Yes. But a cell is "on" if it receptive to signals, just as a radio may be "on" even if the station to which it is tuned is only sending "dead air."Belindi wrote: ↑September 3rd, 2022, 5:11 amHealthy neurons can potentially communicate 'information' . When healthy neurons communicate 'information' with other neurons these events always correlate with electrochemical synaptic connection.GE Morton wrote: ↑September 2nd, 2022, 8:19 pmA better analogy is with a thermostat, or a radio transmitter. They are "on" as long as there is power to them. But they don't send a signal until they receive one. When "off," they cannot detect or respond to signals.
Hardly. They are constantly carrying on all the metabolic processes that keep them alive, just as do all other cells.A neuron is not working , it's inert, until the synapses are breached by the electrochemical.
It's true that merely staying alive uses energy. One is told that brains use a lot of energy. However merely staying alive does not communicate 'information'.
Assigning number values to none existent things
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Re: Assigning number values to none existent things
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Re: Assigning number values to none existent things
You seem oblivious to the science on this subject. Perhaps these will help you:GE Morton wrote: ↑September 2nd, 2022, 3:23 pmEr, no. Just you. "My" theory is not mine, but that of virtually everyone working in this field.3017Metaphysician wrote: ↑September 2nd, 2022, 1:23 pm
WOW. You said neuron's cause feeling, and I'm guessing action too. If you don't mind me saying, your theory is very very strange GE. Most of us are scratching our heads, but that's ok.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VNNsN9IJkws
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0jX8hSWQMkA
There is much more out there, of course.
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Re: Assigning number values to none existent things
Like fictional existence, imaginary existence is not a form of existence but plain non-existence; and…Pattern-chaser wrote: ↑September 3rd, 2022, 9:08 amHogwarts has imaginary existence; it's part of a story, and the story does exist, even though what it describes has no spacetime-universe 'existence'. That is, I think, just a little bit different from "non-existent". As for statements concerning imaginary things being 'true', I don't think that's a meaningful or useful idea. 'Truth' and fiction are not good bedfellows, IME.
"A thing cannot half-exist."
(Smart, J. J. C. Our Place in the Universe: A Metaphysical Discussion. Oxford: Blackwell, 1989. p. 58)
So there is no ontological twilight zone between existence and non-existence.
As for "truth in fiction"/"fictional truth", this is a hotly discussed issue: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fiction/#TrutFict
By the way, if statements about ficta such as "Chewbacca is a Wookiee" are regarded as false due to the non-existence of Chewbacca and Wookiees, then one can interpret the copula "is" as "is represented (described/depicted) as being", and thereby easily get an indubitably true statement, because being represented to be doesn't mean being: "Chewbacca is represented (in the Star Wars saga) as a Wookiee."
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Re: Assigning number values to none existent things
I once asked a professional physicist about this and he said( my paraphrase) that mathematics is used by physicists in a supportive role to actual things and events.Pattern-chaser wrote: ↑August 26th, 2022, 11:22 amTo assign a number value, we must first have something to assign it to. If the thing we try to assign it to if non-existent, the assignment will fail. Non-existent things don't exist, and so their attributes cannot exist as they can't have any. And so on.Whitedragon wrote: ↑August 26th, 2022, 6:59 am If we take a notion of something that doesn't exist, example, no matter or energy might have existed in zero-t conditions, can we say that the E =mc^2 is zero for E and m, or are we prohibited from asigning a number value to something that doesn't exist, and what would this mean for c?
We say that t is zero in zero t. By this argument, does it mean time exists, but just has a different property? If time does not exist, how can we assign a value to it, since the enigma of zero hasn't quite been solved.
As for E = mc^2, if m is zero, E is zero, and this says nothing at all about c, one way or the other. If time is stopped (as opposed to 'stuck' at zero), then there can be no velocity, and c is meaningless.
I'm not quite sure what you mean by "zero-t".
