s Benjamin Libet conducted some experiments which appeared to indicate that the neural activity initiating an action occurred BEFORE the subject made the decision to act. More recent work has called that into question, due to uncertainties as to what role the measured neural activity ("readiness potentials, or RPs) actually plays in executing the action. But there is no doubt that neural activity accompanies decision-making, or that decision-making ("will") is itself neural activity.

Conversely, in support of your conclusion, you would have to demonstrate that the physical process somehow has a purpose to its own existence.

Of course it (a physical action) has a purpose, namely, to satisfy some desire. The desire itself also has a purpose --- to maintain or improve the organism's welfare.

The Will, intentions and desires in-themselves are not purely physical, or are they?

Yes and no. Yes, because they are products of a physical system. No, because the vocabulary used to describe them is not reducible to the vocabulary of physics --- because the vocabulary we use use to denote and describe phenomenal entities and events pre-dates the vocabulary of physics, which postulates a realm of existents intended to explain phenomenal experience. The latter vocabulary is derived from, and reduces to, the former, not the other way around.

[Gertie]

Consul

I recommend Jennefer Hodges well-written PhD thesis "Making Sense of Biological Naturalism":

https://uhra.herts.ac.uk/bitstream/hand ... sequence=1 (PDF)

She argues that…

“By highlighting the difference between the meaning of irreducibility intended by the property dualist and Searle I show that there is sufficient difference in their use of the term so as to reject an interpretation of Biological Naturalism as a form of property dualism. Chapter 6 is where I turn to the other end of the physicalism/dualism spectrum and assess whether Searle should be seen as holding a form of identity theory. I first argue for a neutral form of identity that I call real identity, which does not include the inherent reductive privileging of standard identity. I then argue that Searle should be seen as advocating a form of real identity theory; a form of token identity theory which does not privilege the physical over the mental.”
(p. 5)

I don't understand this?

"Searle’s view of the property dualist position: Searle believes the property dualist to be claiming, when they argue for the ontological irreducibility of experiences, that
—
‘Because mental states are not reducible to neurobiological states, they are something distinct from and over and above neurobiological states. The irreducibility of the mental to the physical, of consciousness to neurobiology, is by itself sufficient proof of the distinctness of the mental, and proof that the mental is something over and above the neurobiological’

OK
—

The key difference between Searle’s notion of irreducibility and that of the property dualist is that he denies the first sentence. That is to say, just because experiences are not reducible to neurological states, does not imply that they are distinct from and over and above those neurological states. I think this is the essence of Searle’s triviality clause for irreducibility and is his way of restraining the ontological consequences of the irreducibility to avoid experiences being “over and above” neurological states, as he thinks the property dualist believes them to be."
(pp. 120-1)

It depends on what exactly is meant by “distinct from” and “over and above”. To say that x is ontologically irreducible to y is to say that x is different from/non-identical with y or y1+…+yn; so if “distinctness” and “over-and-aboveness” simply mean “difference/non-identity”, then ontological irreducibility does entail distinctness and over-and-aboveness. However, if the latter expressions are used to mean "difference plus independence (non-supervenience)", then ontological irreducibility does not entail distinctness and over-and-aboveness.

Distinct from and over over and above must surely mean brain-stuff neural processes have particular physical properties (neurons exchanging electro-chemicals) and experience has first person qualiative properties (seeing, feeling, thinking, etc).  These are radically distinct properties which as far as we know no other physical processes have and currently aren't accounted for by physics (or biology or chemistry).  Independence/non-supervenience would be more likely to imply non-reducibility imo.  Perhaps two separate substances interacting causally, or some property  of brain stuff which has 'escaped'  reducibility via some mechanism we haven't discovered.

But what would 'escaping reducibility' actually mean? Surely it means  all the same material brain-stuff, configuring in ways which simultaneously have radically different properties ('lower level neural interactions  and 'upper level' experience),  but the 'upper level' experiential properties can't be ontologically reduced to the material stuff, while being a configuration of that stuff.

Halp!

Minimal property dualism merely requires that the two basic kinds of properties in question—physical (nonpsychophysical) ones and mental (psychophysical) ones—be irreducibly different from one another. It doesn't also require that they be (existentially or causally) independent of one another. Searle's causal materialism, according to which mental events are higher-level neural events sui generis caused by lower-level nonmental-neural events, is minimally property-dualistic at least.

Again I'm struggling to make sense of this.  To make sense of  two sets of of properties as being irreducible to each other,  we'd have to see them as like two forking branches in a tree, both reducible to the trunk, but not each other (assuming a property of something is a way something is). But that's not what either property dualism or Searle is saying.  Property dualism takes the physical brain processes as the lower level substance in motion, from which the higher level experiential propties somehow instantiate, right?  Brain-substance somehow instantiates as experience, which 'escapes' reducibility to brain stuff, but is still comprised of brain stuff.  Where-as Searle says brain stuff in motion somehow causes experience to  manifest as a different kind of thing with different properties which are irreducible to brain-stuff,  but  still made of brain stuff.