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Re: Assigning number values to none existent things
What existents that are not objects of thought or imagination are there, other than "physical" existents? What you're claiming there certainly seems to be a defintion of "exists" --- you're proposing to define that term in such a way that only "external world," "physical" things can properly be denoted or described with it.Consul wrote: ↑September 2nd, 2022, 6:05 pmNo, I am not using "existence" synonymously with "physical existence"! I am not definitionally restricting the scope of existence to any particular sort of existents (entities). (If my physicalist worldview is true, it isn't true by definition.) Anything that is not only an object of thought or imagination exists.GE Morton wrote: ↑September 2nd, 2022, 12:21 pm Begs the question. If it exists "in thought," it exists in some sense. You're just (arbitrarily and unnecessarily) restricting "exists" there to physical ("external world") existents. That restriction renders much of common (and highly useful) speech meaningless; i.e., you're forced to deny that love, anger, ideas, thoughts --- all conscious phenomena --- exist.
As I said above, that entails that objects of thought or imagination do not exist, doesn't it? So when we speak of ideas, dreams, love, memories, etc., are we uttering meaningless gibberish?
You can't even make that claim without refuting it by the very words you use --- when you say, "they are, "are/is" being a synonym for "exists." Can a dream or idea be a "way of non-being" if it doesn't exist? Doesn't the dream have to exist to be a "way of non-being"?Therefore, there are no fictional entities, because they are mere (nothing more than) objects of thought or imagination, with being nothing more than an object of thought or imagination not being a way of being but of nonbeing.
I agree. That is a tautology. So can nothing but a tiger exist as a tiger ("A is A"). But something that "exists as a thought" therefore exists, does it not? Didn't you just say so, by making that claim?What "exists in thought" is nothing more than thought itself, because "to exist in thought" can only mean "to exist as a thought"; and nothing but a thought can exist as a thought.
"Nonexistent objects . . . exist as nothing?" Isn't that the same as saying, "Nonexistent objects don't exist," which is a truism? Doesn't "objects of thought don't exist as nonphysical entities," nor, of course, as physical entities, imply that objects of thought don't exist, that there are no objects of thought?Once again: WRONG!
Nonexistent objects of thought exist as nothing, not even as nonphysical entities, since they don't exist at all.
We could go on with this, but I think I've shown that you can't even advance your thesis without refuting it. That is because what "exists" is an artifact of language, a term denoting something, anything, we wish to talk about and can exchange useful information about. When we say such things as, "Unicorns don't exist," we only mean unicorns are not physical animals in the "external world" we can ride, photograph, are studied by zoologists, etc. But they certainly exist as imaginary animals. If they didn't, we wouldn't be having this conversation!
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Re: Assigning number values to none existent things
I am a physicalist, and physicalists certainly do claim that all existents are physical (or reducible to physical ones); but this metaphysical claim is different from and doesn't entail the semantic claim that "existence" is synonymous with "physical existence". If it were, then physicalism would be a necessary analytic truth per definitionem, which it surely isn't.GE Morton wrote: ↑September 4th, 2022, 1:19 pmWhat existents that are not objects of thought or imagination are there, other than "physical" existents? What you're claiming there certainly seems to be a defintion of "exists" --- you're proposing to define that term in such a way that only "external world," "physical" things can properly be denoted or described with it.Consul wrote: ↑September 2nd, 2022, 6:05 pmNo, I am not using "existence" synonymously with "physical existence"! I am not definitionally restricting the scope of existence to any particular sort of existents (entities). (If my physicalist worldview is true, it isn't true by definition.) Anything that is not only an object of thought or imagination exists.
No, what I wrote doesn't entail that! An object of thought/imagination can but needn't exist. Mere objects of thought/imagination do not exist. That is, if something is nothing but/more than/over and above an object of thought/imagination, it doesn't exist. And, again, merely being an object of thought/imagination isn't a kind or way of being.
Medieval philosophers distinguish between an ens realis (real entity) and an ens rationis (literally, entity of reason), the latter of which is "another term for an intentional object or object of thought, as opposed to self-subsistent or independent objects" (Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy). A mere ens rationis is said by them to have esse intentionale (intentional being) or esse intra mentem (intramental being) rather than esse reale (real being) or esse extra mentem (extramental being).
My point is that it is a basic ontological mistake to regard mere entia rationis or objects of thoughts as a sort of entities or existents, and to ascribe a form of being or existence to them, viz. intentional or intramental being or existence. The only thing that has real intramental being in the case of a mere, i.e. fictional or imaginary, object of thought is the thought of it.
I didn't mean to speak of "a way of non-being", so I should have omitted the second "of" in "…not being a way of being but of nonbeing", because there are different ways of being but no different ways of nonbeing: "…not being a way of being but nonbeing" – Sorry, my fault!GE Morton wrote: ↑September 4th, 2022, 1:19 pmYou can't even make that claim without refuting it by the very words you use --- when you say, "they are, "are/is" being a synonym for "exists." Can a dream or idea be a "way of non-being" if it doesn't exist? Doesn't the dream have to exist to be a "way of non-being"?
Mental ideas (concepts) or images of nonexistent things such as those entertained in dreams are certainly existent things, but an idea (concept) or image of a thing is not the thing but something different from it. Ideas or images of entities or nonentities must exist or occur in order for entities or nonentities to be(come) objects of thought, but existent ideas or images of things don't require existent things whose ideas or images they are.
QUOTE:
"[W]e have power to conceive things which neither do nor ever did exist. We have power to conceive attributes without regard to their existence. The conception of such an attribute is a real and individual act of the mind; but the attribute conceived is common to many individuals that do or may exist. We are too apt to confound an object of conception with the conception of that object."
(Reid, Thomas. Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man. 1785. In The Works of Thomas Reid, 3rd ed., edited by William Hamilton, 213-508. Edinburgh: Maclachlan & Stewart, 1852. pp. 403-4)
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Once again, nonexistent objects of thought require existent thoughts, but existent thoughts don't require existent objects.
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"[T]he powers of sensation, of perception, of memory, and of consciousness, are all employed solely about objects that do exist, or have existed. But conception is often employed about objects that neither do, nor did, nor will exist. This is the very nature of this faculty, that its object, though distinctly conceived, may have no existence. Such an object we call a creature of imagination; but this creature never was created.
That we may not impose upon ourselves in this matter, we must distinguish between that act or operation of the mind, which we call conceiving an object, and the object which we conceive. When we conceive anything, there is a real act or operation of the mind. Of this we are conscious, and can have no doubt of its existence. But every such act must have an object; for he that conceives must conceive something. Suppose he conceives a centaur, he may have a distinct conception of this object, though no centaur ever existed."
(Reid, Thomas. Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man. 1785. In The Works of Thomas Reid, 3rd ed., edited by William Hamilton, 213-508. Edinburgh: Maclachlan & Stewart, 1852. p. 368)
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To exist as nothing is not to exist. Bare existence without essence is impossible! Dasein requires Sosein (and vice versa)!GE Morton wrote: ↑September 4th, 2022, 1:19 pm"Nonexistent objects . . . exist as nothing?" Isn't that the same as saying, "Nonexistent objects don't exist," which is a truism? Doesn't "objects of thought don't exist as nonphysical entities," nor, of course, as physical entities, imply that objects of thought don't exist, that there are no objects of thought?
We could go on with this, but I think I've shown that you can't even advance your thesis without refuting it. That is because what "exists" is an artifact of language, a term denoting something, anything, we wish to talk about and can exchange useful information about. When we say such things as, "Unicorns don't exist," we only mean unicorns are not physical animals in the "external world" we can ride, photograph, are studied by zoologists, etc. But they certainly exist as imaginary animals. If they didn't, we wouldn't be having this conversation!
If the expression "there is/are" is regarded as "existentially loaded" and thus as being equivalent to the existential quantifier, such that using it entails an ontological commitment to what is said to be there, then the sentence "There are things (objects of thought) which don't exist" is doubtless self-contradictory. But it is doubtful that the expression "there is/are" cannot be consistently regarded as "existentially unloaded" and thus as being ontologically neutral and non-committing, such that "There are nonexistent objects (of thought)" is not synonymous with the obvious contradiction "There exist objects (of thought) which don't exist" or "Objects (of thought) exist which don't exist".
If "there is/are" is used as an existential quantifier with an intended ontological commitment, then, of course, there are no nonexistent objects (of thought), and there cannot possibly be any.