It strikes me that if you think about what the abstract terms really mean, neither positions  make sense. Both say experience is ontologically comprised of physical brain stuff, but not ontologically reducible to brain stuff.


Or have I confused myself?


Pace Hodges, given his repeated affirmation of ontological antireductionism about mental/experiential events, I see no possible way of coherently interpreting Searle's texts as expressing a form of materialist identity theory aka physicalist property monism. For even if the irreducible mental events can properly be counted among the neural/physical events, they are neural/physical events sui generis that do not contain any neurological or physical properties which are (reducible to/reductively identifiable with) combinations of other, nonmental kinds of neurological or physical properties. Therefore, we still have a property dualism in Searle's biological naturalism, even if it is a materialistic/naturalistic one rather than a supermaterialistic/supernaturalistic one!


Sorry, didn't understand that?

[Gertie]

oops missed the quote marks round ''Pace Hodges... one!''

The ''Sorry, didn't understand that?'' is me lol

[Gertie]

meta!

Gertie!

I didn't see that particular argument so I may have very well missed it.

He's talked about free will elsewhere.

I think part of this problem, though, is excruciatingly simple. If he wants to 'dichotomize' brainstate's or neurological processes then we really need to parse these kinds of questions for him:

Do brain states in-themselves talk to other brain states? Do brain states in-themselves love other brain states? Do neurological processes in-themselves move other neurological processes....Do neurological processes care about other neurological processes.... Do all brain states cause other brain states to have purpose. Do all neurological processes cause other neurological processes to behave differently? Ad nauseum.

Yes it's hard to find a way to reconcile such radically different ways of being, the physical and experiential, based only on correlation and no other obvious way to get a handle on it. Hence philosophers get to have a go at it.

I can see where Searle's coming from, it might be one of the quirks of nature that certain physical processes somehow cause experience to manifest. And maybe it'll be subsumed into our understanding of the physical world at some point.

But it presents a special difficulty, because our scientific model of what the world is made of and how it works deals with physical stuff and processes which are observable and measurable - objective/public/third person/quantitive, where-as experience is subjective/private/first person/qualiative. They seem like radically different types of things, connected but with no apparent 'bridging mechanism'. I think there's a natural assumption that the physical somehow gives rise to the experiential because our current model is physicalist, and because if you poke the brain then experience changes. But the connection might lie in substance dualism, panpsychism or something more fundamental we haven't discovered yet. Who knows...

[3017Metaphysician]

The cause of me willing to move my arm takes primacy in the physical process of moving it.

That is open question. In the 1980s Benjamin Libet conducted some experiments which appeared to indicate that the neural activity initiating an action occurred BEFORE the subject made the decision to act. More recent work has called that into question, due to uncertainties as to what role the measured neural activity ("readiness potentials, or RPs) actually plays in executing the action. But there is no doubt that neural activity accompanies decision-making, or that decision-making ("will") is itself neural activity.

Conversely, in support of your conclusion, you would have to demonstrate that the physical process somehow has a purpose to its own existence.

Of course it (a physical action) has a purpose, namely, to satisfy some desire. The desire itself also has a purpose --- to maintain or improve the organism's welfare.

The Will, intentions and desires in-themselves are not purely physical, or are they?

Yes and no. Yes, because they are products of a physical system. No, because the vocabulary used to describe them is not reducible to the vocabulary of physics --- because the vocabulary we use use to denote and describe phenomenal entities and events pre-dates the vocabulary of physics, which postulates a realm of existents intended to explain phenomenal experience. The latter vocabulary is derived from, and reduces to, the former, not the other way around.

Yes, the desire the move the arm in-turn causes the arm to physically move. So the desire itself, is the causal entity. The effect is the arm moving. And desire itself, takes primacy in that action. What Searle, for some reason overlooks, is his exclusivity of the physical medium only. As such, he tries to justify his belief system by way of human instinctual behavior (nerve stimulation) such as the desire to scratch an itch. What he denies is that all desires aren't caused by 'biological' "itch scratching".

I agree with Chalmers/Hodges in that many of his arguments don't seem to be very well thought out or useful. Repeating the mantra "the brain causes consciousness" as Chalmer's remarked, is indeed only part of the problem and not the solution. If the brain causes consciousness, it only begs the more obvious questions of biological purpose and propagation of the species.

Another way to view it are the questions concerning the purpose of cognition itself. It's basically an information processing center. Most certainly it requires physical entities to operate efficiently as it was designed or intended or to affect its purpose, but not exclusively. Hence, if brain states were exclusively neurobiological, and served no other purpose, one would have to make sense of these questions:

Do brain states in-themselves talk to other brain states? Do brain states in-themselves love other brain states? Do neurological processes in-themselves move other neurological processes....Do neurological processes care about other neurological processes.... Do all brain states cause other brain states to have purpose. Do all neurological processes cause other neurological processes to behave differently? Do neurological processes desire to happiness? Ad nauseum.