But I can sidestep the question as to whether or not "there is/are" is always ontologically committing or binding simply by saying that some objects (of thought) do not exist rather than that there are some objects (of thought) which do not exist. For I see no logico-semantic problem with using "some" as an existentially neutral quantifier called "the particular quantifier" rather than as an existentially non-neutral quantifier called "the existential quantifier". So "Some Xs are Ys" needn't be read as "There are some Xs which are Ys". (And there are philosophers who argue that even the latter needn't be read as "There exist some Xs/Some Xs exist which are Ys".)
When I say unicorns don't exist, I do not at all mean to say that unicorns exist as imaginary animals rather than as real ones—for the same good old reason that imaginary existence is not a form of existence. To exist imaginarily is not to exist!
The meaningfulness of our existing thought and talk about things doesn't depend on their existence. So we can happily be having this conservation, which doesn't consist in gibberish, does it?
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Re: Assigning number values to none existent things
…"conversation", not "conservation"!
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Re: Assigning number values to none existent things
By the way, the German counterpart of the English expression "there is/are" is "es gibt", which literally means "it gives", with "es"/"it" being a grammatical dummy subject (like in "It is raining"). So, from the linguistic perspective, in German a semantic dissociation of "es gibt" from Sein/Dasein (being/being-there) and Existenz (existence) is intuitively more plausible than the semantic dissociation of "there is/are" from being and existence in English, which contains grammatical forms of "to be"—whereas "es gibt" contains a grammatical form of the verb "geben" ("to give") rather than of "sein" ("to be").Consul wrote: ↑September 5th, 2022, 12:58 pmIf the expression "there is/are" is regarded as "existentially loaded" and thus as being equivalent to the existential quantifier, such that using it entails an ontological commitment to what is said to be there, then the sentence "There are things (objects of thought) which don't exist" is doubtless self-contradictory. But it is doubtful that the expression "there is/are" cannot be consistently regarded as "existentially unloaded" and thus as being ontologically neutral and non-committing, such that "There are nonexistent objects (of thought)" is not synonymous with the obvious contradiction "There exist objects (of thought) which don't exist" or "Objects (of thought) exist which don't exist".
Here's a famous statement by Alexius Meinong:
"Wer paradoxe Ausdrucksweise liebt, könnte also ganz wohl sagen: es gibt Gegenstände, von denen gilt, dass es dergleichen Gegenstände nicht gibt."
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"Who loves paradoxical ways of expression could very well say: there are objects of which it is true that there are no such objects."
[© my translation from German]
(Meinong, Alexius. Über Gegenstandstheorie [On Object Theory]. In Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie, edited by Alexius Meinong, 1-50. Leipzig: Barth, 1904. p. 9)
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Re: Assigning number values to none existent things
GE!GE Morton wrote: ↑September 2nd, 2022, 3:23 pmEr, no. Just you. "My" theory is not mine, but that of virtually everyone working in this field.3017Metaphysician wrote: ↑September 2nd, 2022, 1:23 pm
WOW. You said neuron's cause feeling, and I'm guessing action too. If you don't mind me saying, your theory is very very strange GE. Most of us are scratching our heads, but that's ok.
No, they are not. They are only analogous, with respect to the question of whether the cause of an effect must have the properties of the effect. And, of course, neurons are not conscious --- that is the category mistake you refuse to correct.1. In your foregoing analogy, is lighting, water, and other particles equivalent to 'conscious' neuron's?
Same category mistake. Neurons, not being sentient creatures, don't "advise" anyone nor solicit or heed advice.2. If all neuron's cause human feeling, are those material neuron's waiting for us to somehow advise them we need to be angry over something?
Same category mistake. Not being conscious entities neurons don't "feel" anything. They are merely electro-biochemical transceivers, which respond to certain stimuli and stimulate other neurons.3. If neuron's are the exclusive cause to human anger, can they cause us to feel angry when they feel like it?
Neurons generate your feelings of anger, and all other feelings you may experience. Not sure what you mean by "primacy," but in the sense that causes have "primacy" over effects, yes, they have primacy.4. Do neuron's have primacy over making me angry, or do we have primacy over them?