And so, he's simply advancing a type of false dichotomy because there are other alternatives to his theory beyond physical exclusivity. In this case, It simply requires a sentient human being to make sense of the existence of our neurological processes. In a sense, his argument is almost self refuting.

It's kind of like saying a car exists without an engine, or maybe more specifically, a car exists just to look at, but you can't drive it because it's not designed for that purpose. Neurological processes have a purpose. And that purpose relates to sentient Beings with subjective brain states. And sentient human beings with a brain have both physical and meta-physical entities, or quantiles and qualities of conscious existence respectively. Simply put, he may be stuck on quantities rather than qualities(Qualia).

Remember, human beings have arguably the most complex 'brain states' of primates in biology. In anthropology (anthropic conditions), physical entities are transformed into complex information processing systems (the brain). The evolution of pure matter/inert matter from simplicity to complexity includes the production or emergence of conscious organisms from inanimate matter.

I think Searle has fallen and can't get up!

[GE Morton]

Yes, the desire the move the arm in-turn causes the arm to physically move. So the desire itself, is the causal entity.

But non-conscious neural activity causes the desire.

If the brain causes consciousness, it only begs the more obvious questions of biological purpose and propagation of the species.

Yes, that question --- "What evolutionary advantage does consciousness confer?" --- is an important one. It remains open.

https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10 ... 01537/full

Here is one answer:

"Consciousness, via volitional action, increases the likelihood that an organism will direct its attention, and ultimately its movements, to whatever is most important for its survival and reproduction."

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/a ... 8X15300039

My own view is that consciousness is the capacity of an organism to construct a phenomenal model of itself and its environment. It does this by integrating all the information delivered by the senses, including those reporting on one's internal states, into a complex but coherent whole, sensory qualia being the "tags" by which different sensory inputs are distinguished and represented in the model. The model is dynamic, changing constantly as inputs change; the organism can record past states of the model and the organism's action in that state (memory). With such a model in hand the organism can examine, in a leisurely way, relationships among various elements of the model, compare past states to its current state, explore "what-if" scenarios, recognize and anticipate future opportunities, and prepare itself for possible future threats. The model provides an enduring, continuous "reality" enabling it to devise behaviors and even manage its environment to an extent not possible for a creature acting entirely via stimulus-response arcs.

A neural network of sufficient size and of the right design can generate such a model (including, perhaps, an electronic one, as well as biological ones), and will generate one under evolutionary pressure.

Hence, if brain states were exclusively neurobiological, and served no other purpose, one would have to make sense of these questions:

Do brain states in-themselves talk to other brain states? Do brain states in-themselves love other brain states? Do neurological processes in-themselves move other neurological processes....Do neurological processes care about other neurological processes.... Do all brain states cause other brain states to have purpose. Do all neurological processes cause other neurological processes to behave differently? Do neurological processes desire to happiness? Ad nauseum.

Confused questions. You're using "mind talk" terms to ask questions about non-mental phenomena. "Love," "caring about," "happiness," etc. are terms denoting different affective qualia. Those qualia are "tags" representing different dispositional states in the model, which states are induced by neural activity.

[3017Metaphysician]

Yes, the desire the move the arm in-turn causes the arm to physically move. So the desire itself, is the causal entity.

But non-conscious neural activity causes the desire.

To" scratch an itch" correct. But not in everydayness or everyday cognition (of self-aware beings). Which is the crux of the argument. Desires themselves, in most instances, take primacy over physical effects. The physical is subordinate to the desire, or the effect of most desires that relate to all other things not being instinctual, neurological or biologically relevant for survival, like itch scratching... . You know, other quality of life stuff. Conversely, if you want to argue that 'brain stuff' or neurobiology in-themselves, causes people to choose dying over living, be my guest!

If the brain causes consciousness, it only begs the more obvious questions of biological purpose and propagation of the species.

Yes, that question --- "What evolutionary advantage does consciousness confer?" --- is an important one. It remains open.

I'll be happy to check-out the article. But for now, you will need to demonstrate that things like math and music have biological survival advantages.

https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10 ... 01537/full

Here is one answer:

"Consciousness, via volitional action, increases the likelihood that an organism will direct its attention, and ultimately its movements, to whatever is most important for its survival and reproduction."

No, not really. Volition can cause not only euthanasia, but also 'mental' phenomenon like that of Hitler. In those cases, volition caused and causes death and destruction. And one can always choose the end their life, particular if it's perceived that they have no quality (i.e., Qualia) of same. Remember, Searle has fallen for the trappings of dichotomized science. Maslow teaches us not to be tempted by it.

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/a ... 8X15300039

My own view is that consciousness is the capacity of an organism to construct a phenomenal model of itself and its environment. It does this by integrating all the information delivered by the senses, including those reporting on one's internal states, into a complex but coherent whole, sensory qualia being the "tags" by which different sensory inputs are distinguished and represented in the model. The model is dynamic, changing constantly as inputs change; the organism can record past states of the model and the organism's action in that state (memory). With such a model in hand the organism can examine, in a leisurely way, relationships among various elements of the model, compare past states to its current state, explore "what-if" scenarios, recognize and anticipate future opportunities, and prepare itself for possible future threats. The model provides an enduring, continuous "reality" enabling it to devise behaviors and even manage its environment to an extent not possible for a creature acting entirely via stimulus-response arcs.

A neural network of sufficient size and of the right design can generate such a model (including, perhaps, an electronic one, as well as biological ones), and will generate one under evolutionary pressure.

Hence, if brain states were exclusively neurobiological, and served no other purpose, one would have to make sense of these questions:

Do brain states in-themselves talk to other brain states? Do brain states in-themselves love other brain states? Do neurological processes in-themselves move other neurological processes....Do neurological processes care about other neurological processes.... Do all brain states cause other brain states to have purpose. Do all neurological processes cause other neurological processes to behave differently? Do neurological processes desire to happiness? Ad nauseum.

Confused questions. You're using "mind talk" terms to ask questions about non-mental phenomena. "Love," "caring about," "happiness," etc. are terms denoting different affective qualia. Those qualia are "tags" representing different dispositional states in the model, which states are induced by neural activity.

Of course they are. Because Searle dichotomized his theory, it begs those absurd kinds of questions of like and kind. But since that's his logical approach, and if one subscribes to it, you must consider them in order to make the case that dichotomizing (cognitive reality) the nature of conscious existence is the best approach to understanding same.

[Consul]

I recommend Jennefer Hodges well-written PhD thesis "Making Sense of Biological Naturalism":

https://uhra.herts.ac.uk/bitstream/hand ... sequence=1 (PDF)

She argues that…

“By highlighting the difference between the meaning of irreducibility intended by the property dualist and Searle I show that there is sufficient difference in their use of the term so as to reject an interpretation of Biological Naturalism as a form of property dualism. Chapter 6 is where I turn to the other end of the physicalism/dualism spectrum and assess whether Searle should be seen as holding a form of identity theory. I first argue for a neutral form of identity that I call real identity, which does not include the inherent reductive privileging of standard identity. I then argue that Searle should be seen as advocating a form of real identity theory; a form of token identity theory which does not privilege the physical over the mental.”
(p. 5)

I don't understand this?

More context (quoted from Hodges):

QUOTE>
"Real identity, I argue, is identity without any additional reduction of mental to physical." (p. 144)

Hodges introduces "a new terminology of real-identity, as opposed to privileging-identity, depending on whether a reductive privileging is incorporated within the identity claim." (p. 152)

"The main point I am trying to make is that identity itself does not imply reductive privileging of one description over another. In the case of philosophy of mind, this means that identity claims between experiences and brain states do not imply that brain states are more essential, fundamental or basic than experiences. Identity claims simply mean that experiential descriptions and neurobiological descriptions co-refer to the same conscious phenomenon." (pp. 152-3)

"In order to keep these ideas clear I will now use the following terminology:

Real-identity: The neutral metaphysical relation where two terms are found to co-refer to the same referent.
Privileging-identity: The compound claim found in traditional mind-brain identity theory, which amounts to a claim of real-identity plus an additional claim of the reductive privileging of the physical over the mental." (p. 154)

"Summary of real identity theory: The real identity theory I am proposing is a form of token identity theory regarding the mind-body problem where for any particular brain state which occurs in the brain of an experiencing subject, there are two ways of picking out that token brain state – an experiential way and a neuronal way. That is to say, any particular token brain state which occurs when a subject is having an experience will fall under two different types – both the “experience” type and the “neuronal activity” type. As identity is a metaphysical relation between a thing and itself, the identity part of real identity theory is referring to the fact that where it was thought there was a neuronal state and a separate experience, in fact there is just a particular token brain state occurring in the brain of a subject, and that brain state is both an experience and a particular configuration of neuronal activity. So, for any subject undergoing an experience, there is one token brain state going on in their brain which can be brought under two types; “experience” and “neuronal activity”. This view is token identity theory in as much as every time an experience is occurring for a subject, a particular state of their brain is coming under the type “experience” and, at the very same time, that very same brain state will also come under the type “configuration of neuronal activity”." (p. 155)

"Terminological precautions to avoid sliding into privileging-identity or property dualism: It is important to phrase my position carefully at this point, for it is very easy to either slide back into the locution of traditional privileging-identity, or in relation to experiences and brain states, to seem as if you are sliding towards property dualism. To avoid the latter, I must be clear that the property of having a particular experience, of an itchy foot say, just is the property of having certain configurations of neuronal activity going on in my brain. If I am now clear about this, the two different descriptions might seem disparate enough to warrant an interpretation of a dualism of properties. The problem with using the “just is” terminology is that it almost suggests an inherent reduction or privileging of physical over mental. I must be clear here that to avoid any confusion about a “just is” claim seeming reductive, when I claim that experiences “just are” certain patterns of neuronal activity going on in a brain, what I mean is that there is a single phenomenon going on in a subject’s brain, and that phenomenon can be picked out either in terms of neurological activity or in terms of being an experience – the two descriptions concerned co-refer. This avoids any sense of reduction that might be caught up with the “is” or particularly the “just is” expression, which might seem all too close to the “nothing but” reductive claim of traditional mind-brain privileging-identity theorists." (p. 156)