"We" don't communicate with neurons. Same category mistake.5. If you believe neuron's have primacy, does that mean we somehow have to communicate with them to advise we need to be angry?
Yes, men and women are material objects. So are all other animals. Are you questioning that? As for how they ought to be treated, whether or not they're material objects has no bearing on that; that depends on the kinds of material objects they are.6. If you believe neuron's are material objects (which they are) like your lightening, water, etc.,, do you also consider both men and women material objects, and should they be treated as such?
Easily --- the neurons causing your actions are YOUR neurons. That makes you responsible for the feelings and actions they generate.7. If you believe neuron's cause all human action and conduct, how do we take responsibility for that action and conduct?
Oh, I have answered that silly question several times. No, they are not. Nor do they need to be in order to produce sentience in an organism, any more than photons need to be beautiful in order to assemble into a beautiful scene.8. Are all neuron's sentient in-themselves? (I'm not sure you ever gave us a straight answer on that).
Until you grasp and correct that category mistake you'll persist with these silly questions. They're not worth any more of my time.
WOW. Not sure where to begin. You're all over the place GE!?! With respect to epistemology, it's as if you have no philosophical training at all. I mean, please don't take this the wrong way, but defaulting to your 'category errors' only seems to weaken your arguments, not strengthen them (if that's what you're intending). In other words, there's been ample opportunity to correct them, which you haven't been able to do yet. Even relegating your argument's to simple logic hasn't really worked either. Is logic not relevant to your theory?
Perhaps there is something metaphysical or transcendental to your theory? You know, perhaps something beyond human reason. Or maybe some understanding of existing properties that lie outside the usual categories of rational human thought. And that's ok, even science hasn't arrived at an ultimate theory of everything yet.
Alternatively, your responses are like someone claiming, although GE has claimed that the moon is not made of spare ribs, GE has not proven that its core cannot be filled with them; therefore, the moon’s core is filled with spare ribs. Your material theory of consciousness is at best, logically incoherent. With respect to the OP, are numbers material things?
Unfortunately, you keep making those so-called category mistakes, appeals to ignorance, along with other false dichotomies, so it's kind of hard to read your tea leaves. Are you familiar with the usual or typical properties of existing things? (You made another category error in your 'non-existents' comment about numbers/the number 0.) Maybe the glaring mistake worth mentioning goes back to the distinctions between quality v. quantity in your epistemology/metaphysics, not sure.
Specifically, you don't seem to be able to defend the theory very well (the theory that you're now obviating ownership) because when asked pointed questions about those distinctions, you either equivocate, or keep saying that it's not your theory (or something t that effect). It's as if you're trying to escape supporting it, for some reason? Are you committed to that theory, or does it just 'sound good' to you? And if it's not your own theory GE, have you thought about providing your own interpretations to that theory?
I think I'll do another thread in the Metaphysics/Epistemology section, and then perhaps you can provide some cogent or even logical arguments in there, unless of course you think that logic doesn't apply? Anyway, we'll have some fun. I'll jokingly refer to it as the 'theory' behind GE's angry neuron's, otherwise known as GE's material argument of exclusivity
I got to tell you, that silly theory of yours keep reminding me of the angry Hulk character
― Albert Einstein
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Re: Assigning number values to none existent things
Halc!Halc wrote: ↑September 2nd, 2022, 4:00 pmFine for the realist, but the latter assertion is not made by the relativist.
Admittedly, it is difficult to suggest that the sum of 3 and 5 being 8 is merely a relative truth. But the standard duration of a Hogwarts education being 7 is definitely relative only to the Hogwarts I know, and not to a different one envisioned by say a different author. The electron actually going through the left slit likely isn’t even a relative truth/falsity if it isn’t thus measured.
Hard to parse all that, but I’m not suggesting its truth is relative to a culture or belief system, or for that matter, to the utter absence of entities with culture or beliefs.if you assert its relative truth, you "can avoid the standard charge of self-refutation by accepting that relativism cannot be proven true in any non-relative sense—viz., that relativism itself as a philosophical position is at best true only relative to a cultural or historical context and therefore could be false in other frameworks or cultures.