"How real identity theory compares to privileging mind-brain identity theory: A particular token brain process in a subject’s brain, one which is going on when they are undergoing an experience, falls both under the type “being an experience” and the type “being a pattern of neuronal activity”." (p. 158)
<QUOTE

The problem is that her "real identity theory" qua token identity theory (i.e. identity theory with identical tokens of occurrences: events/states/processes) doesn't really get rid of property dualism! For if the experiential property and the structural neural property contained in (not possessed by!) one and the same brain occurrence describable both phenomenologically/psychologically from the first-person point of view and neurophysiologically from the third-person point of view are mutually irreducible to and thus different from one another, we still have a property dualism within the same brain occurrence.

Moreover, given that occurrences (events/states/processes) are individuated in terms of their respective substrates and the respective properties they contain, an allegedly identical occurrence having an identical substrate but containing two different properties turns out to actually be two different occurrences with two different properties. As McGinn explains…

QUOTE>
"It may be thought that dualistic troubles with type identity are not so significant for materialism, because we can always fall back on token identity. Token identity does not entail type identity (though the converse holds), so it need not be disturbed by the duality of essences we noted above. Token identity claims merely that for any token mental event m there is an event e such that m is identical to e and e also has a physical property. For instance, a token of pain, occurring at a particular time, is identical to an event e that also has the property of being a C-fiber firing. In other words, there are events that have both mental and physical properties, where these properties are not themselves identical. A particular instance of pain is both an instance of pain and an instance of C-fiber firing. Every token mental event is thus identical to a token physical event, that is, falls under a physical description. Token identity theories are double-aspect theories in that they hold that there are events that have both a mental and a physical aspect—they have a dual nature. There are no mental events that fail to exhibit such a dual nature. Thus every mental event is a physical event of some kind, even though the mental aspects are not identical to physical aspects."
(p. 36)

"It looks as if the token identity theorist has just jammed two different events together by stipulation, not by dint of natural identity.
…
According to one view of the individuation of events, an event is just the occurrence of a property by an object at a time, so that there are as many events as there are properties manifested at a given place and time. If mental and physical types are not identical, then they cannot occur in the same event, since events are individuated by the property in question; no one event can have both properties.
…
Events can have only one constitutive nature.
…
Once we multiply natures we multiply events—that is just what events are, ontologically speaking. That is how they are individuated. We can add various descriptions, such as time, place, and consequences, but we cannot add completely new second natures. But that is exactly what the token identity theorist is trying to do in claiming that one event can be both mental and physical: he is therefore under suspicion of concocting one event out of two events. No one would think that a mental event could be both a sensation and a thought, or that a physical event could be both a C-fiber firing and a D-fiber firing: so why suppose that a single event can be both a pain and a C-fiber firing, where these properties are distinct and independent? If the properties are different, then the token events in which they occur must be different, on pain of violating the 'single-nature condition' on event individuation.
…
And that is what is problematic: for how can a single event be the locus of totally distinct intrinsic natures? If two, then why not three; and if three, why not a hundred? The token dualist will say that there are simply two contemporaneous events here, tied to two distinct properties, namely being a pain and being a C-fiber firing; and that the token identity theorist has bunched them into one by arbitrary stipulation.
…
It thus appears that token identity presupposes type identity, because only that will reduce the event's nature to a single property. The problem arises when the two properties are distinct and independent, for then we are crediting a single event with two independent natures—as if one event could be both an assassination and a book[39]signing. Token identity with type identity is perfectly coherent, but token identity without type identity looks like an ontological monster—a creature of metaphysical invention not natural unity. This is presumably why the notion of token mind-brain identity seems so forced and artificial (without the backing of type identity): we are just declaring an identity, not discovering one.
…
But what if we suppose that the mental and physical aspects of a given event are not independent but dependent (though nonidentical)? What if we take the mental aspect to supervene on the physical aspect? Would that solve the double-nature problem?
…
[C]an we say that an event has both a mental and a physical nature, with the former supervening on the latter, without compromising its status as a single event? The trouble with this suggestion is that the claim is subject to the same dilemma as before: if we have supervenience underwritten by reduction (i.e., a type identity theory), then we don't have a case of a single event with a dual nature; but if we reject such a reduction, then we still have an unacceptable duality at the heart of the alleged unitary event.
…
For the supervening properties are still distinct properties that confer a nature on the event to which they contribute; and so there is no room for a further nature in that event. Intuitively, the mental event of pain cannot also have a second nature, despite supervenience: being the event it is does not allow it to host an additional physical nature. It would be different if the mental property were identical to the physical property on which it supervenes, since then there would be a single nature satisfying two descriptions. But if the mental property is really distinct from any physical property, then introducing a physical property into the event violates the single-nature condition. It is therefore better to say that we have two events here, one mental and one physical, even though the properties of the former supervene on the properties of the latter.

When first confronted by token identity theory one's first instinct is to ask, 'But is it mental or physical?' We are then pityingly informed that the theory is that a single event e has both a mental and a physical aspect—is both a pain and a C-fiber firing—and that we should cease our doubting. The wonderful event e enjoys a double nature (a double life), each side of e being irreducible to the other. It magically straddles the mental-physical divide. We are impressed and captivated by this protean being, but it is hard to suppress our unease, because we want to be told which of its sides constitutes its basic nature—with the other side merely derivative. It is then sternly insisted that both sides are equally basic, equally real, and equally irreducible. But we are left wondering how we can be dealing with a single unified event. Analogies with other kinds of token identity statement don't assuage our concerns, because they don't involve the idea of dual intrinsic natures, just the idea of different descriptions attaching to a single intrinsic nature—what we think of as the constitutive nature of the event. Thus the token identity theorist does not succeed in persuading us that what he proposes is really metaphysically possible. It still seems as if he is conjuring identity from nowhere, in the face of clear indications of nonidentity."
(pp. 37-40)

(McGinn, Colin. "Mind-Brain Identity Theories." In Philosophical Provocations: 55 Short Essays, 33-40. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2017.)
<QUOTE

It depends on what exactly is meant by “distinct from” and “over and above”. To say that x is ontologically irreducible to y is to say that x is different from/non-identical with y or y1+…+yn; so if “distinctness” and “over-and-aboveness” simply mean “difference/non-identity”, then ontological irreducibility does entail distinctness and over-and-aboveness. However, if the latter expressions are used to mean "difference plus independence (non-supervenience)", then ontological irreducibility does not entail distinctness and over-and-aboveness.

Distinct from and over over and above must surely mean brain-stuff neural processes have particular physical properties (neurons exchanging electro-chemicals) and experience has first person qualiative properties (seeing, feeling, thinking, etc).  These are radically distinct properties which as far as we know no other physical processes have and currently aren't accounted for by physics (or biology or chemistry).  Independence/non-supervenience would be more likely to imply non-reducibility imo.  Perhaps two separate substances interacting causally, or some property  of brain stuff which has 'escaped'  reducibility via some mechanism we haven't discovered.

But what would 'escaping reducibility' actually mean? Surely it means  all the same material brain-stuff, configuring in ways which simultaneously have radically different properties ('lower level neural interactions  and 'upper level' experience),  but the 'upper level' experiential properties can't be ontologically reduced to the material stuff, while being a configuration of that stuff.

Halp!

Searle's biological naturalism is different from substance dualism, but it is no different from property-dualistic causal emergentism insofar as according to it the instantiation of higher-level mental/experiential properties is caused by (causally emergent from) the instantiation of lower-level configurational or structural neural properties, in which case there are two different or distinct (kinds of) properties connected as cause and effect, such that ontological reductionism about mental/experiential properties is false, since X is a cause of Y/Y is an effect of X entails X ≠ Y.

Again I'm struggling to make sense of this.  To make sense of  two sets of of properties as being irreducible to each other,  we'd have to see them as like two forking branches in a tree, both reducible to the trunk, but not each other (assuming a property of something is a way something is). But that's not what either property dualism or Searle is saying.  Property dualism takes the physical brain processes as the lower level substance in motion, from which the higher level experiential propties somehow instantiate, right?  Brain-substance somehow instantiates as experience, which 'escapes' reducibility to brain stuff, but is still comprised of brain stuff.  Where-as Searle says brain stuff in motion somehow causes experience to  manifest as a different kind of thing with different properties which are irreducible to brain-stuff,  but  still made of brain stuff.

It strikes me that if you think about what the abstract terms really mean, neither positions  make sense. Both say experience is ontologically comprised of physical brain stuff, but not ontologically reducible to brain stuff.

Or have I confused myself?

Maybe. It depends on what you mean by "brain stuff". Searle is a materialist substance monist, i.e. both mental properties and the neural properties from which they emerge causally are instantiated by and in the same (kind of) material substance, viz. the brain. But if, as Searle maintains, the relation between higher-level mental properties and lower-level neural properties is causation rather than composition or constitution, then the former are ontologically different from and hence irreducible to (configurations/combinations of) the latter.