Hard to argue for any position then. The stance is more of what’s left after more classic stances fail. The realists for instance have trouble explaining the reality of whatever it is they designate to be real. This includes even say idealism, which is a realist-of-mind sort of position.But such an admission will undermine the relativist’s attempt to convince others of her position, for the very act of argumentation, as it is commonly understood, is an attempt to convince those who disagree with us of the falsehood of their position.
I’m kind of saying there are no numbers ‘there’.3017Metaphysician wrote: ↑September 2nd, 2022, 1:37 pm No sarcasm here. I suppose to the first part of the question, you're saying that numbers themselves have no meaning. Is that pretty much what you are saying?
I know of no alternative. The BBT isn’t one theory, but a general label assigned to the idea that since all distant things appear to be moving away, it was all closer together in the past.And in the second part of that question, I'm guessing you are hopeful that they would reach the "goal line" as you say, in that you feel certain the BB theory is the most accurate theory?
Sure there are cyclic models (pretty much falsified), a big bounce model which is just a different framing of the same BBT theory suggesting no useful falsification tests. BBT doesn’t attempt to explain the origin of our spacetime, only its subsequent evolution. There are people working on models of what might be on the other side of that singularity, but that’s all beyond the label of BBT.
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I’m barely able to keep up with those interacting with me, and have only touched on some of the conversations about say neurons and such.
Thank you again for your replies (and thank you for your reply in the Time thread... .) Two quick points that summarize those two questions of mine.
1. Some physicists argue that the 'Hawking equation's' and other mathematical laws of the universe are transcendent in that they describe the initial conditions prior to the BB. Human invention or transcendental? Of course, the meta-physical laws themselves provide for a 'sense' of a some-thing being transcendent. And irrational numbers are said to be transcendent. Thoughts?
2. You don't seem necessarily married to the BB. Is Multiverse a plausible theory in your view? If something exists, everything exists.
― Albert Einstein
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Re: Assigning number values to none existent things
The conditions described are outside our spacetime. Calling it 'prior' implies an arrow of time which probably isn't meaningful. This transcendental realm most likely is responsible for untold quantities of universe will different laws, which for the most part explains the tuning of ours. Without all those dice rolls, we'd be entirely too improbable.3017Metaphysician wrote: ↑September 8th, 2022, 8:10 am 1. Some physicists argue that the 'Hawking equation's' and other mathematical laws of the universe are transcendent in that they describe the initial conditions prior to the BB.
No idea what you mean by that. How is √2 more 'trancendent' than 7/5?And irrational numbers are said to be transcendent.
BB neither asserts nor precludes a multiverse. I actually can't think of a mainstream multiverse theory that denies the big bang.You don't seem necessarily married to the BB. Is Multiverse a plausible theory in your view?
What kind of multiverse are we talking here? Distant places (beyond visible universe)? Other spacetimes with different values/constants? MWI?
Even self-contradictory things? I mean, I can make a square circle, but some things just don't work.If something exists, everything exists.
I've been trying not not to push my personal views in your topics, but if you must know, I don't find the phrase 'X exists' to be meaningful as worded.
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Re: Assigning number values to none existent things
It's okay. Like music composition, intuition and imaginative leaps are often times the foundation of theoretical physics. As such, they work those ideas backwards to make it fit into an established axiom.Halc wrote: ↑September 8th, 2022, 12:44 pmThe conditions described are outside our spacetime. Calling it 'prior' implies an arrow of time which probably isn't meaningful. This transcendental realm most likely is responsible for untold quantities of universe will different laws, which for the most part explains the tuning of ours. Without all those dice rolls, we'd be entirely too improbable.3017Metaphysician wrote: ↑September 8th, 2022, 8:10 am 1. Some physicists argue that the 'Hawking equation's' and other mathematical laws of the universe are transcendent in that they describe the initial conditions prior to the BB.
Causation laws either posit infinite regress or some logically necessary thing-in-itself that caused the theoretical BB. And whether it's Multiverse or some other steady state theory, string theory, ToE, we can't escape the logic associated with causation. Hence the proposition: all events must have a cause.