[Consul]

More context (quoted from Hodges):

QUOTE>
"The main point I am trying to make is that identity itself does not imply reductive privileging of one description over another. In the case of philosophy of mind, this means that identity claims between experiences and brain states do not imply that brain states are more essential, fundamental or basic than experiences. Identity claims simply mean that experiential descriptions and neurobiological descriptions co-refer to the same conscious phenomenon." (pp. 152-3)
…
<QUOTE

She is right insofar as there is nothing intrinsically reductive about identity as such, since it is a symmetric relation—as opposed to reduction: A = B <—> B = A. Therefore, A = B/B = A doesn't entail that, ontologically, A/B is nothing but/more than/over and above B/A; so identity statements as such aren't reductionistic ones.

It follows that the mind-brain identity theory isn't per se materialistic, because if all mental entities are (identical with) physical entities, then some physical entities are (identical with) mental entities, such that some physical entities may be ontologically reducible to mental entities, in which case we would have reductive mentalism instead of reductive materialism—that is, a brain-mind identity theory instead of a mind-brain identity theory.

Hodges is right that "identity claims simply mean that experiential descriptions and neurobiological descriptions co-refer to the same conscious phenomenon," but the crucial ontological questions are:
What is that conscious phenomenon in itself (apart from its dual describability)? What is its fundamental nature? – Is it purely mental in itself (mentalist monism/reductive mentalism)? Is it purely physical in itself (materialist monism/reductive materialism)? Is it both mental and physical in itself ("egalitarian dualism")? Is it neither mental nor physical in itself (neutral monism/reductive neutralism)?

[Consul]

I think Searle's position is that causality works both ways. Brain processes (somehow) cause conscious experience and conscious experience can (somehow) will behaviour /make choices, (in practice act causally on motor neurons). He believes there's a two-way causal relationship between two different ontologically irreducible iterations of the same brain stuff. I think.

There's a distinction between horizontal ("sideways") or intra-level causation between items on the same level of being, and vertical (upward/bottom-up or downward/top-down) or inter-level causation between items on different (higher and lower) levels of being.

When Searle says that mental events are caused by physical events in the brain, the kind of causation involved is vertical causation, physical-to-mental (neural-to-experiential) upward causation, to be precise. Whether there is also mental-to-physical (experiential-to-neural) downward causation (as postulated by emergentists) is a highly contentious issue.

[GE Morton]

Interested to see your take. First on how ontological irreducibility can reconcile with substance monism, then it might be clearer how causality could fit in.

As I said above, the problem is not with reducibility (that is fairly easily explained), but with ontology, especially the ontology that postulates a distinction between "physical stuff" and "mental stuff) (mind-body dualism), and the assumption those two categories denote different "realms of reality."

But they don't; they only denote different vocabularies for talking about "reality." But that, of course, obliges me to define "reality." I take there to be 3 categories of "reality" which can be well-defined and have some communicative utility:

1. Phenomenal reality, i.e., that which we directly and immediately experience, including sensory percepts and their qualia, moods, emotional states, thoughts, ideas, memories, and all the other contents of the "mental realm." That is the only "reality" of which we can speak with complete certainty; if I have a headache I cannot doubt that I have it; if I see a tree, while I might be uncertain of what causes that percept, I can't deny that I'm having the percept. Cartesian doubt of the existence of conscious phenomena is not possible.

2. External reality, Kant's noumena, a realm of existence which we postulate to exist independently of us and persists even in the absence of any phenomenal experiences by anyone, the purpose of which is to supply some explanation, some cause, for the phenomena of experience (realm #1 above) --- because, per Kant, we are constitutionally compelled to seek, and insist upon, causes for effects, and can find no causes for our own existence and experiences within those experiences.

3. Conceptual reality. That embraces the entire realm of entities, processes, events we conjure up in imagination (subconsciously) and can exchange information about. Some of those entities are constructed involuntarily; they are artifacts produced automatically by neural networks of sufficient size and of the right design; they make up the "phenomenal self-model" and the "phenomenal world model" described by Metzinger. Thus a "tree" is any of many perceptible complexes found in the "world model" which satisfies certain defining criteria. But there are also many constructs consciously created, some tangible (with properties perceptible in the world model), and some intangible, such as laws, moralities, mathematics, theories, and other "abstract" entities.

We may fairly call entities or phenomena in any of those categories "real," as long as we're not confused about to which category they belong.

The "physical" reality is the misguided half of the "mental/physical" dichotomy. Physical reality is simply one of the constructs, a sub-category of, conceptual reality --- it denotes those elements and processes found in the world model which can be described by the laws of physics, another conceptual construct devised to enable us to explain and thus predict the behaviors of those elements. Thus they are not truly "external" to us, or to consciousness. They are explanatory overlays on the world model, not "representations" of the noumena --- but they can "stand in" for the noumena for many practical purposes.

Asking for an explanation of consciousness in "physical terms" is a "category mistake." It arises from the assumption that "physical reality" is the noumena, the hypothetical "ultimate" cause of phenomena. But it is only a conceptual construct denoting a certain subcategory of those phenomena. It can't explain anything outside that domain. Not only can consiousness not be described in physical terms, neither can laws, morality, mathematics, or even games and fantasies.