No idea what you mean by that. How is √2 more 'trancendent' than 7/5?And irrational numbers are said to be transcendent.
Many physicist view the ordered laws of the universe as being transcendent, particular since they describe the initial conditions prior to the BB. Of course, the question becomes do those laws exist independently, or are they a human invention, or both. Either way, we can't escape the metaphysic's (abstract nature) of numbers. Unless of course, you think that one can confirm their existence (the nature of their existence) by our senses.
BB neither asserts nor precludes a multiverse. I actually can't think of a mainstream multiverse theory that denies the big bang.You don't seem necessarily married to the BB. Is Multiverse a plausible theory in your view?
What kind of multiverse are we talking here? Distant places (beyond visible universe)? Other spacetimes with different values/constants? MWI?
Steady state theory. A sense of eternity.
Even self-contradictory things? I mean, I can make a square circle, but some things just don't work.If something exists, everything exists.
Yes even contradictory things exist. A simple example from logic is three fold:
1. There exists at least one true proposition. (Logical necessity.)
2. This statement is false. (Propositions/contradictions from self-reference.)
3. Socrates: What Plato is about to say is false. Plato: Socrates has just spoken truly.
Or in phenomenology/logic:
1. I was driving and not driving my car (driving while daydreaming). (Conscious/subconscious cognition which is 'logically impossible' to describe.)
2. Apperceptions of ideas themselves, which includes logic/emotion as being logically impossible binary determinations.
3. The apperceptions/feelings of Time itself (Relativity, Block Universe, and so on).
There's more, but that's enough for now!
I've been trying not not to push my personal views in your topics, but if you must know, I don't find the phrase 'X exists' to be meaningful as worded.
― Albert Einstein
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Re: Assigning number values to none existent things
Such laws have never been demonstrated, and are demonstrably false. Quantum mechanics has effects without cause, so that’s an example of uncaused occurrences. Another example is the abrupt end of time in a black hole, which, given the symmetry of time, also allows the abrupt beginning of time in the same way. None of these things violate the laws of the universe, but they do violate this causation ‘law’ you quoted above.3017Metaphysician wrote: ↑September 9th, 2022, 10:40 am Causation laws either posit infinite regress or some logically necessary thing-in-itself that caused the theoretical BB.
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Hence the proposition: all events must have a cause.
First-cause is only a problem for realism: How to explain the reality of whatever it is you consider real. Under presentism for instance, the universe is not there, and then later on it is. That’s a serious issue.
I’ve seen a paper that managed to compete with Einstein’s relativity theory (a century too late), denying both premises of special relativity. It is esssentially a generalization of LET, something nobody ever published in the 20th century. It gets around the big bang problem and the black hole problem by denying both, replacing them with a big bounce and a sort of egg-shell model near the nonexistent ‘space’ within.
No idea what you mean by that. How is √2 more 'trancendent' than 7/5?[/quote]Poorly worded on my part. √2 is irrational but not transcendent since it is the solution to x² = 2.Halc wrote:And irrational numbers are said to be transcendent.
Steady-state theory is a denial of entropy progression. It says that the universe looks more or less the same for all of time. It makes all sorts of predictions that don’t match empirical evidence.Steady state theory. A sense of eternity.
This isn’t a multiverse view, and my question was what sort of multiverse you were referencing. There’s a bunch of different kinds.
Even self-contradictory things? I mean, I can make a square circle, but some things just don't work.If something exists, everything exists.
There’s no contradiction with the existence of any of those statements. The contradiction is only in the assignment of a truth value to them. I was looking for an example of something the existence of which is a contradiction.Yes even contradictory things exist. A simple example from logic is three fold:
1. There exists at least one true proposition. (Logical necessity.)
2. This statement is false. (Propositions/contradictions from self-reference.)
3. Socrates: What Plato is about to say is false. Plato: Socrates has just spoken truly.
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Re: Assigning number values to none existent things
Well, that is an interesting distinction, but surely your metaphysics must deal with non-physical existents ("semantically" speaking) somehow. Are you suggesting we coin a different term than "exists" for the latter (e.g., thoughts, ideas, memories, etc.)? What would be the advantage of doing so, compared with simply understanding "exists" as applying to the 3 conceptually distinguishable realms of phenomena I mentioned, with different implications for each realm?Consul wrote: ↑September 5th, 2022, 12:58 pm
I am a physicalist, and physicalists certainly do claim that all existents are physical (or reducible to physical ones); but this metaphysical claim is different from and doesn't entail the semantic claim that "existence" is synonymous with "physical existence". If it were, then physicalism would be a necessary analytic truth per definitionem, which it surely isn't.
I've said before that I think semantics takes priority over metaphysics, that the entire purpose of the latter is to explain experience and communicate about it. A metaphysics that denies the existence of the very experience it purports to explain would seem to be self-mooting and self-refuting.
Again, doesn't it exist as a thought/imagination whether or not it exists as an external, physical entity? Sorry, but your claim there entails that unexpressed thoughts and imaginary entities don't exist.No, what I wrote doesn't entail that! An object of thought/imagination can but needn't exist.
Aha! If those don't exist, of what are we speaking? A unicorn, say, must be something, not a nothing (we can't say anything about nothings!) Doesn't being something entail existing, in some sense?Mere objects of thought/imagination do not exist.
I see no difference between "a way of being" and "a way (or mode, or category) of existing. Saying a thought is not a "way of being" is saying nothing more than that it does not exist. Which would, of course, be absurd.That is, if something is nothing but/more than/over and above an object of thought/imagination, it doesn't exist. And, again, merely being an object of thought/imagination isn't a kind or way of being.
It is fair enough to distinguish ens realis from ens rationis. That is equivalent to my distinction between experiential phenomena and physical entities (though I consider the latter to be but a category of conceptual constructs). But making that distinction doesn't purge the latter from existence, as you seem to think. They are still "beings" (per your own terms).Medieval philosophers distinguish between an ens realis (real entity) and an ens rationis (literally, entity of reason), the latter of which is "another term for an intentional object or object of thought, as opposed to self-subsistent or independent objects" (Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy). A mere ens rationis is said by them to have esse intentionale (intentional being) or esse intra mentem (intramental being) rather than esse reale (real being) or esse extra mentem (extramental being).
My point is that it is a basic ontological mistake to regard mere entia rationis or objects of thoughts as a sort of entities or existents, and to ascribe a form of being or existence to them, viz. intentional or intramental being or existence. The only thing that has real intramental being in the case of a mere, i.e. fictional or imaginary, object of thought is the thought of it.
Now you're contradicting yourself! Those things now exist after all? Of course the idea of a thing is not the thing, but surely the idea exists, does it not?Mental ideas (concepts) or images of nonexistent things such as those entertained in dreams are certainly existent things, but an idea (concept) or image of a thing is not the thing but something different from it.
Are we now in agreement?
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Re: Assigning number values to none existent things
"All events must have a cause" is a "working hypothesis." It is the hypothesis upon which explanation depends, and (according to Kant) a built-in "category" of thought we cannot put aside. We can question it, but must always come back to it when we seek to understand and explain anything.Halc wrote: ↑September 9th, 2022, 12:03 pmSuch laws have never been demonstrated, and are demonstrably false.3017Metaphysician wrote: ↑September 9th, 2022, 10:40 am Causation laws either posit infinite regress or some logically necessary thing-in-itself that caused the theoretical BB.
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Hence the proposition: all events must have a cause.
It is not "demonstrably false." Nor is it demonstrably true. We can neither prove that every event and existent had a cause, nor prove that any given event or entity had no cause. Such proofs would require that we be omniscient, which we aren't.
Nope. Having no known cause is not the same as having no cause. Some effects may have no cause apparent or deducible within the framework of QM, but claiming they have NO cause is fallacious, a "hasty generalization."Quantum mechanics has effects without cause, so that’s an example of uncaused occurrences.
2023/2024 Philosophy Books of the Month
Mark Victor Hansen, Relentless: Wisdom Behind the Incomparable Chicken Soup for the Soul
by Mitzi Perdue
February 2023
Rediscovering the Wisdom of Human Nature: How Civilization Destroys Happiness
by Chet Shupe
March 2023