The trouble with ontology is that its theorists imagine their theories speak of what "exists," and that they can know what "really exists." I.e., they imagine they are describing the noumena. But all a useful, coherent ontology can really do is propose a coherent framework for talking about the only thing(s) we know exist, namely, phenomena (category #1). It can propose schemes for categorizing existents, most of which will be conceptual constructs (category #3), and devising terminology for communicating about entitites in each category, many of which will apply only to that category or sub-category.

None of this, of course, solves the "hard problem." There are two transcendental arguments suggesting that problem is unsolvable, and indeed misconceived. First, the terms we use to describe conscious phenomena --- terms for colors, scents, sounds, pains, moods, etc., are primitive, which means they can't be defined using more familiar or more elementary terms. They can only be taught ostensively. (No one can inform Mary as to what she will experience when she leaves the black-and-white room). Those terms are unanalyzable, and cannot be "reduced" to anything simpler. On the contrary, all other scientific and other descriptive terms reduce to them --- that is the implication of empiricism.

Secondly, a conscious system cannot completely model itself, and therefore cannot fully explain itself; it can't model that part of the system doing the modeling. That would require a system larger than the system to be modeled.

Searle says brain processes cause experience, which isn't how we generally think of the internal properties of a system, we don't say H2O molecules cause liquidity or solidity.

Sure we do. The molecules' state of motion determines whether they form a liquid or solid. If they move faster the solid becomes a liquid. But there is, of course, a further cause, a source of heat, which caused the molecules to move faster.

We think of causation in terms of one thing acting on another thing.

We still have that --- molecules acting upon each other.

But Searle is claiming material brain substance processes cause a different type/iteration of brain substance (experience), which isn't reducible to the first (material) brain substance. As I understand it...

Searle would not describe conscious experience as a "substance." What is not reducible are the terms we use for denoting those experiences, because those terms are primitive. But we have ample grounds for claiming that neural processes cause experience (which, in my view, is ample grounds for considering consciousness a "physical process").

[GE Morton]

To "scratch an itch" correct. But not in everydayness or everyday cognition (of self-aware beings). Which is the crux of the argument. Desires themselves, in most instances, take primacy over physical effects.

Felt desires are just the affective qualia --- "tags" --- representing certain neural processes in the phenomenal self-model I described above. They don't "take primacy" over those processes; they represent those processes. There are no desires without an underlying neural process.

The physical is subordinate to the desire . . .

Again, a felt desire is a phenomenal token representing a neural process.

Conversely, if you want to argue that 'brain stuff' or neurobiology in-themselves, causes people to choose dying over living, be my guest!

All animals, insofar as they have nervous systems which enable them to perceive and recognize threats, act to avoid or escape those threats. Houseflies fly away if they sense a flyswatter whooshing toward them. In creatures with nervous systems complex enough to allow creation of a self-model that innate neural programming is represented phenomenally as a "desire to live," or "the will to live."

But for now, you will need to demonstrate that things like math and music have biological survival advantages.

No, I don't, although the evolutionary advantages of mathematics should be obvious --- all sciences depend upon it, and those sciences have increased our lifespans, food supply, utilization of natural resources, expanded our means of communicating, etc. But it isn't necessary to explain in detail what evolutionary advantage a particular idiosyncratic desire or taste may confer. Evolution works by trial and error, and many of its experiments prove to be useless, or even detrimental. For some people different kinds of sounds may be relaxing or stimulating, enabling them to function more effectively in the world. For others those sounds may be annoying and unwelcome.

Here is one answer:

"Consciousness, via volitional action, increases the likelihood that an organism will direct its attention, and ultimately its movements, to whatever is most important for its survival and reproduction."

No, not really. Volition can cause not only euthanasia, but also 'mental' phenomenon like that of Hitler. In those cases, volition caused and causes death and destruction. And one can always choose the end their life, particular if it's perceived that they have no quality (i.e., Qualia) of same. Remember, Searle has fallen for the trappings of dichotomized science. Maslow teaches us not to be tempted by it.

It doesn't matter that volition can have detrimental effects. What matters is whether the positive effects outweigh the negative, and if they do, that evolutionary innovation will persist. I don't, however, think volitional action is a very complete answer to the survival advantage question.

Confused questions. You're using "mind talk" terms to ask questions about non-mental phenomena. "Love," "caring about," "happiness," etc. are terms denoting different affective qualia. Those qualia are "tags" representing different dispositional states in the model, which states are induced by neural activity.

Of course they are. Because Searle dichotomized his theory, it begs those absurd kinds of questions of like and kind. But since that's his logical approach, and if one subscribes to it, you must consider them in order to make the case that dichotomizing (cognitive reality) the nature of conscious existence is the best approach to understanding same.[/b]

Nearly everyone discussing these issues "dichotomizes" "reality" into "mind stuff" and "brain stuff" (mind/body dualism). Searle gives some reasons for thinking that analysis of the problem is misguided, and suggests a means of "taming" it.